suggestion defense in Illinois

2020In the plain error context, our supreme court described as “fanciful and denigratory to the defense bar” the State’s argument that defense attorneys would have “ ‘an improper incentive to “sit on their hands” and allow errors to unfold without objection.’ ” People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶¶ 70-71 .

2020In the plain error -9- No. 1-17-2706 context, our supreme court described as “fanciful and denigratory to the defense bar” the State’s argument that defense attorneys would have “ ‘an improper incentive to “sit on their hands” and allow errors to unfold without objection.’ ” People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶¶ 70-71 .

1983(People v. Sprinkle (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 398 ; People v. Marino (1953), 414 Ill. 445 .) Similarly, a hostile attitude toward defense counsel, an implication that defense counsel’s presentation is unimportant, or a suggestion that defense counsel is attempting to present a case in an improper manner may be prejudicial and erroneous. 414 Ill. 445, 451 ; People v. Andrae (1920), 295 Ill. 445, 460-61 ; People v. Ferguson (1973), 11 Ill.

1983(People v. Sprinkle (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 398 ; People v. Marino (1953), 414 Ill. 445 .) Similarly, a hostile attitude toward defense counsel, an implication that defense counsel’s presentation is unimportant, or a suggestion that defense counsel is attempting to present a case in an improper manner may be prejudicial and erroneous. 414 Ill. 445, 451 ; People v. Andrae (1920), 295 Ill. 445, 460-61 ; People v. Ferguson (1973), 11 Ill.

2021Nevertheless, “ ‘[w]here it appears that the comments do not constitute a material factor in the conviction, or that prejudice to the defendant is not the probable result, the verdict will not be disturbed.’ ” Lopez, 2012 IL App (1st) 101395, ¶ 57 (quoting Williams, 209 Ill.

2021Ultimately, given that defendant submitted a written jury waiver, acknowledged discussing the matter with his attorney, and did not express any doubts or ask any questions when afforded the opportunity to do so, we conclude that defendant’s jury waiver was made knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily. ¶ 43 In so holding, we find defendant’s reliance on People v. Sebag, 110 Ill.

2020People v. Bingham, 2014 IL 115964, ¶ 35 ; People v. Bailey, 2015 IL App (3d) 140497, ¶ 13 .

2020A finding of sexual dangerousness must “be accompanied by an explicit finding that it is ‘substantially probable’ the person subject to the commitment proceeding will engage in the commission of sex offenses in the future if not confined.” Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d at 330 . ¶7 Since our supreme court’s decision in Masterson, courts have rejected the suggestion that the requirement of an explicit “substantially probable” finding may be satisfied where the evidence at trial would be sufficient to support such a finding.

2020A witness will be allowed to testify that on a prior occasion either that witness or someone else present in court made an out-of- court identification of the defendant. [Citations.]” Id. ¶ 67 The court in Pointer accepted the State’s suggestion that an exception should also be made for excited utterances.

2020People v. Bingham, 2014 IL 115964, ¶ 35 ; People v. Bailey, 2015 IL App (3d) 140497, ¶ 13 .

2015This - 15 - 2015 IL App (2d) 130135 impermissible hearsay was properly kept from the jury (at the State’s suggestion and with defense counsel’s concurrence) during testimony.

1988(See People v. Lewerenz (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 295 .) A hostile attitude toward defense counsel, an inference that defense counsel’s presentation is unimportant, or a suggestion that defense counsel is attempting to present a case in an improper manner may be prejudicial and erroneous.

1984App. 3d 908, 920 , 449 N.E.2d 1031 .) The prejudicial effect here was compounded by the suggestion that defense counsel was himself employing similar tactics with the jury.

1983(People v. Sprinkle (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 398 ; People v. Marino (1953), 414 Ill. 445 .) Similarly, a hostile attitude toward defense counsel, an implication that defense counsel’s presentation is unimportant, or a suggestion that defense counsel is attempting to present a case in an improper manner may be prejudicial and erroneous. 414 Ill. 445, 451 ; People v. Andrae (1920), 295 Ill. 445, 460-61 ; People v. Ferguson (1973), 11 Ill.

1983(People v. Sprinkle (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 398 ; People v. Marino (1953), 414 Ill. 445 .) Similarly, a hostile attitude toward defense counsel, an implication that defense counsel’s presentation is unimportant, or a suggestion that defense counsel is attempting to present a case in an improper manner may be prejudicial and erroneous. 414 Ill. 445, 451 ; People v. Andrae (1920), 295 Ill. 445, 460-61 ; People v. Ferguson (1973), 11 Ill.

1970This test necessarily rejects a previous suggestion that the test in multiple conviction cases ought to be whether the offenses were “independently motivated.” (People v. Stewart, 45 Ill.2d 310 .) The statutory definition of conduct includes “a series of acts with the accompanying mental state.” This is quite different from saying “a series of acts with the same underlying motivation,” as the former language envisages a breaking of the series of acts into separate and distinct offenses when additional elements of such further offenses are introduced with the accompanying mental state.

1970This test necessarily rejects a previous suggestion that the test in multiple conviction cases ought to be whether the offenses were "independently motivated." ( People v. Stewart, 45 Ill.2d 310 .) The statutory definition of conduct includes "a series of acts with the accompanying mental state." This is quite different from saying "a series of acts with the same underlying motivation," as the former language envisages a breaking of the series of acts into separate and distinct offenses when additional elements of such further offenses are introduced with the accompanying mental state.

1967We find support for the suggestion that this rule prevails in Illinois from the case of Kotrich v. The County of Du Page, 19 Ill2d 181, 166 NE2d 601 , where the Supreme Court recognized that there are land uses which may be infrequent to a community or area, although legitimate and potentially beneficial, which are nonetheless incompatible with normal uses in existing use districts, and as to these uses approved the special use technique as a permissible means of implementing the zoning powers conferred by statute.

1899(Harding v. Larkin, 41 Ill. 413 .) But the right to recover rents and profits during an unlawful occupation was not limited to cases where there had been a recovery in ejectment, and it could be maintained where there 'had been a re-entry without such a judgment.