general saving clause in Illinois

2025However, the plain error rule “is not ‘a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.’ ” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177 (quoting People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 (1978)).

2025However, the plain error rule “is not ‘a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.’ ” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177 (quoting People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 (1978)).

2025However, the plain error rule “is not ‘a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.’ ” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177 (quoting People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 (1978)).

2024However, the plain error rule “is not ‘a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.’ ” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177 (quoting People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 (1978)).

2023The doctrine “is not a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 353 , 856 N.E.2d 349, 356 (2006).

2023The doctrine “is not a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 353 , 856 N.E.2d 349, 356 (2006).

2020App. 3d [305,] 311, 802 N.E.2d [333,] 338 [(2003)] (quoting People v. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d 281, 337 , 592 N.E.2d 1036, 1061 (1992)). ‘The plain-error doctrine is not a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court. [Citation.] Instead, it is a narrow and limited exception to the general rule of forfeiture, whose purpose is to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and reputation of the judi- cial process. [Citation.]’ (Internal quotations marks omitted.) People v. Allen

2020App. 3d [305,] 311, 802 N.E.2d [333,] 338 [(2003)] (quoting People v. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d 281, 337 , 592 N.E.2d 1036, 1061 (1992)). ‘The plain-error doctrine is not a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court. [Citation.] Instead, it is a narrow and limited exception to the general rule of forfeiture, whose purpose is to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and reputation of the judi- cial process. [Citation.]’ (Internal quotations marks omitted.) People v. Allen

2008Plain error exists only when the essential fairness of a trial has been undermined, and this “occurs only in situations which ‘reveal breakdowns in the adversary system,’ as distinguished from ‘typical trial mistakes.’ ” People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 , 660 N.E.2d 901, 909-10 (1995) [citation].’ Rathbone, 345 Ill.

2008Plain error exists only when the essential fairness of a trial has been undermined, and this “occurs only in situations which ‘reveal breakdowns in the adversary system,’ as distinguished from ‘typical trial mistakes.’ ” People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 , 660 N.E.2d 901, 909-10 (1995) [citation].’ Rathbone, 345 Ill.

2017“The second prong of the plain error rule should be invoked only when the possible error is so serious that its consideration is necessary to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. *** [Citation.] The rule is not a general saving clause for alleged errors but is designed to redress serious injustices. [Citation.]” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2003App. 3d 1083, 1090 , 794 N.E.2d 353, 359 (2003), this court addressed the limited availability of plain error review when we wrote as follows: “ ‘The plain error rule may be invoked if the evidence at a sentencing hearing was closely balanced[ ] or if the error was so egregious as to deprive the defendant of a fair sentencing hearing.’ [Citation.] The second prong of the plain error rule should be invoked only when the possible error is so serious that its consideration is ‘ “necessary to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The rule is not a

2017With respect to the first step of the analysis, the court noted that in People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 505 (2002), it found that section 4 of the Statute on Statutes acts as “ ‘the general saving clause of Illinois’ ” through which the legislature “has clearly indicated the ‘temporal reach’ of every amended statute.” (Emphasis in original.) Caveney, 207 Ill. 2d at 92 .

2016With respect to the first step of the analysis, the court noted that in People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 505 (2002), it found that section 4 of the Statute on Statutes acts as “ ‘the general saving clause of Illinois’ ” through which the legislature “has clearly indicated the ‘temporal reach’ of every amended statute.” (Emphasis in original.) Caveney, 207 Ill. 2d at 92 .

2018In so doing, the court observed, “[i]n the absence of a general saving clause or a saving clause within the repealing act, the effect of the repeal of a statute ‘is to destroy the effectiveness of the repealed act in [the future] and to divest the right to proceed under the statute, which, except as to proceedings past and closed, is considered as if it had never existed.’ ” Id. (quoting 1A C.

2018“In the absence of a general saving clause or a saving clause within the repealing act, the effect of the repeal of a statute ‘is to destroy the effectiveness of the repealed act in futuro and to divest the right to proceed under the statute, which, except as to proceedings past and closed, is considered as if it had never existed.’ ” Isenstein v. Rosewell, 106 Ill. 2d 301, 310 (1985) (quoting 1A C.

1997Sutherland, Statutory Construction sec. 23.33, at 279 (4th ed. 1972).)” The repealing statute, Public Act 89 — 2, does not contain a saving clause within its text; moreover, the general saving clause found in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 1996)) is not applicable to legislation that repeals special statutory remedies like the Structural Work Act (Shelton v. City of Chicago, 42 Ill. 2d 468, 473-74 (1969)).

1997Sutherland, Statutory Construction sec. 23.33, at 279 (4th ed.1972).)" The repealing statute, Public Act 89-2, does not contain a saving clause within its text; moreover, the general saving clause found in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 1996)) is not applicable to legislation that repeals special statutory remedies like the Structural Work Act ( Shelton v. City of Chicago, 42 Ill.2d 468, 473-74 , 248 N.E.2d 121 (1969)).

2018People v. Pastorino , 91 Ill. 2d 178 , 188, 62 Ill.Dec. 172 , 435 N.E.2d 1144 (1982).

2018People v. Pastorino , 91 Ill. 2d 178 , 188, 62 Ill.Dec. 172 , 435 N.E.2d 1144 (1982).

2021Under the factual circumstances of this case, where there is no evidence that the jury verdicts were not unanimous, the inadvertent failure to poll 1 of the 12 jurors did not prejudice Jackson’s right to a unanimous jury. ¶ 64 For this reason, the majority’s citation of Ramos, 590 U.S. at ___, 140 S. Ct. at 1395 (2020), for the proposition that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to a unanimous jury verdict, is inapposite.

2021We view this as a needless waste of judicial time.” Id. at 530-31. 24 Under the factual circumstances of this case, where there is no evidence that the jury verdicts were not unanimous, the inadvertent failure to poll 1 of the 12 jurors did not prejudice Jackson’s right to a unanimous jury. ¶64 For this reason, the majority’s citation of Ramos, 590 U.S. at ___, 140 S. Ct. at 1395 (2020), for the proposition that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to a unanimous jury verdict, is inapposite.

2018Dallas Sands, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 23.33, at 279 (4th ed. 1972)); see Holcomb v. Boynton, 151 Ill. 294, 297 (1894) (“Where a statute is repealed without such saving clause it must be considered, except as to proceedings passed and closed, as if it had never existed.”).

2017Dallas Sands, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 23.33, at 279 (4th ed. 1972)); see Holcomb v. Boynton , 151 Ill. 294 , 297, 37 N.E. 1031 (1894) ("Where a statute is repealed without such saving clause it must be considered, except as to proceedings passed and closed, as if it had never existed.").

2005Rather, it is “a ‘ “narrow and limited exception to the general waiver rule” ’ ” (People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 100 (1992), quoting People v. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d 83, 94 (1986), quoting People v. Pastorino, 91 Ill. 2d 178, 188 (1982)), whose purpose is to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and reputation of the judicial process (see People v. Howell, 60 Ill. 2d 117, 121 (1975)).

2005Rather, it is “a ‘ “narrow and limited exception to the general waiver rule” ’ ” ( People v. Hampton , 149 Ill. 2d 71, 100 (1992), quoting People v. Szabo , 113 Ill. 2d 83, 94 (1986), quoting People v. Pastorino , 91 Ill. 2d 178, 188 (1982)), whose purpose is to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and reputation of the judicial process (see People v. Howell , 60 Ill. 2d 117, 121 (1975)).

2005Rather, it is “a ‘ “narrow and limited exception to the general waiver rule” ’ ” (People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 100 (1992), quoting People v. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d 83, 94 (1986), quoting People v. Pastorino, 91 Ill. 2d 178, 188 (1982)), whose purpose is to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and reputation of the judicial process (see People v. Howell, 60 Ill. 2d 117, 121 (1975)).

2005Rather, it is “a ‘ “narrow and limited exception to the general waiver rule” ’ ” ( People v. Hampton , 149 Ill. 2d 71, 100 (1992), quoting People v. Szabo , 113 Ill. 2d 83, 94 (1986), quoting People v. Pastorino , 91 Ill. 2d 178, 188 (1982)), whose purpose is to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and reputation of the judicial process (see People v. Howell , 60 Ill. 2d 117, 121 (1975)).

2005Rather, it is “a ‘ “narrow and limited exception to the general waiver rule” ’ ” (People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d 71, 100 (1992), quoting People v. Szabo, 113 Ill. 2d 83, 94 (1986), quoting People v. Pastorino, 91 Ill. 2d 178, 188 (1982)), whose purpose is to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and reputation of the judicial process (see People v. Howell, 60 Ill. 2d 117, 121 (1975)).

2005Rather, it is “a ‘ “narrow and limited exception to the general waiver rule” ’ ” ( People v. Hampton , 149 Ill. 2d 71, 100 (1992), quoting People v. Szabo , 113 Ill. 2d 83, 94 (1986), quoting People v. Pastorino , 91 Ill. 2d 178, 188 (1982)), whose purpose is to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and reputation of the judicial process (see People v. Howell , 60 Ill. 2d 117, 121 (1975)).

2018"The plain-error rule is not a general saving clause for all trial errors." People v. Scott , 2015 IL App (4th) 130222 , ¶ 41, 389 Ill.Dec. 231 , 25 N.E.3d 1257 .

2018"The plain-error rule is not a general saving clause for all trial errors." People v. Scott , 2015 IL App (4th) 130222 , ¶ 41, 389 Ill.Dec. 231 , 25 N.E.3d 1257 .

2024People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). ¶ 72 The plain error doctrine is not “a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.” People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 (1978).

2021“To obtain relief under this rule, a defendant must first show that a clear or obvious error occurred.” Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545 .

1981Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 615(a)), which provides as an exception that: “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.” This exception, however, “does not mandate that a reviewing court consider all errors involving substantial rights.” (People v. Precup (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 , 382 N.E.2d 227, 231 .) Nor does it “operate in the nature of a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights .” People v. Roberts (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 1, 16 , 387 N.E.2d 331, 338 .

1981Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 615(a)), which provides as an exception that: “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.” This exception, however, “does not mandate that a reviewing court consider all errors involving substantial rights.” (People v. Precup (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 , 382 N.E.2d 227, 231 .) Nor does it “operate in the nature of a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights .” People v. Roberts (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 1, 16 , 387 N.E.2d 331, 338 .