due exception in Alabama

2009This is due to the principle of statutory construction which assumes that ‘in enacting the stat ute the legislature had full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law on the subject of the statute.’ Miller v. State, 349 So.2d 129, 131 (Ala.Cr.App.1977). “ Tf a statute is susceptible to two constructions, one of which is workable and fair and the other unworkable and unjust, the court will assume that the legislature intended that which is workable and fair.’ State v. Calumet & Hecla Consolidated Copper[ Co.], 259 Ala. 225, 233-34 , 66 So.2d 726 (1953).

2009This is due to the principle of statutory construction which assumes that ‘in enacting the stat ute the legislature had full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law on the subject of the statute.’ Miller v. State, 349 So.2d 129, 131 (Ala.Cr.App.1977). “ Tf a statute is susceptible to two constructions, one of which is workable and fair and the other unworkable and unjust, the court will assume that the legislature intended that which is workable and fair.’ State v. Calumet & Hecla Consolidated Copper[ Co.], 259 Ala. 225, 233-34 , 66 So.2d 726 (1953).

1959In the Wilson case, supra, in regard to a juror’s qualifications or disqualifications in order that such question may be reviewed on appeal, this Court said: “A juror’s disqualification may be raised by a due challenge to the venire or by an objection to striking from the list of jurors furnished the defendant and from which the jury was to be selected, using the required method of striking the name from said list of jurors.” In Draper v. State, 250 Ala. 679 , 36 So.2d 73 , this Court said: “The defendant objected to being required to strike from the venire without the presence of Woodruff.

1959In the Wilson case, supra, in regard to a juror’s qualifications or disqualifications in order that such question may be reviewed on appeal, this Court said: “A juror’s disqualification may be raised by a due challenge to the venire or by an objection to striking from the list of jurors furnished the defendant and from which the jury was to be selected, using the required method of striking the name from said list of jurors.” In Draper v. State, 250 Ala. 679 , 36 So.2d 73 , this Court said: “The defendant objected to being required to strike from the venire without the presence of Woodruff.

2015In National Security Insurance Co. v. Elliott, 276 Ala. 353 , 162 So.2d 449 (1964), our supreme court held that, upon appeal from an order granting a motion for a new trial by a successor judge who did not preside over the trial of the case, an appellate court stands in the same position as the successor judge such that it may decide the motion de novo, giving a due presumption of correctness to the factual findings of the trial judge.

2015In National Security Insurance Co. v. Elliott, 276 Ala. 353 , 162 So.2d 449 (1964), our supreme court held that, upon appeal from an order granting a motion for a new trial by a successor judge who did not preside over the trial of the case, an appellate court stands in the same position as the successor judge such that it may decide the motion de novo, giving a due presumption of correctness to the factual findings of the trial judge.

2005The Alabama Supreme Court has set forth the cumulative-error rule as follows: "that, while, under the facts of a particular case, no single error among multiple errors may be sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal under Rule 45, if the accumulated errors have `probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties,' then the cumulative effect of the errors may require reversal." Ex parte Woods, 789 So.2d 941 , 942 n. 1 (Ala.2001)(quoting Rule 45, Ala. R.App.

1983Accord, Lightsey v. Stone, supra; Walling v. Moss, supra; Sulzbacher v. Campbell , 219 Ala. 191 , 121 So. 706 (1929); Copeland v. Warren , 214 Ala. 150 , 107 So. 94 (1926).

1983Accord, Lightsey v. Stone, supra; Walling v. Moss, supra; Sulzbacher v. Campbell , 219 Ala. 191 , 121 So. 706 (1929); Copeland v. Warren , 214 Ala. 150 , 107 So. 94 (1926).

1983Accord, Lightsey v. Stone, supra; Walling v. Moss, supra; Sulzbacher v. Campbell , 219 Ala. 191 , 121 So. 706 (1929); Copeland v. Warren , 214 Ala. 150 , 107 So. 94 (1926).

1983Accord, Lightsey v. Stone, supra; Walling v. Moss, supra; Sulzbacher v. Campbell , 219 Ala. 191 , 121 So. 706 (1929); Copeland v. Warren , 214 Ala. 150 , 107 So. 94 (1926).

1962Possession of the premises is essential, Matthews v. State, 81 Ala. 66 , 1 So. 43 , and must be proved.

1943(Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350 , 21 U.S. (L.Ed.) 959; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 , 17 S.Ct. 841 , 42 U.S. (L.Ed.) 215; Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Iowa 290 , 81 N.W. 604 , 51 L.R.

1943(Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350 , 21 U.S. (L.Ed.) 959; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 , 17 S.Ct. 841 , 42 U.S. (L.Ed.) 215; Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Iowa 290 , 81 N.W. 604 , 51 L.R.

1943(Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350 , 21 U.S. (L.Ed.) 959; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 , 17 S.Ct. 841 , 42 U.S. (L.Ed.) 215; Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Iowa 290 , 81 N.W. 604 , 51 L.R.

1943(Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350 , 21 U.S. (L.Ed.) 959; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 , 17 S.Ct. 841 , 42 U.S. (L.Ed.) 215; Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Iowa 290 , 81 N.W. 604 , 51 L.R.

1940It was observed in Evans v. Evans, 200 Ala. 329 , 76 So. 95 , that such are the requirements of due process, being the fundamental conditions universally prescribed in a system of laws established and all state laws, statutory and judicially declared, regulating procedure, evidence and method of trials, which must be consistent with such requirements of the constitutions.

1940It was observed in Evans v. Evans, 200 Ala. 329 , 76 So. 95 , that such are the requirements of due process, being the fundamental conditions universally prescribed in a system of laws established and all state laws, statutory and judicially declared, regulating procedure, evidence and method of trials, which must be consistent with such requirements of the constitutions.

1938Conceding, without deciding, that a due exception was reserved to the oral instructions of the court under the case of Ex parte Cowart, 201 Ala. 55 , 77 So. 349 , we find no error in the oral instruction of the court to the jury in defining elements of damage in the case at bar.

1938Conceding, without deciding, that a due exception was reserved to the oral instructions of the court under the case of Ex parte Cowart, 201 Ala. 55 , 77 So. 349 , we find no error in the oral instruction of the court to the jury in defining elements of damage in the case at bar.

1935Bank of Eutaw v. Barnes, supra; Wittmeir v. Leonard et al., supra; Veitch et al. v. Woodward Iron Co, 200 Ala. 358 , 76 So. 124 ).

1935Bank of Eutaw v. Barnes, supra; Wittmeir v. Leonard et al., supra; Veitch et al. v. Woodward Iron Co, 200 Ala. 358 , 76 So. 124 ).

1935Co., 202 Ala. 583 , 81 So. 85, 92 ), and were sufficient to put subsequent purchasers to a due inquiry (First Nat.

1935Co., 202 Ala. 583 , 81 So. 85, 92 ), and were sufficient to put subsequent purchasers to a due inquiry (First Nat.

1934Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417 , 12 S. Ct. 239 , 35 L.

1934Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417 , 12 S. Ct. 239 , 35 L.

1931R. 1420 (116 S. C. 113, 107 S. E. 149 ), at page 1429, “The doctrine that instructions which disparage the defense of alibi are erroneous, and may be prejudicial, is illustrated by numerous cases,” the learned annotator then citing, as illustrations, the cases of Williams v. State, 47 Ala. 659 ; Spencer v. State, 50 Ala. 124 ; and Porter v. State, 55 Ala. 95 .

1931R. 1420 (116 S. C. 113, 107 S. E. 149 ), at page 1429, “The doctrine that instructions which disparage the defense of alibi are erroneous, and may be prejudicial, is illustrated by numerous cases,” the learned annotator then citing, as illustrations, the cases of Williams v. State, 47 Ala. 659 ; Spencer v. State, 50 Ala. 124 ; and Porter v. State, 55 Ala. 95 .

1931Due exception was reserved to that portion of the trial court’s oral charge, which was in the following language: “I further charge you, that you should consider the evidence of an alibi with great caution, — that the law so considers it, for the reason that it is so easily manufactured.” True, the quoted excerpt follows the language of the written, requested instruction, the giving of which was approved by the Supreme Court in Provo v. State, 55 Ala. 222 , but in the later decision and opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Pate v. State, 94 Ala. 14 , 10 So. 665 , 666, it is held by that

1931R. 1420 (116 S. C. 113, 107 S. E. 149 ), at page 1429, “The doctrine that instructions which disparage the defense of alibi are erroneous, and may be prejudicial, is illustrated by numerous cases,” the learned annotator then citing, as illustrations, the cases of Williams v. State, 47 Ala. 659 ; Spencer v. State, 50 Ala. 124 ; and Porter v. State, 55 Ala. 95 .

1931Due exception was reserved to that portion of the trial court’s oral charge, which was in the following language: “I further charge you, that you should consider the evidence of an alibi with great caution, — that the law so considers it, for the reason that it is so easily manufactured.” True, the quoted excerpt follows the language of the written, requested instruction, the giving of which was approved by the Supreme Court in Provo v. State, 55 Ala. 222 , but in the later decision and opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Pate v. State, 94 Ala. 14 , 10 So. 665 , 666, it is held by that

1931R. 1420 (116 S. C. 113, 107 S. E. 149 ), at page 1429, “The doctrine that instructions which disparage the defense of alibi are erroneous, and may be prejudicial, is illustrated by numerous cases,” the learned annotator then citing, as illustrations, the cases of Williams v. State, 47 Ala. 659 ; Spencer v. State, 50 Ala. 124 ; and Porter v. State, 55 Ala. 95 .

1930The same placed too great a burden on the defendant with reference to her plea as of “not guilty by reason of self defense,” etc. Perry v. State, 211 Ala. 458 , 100 So. 842 .

1930The same placed too great a burden on the defendant with reference to her plea as of “not guilty by reason of self defense,” etc. Perry v. State, 211 Ala. 458 , 100 So. 842 .

1930Due exception was reserved to the following portion of the trial court’s oral charge to the jury: “If it (the property in question) was not taken from the house, dut from the premises somewhere, (italics ours) in order to be grand larceny it would have to be the value of at least $25.00.” Upon reconsideration of this case, we have reached the conclusion that under the holding of our Supreme Court in the case of Driver et al. v. State, 206 Ala. 195 , 89 So. 504 , the quoted portion of the trial court’s oral charge constituted error for which the judgment of conviction should be reversed.

1930Due exception was reserved to the following portion of the trial court’s oral charge to the jury: “If it (the property in question) was not taken from the house, dut from the premises somewhere, (italics ours) in order to be grand larceny it would have to be the value of at least $25.00.” Upon reconsideration of this case, we have reached the conclusion that under the holding of our Supreme Court in the case of Driver et al. v. State, 206 Ala. 195 , 89 So. 504 , the quoted portion of the trial court’s oral charge constituted error for which the judgment of conviction should be reversed.

1917Clearly,' therefore, charge 7 was properly refused as invasive of the province of. the jury. (2) Under the w.ell-established rule in this state a wider latitude is allowed upon a cross-examination of a witness than upon a direct examination, and the extent of the same is a matter that must, of necessity, largely rest within the discretion of the trial court. —Cox v. State, 162 Ala. 66 , 50 South. 398 ; Wilson v. State, 195 Ala. 675 , 71 South. 115 .

1917Clearly,' therefore, charge 7 was properly refused as invasive of the province of. the jury. (2) Under the w.ell-established rule in this state a wider latitude is allowed upon a cross-examination of a witness than upon a direct examination, and the extent of the same is a matter that must, of necessity, largely rest within the discretion of the trial court. —Cox v. State, 162 Ala. 66 , 50 South. 398 ; Wilson v. State, 195 Ala. 675 , 71 South. 115 .

1917Clearly,' therefore, charge 7 was properly refused as invasive of the province of. the jury. (2) Under the w.ell-established rule in this state a wider latitude is allowed upon a cross-examination of a witness than upon a direct examination, and the extent of the same is a matter that must, of necessity, largely rest within the discretion of the trial court. —Cox v. State, 162 Ala. 66 , 50 South. 398 ; Wilson v. State, 195 Ala. 675 , 71 South. 115 .

1917Clearly,' therefore, charge 7 was properly refused as invasive of the province of. the jury. (2) Under the w.ell-established rule in this state a wider latitude is allowed upon a cross-examination of a witness than upon a direct examination, and the extent of the same is a matter that must, of necessity, largely rest within the discretion of the trial court. —Cox v. State, 162 Ala. 66 , 50 South. 398 ; Wilson v. State, 195 Ala. 675 , 71 South. 115 .