17 California opinions name it 1 courts 1986–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Nilssongreen2 sentences2025(People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415 , 424–425; People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 34 [remand for full resentencing includes 8. “terms, fines, fees, and restitution”]; People v. Rosas (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 107, 117 [“[T]he matter of the restitution and parole revocation fines is most assuredly not severable from the sentencing issues that were sent back to the trial court upon the first appeal”].) B. 2025(People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 ; People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 34 [remand for full resentencing includes “terms, fines, fees, and restitution”]; People v. Rosas (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 107, 117 [“[T]he matter of the restitution and parole revocation fines is most assuredly not severable from the sentencing issues that were sent back to the trial court upon the first appeal”].) D. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Rosasgreen2 sentences2025(People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415 , 424–425; People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 34 [remand for full resentencing includes 8. “terms, fines, fees, and restitution”]; People v. Rosas (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 107, 117 [“[T]he matter of the restitution and parole revocation fines is most assuredly not severable from the sentencing issues that were sent back to the trial court upon the first appeal”].) B. 2025(People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 ; People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 34 [remand for full resentencing includes “terms, fines, fees, and restitution”]; People v. Rosas (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 107, 117 [“[T]he matter of the restitution and parole revocation fines is most assuredly not severable from the sentencing issues that were sent back to the trial court upon the first appeal”].) D. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Giordanogreen1 sentence2025(Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 664 [“a trial court must demonstrate a rational basis for its award, and ensure that the record is sufficient to permit meaningful review. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bellgreen1 sentence2022(People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 125 [deficient performance is necessary to prove an ineffective assistance claim].) Though Richmond argues, “[W]hy on earth would counsel not object,” an obvious answer jumps to mind: counsel previously failed to convince the court to strike the enhancement at the first sentencing hearing.5 within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c), for the five-year enhancement to apply.” (Dotson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 555 .) The parties agree this significant distinction is no longer tenable for indeterminate third strike sentences, i.e., life sentences impo | 1 | 1 |
People v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2016(See People v. Washington (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 940, 944 [the defendant failed to carry burden of showing a “Marsden motion would have been granted had it been heard, or that a more favorable result would have been achieved had the motion in fact been granted”].) The trial court left no doubt that any such motion filed after the first sentencing hearing— when the victim’s mother called defendant by another name (of the individual Perry claimed actually pulled the trigger) and after which Perry claimed to have had an epiphany as to the merits of a motion to withdraw his plea—would be denied as | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wileygreen1 sentence2015(People v. Wiley (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 159, 163 [the court has no power to increase a restitution fine imposed as part of the sentence by an earlier court].) The People argue that even if appellant has not forfeited this issue on appeal, appellant’s claim fails because the trial court erroneously calculated the restitution fine at the first sentencing hearing and therefore it was “proper for that amount to be corrected at the subsequent proceeding.” Before taking appellant’s plea in the robbery case, the court advised appellant that the court would impose a restitution fund fine; the court sta | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2014(Ibid.; see Smith, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 853 .) Similarly here, at the first sentencing hearing, the trial court failed to state on the record its reason for imposing less than the minimum fine of $200. 2014(Ibid.; see Smith, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 853 .) Similarly here, at the first sentencing hearing, the trial court failed to state on the record its reason for imposing less than the minimum fine of $200. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Nicklesgreen2 sentences1993(See, e.g., In re Bustos (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 851, 855 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 767 ] [duplicative credit issue]; In re Nickles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 415, 417-424 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 411 ] [same]; People v. Odom (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 907, 910 [same] [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 827 ].) Indeed, that is for good reason. 1993(See, e.g., In re Bustos (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 851, 855 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 767 ] [duplicative credit issue]; In re Nickles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 415, 417-424 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 411 ] [same]; People v. Odom (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 907, 910 [same] [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 827 ].) Indeed, that is for good reason. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Odomgreen2 sentences1993(See, e.g., In re Bustos (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 851, 855 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 767 ] [duplicative credit issue]; In re Nickles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 415, 417-424 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 411 ] [same]; People v. Odom (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 907, 910 [same] [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 827 ].) Indeed, that is for good reason. 1993(See, e.g., In re Bustos (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 851, 855 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 767 ] [duplicative credit issue]; In re Nickles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 415, 417-424 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 411 ] [same]; People v. Odom (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 907, 910 [same] [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 827 ].) Indeed, that is for good reason. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Bustosgreen2 sentences1993(See, e.g., In re Bustos (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 851, 855 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 767 ] [duplicative credit issue]; In re Nickles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 415, 417-424 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 411 ] [same]; People v. Odom (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 907, 910 [same] [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 827 ].) Indeed, that is for good reason. 1993(See, e.g., In re Bustos (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 851, 855 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 767 ] [duplicative credit issue]; In re Nickles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 415, 417-424 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 411 ] [same]; People v. Odom (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 907, 910 [same] [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 827 ].) Indeed, that is for good reason. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Blevinsgreen2 sentences1986The record of the first sentencing hearing indicates that the trial court misunderstood that the express language of section 12022.3 relieved it of the duty to stay weapons enhancements under section 654. 5 (See In re Cul *1411 breth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 , 334 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ]; People v. Rodriquez (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 207, 218, fn. 13 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 563 ]; People v. Blevins (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 64, 69-71 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 124 ].) The probation officer’s report states: “[B]ecause the defendant’s personal use of a knife was a continuous act through the sexual attacks, your of 1986The record of the first sentencing hearing indicates that the trial court misunderstood that the express language of section 12022.3 relieved it of the duty to stay weapons enhancements under section 654. 5 (See In re Cul *1411 breth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 , 334 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ]; People v. Rodriquez (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 207, 218, fn. 13 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 563 ]; People v. Blevins (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 64, 69-71 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 124 ].) The probation officer’s report states: “[B]ecause the defendant’s personal use of a knife was a continuous act through the sexual attacks, your of | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences1986The record of the first sentencing hearing indicates that the trial court misunderstood that the express language of section 12022.3 relieved it of the duty to stay weapons enhancements under section 654. 5 (See In re Cul *1411 breth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 , 334 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ]; People v. Rodriquez (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 207, 218, fn. 13 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 563 ]; People v. Blevins (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 64, 69-71 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 124 ].) The probation officer’s report states: “[B]ecause the defendant’s personal use of a knife was a continuous act through the sexual attacks, your of 1986The record of the first sentencing hearing indicates that the trial court misunderstood that the express language of section 12022.3 relieved it of the duty to stay weapons enhancements under section 654. 5 (See In re Cul *1411 breth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 , 334 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ]; People v. Rodriquez (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 207, 218, fn. 13 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 563 ]; People v. Blevins (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 64, 69-71 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 124 ].) The probation officer’s report states: “[B]ecause the defendant’s personal use of a knife was a continuous act through the sexual attacks, your of | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Valenzuela
green
2 sentences2025(People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415 , 424–425; People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 34 [remand for full resentencing includes 8. “terms, fines, fees, and restitution”]; People v. Rosas (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 107, 117 [“[T]he matter of the restitution and parole revocation fines is most assuredly not severable from the sentencing issues that were sent back to the trial court upon the first appeal”].) B. 2025(People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 ; People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 34 [remand for full resentencing includes “terms, fines, fees, and restitution”]; People v. Rosas (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 107, 117 [“[T]he matter of the restitution and parole revocation fines is most assuredly not severable from the sentencing issues that were sent back to the trial court upon the first appeal”].) D. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Dueñas
green
1 sentence2025They recommended [a] $10,000 fine. [¶] My client is indigent, and under People v. Dueñas [(2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 ], the People are required to put on evidence that he has the ability to pay that type of fine before the Court would impose it, and so I would -- I think I’ve objected to the imposition of a fine, but I wanted to bring that case to the Court’s attention, related to the fine, if the Court was thinking of imposing it.” Defendant again did not provide evidence to support his counsel’s argument that he could not pay the $10,000 fine. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Buckhalter
green
1 sentence2024(People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 ; see §§ 2900.1, 2900.5; see generally Couzens et al., Sentencing California Crimes (The Rutter Group 2023) §§ 15:15, 15:20, 15:24, 26:6.) We see no other arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to Stuart. 4 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Doolin
green
1 sentence2023(People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 453 ; People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46 , 57 [resentencing is a critical stage of a defendant’s criminal prosecution].) The Attorney General also contends defendant was represented by counsel because his counsel was the same attorney who represented him through trial and the first sentencing hearing and was thus familiar with the not applicable to defendant in this case because the crimes at issue do not involve murder. 5 facts of the case and the sentencing issues. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Dotson
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 125 [deficient performance is necessary to prove an ineffective assistance claim].) Though Richmond argues, “[W]hy on earth would counsel not object,” an obvious answer jumps to mind: counsel previously failed to convince the court to strike the enhancement at the first sentencing hearing.5 within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c), for the five-year enhancement to apply.” (Dotson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 555 .) The parties agree this significant distinction is no longer tenable for indeterminate third strike sentences, i.e., life sentences impo | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Murphy
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Murphy (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 392, 396-397 ; People v. Deere (1991) 53 Cal.3d 705, 713 .) Put differently, our review in this case is limited to claims of error in the proceedings that occurred on remand after defendant’s prior appeal. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Deere
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Murphy (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 392, 396-397 ; People v. Deere (1991) 53 Cal.3d 705, 713 .) Put differently, our review in this case is limited to claims of error in the proceedings that occurred on remand after defendant’s prior appeal. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Delgado
green
1 sentence2021The record of the first sentencing hearing indicates that the trial court intended from the outset to stay the sentences under section 654, but misspoke in stating that the sentences would “merge.” The amended abstract of judgment specifies that the sentences for these counts are stayed, but “the abstract of judgment is not itself the judgment of conviction, and cannot prevail over the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment to the extent the two conflict.” (People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070 , superseded by statute on another ground, as stated in People v. Frahs (2018) 27 Cal.App.5 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Frahs
green
1 sentence2021The record of the first sentencing hearing indicates that the trial court intended from the outset to stay the sentences under section 654, but misspoke in stating that the sentences would “merge.” The amended abstract of judgment specifies that the sentences for these counts are stayed, but “the abstract of judgment is not itself the judgment of conviction, and cannot prevail over the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment to the extent the two conflict.” (People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070 , superseded by statute on another ground, as stated in People v. Frahs (2018) 27 Cal.App.5 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Harvey
green
1 sentence2021Code, § 288, subd. (a).)1 In exchange, the People dismissed two additional counts with a Harvey waiver.2 At the first sentencing hearing, the prosecution asked that 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 . 2 defendant be placed on probation, but the trial court stated its intent to deny probation and impose the midterm of six years. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Carmony
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 .) “[A] trial court’s refusal or failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction allegation under section 1385 is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375 .) In reconsidering whether to strike Guzman’s strike, the trial court expressly found that “all of the factors that were [previously] considered” “still stand.” As stated at the first sentencing hearing in 2012, the court found that defendant was not a minor participant in the events. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 .) “[A] trial court’s refusal or failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction allegation under section 1385 is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375 .) In reconsidering whether to strike Guzman’s strike, the trial court expressly found that “all of the factors that were [previously] considered” “still stand.” As stated at the first sentencing hearing in 2012, the court found that defendant was not a minor participant in the events. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Norwood
green
1 sentence2014“A matter normally not reviewable upon direct appeal, but which is shown by the appeal record to be vulnerable to habeas corpus proceedings based upon constitutional grounds may be considered upon direct appeal. [Citations.]” (People v. Norwood (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 148, 152-153 .) Failing to raise a constitutional issue, that is, an ex post facto objection to the fines when imposed at the first sentencing hearing was substandard representation by trial counsel that prejudiced defendant, rendering the fines vulnerable to collateral attack on habeas corpus. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Culbreth
green
2 sentences1986The record of the first sentencing hearing indicates that the trial court misunderstood that the express language of section 12022.3 relieved it of the duty to stay weapons enhancements under section 654. 5 (See In re Cul *1411 breth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 , 334 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ]; People v. Rodriquez (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 207, 218, fn. 13 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 563 ]; People v. Blevins (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 64, 69-71 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 124 ].) The probation officer’s report states: “[B]ecause the defendant’s personal use of a knife was a continuous act through the sexual attacks, your of 1986The record of the first sentencing hearing indicates that the trial court misunderstood that the express language of section 12022.3 relieved it of the duty to stay weapons enhancements under section 654. 5 (See In re Cul *1411 breth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 , 334 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ]; People v. Rodriquez (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 207, 218, fn. 13 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 563 ]; People v. Blevins (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 64, 69-71 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 124 ].) The probation officer’s report states: “[B]ecause the defendant’s personal use of a knife was a continuous act through the sexual attacks, your of | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.