ab initio doctrine in Illinois

2006In Board of Highway Commissioners v. City of Bloomington, 253 Ill. 164, 176 (1911) this court, citing Norton, upheld the right of the board of highway commissioners to recoup moneys received by the city.

2006In Board of Highway Commissioners v. City of Bloomington, 253 Ill. 164, 176 , 97 N.E. 280 (1911) this court, citing Norton , upheld the right of the board of highway commissioners to recoup moneys received by the city.

2006Although the ab initio doctrine has recently been applied with qualifications to procedural matters (Perlstein v. Wolk, 349 Ill.

2006Although the ab initio doctrine has recently been applied with qualifications to procedural matters ( Perlstein v. Wolk, 349 Ill.App.3d 161, 168 , 284 Ill.Dec. 808 , 810 N.E.2d 598 (2004)), where a party's constitutional rights are in need of vindication, strict application of the ab initio doctrine is appropriate.

2006Moreover, neither the case Hurst cites for this proposition, Mills v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 327 Ill. 508, 535 , 158 N.E. 814 (1927), nor the case cited by Mills, Board of Highway Commissioners v. City of Bloomington, 253 Ill. 164, 176 , 97 N.E. 280 (1911), confronts the issue of whether the forbearance of a claim pursuant to a statute later found unconstitutional is valid consideration for a contract.

2006Moreover, neither the case Hurst cites for this proposition, Mills v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 327 Ill. 508, 535 , 158 N.E. 814 (1927), nor the case cited by Mills, Board of Highway Commissioners v. City of Bloomington, 253 Ill. 164, 176 , 97 N.E. 280 (1911), confronts the issue of whether the forbearance of a claim pursuant to a statute later found unconstitutional is valid consideration for a contract.

2006Because sections 607(b)(1) and (b)(3) affected substantive rights, and were declared unconstitutional for violating parents’ constitutional liberty interests (Wickham, 199 Ill. 2d at 320 ), the ab initio doctrine strictly applies (see Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d at 392 ; Yakubinis, 365 Ill.

2006Because sections 607(b)(1) and (b)(3) affected substantive rights, and were declared unconstitutional for violating parents' constitutional liberty interests ( Wickham, 199 Ill.2d at 320 , 263 Ill.Dec. 799 , 769 N.E.2d 1 ), the ab initio doctrine strictly applies (see Gersch, 135 Ill.2d at 392 , 142 Ill.Dec. 767 , 553 N.E.2d 281 ; Yakubinis, 365 Ill.

2019In Burns, the court clarified the Aguilar holding extends to the entirety of the AUUW offense in section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) (Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 22 ), the section on which defendant’s AUUW conviction is based. ¶ 19 Defendant argues, because his AUUW conviction is based on a facially unconstitutional statute, the void ab initio doctrine applies and his armed habitual criminal conviction—based on an invalid conviction—must accordingly be reversed. ¶ 20 According to the ab initio doctrine, when a statute is found facially unconstitutional— unconstitutional in all its applications (see I

2019In Burns, the court clarified the Aguilar holding extends to the entirety of the AUUW offense in section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) (Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 22 ), the section on which defendant’s AUUW conviction is based. ¶ 19 Defendant argues, because his AUUW conviction is based on a facially unconstitutional statute, the void ab initio doctrine applies and his armed habitual criminal conviction—based on an invalid conviction—must accordingly be reversed. ¶ 20 According to the ab initio doctrine, when a statute is found facially unconstitutional— unconstitutional in all its applications (see I

2019In Burns, the court clarified the Aguilar holding extends to the entirety of the AUUW offense in section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) (Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 22 ), the section on which defendant’s AUUW conviction is based. ¶ 19 Defendant argues, because his AUUW conviction is based on a facially unconstitutional statute, the void ab initio doctrine applies and his armed habitual criminal conviction—based on an invalid conviction—must accordingly be reversed. ¶ 20 According to the ab initio doctrine, when a statute is found facially unconstitutional— unconstitutional in all its applications (see I

2019In Burns, the court clarified the Aguilar holding extends to the entirety of the AUUW offense in section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) (Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 22 ), the section on which defendant’s AUUW conviction is based. ¶ 19 Defendant argues, because his AUUW conviction is based on a facially unconstitutional statute, the void ab initio doctrine applies and his armed habitual criminal conviction—based on an invalid conviction—must accordingly be reversed. ¶ 20 According to the ab initio doctrine, when a statute is found facially unconstitutional— unconstitutional in all its applications (see I

2001"This duty *** is *** exhibited in the strong language of our precedents declaring the ab initio principle: 'When a statute is held unconstitutional in its entirety, it is void ab initio .' " Gersch , 135 Ill. 2d at 399 , 553 N.E.2d at 288 (quoting People v. Manuel , 94 Ill. 2d 242, 244-45 , 446 N.E.2d 240, 241 (1983)).

2001"This duty *** is *** exhibited in the strong language of our precedents declaring the ab initio principle: 'When a statute is held unconstitutional in its entirety, it is void ab initio .' " Gersch , 135 Ill. 2d at 399 , 553 N.E.2d at 288 (quoting People v. Manuel , 94 Ill. 2d 242, 244-45 , 446 N.E.2d 240, 241 (1983)).

2021Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22 ; Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 21 ; see also, People v. Cavette, 2018 IL App (4th) 150910, ¶ 18 , 118 N.E.3d 699 . ¶ 15 “According to the ab initio doctrine, when a statute is found facially unconstitutional—unconstitutional in all its applications [citation]—it is void from the beginning. [Citations].

2021Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22 ; Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶ 21 ; see also, People v. Cavette, 2018 IL App (4th) 150910, ¶ 18 , 118 N.E.3d 699 . ¶ 15 “According to the ab initio doctrine, when a statute is found facially unconstitutional—unconstitutional in all its applications [citation]—it is void from the beginning. [Citations].

2001See Keslick v. Williams Oil-O-Matic Heating Corp. , 360 Ill. 552 , 196 N.E. 814 (1935) (widow's cause of action based upon violations of the Occupational Diseases Act, which was declared unconstitutional subsequent to the filing of the action, would not be reinstated despite the fact that it was initially dismissed upon an improper ground); Barnacki v. Crane Co. , 284 Ill.

2001See Keslick v. Williams Oil-O-Matic Heating Corp. , 360 Ill. 552 , 196 N.E. 814 (1935) (widow's cause of action based upon violations of the Occupational Diseases Act, which was declared unconstitutional subsequent to the filing of the action, would not be reinstated despite the fact that it was initially dismissed upon an improper ground); Barnacki v. Crane Co. , 284 Ill.

1990(Sutherland § 2.07, at 35; Field, at 3.) Also, in cases involving criminal procedure, the United States Supreme Court has recently declared that new rules involving criminal cases must be applied retroactively to all defendants with cases pending on review at the time of the decision. ( Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328 , 93 L.Ed.2d at 661 , 107 S.Ct. at 716 .) While Griffith is distinguishable from the case at bar in the same manner as Erickson ( Griffith, 479 U.S. at 316 , 93 L.Ed.2d at 654 , 107 S.Ct. at 710 ( Griffith involved the retroactivity of a decision declaring that the use of peremptory ch

1990(Sutherland § 2.07, at 35; Field, at 3.) Also, in cases involving criminal procedure, the United States Supreme Court has recently declared that new rules involving criminal cases must be applied retroactively to all defendants with cases pending on review at the time of the decision. ( Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328 , 93 L.Ed.2d at 661 , 107 S.Ct. at 716 .) While Griffith is distinguishable from the case at bar in the same manner as Erickson ( Griffith, 479 U.S. at 316 , 93 L.Ed.2d at 654 , 107 S.Ct. at 710 ( Griffith involved the retroactivity of a decision declaring that the use of peremptory ch

1990This duty to review and invalidate the unconstitutional actions of our legislature is also exhibited in the strong langüage of our precedents declaring the ab initio principle: “When a statute is held unconstitutional in its entirety, it is void ab initio." (Manuel, 94 Ill. 2d at 244-45 ; see Quitman v. Chicago Transit Authority (1952), 348 Ill.

1990This duty to review and invalidate the unconstitutional actions of our legislature is also exhibited in the strong language of our precedents declaring the ab initio principle: "When a statute is held unconstitutional in its entirety, it is void ab initio. " ( Manuel, 94 Ill.2d at 244-45 ; see Quitman v. Chicago Transit Authority (1952), 348 Ill.

1990We must note, however, that courts have been struggling with the potentially harsh results of the ab initio doctrine, particularly where law enforcement officials have relied in good faith on the validity of a statute (see Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank (1940), 308 U.S. 371, 374 , 84 L.

1990We must note, however, that courts have been struggling with the potentially harsh results of the ab initio doctrine, particularly where law enforcement officials have relied in good faith on the validity of a statute (see Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank (1940), 308 U.S. 371, 374 , 84 L.

1990Ed. 329, 332-33 , 60 S. Ct. 317, 318 (statute is an operative fact with consequences which must be taken into consideration); Reich v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1973), 13 Ill.

1990We must note, however, that courts have been struggling with the potentially harsh results of the ab initio doctrine, particularly where law enforcement officials have relied in good faith on the validity of a statute (see Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank (1940), 308 U.S. 371, 374 , 84 L.Ed. 329, 332-33 , 60 S.Ct. 317, 318 (statute is an operative fact with consequences which must be taken into consideration); Reich *400 v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1973), 13 Ill.