suggestion defense in California

2015The alternative is to allow endless duplicative credit against separately imposed terms of incarceration when it is not at all clear that the misconduct underlying these terms was related. . . . [S]uch credit windfalls are not within the contemplation of section 2900.5.” (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1193 , fn. omitted.) Responding to the suggestion that a rule of strict causation in these circumstances worked an undue hardship on defendants, the court noted a “defendant’s burden, while onerous, is not necessarily impossible.” (Id. at p. 1193, fn. 10.) Thus, a defendant in custody on multipl

2013The alternative is to allow endless duplicative credit against separately imposed terms of incarceration when it is not at all clear that the misconduct underlying these terms was related. . . . [S]uch credit windfalls are not within the contemplation of section 2900.5.” (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1193 .) Responding to the suggestion a rule of strict causation in these circumstances worked an undue hardship on defendants, the Court noted a “defendant‟s burden, while onerous, is not necessarily impossible.” (Id. at p. 1193, fn. 10.) Thus, a defendant in custody on multiple causes, such as

2018(See § 6255, subd.(a) [agency must show withheld record is exempt from disclosure]; American Civil Liberties Union of Northern Cal. v. Superior Court (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55 , 67, 84-85, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 472 .) This, they seem to assert, means the trial court was obligated to independently formulate a viable plan that would allow the State Bar to provide some, but not all, of the requested fields of data, while protecting bar applicants' privacy interests.

2018(See § 6255, subd.(a) [agency must show withheld record is exempt from disclosure]; American Civil Liberties Union of Northern Cal. v. Superior Court (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55 , 67, 84-85, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 472 .) This, they seem to assert, means the trial court was obligated to independently formulate a viable plan that would allow the State Bar to provide some, but not all, of the requested fields of data, while protecting bar applicants' privacy interests.

2013(Id. at pp. 1193-1194.) People v. Stump (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1264 (Stump) is particularly instructive here.

2013(Id. at pp. 1193-1194.) People v. Stump (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1264 (Stump) is particularly instructive on the application of Bruner to the facts of the instant case.

2007Responding to a suggestion of defense counsel that the witness had "`made up'" his conclusion that the bullet taken from the victim's body had been fired from a particular weapon, the prosecutor insisted in his closing argument that had he lied, the ballistics expert "would have `risked his whole career of 17 years.'" ( Id. at p. 946.) Noting that "the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit [had]held a closely similar argument by a prosecutor (asking the jury why a state police officer would `risk his career, 18 years in the state police, to come in here and lie . . .') to be imp

2007Responding to a suggestion of defense counsel that the witness had "`made up'" his conclusion that the bullet taken from the victim's body had been fired from a particular weapon, the prosecutor insisted in his closing argument that had he lied, the ballistics expert "would have `risked his whole career of 17 years.'" ( Id. at p. 946.) Noting that "the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit [had]held a closely similar argument by a prosecutor (asking the jury why a state police officer would `risk his career, 18 years in the state police, to come in here and lie . . .') to be imp

1998In Hall, relying on In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 , we articulated a standard of review of claims of actual innocence: The evidence supporting such claims must be "conclusive" and "'point unerringly to innocence.'" ( Hall, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 423 , 179 Cal. *887 Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690 .) We rejected, however, the suggestion that this standard imposes "either the hypertechnical requirement that each bit of prosecutorial evidence be specifically refuted, or the virtually impossible burden of proving there is no conceivable basis on which the prosecution

1998In Hall, relying on In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 , we articulated a standard of review of claims of actual innocence: The evidence supporting such claims must be "conclusive" and "'point unerringly to innocence.'" ( Hall, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 423 , 179 Cal. *887 Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690 .) We rejected, however, the suggestion that this standard imposes "either the hypertechnical requirement that each bit of prosecutorial evidence be specifically refuted, or the virtually impossible burden of proving there is no conceivable basis on which the prosecution

1998In Hall, relying on In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 , we articulated a standard of review of claims of actual innocence: The evidence supporting such claims must be "conclusive" and "'point unerringly to innocence.'" ( Hall, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 423 , 179 Cal. *887 Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690 .) We rejected, however, the suggestion that this standard imposes "either the hypertechnical requirement that each bit of prosecutorial evidence be specifically refuted, or the virtually impossible burden of proving there is no conceivable basis on which the prosecution

1998In Hall, relying on In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 , we articulated a standard of review of claims of actual innocence: The evidence supporting such claims must be "conclusive" and "'point unerringly to innocence.'" ( Hall, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 423 , 179 Cal. *887 Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690 .) We rejected, however, the suggestion that this standard imposes "either the hypertechnical requirement that each bit of prosecutorial evidence be specifically refuted, or the virtually impossible burden of proving there is no conceivable basis on which the prosecution

2025Rather, our prior holdings make clear that when valuing property under the income method, the proper inquiry is whether the revenue qualifies as “earnings from the [taxable] property itself or from the beneficial use thereof.” (California Portland Cement, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 584 .) We simply disagree with the dissent’s suggestion that this analysis should be altered merely because Olympic planned to spend that additional revenue to pay down construction costs or because the City wanted to help them pay those costs.

2023(See People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 921 , overruled on another ground in People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 860 [“proof that defendants were members of the same gang formed a significant evidentiary link in the chain of proof tying them to the crimes in this case”].) The evidence also demonstrated Daniels’ and Barnes’ presence and knowledge of the scene of both shootings, and rebutted the suggestion by defense counsel that the Vigil shooting did not increase DDC’s reputation.

2021(See People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1191-1192 [prosecutor did not imply defense counsel was responsible for witness’s allegedly false testimony, where general thrust of prosecutor’s argument was that physical evidence proved witness was not credible, not that defense counsel knew witness had lied]; Thomas, supra, 2 Cal.4th at 529 -530 & fn. 14 [same, where general thrust of prosecutor’s argument was that witness’s boyfriend induced her allegedly false testimony, despite prosecutor’s arguing, “‘Now, I suppose Mr. Chaffee [defense counsel] would have you think, just another little mista

2021(See People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1191-1192 [prosecutor did not imply defense counsel was responsible for witness’s allegedly false testimony, where general thrust of prosecutor’s argument was that physical evidence proved witness was not credible, not that defense counsel knew witness had lied]; Thomas, supra, 2 Cal.4th at 529 -530 & fn. 14 [same, where general thrust of prosecutor’s argument was that witness’s boyfriend induced her allegedly false testimony, despite prosecutor’s arguing, “‘Now, I suppose Mr. Chaffee [defense counsel] would have you think, just another little mista

2020(See Bennett, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 883.) Sanchez abolished a practice whereby courts would admit hearsay facts into evidence through expert testimony under the guise 20 that such facts were not being admitted for their truth, but rather to show the basis of an expert’s opinion. ( Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 680–681.) But Sanchez affirmed the well-settled rule that hearsay, including case- specific facts related by experts, is admissible if it is covered by an exception to the hearsay rule.

2019(See id . at pp. 826-827, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347 , 919 P.2d 1280 ; People v. McDougal (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 571 , 579-580, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 .) We reject the People's suggestion that an inquiry in that circumstance is necessarily coercive.

2019(See id . at pp. 826-827, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347 , 919 P.2d 1280 ; People v. McDougal (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 571 , 579-580, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 .) We reject the People's suggestion that an inquiry in that circumstance is necessarily coercive.

2019(See id . at pp. 826-827, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347 , 919 P.2d 1280 ; People v. McDougal (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 571 , 579-580, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 .) We reject the People's suggestion that an inquiry in that circumstance is necessarily coercive.

2019(See id . at pp. 826-827, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347 , 919 P.2d 1280 ; People v. McDougal (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 571 , 579-580, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 .) We reject the People's suggestion that an inquiry in that circumstance is necessarily coercive.

2016We are aware of two cases, People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839 and People v. Herring (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1066 , which involved accusations of witness coaching among other improper conduct and resulted in reversals, but the overall mischief in those cases was far worse than what happened here.

2016We are aware of two cases, People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839 and People v. Herring (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1066 , which involved accusations of witness coaching among other improper conduct and resulted in reversals, but the overall mischief in those cases was far worse than what happened here.

2016A declarant’s emotional state and physical condition at the time of making the statement is one of the factors a court may properly consider. ( Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 64-65.) The trial court’s suggestion to defense counsel to ask about Johnson’s demeanor in order to elicit evidence about his emotional state and physical condition does not show that the trial court incorrectly believed outward indications of stress were a necessary or dispositive factor.

2015In my review of this, I believe that the CALJIC instruction more accurately . . . characterized the state of the law in terms of an adoptive admission.” The court then permitted the prosecutor to “make [his] record on this,” and the prosecutor responded, “as the court knows that we respectfully disagreed and was asking for 357, because I think 357 encompasses much more wider type liability which the case law has recognized.” Although the reason for defense counsel’s request was not stated on the record, the fact that he affirmatively asked the court to give CALJIC No. 2.71.5 over CALCRIM No. 3

2013However, the Court expressly rejected the suggestion that its analysis in Johnson would have any effect on interpretation of § 922(g)(9), stating: ―We have interpreted the phrase ‘physical force’ only in the context of a statutory definition of ‘violent felony.’ We do not decide that the phrase has the same meaning in the context of defining a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. [Citation.]‖ (Booker, supra, 644 F.3d at p. 18 , fn. omitted, italics added.) Recently, in U.S. v. Armstrong (1st Cir. 2013) 706 F.3d 1 , the First Circuit declined to reconsider Nason and Booker, and reaffirmed th

2013However, the Court expressly rejected the suggestion that its analysis in Johnson would have any effect on interpretation of § 922(g)(9), stating: ―We have interpreted the phrase ‘physical force’ only in the context of a statutory definition of ‘violent felony.’ We do not decide that the phrase has the same meaning in the context of defining a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. [Citation.]‖ (Booker, supra, 644 F.3d at p. 18 , fn. omitted, italics added.) Recently, in U.S. v. Armstrong (1st Cir. 2013) 706 F.3d 1 , the First Circuit declined to reconsider Nason and Booker, and reaffirmed th

2012(Gonzalez, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 962 .) We then said: “We also find a reasonable possibility the verdict would have been different had defendant presented the proffered mitigating evidence.

2008The alternative is to allow endless duplicative credit against separately imposed terms of incarceration when it is not at all clear that the misconduct underlying these terms was related. . . . [S]uch credit windfalls are not within the contemplation of section 2900.5.” (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1193 .) Further responding to the suggestion a rule of strict causation in these circumstances worked an undue hardship on defendants, the court noted a “defendant’s burden, while onerous, is not necessarily impossible” (id. at p. 1193, fn. 10), giving as an example Williams, supra, 10 Cal.App.4

2007(See U. S. v. Hankey, supra, 203 F.3d at p. 1169 [exhaustively discussing trial court’s gatekeeping responsibility]; U. S. v. Vesey (8th Cir. 2003) 338 F.3d 913, 916-917 [trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a defense *1226 expert, a convicted drug trafficker, who would have testified concerning the usual practice in drug transactions, and explaining scope of court’s discretion in assessing reliability]; Kaye et al., New Wigmore Treatise on Evidence (2004) Expert Evidence, § 9.3.3, pp. 323-325 [analyzing reliability requirement in light of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) 526 U.S

2007Responding to a suggestion of defense counsel that the witness had "`made up'" his conclusion that the bullet taken from the victim's body had been fired from a particular weapon, the prosecutor insisted in his closing argument that had he lied, the ballistics expert "would have `risked his whole career of 17 years.'" ( Id. at p. 946.) Noting that "the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit [had]held a closely similar argument by a prosecutor (asking the jury why a state police officer would `risk his career, 18 years in the state police, to come in here and lie . . .') to be imp

2007A false compartment may be ((a/an) (false/modified/altered fuel tank[,]/original factory equipment of a vehicle that is (modified/altered/changed)[,]/[or] a compartment, space, or box that is added to, or made or created from, existing compartments, spaces, or boxes within a vehicle)." The unduly equivocal statement that a false compartment "may be" a modification of original factory equipment apparently reflects the fact that, as acknowledged in the use notes to the instruction, People v. Gonzales, supra , 116 Cal.App.4th 1405 , 1414 , states that a false compartment does not require modifica