North Carolina rule in North Carolina

2022Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 556-57 , 127 S. Ct. 1955 , 167 L.

2022Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 556-57 , 127 S. Ct. 1955 , 167 L.

2022App. 312, 323 , 603 S.E.2d 134, 142 (2004), aff’d, 360 N.C. 51 , 619 S.E.2d 503 (2005). ¶ 21 “When determining whether an officer’s actions constitute gross negligence, we consider: (1) the reason for the pursuit, (2) the probability of injury to the public due to the officer’s decision to begin and maintain pursuit, and (3) the officer’s conduct during the pursuit.” Greene, 225 N.C.

2022App. 312, 323 , 603 S.E.2d 134, 142 (2004), aff’d, 360 N.C. 51 , 619 S.E.2d 503 (2005). ¶ 21 “When determining whether an officer’s actions constitute gross negligence, we consider: (1) the reason for the pursuit, (2) the probability of injury to the public due to the officer’s decision to begin and maintain pursuit, and (3) the officer’s conduct during the pursuit.” Greene, 225 N.C.

2022App. 312, 323 , 603 S.E.2d 134, 142 (2004), aff’d, 360 N.C. 51 , 619 S.E.2d 503 (2005). ¶ 21 “When determining whether an officer’s actions constitute gross negligence, we consider: (1) the reason for the pursuit, (2) the probability of injury to the public due to the officer’s decision to begin and maintain pursuit, and (3) the officer’s conduct during the pursuit.” Greene, 225 N.C.

2022App. 312, 323 , 603 S.E.2d 134, 142 (2004), aff’d, 360 N.C. 51 , 619 S.E.2d 503 (2005). ¶ 21 “When determining whether an officer’s actions constitute gross negligence, we consider: (1) the reason for the pursuit, (2) the probability of injury to the public due to the officer’s decision to begin and maintain pursuit, and (3) the officer’s conduct during the pursuit.” Greene, 225 N.C.

1976In Lorbacher v. Talley, 256 N.C. 258 , 123 S.E. 2d 477 (1962), Justice Bobbitt (later Chief Justice) quoted with approval : “As stated by Smith, C.J., in Jones v. Jones, 80 N.C. 246 , 250: ‘In whatever way the credit of the witness may be impaired, it may be restored or strengthened by this [proof of prior consistent statements] or any other proper evidence tending to insure confidence in his veracity and in the truthfulness of his testimony.’ Bowman v. Blankenship, 165 N.C. 519 , 81 S.E. 2d 746 ; Brown v. Loftis, 226 N.C. 762, 764 , 40 S.E. 2d 421 ; Stansbury, op. cit. § 50. ... ” See State v

1976In Lorbacher v. Talley, 256 N.C. 258 , 123 S.E. 2d 477 (1962), Justice Bobbitt (later Chief Justice) quoted with approval : “As stated by Smith, C.J., in Jones v. Jones, 80 N.C. 246 , 250: ‘In whatever way the credit of the witness may be impaired, it may be restored or strengthened by this [proof of prior consistent statements] or any other proper evidence tending to insure confidence in his veracity and in the truthfulness of his testimony.’ Bowman v. Blankenship, 165 N.C. 519 , 81 S.E. 2d 746 ; Brown v. Loftis, 226 N.C. 762, 764 , 40 S.E. 2d 421 ; Stansbury, op. cit. § 50. ... ” See State v

2022App. 312, 323 , 603 S.E.2d 134, 142 (2004), aff’d, 360 N.C. 51 , 619 S.E.2d 503 (2005). ¶ 21 “When determining whether an officer’s actions constitute gross negligence, we consider: (1) the reason for the pursuit, (2) the probability of injury to the public due to the officer’s decision to begin and maintain pursuit, and (3) the officer’s conduct during the pursuit.” Greene, 225 N.C.

2022App. 312, 323 , 603 S.E.2d 134, 142 (2004), aff’d, 360 N.C. 51 , 619 S.E.2d 503 (2005). ¶ 21 “When determining whether an officer’s actions constitute gross negligence, we consider: (1) the reason for the pursuit, (2) the probability of injury to the public due to the officer’s decision to begin and maintain pursuit, and (3) the officer’s conduct during the pursuit.” Greene, 225 N.C.

2020In rejecting the individual’s argument that the Board of Law Examiners was not required to have identified the law schools whose graduates were eligible to take the North Carolina bar examination, we stated, without further elaboration, that N.C.G.S. § 84-21 “[gave] specific directions as to how the Board [of Law Examiners] should adopt rules.” Id. at 660, 501 S.E.2d at 910 .

2020In rejecting the individual’s argument that the Board of Law Examiners was not required to have identified the law schools whose graduates were eligible to take the North Carolina bar examination, we stated, without further elaboration, that N.C.G.S. § 84-21 “[gave] specific directions as to how the Board [of Law Examiners] should adopt rules.” Id. at 660, 501 S.E.2d at 910 .

2004“The only exception to this exclusion in both the North Carolina rule and the federal regulations is that payment is authorized for medical ‘care and services’ that are necessary for the treatment of an emergency medical condition.” Id. at 4 , 589 S.E.2d at 919-20 .

2004“The only exception to this exclusion in both the North Carolina rule and the federal regulations is that payment is authorized for medical ‘care and services’ that are necessary for the treatment of an emergency medical condition.” Id. at 4 , 589 S.E.2d at 919-20 .

2003Coach Co. v. Coach Co., 237 N.C. 697 , 76 S.E.2d 47 (1953); Berrier v. Commissioners, 186 N.C. 564 , 120 S.E. 328 (1923). . . .

2003Coach Co. v. Coach Co., 237 N.C. 697 , 76 S.E.2d 47 (1953); Berrier v. Commissioners, 186 N.C. 564 , 120 S.E. 328 (1923). . . .

2003Coach Co. v. Coach Co., 237 N.C. 697 , 76 S.E.2d 47 (1953); Berrier v. Commissioners, 186 N.C. 564 , 120 S.E. 328 (1923). . . .

2003Coach Co. v. Coach Co., 237 N.C. 697 , 76 S.E.2d 47 (1953); Berrier v. Commissioners, 186 N.C. 564 , 120 S.E. 328 (1923). . . .

1990It is a rule or test of voluntariness in which the court looks at the totality of the circumstances of the case in determining whether the confession was voluntary.” Id. (citing cases); see State v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40, 47-48 , 311 S.E.2d 540, 545 (1984).

1990It is a rule or test of voluntariness in which the court looks at the totality of the circumstances of the case in determining whether the confession was voluntary.” Id. (citing cases); see State v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40, 47-48 , 311 S.E.2d 540, 545 (1984).

1986Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 1:03 (1984); State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171 , 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954) (traditional North Carolina rule).

1986Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 1:03 (1984); State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171 , 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954) (traditional North Carolina rule).

1982The Court, in announcing in a footnote that the above test was “the constitutional minimum required to enforce the due process right,” noted that this test “is not novel.” In so *67 doing it approved of the test applied in United States v. Jorgenson, 451 F. 2d 516, 521 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 , 92 S.Ct. 959 , 30 L.Ed. 2d 793 (1972), a test which is comparable to the North Carolina standard: “[WJhether ‘considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there is substantial evidence from which a jury might reasonably find that an accused is guilty beyon

1982The Court, in announcing in a footnote that the above test was “the constitutional minimum required to enforce the due process right,” noted that this test “is not novel.” In so *67 doing it approved of the test applied in United States v. Jorgenson, 451 F. 2d 516, 521 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 , 92 S.Ct. 959 , 30 L.Ed. 2d 793 (1972), a test which is comparable to the North Carolina standard: “[WJhether ‘considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there is substantial evidence from which a jury might reasonably find that an accused is guilty beyon

1978Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure (Wright Ed.) Vol. 3, § 1232.1; Gordon, The New Summary Judgment Rule in North Carolina, supra. But summary judgment is proper where it *647 appears that even if the facts as claimed by the plaintiff are proved, there can be no recovery, Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, supra, thus providing a device for identifying the factually groundless claim or defense.” See also Page v. Sloan, 281 N.C. 697 , 190 S.E. 2d 189 (1972); Kessing v. Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523 , 180 S.E. 2d 823 (1971); and Forte v. Paper Co., 35 N.C.

1978Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure (Wright Ed.) Vol. 3, § 1232.1; Gordon, The New Summary Judgment Rule in North Carolina, supra. But summary judgment is proper where it *647 appears that even if the facts as claimed by the plaintiff are proved, there can be no recovery, Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, supra, thus providing a device for identifying the factually groundless claim or defense.” See also Page v. Sloan, 281 N.C. 697 , 190 S.E. 2d 189 (1972); Kessing v. Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523 , 180 S.E. 2d 823 (1971); and Forte v. Paper Co., 35 N.C.

1976In Lorbacher v. Talley, 256 N.C. 258 , 123 S.E. 2d 477 (1962), Justice Bobbitt (later Chief Justice) quoted with approval : “As stated by Smith, C.J., in Jones v. Jones, 80 N.C. 246 , 250: ‘In whatever way the credit of the witness may be impaired, it may be restored or strengthened by this [proof of prior consistent statements] or any other proper evidence tending to insure confidence in his veracity and in the truthfulness of his testimony.’ Bowman v. Blankenship, 165 N.C. 519 , 81 S.E. 2d 746 ; Brown v. Loftis, 226 N.C. 762, 764 , 40 S.E. 2d 421 ; Stansbury, op. cit. § 50. ... ” See State v

1976In Lorbacher v. Talley, 256 N.C. 258 , 123 S.E. 2d 477 (1962), Justice Bobbitt (later Chief Justice) quoted with approval : “As stated by Smith, C.J., in Jones v. Jones, 80 N.C. 246 , 250: ‘In whatever way the credit of the witness may be impaired, it may be restored or strengthened by this [proof of prior consistent statements] or any other proper evidence tending to insure confidence in his veracity and in the truthfulness of his testimony.’ Bowman v. Blankenship, 165 N.C. 519 , 81 S.E. 2d 746 ; Brown v. Loftis, 226 N.C. 762, 764 , 40 S.E. 2d 421 ; Stansbury, op. cit. § 50. ... ” See State v

1976In Lorbacher v. Talley, 256 N.C. 258 , 123 S.E. 2d 477 (1962), Justice Bobbitt (later Chief Justice) quoted with approval : “As stated by Smith, C.J., in Jones v. Jones, 80 N.C. 246 , 250: ‘In whatever way the credit of the witness may be impaired, it may be restored or strengthened by this [proof of prior consistent statements] or any other proper evidence tending to insure confidence in his veracity and in the truthfulness of his testimony.’ Bowman v. Blankenship, 165 N.C. 519 , 81 S.E. 2d 746 ; Brown v. Loftis, 226 N.C. 762, 764 , 40 S.E. 2d 421 ; Stansbury, op. cit. § 50. ... ” See State v

1976In Lorbacher v. Talley, 256 N.C. 258 , 123 S.E. 2d 477 (1962), Justice Bobbitt (later Chief Justice) quoted with approval : “As stated by Smith, C.J., in Jones v. Jones, 80 N.C. 246 , 250: ‘In whatever way the credit of the witness may be impaired, it may be restored or strengthened by this [proof of prior consistent statements] or any other proper evidence tending to insure confidence in his veracity and in the truthfulness of his testimony.’ Bowman v. Blankenship, 165 N.C. 519 , 81 S.E. 2d 746 ; Brown v. Loftis, 226 N.C. 762, 764 , 40 S.E. 2d 421 ; Stansbury, op. cit. § 50. ... ” See State v

1976In Lorbacher v. Talley, 256 N.C. 258 , 123 S.E. 2d 477 (1962), Justice Bobbitt (later Chief Justice) quoted with approval : “As stated by Smith, C.J., in Jones v. Jones, 80 N.C. 246 , 250: ‘In whatever way the credit of the witness may be impaired, it may be restored or strengthened by this [proof of prior consistent statements] or any other proper evidence tending to insure confidence in his veracity and in the truthfulness of his testimony.’ Bowman v. Blankenship, 165 N.C. 519 , 81 S.E. 2d 746 ; Brown v. Loftis, 226 N.C. 762, 764 , 40 S.E. 2d 421 ; Stansbury, op. cit. § 50. ... ” See State v

1976In Lorbacher v. Talley, 256 N.C. 258 , 123 S.E. 2d 477 (1962), Justice Bobbitt (later Chief Justice) quoted with approval : “As stated by Smith, C.J., in Jones v. Jones, 80 N.C. 246 , 250: ‘In whatever way the credit of the witness may be impaired, it may be restored or strengthened by this [proof of prior consistent statements] or any other proper evidence tending to insure confidence in his veracity and in the truthfulness of his testimony.’ Bowman v. Blankenship, 165 N.C. 519 , 81 S.E. 2d 746 ; Brown v. Loftis, 226 N.C. 762, 764 , 40 S.E. 2d 421 ; Stansbury, op. cit. § 50. ... ” See State v

2025TIRADO Opinion of the Court this Court observed that “[t]he [f]ederal rule coincide[d] with the North Carolina rule.” Mitchell, 283 N.C. at 471 , 196 S.E.2d at 742 (citing Martin v. United States, 317 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1963)); accord, e.g., Frank, 284 N.C. at 147 , 200 S.E.2d at 176 ; Tolley, 290 N.C. at 362 , 226 S.E.2d at 364 (collecting cases).18 Over time, 18 The concurrence insists that we should primarily frame any historical understanding of the Cruel or Unusual Punishments Clause around the 1971 constitution.

2025TIRADO Opinion of the Court this Court observed that “[t]he [f]ederal rule coincide[d] with the North Carolina rule.” Mitchell, 283 N.C. at 471 , 196 S.E.2d at 742 (citing Martin v. United States, 317 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1963)); accord, e.g., Frank, 284 N.C. at 147 , 200 S.E.2d at 176 ; Tolley, 290 N.C. at 362 , 226 S.E.2d at 364 (collecting cases).18 Over time, 18 The concurrence insists that we should primarily frame any historical understanding of the Cruel or Unusual Punishments Clause around the 1971 constitution.

2018Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 106 (2017) codifies the common law Rule of Completeness and states: "When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it." Our Supreme Court reviewed and addressed Rule 106 in State v. Thompson and noted North Carolina's rule is identical to the Federal rule, which has been interpreted and applied in many federal courts' decisions. 332 N.C. 204 , 219, 420 S.E.2d 395 ,

2018Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 106 (2017) codifies the common law Rule of Completeness and states: "When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it." Our Supreme Court reviewed and addressed Rule 106 in State v. Thompson and noted North Carolina's rule is identical to the Federal rule, which has been interpreted and applied in many federal courts' decisions. 332 N.C. 204 , 219, 420 S.E.2d 395 ,