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18 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 2009–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Janowski v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervisiongreen2 sentences2024See ORS 163.105(3) (1993); see also Janowski/Fleming v. Board of Parole, 349 Or 432, 453 , 245 P3d 1270 (2010) (concluding that the legislature intended that the board, after making the requisite deter- mination following a murder-review hearing, set a release date in accordance with the parole matrix in place at the time of the offense). 2024See ORS 163.105(3) (1993); see also Janowski/Fleming v. Board of Parole, 349 Or 432, 453 , 245 P3d 1270 (2010) (concluding that the legislature intended that the board, after making the requisite deter- mination following a murder-review hearing, set a release date in accordance with the parole matrix in place at the time of the offense). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Linkgreen2 sentences2020Finally, as in Link, “the possibility of a murder review hearing by the parole board * * * years in the future is not a constitutionally adequate substitute” for the consideration of youth at the time of sentencing. 297 Or App at 158 . 2020See Hardegger v. Amsberry, 305 Or App 726, 728 , 473 P3d 576 (2020) (concluding that Link applies retroactively); Link, 297 Or App at 154-56 (concluding that the murder review hearing, in its current form, cannot cure a Miller violation). 292 Gillette v. Cain The Court determined that “a lifetime in prison is a dispro- portionate sentence for all but the rarest of children, those whose crimes reflect ‘irreparable corruption.’ ” Id. at 479. | 1 | 2 |
Wille v. Board of Parole & Post-Prision Supervisiongreen2 sentences2022See also Wille v. Board of Parole, 287 Or App 709, 718-19 , 404 P3d 1042 (2017) (concluding that when the petitioner in that case “received the murder review hearing that he contends he should have received earlier” the issue was moot because he received the only relief to which he was entitled). 2022See also Wille v. Board of Parole, 287 Or App 709, 718-19 , 404 P3d 1042 (2017) (concluding that when the petitioner in that case “received the murder review hearing that he contends he should have received earlier” the issue was moot because he received the only relief to which he was entitled). | 1 | 1 |
Montgomery v. Louisianagreen1 sentence2021In a dissenting opinion, Judge Tookey wrote that Miller and Montgomery apply to a sentence of “life without parole under a mandatory sentencing scheme that precludes Cite as 367 Or 625 (2021) 653 the defendant from ‘present[ing] mitigation evidence to justify a less severe sentence.’ ” Id. at 167 (Tookey, J., dis- senting) (quoting Montgomery, 577 US at 194 (brackets in Link IV)). | 1 | 1 |
Hardegger v. Amsberrygreen2 sentences2020See Hardegger v. Amsberry, 305 Or App 726, 728 , 473 P3d 576 (2020) (concluding that Link applies retroactively); Link, 297 Or App at 154-56 (concluding that the murder review hearing, in its current form, cannot cure a Miller violation). 292 Gillette v. Cain The Court determined that “a lifetime in prison is a dispro- portionate sentence for all but the rarest of children, those whose crimes reflect ‘irreparable corruption.’ ” Id. at 479. 2020See Hardegger v. Amsberry, 305 Or App 726, 728 , 473 P3d 576 (2020) (concluding that Link applies retroactively); Link, 297 Or App at 154-56 (concluding that the murder review hearing, in its current form, cannot cure a Miller violation). 292 Gillette v. Cain The Court determined that “a lifetime in prison is a dispro- portionate sentence for all but the rarest of children, those whose crimes reflect ‘irreparable corruption.’ ” Id. at 479. | 1 | 1 |
Atkinson v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervisiongreen2 sentences2017See Atkinson v. Board of Parole, 280 Or App 410, 426 , 382 P3d 567 (2016), rev den, 360 Or 851 (2017) (concluding that, even if the board erred in setting the petitioner’s parole-release date too far in the future, his challenge was moot because “petitioner already ha[d] received the only relief to which he would be entitled if his view were to prevail on judicial review”). 2017See Atkinson v. Board of Parole, 280 Or App 410, 426 , 382 P3d 567 (2016), rev den, 360 Or 851 (2017) (concluding that, even if the board erred in setting the petitioner’s parole-release date too far in the future, his challenge was moot because “petitioner already ha[d] received the only relief to which he would be entitled if his view were to prevail on judicial review”). | 1 | 1 |
Corgain v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervisiongreen1 sentence2016Corgain, 213 Or App at 421 (“[T]he legislature intended the board to apply ORS 144.125 (1981) in making its determination as to whether an inmate should be released from an aggravated murder sentence and begin serving a consecutive sentence.”). | 1 | 1 |
Atkinson v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervisiongreen2 sentences2015Relying on that passage in Cooke, we concluded in Smith that “the ability to subpoena witnesses is not a requirement for a constitutionally adequate parole consideration hearing under ORS 144.228,” which is a statute that provides for periodic parole review for “dangerous offenders.” Smith, 268 Or App at 469 ; see also Atkinson v. Board of Parole, 341 Or 382 , 390 n 9, 143 P3d 538 (2006) (“Even assuming that some due process requirements were applicable to the board [for a murder-review hearing under ORS 163.105 (1983)], the United States Supreme Court has held that parole release hearing proc 2015Relying on that passage in Cooke, we concluded in Smith that “the ability to subpoena witnesses is not a requirement for a constitutionally adequate parole consideration hearing under ORS 144.228,” which is a statute that provides for periodic parole review for “dangerous offenders.” Smith, 268 Or App at 469 ; see also Atkinson v. Board of Parole, 341 Or 382 , 390 n 9, 143 P3d 538 (2006) (“Even assuming that some due process requirements were applicable to the board [for a murder-review hearing under ORS 163.105 (1983)], the United States Supreme Court has held that parole release hearing proc | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Engweiler v. Powersgreen2 sentences2010Accord Engweiler II, 232 Or App at 234 n 6 (expressing “no opinion as to the proper interpretation of ORS 163.105(2) (1989) in regard to the timing of the murder review hearing that, we have concluded, applies to relator”); id. at 229 (noting that “to the extent that [the requirement in ORS 163.105(2) (1989) that an offender wait 20 years before first petitioning for a review hearing] is superfluous in regard to juvenile aggravated murderers, we assume that the board will apply appropriate criteria in determining the proper timing of rehabilitation hearings for those offenders”). 2010Accord Engweiler II, 232 Or App at 234 n 6 (expressing “no opinion as to the proper interpretation of ORS 163.105(2) (1989) in regard to the timing of the murder review hearing that, we have concluded, applies to relator”); id. at 229 (noting that “to the extent that [the requirement in ORS 163.105(2) (1989) that an offender wait 20 years before first petitioning for a review hearing] is superfluous in regard to juvenile aggravated murderers, we assume that the board will apply appropriate criteria in determining the proper timing of rehabilitation hearings for those offenders”). | 1 | 1 |
Ramirez v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Alexander v. Board of Parole, 205 Or App 443 , 134 P3d 1055 , rev den, 341 Or 449 (2006) (applying substantive criteria for parole release provided in the version of the statute in effect at the time of the petitioner’s crime; applying procedural requirements in effect at the time of the hearing). | 1 | 1 |
Alexander v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervisiongreen2 sentences2009See Alexander v. Board of Parole, 205 Or App 443 , 134 P3d 1055 , rev den, 341 Or 449 (2006) (applying substantive criteria for parole release provided in the version of the statute in effect at the time of the petitioner’s crime; applying procedural requirements in effect at the time of the hearing). 2009See Alexander v. Board of Parole, 205 Or App 443 , 134 P3d 1055 , rev den, 341 Or 449 (2006) (applying substantive criteria for parole release provided in the version of the statute in effect at the time of the petitioner’s crime; applying procedural requirements in effect at the time of the hearing). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Justice Resource Center v. Board of Parole
green
1 sentence2025Cite as 338 Or App 509 (2025) 521 And to the extent that the Parole Board argues that its Chair’s comments were describing the impact of SB 1027 on the “exit interview” that ORS 144.125 permits—rather than the murder review hearing under ORS 163.105—it is important to recognize that “actual rehabilitation” does not apply in that context either. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Moret v. Board of Parole
neutral
1 sentence2023Nonprecedential Memo Op: 325 Or App 421 (2023) 423 Finally, petitioner argues in the alternative that the board should have treated his request for a murder review hearing as a request for a “personal interview” hearing. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Graham v. Florida
green
2 sentences2021Moreover, according to defendant, the murder-review hearing is not a meaning- ful opportunity for release because the “default is for the board to deny relief unless the juvenile offender has satis- fied the listed criteria.” Defendant accurately describes the mechanics of the statutory scheme, but his argument fails to show that the scheme does not provide a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.” That phrase has its origins in Graham, which, as discussed above, held that life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders is cruel and unusual punishment. 560 US at 82 . 2021Moreover, according to defendant, the murder-review hearing is not a meaning- ful opportunity for release because the “default is for the board to deny relief unless the juvenile offender has satis- fied the listed criteria.” Defendant accurately describes the mechanics of the statutory scheme, but his argument fails to show that the scheme does not provide a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.” That phrase has its origins in Graham, which, as discussed above, held that life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders is cruel and unusual punishment. 560 US at 82 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Link
green
2 sentences2021Cite as 367 Or 625 (2021) 629 Thus, in 2001, a juvenile who committed aggravated murder at the age of 15, 16, or 17 years old would automatically be tried in adult criminal court but, unlike an adult, could be sentenced only to “life imprisonment without the possibil- ity of release or parole” or “life imprisonment.” A defendant who received the latter sentence would have to serve at least 30 years before being entitled to a murder-review hearing at which the board would determine whether the sentence should be converted to life with the possibility of parole. 2021In a dissenting opinion, Judge Tookey wrote that Miller and Montgomery apply to a sentence of “life without parole under a mandatory sentencing scheme that precludes Cite as 367 Or 625 (2021) 653 the defendant from ‘present[ing] mitigation evidence to justify a less severe sentence.’ ” Id. at 167 (Tookey, J., dis- senting) (quoting Montgomery, 577 US at 194 (brackets in Link IV)). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
King v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision
green
2 sentences2021In the first case, King v. Board of Parole, 283 Or App 689 , 389 P3d 1171 (2017) (King I), petitioner sought review of a final order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision from a murder-review hearing, arguing that the board’s order lacked substantial evidence and substantial reason—only the former of which the court addressed. 2021In the first case, King v. Board of Parole, 283 Or App 689 , 389 P3d 1171 (2017) (King I), petitioner sought review of a final order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision from a murder-review hearing, arguing that the board’s order lacked substantial evidence and substantial reason—only the former of which the court addressed. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Smith v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision
green
1 sentence2015Relying on that passage in Cooke, we concluded in Smith that “the ability to subpoena witnesses is not a requirement for a constitutionally adequate parole consideration hearing under ORS 144.228,” which is a statute that provides for periodic parole review for “dangerous offenders.” Smith, 268 Or App at 469 ; see also Atkinson v. Board of Parole, 341 Or 382 , 390 n 9, 143 P3d 538 (2006) (“Even assuming that some due process requirements were applicable to the board [for a murder-review hearing under ORS 163.105 (1983)], the United States Supreme Court has held that parole release hearing proc | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Maney v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision
neutral
2 sentences2015Relying on that passage in Cooke, we concluded in Smith that “the ability to subpoena witnesses is not a requirement for a constitutionally adequate parole consideration hearing under ORS 144.228,” which is a statute that provides for periodic parole review for “dangerous offenders.” Smith, 268 Or App at 469 ; see also Atkinson v. Board of Parole, 341 Or 382 , 390 n 9, 143 P3d 538 (2006) (“Even assuming that some due process requirements were applicable to the board [for a murder-review hearing under ORS 163.105 (1983)], the United States Supreme Court has held that parole release hearing proc 2015Relying on that passage in Cooke, we concluded in Smith that “the ability to subpoena witnesses is not a requirement for a constitutionally adequate parole consideration hearing under ORS 144.228,” which is a statute that provides for periodic parole review for “dangerous offenders.” Smith, 268 Or App at 469 ; see also Atkinson v. Board of Parole, 341 Or 382 , 390 n 9, 143 P3d 538 (2006) (“Even assuming that some due process requirements were applicable to the board [for a murder-review hearing under ORS 163.105 (1983)], the United States Supreme Court has held that parole release hearing proc | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Walton
green
2 sentences2014State v. Walton, 134 Or App 66 , 894 P2d 1212 , rev den, 321 Or 429 (1995). 1 In 2007, petitioner petitioned the board for a murder review hearing pursuant to ORS 163.105(2) (1985). 2014State v. Walton, 134 Or App 66 , 894 P2d 1212 , rev den, 321 Or 429 (1995). 1 In 2007, petitioner petitioned the board for a murder review hearing pursuant to ORS 163.105(2) (1985). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2014We note that, under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 US___,___, 132 S Ct 2455, 2469 , 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), “the Eighth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of the parole for juvenile offenders.” (Emphasis added.) According to the court, “a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing” such a penalty on juveniles. 2014We note that, under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 US___,___, 132 S Ct 2455, 2469 , 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), “the Eighth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of the parole for juvenile offenders.” (Emphasis added.) According to the court, “a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing” such a penalty on juveniles. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Norris v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision
green
2 sentences2014More particularly, in Severy/Wilson , the Supreme Court reasoned that a rehabilitation finding made at a murder review hearing is applicable to both sentences (abrogating its earlier decision in Norris v. Board of Parole, 331 Or 194 , 13 P3d 104 (2000)). 2014More particularly, in Severy/Wilson , the Supreme Court reasoned that a rehabilitation finding made at a murder review hearing is applicable to both sentences (abrogating its earlier decision in Norris v. Board of Parole, 331 Or 194 , 13 P3d 104 (2000)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Sifuentez-Ruiz v. Belleque
green
1 sentence2012Id. at 61 n 1. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Taylor v. Board of Parole
green
1 sentence2009The flaw in petitioner’s argument is this: In Taylor v. Board of Parole, 200 Or App 514, 521 , 115 P3d 256 , rev den, 339 Or 475 (2005), we held that the board may not, by “protracted inaction,” preclude judicial review of its orders. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Taylor v. Board of Parole
green
1 sentence2009The flaw in petitioner’s argument is this: In Taylor v. Board of Parole, 200 Or App 514, 521 , 115 P3d 256 , rev den, 339 Or 475 (2005), we held that the board may not, by “protracted inaction,” preclude judicial review of its orders. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.