transcript of the motion hearing in Georgia

2002Moreover, “in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court may consider both the transcript of the motion hearing and the trial transcript.” (Citation omitted.) Barnes v. State, 228 Ga. App. 44 ( 491 SE2d 116 ) (1997); accord Goddard v. State, 244 Ga. App. 730, 731 (1) ( 536 SE2d 160 ) (2000).

2002Moreover, “in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court may consider both the transcript of the motion hearing and the trial transcript.” (Citation omitted.) Barnes v. State, 228 Ga. App. 44 ( 491 SE2d 116 ) (1997); accord Goddard v. State, 244 Ga. App. 730, 731 (1) ( 536 SE2d 160 ) (2000).

2002Moreover, “in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court may consider both the transcript of the motion hearing and the trial transcript.” (Citation omitted.) Barnes v. State, 228 Ga. App. 44 ( 491 SE2d 116 ) (1997); accord Goddard v. State, 244 Ga. App. 730, 731 (1) ( 536 SE2d 160 ) (2000).

2002Moreover, “in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court may consider both the transcript of the motion hearing and the trial transcript.” (Citation omitted.) Barnes v. State, 228 Ga. App. 44 ( 491 SE2d 116 ) (1997); accord Goddard v. State, 244 Ga. App. 730, 731 (1) ( 536 SE2d 160 ) (2000).

2017Davidson v. State, 257 Ga.App. 260, 261 ( 570 SE2d 698 ) (2002). 2 Installation of the tracking device had been approved by a judge. 3 During cross-examination, the officer admitted that he did not include his observation of Batten’s traffic offense in his written report. 4 The officer obtained Batten’s identification from the vehicle for him. 5 Even if Batten had not waived this argument, it would still fail because OCGA § 40-8-91 (f) provides that “ [a] n otherwise lawful arrest shall not be invalidated or in any manner affected by failure to comply with this Code section.” See also State v.

2017Davidson v. State, 257 Ga.App. 260, 261 ( 570 SE2d 698 ) (2002). 2 Installation of the tracking device had been approved by a judge. 3 During cross-examination, the officer admitted that he did not include his observation of Batten’s traffic offense in his written report. 4 The officer obtained Batten’s identification from the vehicle for him. 5 Even if Batten had not waived this argument, it would still fail because OCGA § 40-8-91 (f) provides that “ [a] n otherwise lawful arrest shall not be invalidated or in any manner affected by failure to comply with this Code section.” See also State v.

2017Davidson v. State, 257 Ga.App. 260, 261 ( 570 SE2d 698 ) (2002). 2 Installation of the tracking device had been approved by a judge. 3 During cross-examination, the officer admitted that he did not include his observation of Batten’s traffic offense in his written report. 4 The officer obtained Batten’s identification from the vehicle for him. 5 Even if Batten had not waived this argument, it would still fail because OCGA § 40-8-91 (f) provides that “ [a] n otherwise lawful arrest shall not be invalidated or in any manner affected by failure to comply with this Code section.” See also State v.

2017Davidson v. State, 257 Ga.App. 260, 261 ( 570 SE2d 698 ) (2002). 2 Installation of the tracking device had been approved by a judge. 3 During cross-examination, the officer admitted that he did not include his observation of Batten’s traffic offense in his written report. 4 The officer obtained Batten’s identification from the vehicle for him. 5 Even if Batten had not waived this argument, it would still fail because OCGA § 40-8-91 (f) provides that “ [a] n otherwise lawful arrest shall not be invalidated or in any manner affected by failure to comply with this Code section.” See also State v.

2014Co. v. Khan, 307 Ga. App. 609, 612 (1) ( 705 SE2d 707 ) (2011) (finding that “complaints and other pleadings should be construed as to do substantial justice ... in favor of the pleader”) (punctuation omitted).

2014Co. v. Khan, 307 Ga. App. 609, 612 (1) ( 705 SE2d 707 ) (2011) (finding that “complaints and other pleadings should be construed as to do substantial justice ... in favor of the pleader”) (punctuation omitted).

2014Similarly, if the Board had been authorized to enter into the 2012 Employment Agreement, which also contains a “roll-over” provision, then the 2012 Employment Agreement would not be void in its entirety on that ground. 27 See Horne, 247 Ga. at 806 (2) (finding that a covenant was not such an integral part of the contract that the parties intended that the agreement was premised on its validity). 28 Although the transcript of the motion hearing is not included in the record, the record contains post-hearing briefs in which the Board responded to questions raised by the trial court at the hearin

2010See Barnes v. State, 228 Ga. App. 44 ( 491 SE2d 116 ) (1997); Shirley v. State, 166 Ga. App. 456, 458 (3) ( 304 SE2d 468 ) (1983). 2 Compare State u.

2009The federal court granted the motion and remanded the case to the Superior Court of Rockdale County for the resolution of the state law claims. 2 Chemtura’s motion to dismiss did not address the plaintiffs’ claims for personal injury arising out of the May 2004 fire (including claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, mental and emotional pain and suffering, failure to warn, and negligence), stubborn litigiousness, trespass, or punitive damages. 3 The record does not contain a transcript of the motion hearing. 4 Chemtura did not seek dismissal of the minor plaintif

2009The federal court granted the motion and remanded the case to the Superior Court of Rockdale County for the resolution of the state law claims. 2 Chemtura’s motion to dismiss did not address the plaintiffs’ claims for personal injury arising out of the May 2004 fire (including claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, mental and emotional pain and suffering, failure to warn, and negligence), stubborn litigiousness, trespass, or punitive damages. 3 The record does not contain a transcript of the motion hearing. 4 Chemtura did not seek dismissal of the minor plaintif

2009The transcript of the motion hearing, however, makes clear that Harper was not in custody at the time of his trial. 5 At some point Harper was remanded to the custody of the State Department of Corrections; he is currently incarcerated at a DOC facility in Folkston. 6 Yates v. Brown, 235 Ga. 391, 392 (1) ( 219 SE2d 729 ) (1975). 7 Bryant v. State, 174 Ga. App. 522 (1) ( 330 SE2d 743 ) (1985). 8 Kraus v. State, 161 Ga. App. 739, n. 1 ( 289 SE2d 555 ) (1982). 9 Mohamed v. State, 289 Ga. App. 394, 395 ( 657 SE2d 307 ) (2008). 10 Hall v. State, 271 Ga. App. 302, 303 ( 609 SE2d 653 ) (2004). 11 Moo

2009The transcript of the motion hearing, however, makes clear that Harper was not in custody at the time of his trial. 5 At some point Harper was remanded to the custody of the State Department of Corrections; he is currently incarcerated at a DOC facility in Folkston. 6 Yates v. Brown, 235 Ga. 391, 392 (1) ( 219 SE2d 729 ) (1975). 7 Bryant v. State, 174 Ga. App. 522 (1) ( 330 SE2d 743 ) (1985). 8 Kraus v. State, 161 Ga. App. 739, n. 1 ( 289 SE2d 555 ) (1982). 9 Mohamed v. State, 289 Ga. App. 394, 395 ( 657 SE2d 307 ) (2008). 10 Hall v. State, 271 Ga. App. 302, 303 ( 609 SE2d 653 ) (2004). 11 Moo

2009The transcript of the motion hearing, however, makes clear that Harper was not in custody at the time of his trial. 5 At some point Harper was remanded to the custody of the State Department of Corrections; he is currently incarcerated at a DOC facility in Folkston. 6 Yates v. Brown, 235 Ga. 391, 392 (1) ( 219 SE2d 729 ) (1975). 7 Bryant v. State, 174 Ga. App. 522 (1) ( 330 SE2d 743 ) (1985). 8 Kraus v. State, 161 Ga. App. 739, n. 1 ( 289 SE2d 555 ) (1982). 9 Mohamed v. State, 289 Ga. App. 394, 395 ( 657 SE2d 307 ) (2008). 10 Hall v. State, 271 Ga. App. 302, 303 ( 609 SE2d 653 ) (2004). 11 Moo

2009The transcript of the motion hearing, however, makes clear that Harper was not in custody at the time of his trial. 5 At some point Harper was remanded to the custody of the State Department of Corrections; he is currently incarcerated at a DOC facility in Folkston. 6 Yates v. Brown, 235 Ga. 391, 392 (1) ( 219 SE2d 729 ) (1975). 7 Bryant v. State, 174 Ga. App. 522 (1) ( 330 SE2d 743 ) (1985). 8 Kraus v. State, 161 Ga. App. 739, n. 1 ( 289 SE2d 555 ) (1982). 9 Mohamed v. State, 289 Ga. App. 394, 395 ( 657 SE2d 307 ) (2008). 10 Hall v. State, 271 Ga. App. 302, 303 ( 609 SE2d 653 ) (2004). 11 Moo

2009The transcript of the motion hearing, however, makes clear that Harper was not in custody at the time of his trial. 5 At some point Harper was remanded to the custody of the State Department of Corrections; he is currently incarcerated at a DOC facility in Folkston. 6 Yates v. Brown, 235 Ga. 391, 392 (1) ( 219 SE2d 729 ) (1975). 7 Bryant v. State, 174 Ga. App. 522 (1) ( 330 SE2d 743 ) (1985). 8 Kraus v. State, 161 Ga. App. 739, n. 1 ( 289 SE2d 555 ) (1982). 9 Mohamed v. State, 289 Ga. App. 394, 395 ( 657 SE2d 307 ) (2008). 10 Hall v. State, 271 Ga. App. 302, 303 ( 609 SE2d 653 ) (2004). 11 Moo

2009The transcript of the motion hearing, however, makes clear that Harper was not in custody at the time of his trial. 5 At some point Harper was remanded to the custody of the State Department of Corrections; he is currently incarcerated at a DOC facility in Folkston. 6 Yates v. Brown, 235 Ga. 391, 392 (1) ( 219 SE2d 729 ) (1975). 7 Bryant v. State, 174 Ga. App. 522 (1) ( 330 SE2d 743 ) (1985). 8 Kraus v. State, 161 Ga. App. 739, n. 1 ( 289 SE2d 555 ) (1982). 9 Mohamed v. State, 289 Ga. App. 394, 395 ( 657 SE2d 307 ) (2008). 10 Hall v. State, 271 Ga. App. 302, 303 ( 609 SE2d 653 ) (2004). 11 Moo

2009Co., 267 Ga. 26,27 (2) ( 471 SE2d 854 ) (1996); Robert F. Bullock, Inc. v. Thorpe, 256 Ga. 744, 745 ( 353 SE2d 340 ) (1987), aff g Thorpe v. Robert F. Bullock, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 867 ( 348 SE2d 55 ) (1986). 16 See OCGA § 51-1-11. 17 Monroe, 267 Ga. at 29 (3).

2009Co., 267 Ga. 26,27 (2) ( 471 SE2d 854 ) (1996); Robert F. Bullock, Inc. v. Thorpe, 256 Ga. 744, 745 ( 353 SE2d 340 ) (1987), aff g Thorpe v. Robert F. Bullock, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 867 ( 348 SE2d 55 ) (1986). 16 See OCGA § 51-1-11. 17 Monroe, 267 Ga. at 29 (3).

2009The federal court granted the motion and remanded the case to the Superior Court of Rockdale County for the resolution of the state law claims. 2 Chemtura’s motion to dismiss did not address the plaintiffs’ claims for personal injury arising out of the May 2004 fire (including claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, mental and emotional pain and suffering, failure to warn, and negligence), stubborn litigiousness, trespass, or punitive damages. 3 The record does not contain a transcript of the motion hearing. 4 Chemtura did not seek dismissal of the minor plaintif

2009The federal court granted the motion and remanded the case to the Superior Court of Rockdale County for the resolution of the state law claims. 2 Chemtura’s motion to dismiss did not address the plaintiffs’ claims for personal injury arising out of the May 2004 fire (including claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, mental and emotional pain and suffering, failure to warn, and negligence), stubborn litigiousness, trespass, or punitive damages. 3 The record does not contain a transcript of the motion hearing. 4 Chemtura did not seek dismissal of the minor plaintif

2009The federal court granted the motion and remanded the case to the Superior Court of Rockdale County for the resolution of the state law claims. 2 Chemtura’s motion to dismiss did not address the plaintiffs’ claims for personal injury arising out of the May 2004 fire (including claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, mental and emotional pain and suffering, failure to warn, and negligence), stubborn litigiousness, trespass, or punitive damages. 3 The record does not contain a transcript of the motion hearing. 4 Chemtura did not seek dismissal of the minor plaintif

2009The federal court granted the motion and remanded the case to the Superior Court of Rockdale County for the resolution of the state law claims. 2 Chemtura’s motion to dismiss did not address the plaintiffs’ claims for personal injury arising out of the May 2004 fire (including claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, mental and emotional pain and suffering, failure to warn, and negligence), stubborn litigiousness, trespass, or punitive damages. 3 The record does not contain a transcript of the motion hearing. 4 Chemtura did not seek dismissal of the minor plaintif

2009The federal court granted the motion and remanded the case to the Superior Court of Rockdale County for the resolution of the state law claims. 2 Chemtura’s motion to dismiss did not address the plaintiffs’ claims for personal injury arising out of the May 2004 fire (including claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, mental and emotional pain and suffering, failure to warn, and negligence), stubborn litigiousness, trespass, or punitive damages. 3 The record does not contain a transcript of the motion hearing. 4 Chemtura did not seek dismissal of the minor plaintif

2009The federal court granted the motion and remanded the case to the Superior Court of Rockdale County for the resolution of the state law claims. 2 Chemtura’s motion to dismiss did not address the plaintiffs’ claims for personal injury arising out of the May 2004 fire (including claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, mental and emotional pain and suffering, failure to warn, and negligence), stubborn litigiousness, trespass, or punitive damages. 3 The record does not contain a transcript of the motion hearing. 4 Chemtura did not seek dismissal of the minor plaintif

2009The transcript of the motion hearing, however, makes clear that Harper was not in custody at the time of his trial. 5 At some point Harper was remanded to the custody of the State Department of Corrections; he is currently incarcerated at a DOC facility in Folkston. 6 Yates v. Brown, 235 Ga. 391, 392 (1) ( 219 SE2d 729 ) (1975). 7 Bryant v. State, 174 Ga. App. 522 (1) ( 330 SE2d 743 ) (1985). 8 Kraus v. State, 161 Ga. App. 739, n. 1 ( 289 SE2d 555 ) (1982). 9 Mohamed v. State, 289 Ga. App. 394, 395 ( 657 SE2d 307 ) (2008). 10 Hall v. State, 271 Ga. App. 302, 303 ( 609 SE2d 653 ) (2004). 11 Moo

2009The transcript of the motion hearing, however, makes clear that Harper was not in custody at the time of his trial. 5 At some point Harper was remanded to the custody of the State Department of Corrections; he is currently incarcerated at a DOC facility in Folkston. 6 Yates v. Brown, 235 Ga. 391, 392 (1) ( 219 SE2d 729 ) (1975). 7 Bryant v. State, 174 Ga. App. 522 (1) ( 330 SE2d 743 ) (1985). 8 Kraus v. State, 161 Ga. App. 739, n. 1 ( 289 SE2d 555 ) (1982). 9 Mohamed v. State, 289 Ga. App. 394, 395 ( 657 SE2d 307 ) (2008). 10 Hall v. State, 271 Ga. App. 302, 303 ( 609 SE2d 653 ) (2004). 11 Moo

2009Co., 267 Ga. 26,27 (2) ( 471 SE2d 854 ) (1996); Robert F. Bullock, Inc. v. Thorpe, 256 Ga. 744, 745 ( 353 SE2d 340 ) (1987), aff g Thorpe v. Robert F. Bullock, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 867 ( 348 SE2d 55 ) (1986). 16 See OCGA § 51-1-11. 17 Monroe, 267 Ga. at 29 (3).

2009Co., 267 Ga. 26,27 (2) ( 471 SE2d 854 ) (1996); Robert F. Bullock, Inc. v. Thorpe, 256 Ga. 744, 745 ( 353 SE2d 340 ) (1987), aff g Thorpe v. Robert F. Bullock, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 867 ( 348 SE2d 55 ) (1986). 16 See OCGA § 51-1-11. 17 Monroe, 267 Ga. at 29 (3).

2009The transcript of the motion hearing, however, makes clear that Harper was not in custody at the time of his trial. 5 At some point Harper was remanded to the custody of the State Department of Corrections; he is currently incarcerated at a DOC facility in Folkston. 6 Yates v. Brown, 235 Ga. 391, 392 (1) ( 219 SE2d 729 ) (1975). 7 Bryant v. State, 174 Ga. App. 522 (1) ( 330 SE2d 743 ) (1985). 8 Kraus v. State, 161 Ga. App. 739, n. 1 ( 289 SE2d 555 ) (1982). 9 Mohamed v. State, 289 Ga. App. 394, 395 ( 657 SE2d 307 ) (2008). 10 Hall v. State, 271 Ga. App. 302, 303 ( 609 SE2d 653 ) (2004). 11 Moo

2009The transcript of the motion hearing, however, makes clear that Harper was not in custody at the time of his trial. 5 At some point Harper was remanded to the custody of the State Department of Corrections; he is currently incarcerated at a DOC facility in Folkston. 6 Yates v. Brown, 235 Ga. 391, 392 (1) ( 219 SE2d 729 ) (1975). 7 Bryant v. State, 174 Ga. App. 522 (1) ( 330 SE2d 743 ) (1985). 8 Kraus v. State, 161 Ga. App. 739, n. 1 ( 289 SE2d 555 ) (1982). 9 Mohamed v. State, 289 Ga. App. 394, 395 ( 657 SE2d 307 ) (2008). 10 Hall v. State, 271 Ga. App. 302, 303 ( 609 SE2d 653 ) (2004). 11 Moo

2009The transcript of the motion hearing, however, makes clear that Harper was not in custody at the time of his trial. 5 At some point Harper was remanded to the custody of the State Department of Corrections; he is currently incarcerated at a DOC facility in Folkston. 6 Yates v. Brown, 235 Ga. 391, 392 (1) ( 219 SE2d 729 ) (1975). 7 Bryant v. State, 174 Ga. App. 522 (1) ( 330 SE2d 743 ) (1985). 8 Kraus v. State, 161 Ga. App. 739, n. 1 ( 289 SE2d 555 ) (1982). 9 Mohamed v. State, 289 Ga. App. 394, 395 ( 657 SE2d 307 ) (2008). 10 Hall v. State, 271 Ga. App. 302, 303 ( 609 SE2d 653 ) (2004). 11 Moo

2009The transcript of the motion hearing, however, makes clear that Harper was not in custody at the time of his trial. 5 At some point Harper was remanded to the custody of the State Department of Corrections; he is currently incarcerated at a DOC facility in Folkston. 6 Yates v. Brown, 235 Ga. 391, 392 (1) ( 219 SE2d 729 ) (1975). 7 Bryant v. State, 174 Ga. App. 522 (1) ( 330 SE2d 743 ) (1985). 8 Kraus v. State, 161 Ga. App. 739, n. 1 ( 289 SE2d 555 ) (1982). 9 Mohamed v. State, 289 Ga. App. 394, 395 ( 657 SE2d 307 ) (2008). 10 Hall v. State, 271 Ga. App. 302, 303 ( 609 SE2d 653 ) (2004). 11 Moo

2009See Johnson v. Smith, 227 Ga. 611 (2) ( 182 SE2d 101 ) (1971) (holding, on appeal from a habeas corpus denial, that counsel was not ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal because of defendant’s escape).

2009See Johnson v. Smith, 227 Ga. 611 (2) ( 182 SE2d 101 ) (1971) (holding, on appeal from a habeas corpus denial, that counsel was not ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal because of defendant’s escape).

2004IX (a) of the 1983 Georgia Constitution provides that the General Assembly may “waive the state’s sovereign immunity from suit by enacting a State Tort Claims Act.” Prior to its amendment, that subparagraph provided that the “defense of sovereign immunity is waived as to those actions for the recovery of damages for any claim against the state or any of its departments and agencies for which liability insurance protection for such claims has been provided but only to the extent of any liability insurance provided.” (Punctuation omitted.) Mims v. Clanton, 222 Ga. App. 657, 659 (1) ( 475 SE2d 66

2004IX (a) of the 1983 Georgia Constitution provides that the General Assembly may “waive the state’s sovereign immunity from suit by enacting a State Tort Claims Act.” Prior to its amendment, that subparagraph provided that the “defense of sovereign immunity is waived as to those actions for the recovery of damages for any claim against the state or any of its departments and agencies for which liability insurance protection for such claims has been provided but only to the extent of any liability insurance provided.” (Punctuation omitted.) Mims v. Clanton, 222 Ga. App. 657, 659 (1) ( 475 SE2d 66

1997Beck v. State, 216 Ga. App. 532, 536 (1) ( 455 SE2d 110 ) (1995).

1997Beck v. State, 216 Ga. App. 532, 536 (1) ( 455 SE2d 110 ) (1995).