defendant after violation in Florida

2010See Murphy v. State, 939 So.2d 1168, 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“[T]he successor judge rule does not require the judge who presided over the trial or accepted the plea to sentence the defendant after a violation of probation.”); Lambert v. State, 910 So.2d 890, 891 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“[W]e do not believe that rule 3.700(c) was intended to encompass subsequent violation of probation proceedings, which require consideration of events occurring after the initial sentence has been imposed and which are often conducted years after the initial sentencing decision.”); Lester v. State, 446 So.2d 1088

2006The court quoted from the concurring opinion of Judge Grimes in Lester v. State, 446 So.2d 1088, 1089-90 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984): Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700(c) as construed in Lawley v. State [ 377 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) ] contemplates that, except in emergency situations, a sentence shall be imposed by the trial judge or the judge who accepted the plea.

2011“It is inconceivable that a trial judge can fairly find for a defendant after hearing nothing more than testimony from a plaintiff establishing a prima facie case in that plaintiffs favor.” Tillman v. Baskin, 260 So.2d 509, 511-12 (Fla.1972).

1987As was said in Tillman v. Baskin, 260 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1972): It is inconceivable that a trial judge can fairly find for a defendant after hearing nothing more than testimony from a plaintiff establishing a prima facie case in the plaintiff's favor.

2010The Second District’s conclusion that an original sentencing scoresheet cannot be revised or recalculated for purposes of sentencing a defendant after a violation of probation is inconsistent with section 921.0024, Florida Statutes (1999), and our holding in Roberts v. State, 644 So.2d 81 (Fla.1994).

1995See Roberts v. State, 644 So.2d 81 (Fla.1994); Scherwitz v. State, 644 So.2d 85 (Fla.1994).

1985The appellate court reversed, saying: The law is clear that the state’s intentional or negligent suppression of material evidence favorable to the defendant after a defense request for such evidence constitutes a denial of due process under our state and federal constitutions.... [HJowever, the weight of authority in the country is that the destruction of suspect contraband drugs unavoidably consumed during chemical testing by a state chemist does not constitute an act of suppres sion of evidence by the state sufficient to trigger a due process violation. 365 So.2d at 401 (citations omitted).

1979The court stated: The law is clear that the state's intentional or negligent suppression of material evidence favorable to the defendant after a defense request for such evidence constitutes a denial of due process under our state and federal constitutions... . [T]he weight of authority in the country is that the destruction of suspect contraband drugs unavoidably consumed during chemical testing by a state chemist does not constitute an act of suppression of evidence by the state sufficient to trigger a due process violation. 365 So.2d at 401 .

2010See Murphy v. State, 939 So.2d 1168, 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“[T]he successor judge rule does not require the judge who presided over the trial or accepted the plea to sentence the defendant after a violation of probation.”); Lambert v. State, 910 So.2d 890, 891 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“[W]e do not believe that rule 3.700(c) was intended to encompass subsequent violation of probation proceedings, which require consideration of events occurring after the initial sentence has been imposed and which are often conducted years after the initial sentencing decision.”); Lester v. State, 446 So.2d 1088

2010See Murphy v. State, 939 So.2d 1168, 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“[T]he successor judge rule does not require the judge who presided over the trial or accepted the plea to sentence the defendant after a violation of probation.”); Lambert v. State, 910 So.2d 890, 891 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (“[W]e do not believe that rule 3.700(c) was intended to encompass subsequent violation of probation proceedings, which require consideration of events occurring after the initial sentence has been imposed and which are often conducted years after the initial sentencing decision.”); Lester v. State, 446 So.2d 1088

2002See Pierre-Louis v. State, 682 So.2d 669, 670-71 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (holding that even if a BOLO lacks specific descriptions, it will support an investigatory stop based upon the totality of the circumstances, including the officer's immediate contact with the defendant after hearing the BOLO and the defendant's suspicious conduct consistent with guilt).

1992In Williams v. State, 581 So.2d 144 (Fla.1991), the supreme court observed that, under section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes (1987), when sentencing a defendant after violation of probation, a “court is authorized to impose any sentence that it might have originally imposed before placing a defendant on probation.” 581 So.2d at 146 (emphasis added).

1992In Williams v. State, 581 So.2d 144 (Fla.1991), the supreme court observed that, under section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes (1987), when sentencing a defendant after violation of probation, a “court is authorized to impose any sentence that it might have originally imposed before placing a defendant on probation.” 581 So.2d at 146 (emphasis added).