18 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1871–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kraft v. Langfordgreen2 sentences1987While the Supreme Court stated in Kraft v. Langford, 565 S.W.2d 223 (Tex.1978), that the statute is a codification of the civil law rule, and that land owners who derive their titles from Spanish or Mexican land grants are governed by the civil law rule, independent of *794 the statute, the Blomdahls submitted only their statutory cause of action to the jury. 1987While the Supreme Court stated in Kraft v. Langford, 565 S.W.2d 223 (Tex.1978), that the statute is a codification of the civil law rule, and that land owners who derive their titles from Spanish or Mexican land grants are governed by the civil law rule, independent of the statute, the Blomdahls submitted only their statutory cause of action to the jury. | 2 | 4 |
Manry v. Robisongreen2 sentences2020Id. at 447 (citations omitted) (“Subsequent to the adoption of the common law, we have ignored its rule that grants on streams above tidewater carry title to the thread of the stream, and have continued to apply the civil-law rule, of which the [Navigable Stream Statute] of 1837 is an adaptation, to the effect that the beds of streams there defined are the property of the State.”). 2020Id. at 447 (citations omitted) (“Subsequent to the adoption of the common law, we have ignored its rule that grants on streams above tidewater carry title to the thread of the stream, and have continued to apply the civil-law rule, of which the [Navigable Stream Statute] of 1837 is an adaptation, to the effect that the beds of streams there defined are the property of the State.”). | 1 | 1 |
Zurich-American Insurance v. Audiovox Corp.green2 sentences2008Co. v. Audiovox Corp., 294 A.D.2d 194 , 741 N.Y.S.2d 692, 692 (N.Y.App.Div.2002) (concluding, in a three-sentence opinion, that the "actions seek only economic damages measured by the cost of headphones that allegedly would block the allegedly dangerous radiation emitted by cell phones, and, while alleging the risk of physical harm, specifically disclaim seeking recovery for anything but the cost of the headphones"). [15] Redhibition is a civil law claim defined as "[t]he voidance of a sale as the result of an action brought on account of some defect in a thing sold, on grounds that the defect 2008Co. v. Audiovox Corp., 294 A.D.2d 194 , 741 N.Y.S.2d 692, 692 (N.Y.App.Div.2002) (concluding, in a three-sentence opinion, that the "actions seek only economic damages measured by the cost of headphones that allegedly would block the allegedly dangerous radiation emitted by cell phones, and, while alleging the risk of physical harm, specifically disclaim seeking recovery for anything but the cost of the headphones"). [15] Redhibition is a civil law claim defined as "[t]he voidance of a sale as the result of an action brought on account of some defect in a thing sold, on grounds that the defect | 1 | 1 |
Meyer v. Tunksgreen1 sentence1997Tunks further points out that the degree of proof necessary to support finding a public officer guilty of the removal complaint’s allegations is the civil law standard, a preponderance of the evidence, rather than the criminal law standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tunks, 360 S.W.2d at 520 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co.
green
1 sentence1989Lorino, supra, determined the common law, but not the civil law rule, with respect to the artificial raising of submerged land, but the court did not indicate whether littoral property granted out of the sovereign prior to the 1840 date might be subject to a rule different from the common-law rule applied in that case. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Dickens v. Court of Appeals for the Second Supreme Judicial District of Texas
green
2 sentences1988Dickens v. Court of Appeals for the Second Supreme Judicial District of Texas, 727 S.W.2d at 549 . 1988Dickens v. Court of Appeals for the Second Supreme Judicial District of Texas, 727 S.W.2d at 549 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Dooley v. State
neutral
2 sentences1983In Dooley v. State, 82 Okl.Cr. 243 , 168 P.2d 651 (1946), the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma took judicial knowledge of the fact that 408 North Johnstone in the city of Bartlesville was in Washington County. 1983In Dooley v. State, 82 Okl.Cr. 243 , 168 P.2d 651 (1946), the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma took judicial knowledge of the fact that 408 North Johnstone in the city of Bartlesville was in Washington County. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Papoutsis v. Trevino
green
1 sentence1947There is no factual basis here for the application of the civil law doctrine of “putative marriage.” Papoutsis v. Trevino, Tex. Civ.App., 167 S.W.2d 777 , and authorities relating thereto are not applicable. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
State v. Grubstake Investment Ass'n
neutral
2 sentences1937Law 6, Title 28, Part 3 of the Partidas declares that “Rivers, harbors, and public highways belong to all persons in common.” It was held in Mitchell v. Bass, 26 Texas 372 , 33 Texas 259 (cited in State v. Grubstake Investment Association, 117 Texas 53, 61 , 297 S. W. 202 ), that according to the civil law rule Mexican grants made in 1831 of lands bounded by a public road passed title only as far as the edge of the road and not to the middle of the road as at common law. 1937Law 6, Title 28, Part 3 of the Partidas declares that “Rivers, harbors, and public highways belong to all persons in common.” It was held in Mitchell v. Bass, 26 Texas 372 , 33 Texas 259 (cited in State v. Grubstake Investment Association, 117 Texas 53, 61 , 297 S. W. 202 ), that according to the civil law rule Mexican grants made in 1831 of lands bounded by a public road passed title only as far as the edge of the road and not to the middle of the road as at common law. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Mitchell v. Bass
green
1 sentence1937Law 6, Title 28, Part 3 of the Partidas declares that “Rivers, harbors, and public highways belong to all persons in common.” It was held in Mitchell v. Bass, 26 Texas 372 , 33 Texas 259 (cited in State v. Grubstake Investment Association, 117 Texas 53, 61 , 297 S. W. 202 ), that according to the civil law rule Mexican grants made in 1831 of lands bounded by a public road passed title only as far as the edge of the road and not to the middle of the road as at common law. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Mitchell v. Bass
neutral
1 sentence1937Law 6, Title 28, Part 3 of the Partidas declares that “Rivers, harbors, and public highways belong to all persons in common.” It was held in Mitchell v. Bass, 26 Texas 372 , 33 Texas 259 (cited in State v. Grubstake Investment Association, 117 Texas 53, 61 , 297 S. W. 202 ), that according to the civil law rule Mexican grants made in 1831 of lands bounded by a public road passed title only as far as the edge of the road and not to the middle of the road as at common law. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Kauffman v. Griesemer
green
1 sentence1926L. p. 1108, it is said: “A riparian proprietor may erect any work— bank, levee or dike — in order to prevent his land being overflowed by any change in the natural condition of the stream and to prevent its old course from being altered.” Again, at page 1151: “Under both the civil and the common law, water which naturally flows from higher to lower land may continue to do so without subjecting the upper owner to any liability therefor, but even in the jurisdictions where the civil law rule obtains, the servitude which the owner of the higher adjoining land has upon the lower land for the disch | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Sabine & E. T. R'y Co. v. Joachimi
neutral
1 sentence1916Kinney erroneously states, on page 3095, that Texas adopted the civil law doctrine, and carelessly cites the case of Sabine, etc., v. Joachimi, 58 Tex. 456 . | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Gulf, Col. & S. F. R'y Co. v. Helsley
neutral
1 sentence1916Stat. art. 5492), except as to embankments built by railway corporations for roadbeds, which are governed by statute (Railway v. Helsley, 62 Tex. 593 ). | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Holliman v. Rogers
green
1 sentence1899Holliman v. Rogers, 6 Texas, 91 ; Howard v. Randolph, Admr., 73 Texas, 459 . | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Howard v. Randolph
neutral
1 sentence1898This distinction is adverted to by us because it has been held by our Supreme Court that “our statute authorizing discounts and set-offs did not introduce the civil law doctrine of compensation.” Holliman v. Rogers, 6 Texas, 98 ; Howard v. Randolph, 73 Texas, 454 . | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Bright v. Boyd
green
1 sentence1881Saunders v. Wilson, 19 Tex., 194 ; id., 201 ; Bright v. Boyd, 1 Story, 478 ; 2 Story’s Eq. | 1 | 1881–1881 |
Saunders v. Wilson
neutral
2 sentences1881Saunders v. Wilson, 19 Tex., 194 ; id., 201 ; Bright v. Boyd, 1 Story, 478 ; 2 Story’s Eq. 1881Saunders v. Wilson, 19 Tex., 194 ; id., 201 ; Bright v. Boyd, 1 Story, 478 ; 2 Story’s Eq. | 1 | 1881–1881 |
Briscoe v. Bronaugh
green
1 sentence1871In Briscoe against Bronaugh, 1 Texas 326 , it ■ was held as follows: “It is a doctrine of the civil law, and of the equity jurisprudence of the United States and England, that a vendor has a lien upon the thing sold for the purchase money, without any special agreement for that purpose. “ The vendee holds in trust for the vendor until the purchase money is paid, and this trust attaches to the land or thing sold, and follows it into the hands of subsequent purchasers with notice. | 1 | 1871–1871 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.