Covell test (Washington) · Go Syfert
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Covell test in Washington

18 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2019 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
Covell v. City of Seattlegreen
wash · 1995 · cited in 9 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1997–2017
2 sentences

2008The Covell factors are the purpose of the cost: where the money raised is allocated and whether the cities pay the cost because they use the service. 127 Wn.2d at 879 . ¶39 The purpose of charging Lake Forest Park for hydrants is clearly to raise money, indicating a tax.

2008The Covell factors are the purpose of the cost: where the money raised is allocated and whether the cities pay the cost because they use the service. 127 Wn.2d at 879 . ¶39 The purpose of charging Lake Forest Park for hydrants is clearly to raise money, indicating a tax.

49
Okeson v. City of Seattlegreen
wash · 2003 · cited in 5 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2008–2017
2 sentences

2008“A city could then avoid the constitutional limitations on taxes by simply charging its citizens a ‘fire department fee’ or a ‘police fee.’ ” Okeson, 150 Wn.2d at 552 . ¶[15 As a threshold matter, the County asks this court to consider, before engaging in a Covell analysis, whether Teter v. Clark County, 104 Wn.2d 227, 228 , 704 P.2d 1171 (1985), is dispositive on the issue.

2008“A city could then avoid the constitutional limitations on taxes by simply charging its citizens a ‘fire department fee’ or a ‘police fee.’ ” Okeson, 150 Wn.2d at 552 . ¶[15 As a threshold matter, the County asks this court to consider, before engaging in a Covell analysis, whether Teter v. Clark County, 104 Wn.2d 227, 228 , 704 P.2d 1171 (1985), is dispositive on the issue.

25
Okeson v. City of Seattlegreen
wash · 2003 · cited in 4 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2008–2017
2 sentences

2008"A city could then avoid the constitutional limitations on taxes by simply charging its citizens a `fire department fee' or a `police fee.'" Okeson, 150 Wash.2d at 552 , 78 P.3d 1279 . *382 ¶ 15 As a threshold matter, the County asks this court to consider, before engaging in a Covell analysis, whether Teter v. Clark County, 104 Wash.2d 227, 228 , 704 P.2d 1171 (1985), is dispositive on the issue.

2008"A city could then avoid the constitutional limitations on taxes by simply charging its citizens a `fire department fee' or a `police fee.'" Okeson, 150 Wash.2d at 552 , 78 P.3d 1279 . *382 ¶ 15 As a threshold matter, the County asks this court to consider, before engaging in a Covell analysis, whether Teter v. Clark County, 104 Wash.2d 227, 228 , 704 P.2d 1171 (1985), is dispositive on the issue.

24
Dean v. Lehmangreen
wash · 2001 · cited in 4 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2012–2017
2 sentences

2017Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, No. 93723-1 (Gonzalez, J., concurring) whereas a "tax" generates revenue and may incidentally govern conduct, see id. at 551 (citing Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 25 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001)). 1 The majority applies Covell's three-factor test2 to determine if the City correctly labeled the Ordinance a "tax." While I agree with the dissent that the Covell test may not be an adequate test in all preemption cases, I ultimately agree with the majority that Covell is helpful and dispositive in this case involving alleged regulatory fees.

2017Generally, a "regulation" governs conduct and may incidentally generate revenue, see id. at 551-52 (citing Samis, 143 Wn.2d at 805), Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, No. 93723-1 (Gonzalez, J., concurring) whereas a "tax" generates revenue and may incidentally govern conduct, see id. at 551 (citing Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 25 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001)). 1 The majority applies Covell's three-factor test2 to determine if the City correctly labeled the Ordinance a "tax." While I agree with the dissent that the Covell test may not be an adequate test in all preemption cases, I ultimately agree wit

24
Franks & Son, Inc. v. Stategreen
wash · 1998 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012See, e.g., Franks & Son, 136 Wn.2d at 750-51 (applying Covell test to Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission charge to determine whether it was a tax or a regulatory fee); Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 27-28 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001) (applying Covell test to Washington State Department of Corrections charge to determine whether it was a tax).

2012See, e.g., Franks & Son, 136 Wash.2d at 750-51, 966 P.2d 1232 (applying Covell test to Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission charge to determine whether it was a tax or a regulatory fee); Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wash.2d 12, 27-28 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001) (applying Covell test to Washington State Department of Corrections charge to determine whether it was a tax). [4] There is one possible exception.

22
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. Stategreen
wash · 2000 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012Id. ¶63 Applying the Covell factors to this case leaves no doubt that the 1-1183 “license issuance fees” are taxes.

2012Id. ¶63 Applying the Covell factors to this case leaves no doubt that the 1-1183 “license issuance fees” are taxes.

22
Samis Land Co. v. City of Soap Lakegreen
wash · 2001 · cited in 3 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2004–2017
2 sentences

2017Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, No. 93723-1 (Gonzalez, J., concurring) whereas a "tax" generates revenue and may incidentally govern conduct, see id. at 551 (citing Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 25 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001)). 1 The majority applies Covell's three-factor test2 to determine if the City correctly labeled the Ordinance a "tax." While I agree with the dissent that the Covell test may not be an adequate test in all preemption cases, I ultimately agree with the majority that Covell is helpful and dispositive in this case involving alleged regulatory fees.

2017Generally, a "regulation" governs conduct and may incidentally generate revenue, see id. at 551-52 (citing Samis, 143 Wn.2d at 805), Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, No. 93723-1 (Gonzalez, J., concurring) whereas a "tax" generates revenue and may incidentally govern conduct, see id. at 551 (citing Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 25 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001)). 1 The majority applies Covell's three-factor test2 to determine if the City correctly labeled the Ordinance a "tax." While I agree with the dissent that the Covell test may not be an adequate test in all preemption cases, I ultimately agree wit

13
Samis Land Co. v. City of Soap Lakegreen
wash · 2001 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2004–2017
2 sentences

2017Generally, a "regulation" governs conduct and may incidentally generate revenue, see id. at 551-52 (citing Samis, 143 Wn.2d at 805), Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, No. 93723-1 (Gonzalez, J., concurring) whereas a "tax" generates revenue and may incidentally govern conduct, see id. at 551 (citing Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 25 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001)). 1 The majority applies Covell's three-factor test2 to determine if the City correctly labeled the Ordinance a "tax." While I agree with the dissent that the Covell test may not be an adequate test in all preemption cases, I ultimately agree wit

2004Samis, 143 Wash.2d at 804 n. 8, 23 P.3d 477 . [11] In Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, 105 Wash.2d 288, 299-300 , 714 P.2d 1163 (1986) (" Hillis Homes II "), a case decided before the development of the three-part Covell test, the Court found a water system connection charge to be valid as part of a plan to "`regulate and control the use [and] distribution' of water" (quoting RCW 54.16.030).

12
Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1green
wash · 1986 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004In Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, 105 Wn.2d 288, 299-300 , 714 P.2d 1163 (1986) (Hillis Homes II), a case decided before the development of the three-part Covell test, the court found a water system connection charge to be valid as part of a plan to “ ‘regulate and control the use [and] distribution’ of water” (quoting ROW 54.16.030).

2004In Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, 105 Wn.2d 288, 299-300 , 714 P.2d 1163 (1986) (Hillis Homes II), a case decided before the development of the three-part Covell test, the court found a water system connection charge to be valid as part of a plan to “ ‘regulate and control the use [and] distribution’ of water” (quoting ROW 54.16.030).

12
Lane v. City of Seattlegreen
wash · 2008 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016See Lane v. City of Seattle, 164 Wn.2d 875, 882 , 194 P.3d 977 (2008).

2016See Lane v. City of Seattle, 164 Wn.2d 875, 882 , 194 P.3d 977 (2008).

11
Lane v. City of Seattlegreen
wash · 2008 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016See Lane v. City of Seattle, 164 Wn.2d 875, 882 , 194 P.3d 977 (2008).

2016See Lane v. City of Seattle, 164 Wn.2d 875, 882 , 194 P.3d 977 (2008).

11
Cedar River Water & Sewer District v. King Countygreen
wash · 2013 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016See, e.g., Cedar River Water & Sewer Dist. v. King County, 178 Wn.2d 763, 808 , 315 P.3d 1065 (2013) (credit enhancement charge); Arborwood Idaho, LLC v. City of Kennewick, 151 Wn.2d 359, 371 , 89 P.3d 217 (2004) (ambulance charge); Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150 Wn.2d 540, 553 , 78 P.3d 1279 (2003) (streetlight charge). ¶20 This test has been useful as a tool to discover whether certain charges are actually taxes that have been disguised as fees.

2016See, e.g., Cedar River Water & Sewer Dist. v. King County, 178 Wn.2d 763, 808 , 315 P.3d 1065 (2013) (credit enhancement charge); Arborwood Idaho, LLC v. City of Kennewick, 151 Wn.2d 359, 371 , 89 P.3d 217 (2004) (ambulance charge); Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150 Wn.2d 540, 553 , 78 P.3d 1279 (2003) (streetlight charge). ¶20 This test has been useful as a tool to discover whether certain charges are actually taxes that have been disguised as fees.

11
Franks & Son, Inc. v. Stategreen
wash · 1998 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012See, e.g., Franks & Son, 136 Wash.2d at 750-51, 966 P.2d 1232 (applying Covell test to Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission charge to determine whether it was a tax or a regulatory fee); Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wash.2d 12, 27-28 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001) (applying Covell test to Washington State Department of Corrections charge to determine whether it was a tax). [4] There is one possible exception.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Teter v. Clark County green
wash · 1985
2 sentences

2008“A city could then avoid the constitutional limitations on taxes by simply charging its citizens a ‘fire department fee’ or a ‘police fee.’ ” Okeson, 150 Wn.2d at 552 . ¶[15 As a threshold matter, the County asks this court to consider, before engaging in a Covell analysis, whether Teter v. Clark County, 104 Wn.2d 227, 228 , 704 P.2d 1171 (1985), is dispositive on the issue.

2008“A city could then avoid the constitutional limitations on taxes by simply charging its citizens a ‘fire department fee’ or a ‘police fee.’ ” Okeson, 150 Wn.2d at 552 . ¶[15 As a threshold matter, the County asks this court to consider, before engaging in a Covell analysis, whether Teter v. Clark County, 104 Wn.2d 227, 228 , 704 P.2d 1171 (1985), is dispositive on the issue.

42008–2017
Dean v. Lehman green
wash · 2001
2 sentences

2017Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, No. 93723-1 (Gonzalez, J., concurring) whereas a "tax" generates revenue and may incidentally govern conduct, see id. at 551 (citing Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 25 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001)). 1 The majority applies Covell's three-factor test2 to determine if the City correctly labeled the Ordinance a "tax." While I agree with the dissent that the Covell test may not be an adequate test in all preemption cases, I ultimately agree with the majority that Covell is helpful and dispositive in this case involving alleged regulatory fees.

2017Generally, a "regulation" governs conduct and may incidentally generate revenue, see id. at 551-52 (citing Samis, 143 Wn.2d at 805), Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, No. 93723-1 (Gonzalez, J., concurring) whereas a "tax" generates revenue and may incidentally govern conduct, see id. at 551 (citing Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 25 , 18 P.3d 523 (2001)). 1 The majority applies Covell's three-factor test2 to determine if the City correctly labeled the Ordinance a "tax." While I agree with the dissent that the Covell test may not be an adequate test in all preemption cases, I ultimately agree wit

42012–2017
Arborwood Idaho, L.L.C. v. City of Kennewick green
wash · 2004
2 sentences

2016See, e.g., Cedar River Water & Sewer Dist. v. King County, 178 Wn.2d 763, 808 , 315 P.3d 1065 (2013) (credit enhancement charge); Arborwood Idaho, LLC v. City of Kennewick, 151 Wn.2d 359, 371 , 89 P.3d 217 (2004) (ambulance charge); Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150 Wn.2d 540, 553 , 78 P.3d 1279 (2003) (streetlight charge). ¶20 This test has been useful as a tool to discover whether certain charges are actually taxes that have been disguised as fees.

2008“The third factor is whether there is a direct relationship between the fee charged and the service received by those who pay the fee or between the fee charged and the burden produced by the fee payer.” Arborwood, 151 Wn.2d at 372-73 .

32008–2016
Arborwood Idaho v. City of Kennewick green
wash · 2004
2 sentences

2016See, e.g., Cedar River Water & Sewer Dist. v. King County, 178 Wn.2d 763, 808 , 315 P.3d 1065 (2013) (credit enhancement charge); Arborwood Idaho, LLC v. City of Kennewick, 151 Wn.2d 359, 371 , 89 P.3d 217 (2004) (ambulance charge); Okeson v. City of Seattle, 150 Wn.2d 540, 553 , 78 P.3d 1279 (2003) (streetlight charge). ¶20 This test has been useful as a tool to discover whether certain charges are actually taxes that have been disguised as fees.

2008"The second factor is whether the money collected must be allocated only to the authorized purpose." Arborwood, 151 Wash.2d at 372 , 89 P.3d 217 .

22008–2016
City of Snoqualmie v. King County Executive Dow Constantine green
wash · 2016
2 sentences

2019Covell, 111 Wn.2d at 879. 12 King County v. King County Water Districts et al., No. 96360-6 are too limited" and "not entirely helpful" when the issue is simply whether a charge is a tax or not, as opposed to whether the charge is either a tax or a regulatory fee. 187 Wn.2d at 299-300 .

2019Covell, 111 Wn.2d at 879. 12 King County v. King County Water Districts et al., No. 96360-6 are too limited" and "not entirely helpful" when the issue is simply whether a charge is a tax or not, as opposed to whether the charge is either a tax or a regulatory fee. 187 Wn.2d at 299-300 .

12019–2019
Branson v. Port of Seattle green
wash · 2004
2 sentences

2016As we have previously pointed out, "municipalities may charge fees that are not purely regulatory in nature." See Branson v. Port of Seattle, 152 Wn.2d 862 , 874 n.5, 101 P.3d 67 (2004) (citing Spitzer, supra, at 343-49).

2016As we have previously pointed out, "municipalities may charge fees that are not purely regulatory in nature." See Branson v. Port of Seattle, 152 Wn.2d 862 , 874 n.5, 101 P.3d 67 (2004) (citing Spitzer, supra, at 343-49).

12016–2016
Branson v. Port of Seattle green
wash · 2004
2 sentences

2016As we have previously pointed out, "municipalities may charge fees that are not purely regulatory in nature." See Branson v. Port of Seattle, 152 Wn.2d 862 , 874 n.5, 101 P.3d 67 (2004) (citing Spitzer, supra, at 343-49).

2016As we have previously pointed out, "municipalities may charge fees that are not purely regulatory in nature." See Branson v. Port of Seattle, 152 Wn.2d 862 , 874 n.5, 101 P.3d 67 (2004) (citing Spitzer, supra, at 343-49).

12016–2016
Amalgamated Transit v. State green
wash · 2000
2 sentences

2012It reflects commonly held understandings, as we held in Amalgamated Transit. 142 Wash.2d at 220-21, 226 , 11 P.3d 762 , 27 P.3d 608 .

2012It reflects commonly held understandings, as we held in Amalgamated Transit. 142 Wash.2d at 220-21, 226 , 11 P.3d 762 , 27 P.3d 608 .

12012–2012

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 35.21.710 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 35.22.280 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 35.23.440 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 57.08.005 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

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