first sentencing hearing in Indiana

2020“Evidence supporting a restitution order is sufficient ‘if it affords a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not subject the trier of fact to mere speculation or conjecture.’” J.H. v. State, 950 N.E.2d 731, 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting M.L. v. State, 838 N.E.2d 525, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). [52] Ahead of the sentencing hearing, the State successfully filed a motion seeking judicial notice of A.D.’s father testimony, which was offered at the Wahls’ first sentencing hearing.

2020During the first sentencing hearing, the trial judge failed to provide facts that “supported enhancement of the sentences” and expressly stated that his decision imposing an enhanced sentence was predicated on there being “ample evidence to justify a finding on the murder count itself.” Id. at 1252, 1251 .

2020See Rich, 890 N.E.2d at 51 (holding that the trial court may consider only expenses incurred by the victim prior to the date of sentencing).

2020“Evidence supporting a restitution order is sufficient ‘if it affords a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not subject the trier of fact to mere speculation or conjecture.’” J.H. v. State, 950 N.E.2d 731, 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting M.L. v. State, 838 N.E.2d 525, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied). [52] Ahead of the sentencing hearing, the State successfully filed a motion seeking judicial notice of A.D.’s father testimony, which was offered at the Wahls’ first sentencing hearing.

2014See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007) (holding that if a trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing a defendant, “remand for resentencing may be the appropriate remedy if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.”). 1 At the first sentencing hearing, the 1 The cases upon which Habbinga relies for the proposition that the trial court was obligated to identify and weigh all significant aggravators and mitigators

2014See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007) (holding that if a trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing a defendant, “remand for resentencing may be the appropriate remedy if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.”). 1 At the first sentencing hearing, the 1 The cases upon which Habbinga relies for the proposition that the trial court was obligated to identify and weigh all significant aggravators and mitigators

1999Brown, 698 N.E.2d at 782 (citing Ind.Code § 35-38-1-12(b) (1998)); see also Gardner v. State, 270 Ind. 627, 634 , 388 N.E.2d 513, 517-18 (1979) (“the assertions in the [presentence] report will be accepted as true unless challenged by the defendant”) (construing predecessor statute).

1999Brown, 698 N.E.2d at 782 (citing Ind.Code § 35-38-1-12(b) (1998)); see also Gardner v. State, 270 Ind. 627, 634 , 388 N.E.2d 513, 517-18 (1979) (“the assertions in the [presentence] report will be accepted as true unless challenged by the defendant”) (construing predecessor statute).

1995Our supreme court has stated that "a sentencing error may be raised at any time." Lewandowski v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 4, 6 , 389 N.E.2d 706, 708 ; see also Niece v. State (1983), Ind.App., 456 N.E.2d 1081, 1084 (trial court has power to correct an illegal sentence even if partially executed).