advisement waiver in Colorado

2016Cf. Finney v. People, 2014 CO 38, ¶¶ 18-19 , 325 P.3d 1044 (advisements before a hearing were sufficient to satisfy the advisement requirement where the defendant was advised of the potential penalties six separate times before the hearing); see Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 964 (Colo. 1999) (an advisement is sufficient if the record as a whole shows that the defendant was given sufficient notice of the possible penalties associated with a guilty plea).

2014In so doing, Finney voluntarily waived his right to a penalty advisement at the revocation hearing under section 16-11-206(2). 118 Even if Finney had not waived his statutory right to an advisement under section 16-11-206(2), we conclude that the advisement requirement was met here because Finney was advised of the potential penalties "prior to the commencement of the [revocation] hearing." See Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 963-64 (Colo.1999) (advisement is sufficient if " 'the record as a whole' shows that the defendant was given sufficient notice of the matter in question"). 119 Here, Finne

2025Question number six addressed the charges Johnson faced and appeared as follows: 2 An “Arguello advisement,” named after People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87, 95 (Colo. 1989), requires a trial court to conduct a specific inquiry on the record to ensure that a defendant is voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waiving their right to counsel. 4 ¶9 The district court reviewed the written advisement with Johnson on the record, confirmed Johnson’s signature on the last page, and orally advised Johnson about the possible penalties he faced (first Arguello advisement).

2019See Hill, 528 U.S. at 114 ; People v. Baird, 66 P.3d 183, 190 (Colo. App. 2002) (“A statutory right may be waived by counsel’s statements.”). ¶ 34 Having concluded that counsel may waive a defendant’s UMDDA rights, we must next decide whether counsel can also waive the advisement requirement of section 16-14-104(2).

2019See People 11 v. Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741, 752 (Colo. 1989) (“It is the duty of counsel for appealing parties to inform a reviewing court both as to the specific errors relied upon and as to the grounds, supporting facts and authorities therefor.”) 1.

2019See Hill, 528 U.S. at 114 ; People v. Baird, 66 P.3d 183, 190 (Colo. App. 2002) (“A statutory right may be waived by counsel’s statements.”). ¶ 34 Having concluded that counsel may waive a defendant’s UMDDA rights, we must next decide whether counsel can also waive the advisement requirement of section 16-14-104(2).

2019See Abdu, 215 P.3d at 1268 .

2014See Byrd, 403 F.3d at 1282-83 (indicating that a defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to testify weighs against granting the motion to reopen evidence, and that a defendant who waives the right has not been "denied" the right to testify in his own behalf). 154 The court should consider whether the advisement and waiver occurred at the beginning of the defense case, sometime during the presentation of defense evidence, or after all other defense witnesses have testified.

2014See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 611-12 , 92 S.Ct. 1891 , 32 L.Ed.2d 858 (1972) (a criminal defendant should have the opportunity to weigh the strengths of the defense evidence as it is presented at trial before deciding whether his or her own testimony is necessary or helpful to the case); People v. Reed, 216 P.3d 55, 58 (Colo. App. 2008) ("[A] defendant has the constitutional right to decide at what point during his or her defense he or she wishes to testify."); cf. People v. Walden, 224 P.3d 369, 876 (Colo. App. 2009) (trial court did not deny defendant his constitutional right to rem

2014See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 611-12 , 92 S.Ct. 1891 , 32 L.Ed.2d 858 (1972) (a criminal defendant should have the opportunity to weigh the strengths of the defense evidence as it is presented at trial before deciding whether his or her own testimony is necessary or helpful to the case); People v. Reed, 216 P.3d 55, 58 (Colo. App. 2008) ("[A] defendant has the constitutional right to decide at what point during his or her defense he or she wishes to testify."); cf. People v. Walden, 224 P.3d 369, 876 (Colo. App. 2009) (trial court did not deny defendant his constitutional right to rem

2014See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 611-12 , 92 S.Ct. 1891 , 32 L.Ed.2d 858 (1972) (a criminal defendant should have the opportunity to weigh the strengths of the defense evidence as it is presented at trial before deciding whether his or her own testimony is necessary or helpful to the case); People v. Reed, 216 P.3d 55, 58 (Colo. App. 2008) ("[A] defendant has the constitutional right to decide at what point during his or her defense he or she wishes to testify."); cf. People v. Walden, 224 P.3d 369, 876 (Colo. App. 2009) (trial court did not deny defendant his constitutional right to rem

2014See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 611-12 , 92 S.Ct. 1891 , 32 L.Ed.2d 858 (1972) (a criminal defendant should have the opportunity to weigh the strengths of the defense evidence as it is presented at trial before deciding whether his or her own testimony is necessary or helpful to the case); People v. Reed, 216 P.3d 55, 58 (Colo. App. 2008) ("[A] defendant has the constitutional right to decide at what point during his or her defense he or she wishes to testify."); cf. People v. Walden, 224 P.3d 369, 876 (Colo. App. 2009) (trial court did not deny defendant his constitutional right to rem

1996Chavez II, 853 P.2d at 1152 n. 6; see also Gray, 899 P.2d at 293 .

1996Chavez II, 853 P.2d at 1152 n. 6; see also Gray, 899 P.2d at 293 .

1996See People v. Romero, 767 P.2d 782 (Colo.App.1988).

1996See Bartley v. People, 817 P.2d 1029 (Colo.1991) (constitutional error harmless when properly admitted evidence so overwhelming that violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).