suggestion presumption in Pennsylvania

2010Respectfully, I cannot join the lead opinion because I believe its application of Pa.R.C.P. 126’s doctrine of substantial compliance to a trial court’s order is inapt, see Womer v. Hilliker, 589 Pa. 256 , 908 A.2d 269 (2006), and I question the suggestion that the doctrine has some place in determining whether a party has fulfilled its essential obligations under Rule 1925, in light of our specific pronouncements regarding the bright-line nature of the Rule.

2010Respectfully, I cannot join the lead opinion because I believe its application of Pa.R.C.P. 126’s doctrine of substantial compliance to a trial court’s order is inapt, see Womer v. Hilliker, 589 Pa. 256 , 908 A.2d 269 (2006), and I question the suggestion that the doctrine has some place in determining whether a party has fulfilled its essential obligations under Rule 1925, in light of our specific pronouncements regarding the bright-line nature of the Rule.

2010See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395 , 888 A.2d 775 (2005); Commonwealth v. Butler, 571 Pa. 441 , 812 A.2d 631 (2002); Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415 , 719 A.2d 306 (1998).

2010See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395 , 888 A.2d 775 (2005); Commonwealth v. Butler, 571 Pa. 441 , 812 A.2d 631 (2002); Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415 , 719 A.2d 306 (1998).

1995See, e.g., Jones, supra, 535 Pa. at 95 , 634 A.2d 201 ; Selm, supra, 411 Pa.Super. at 602 , 602 A.2d 358 .

1995See, e.g., Jones, supra, 535 Pa. at 95 , 634 A.2d 201 ; Selm, supra, 411 Pa.Super. at 602 , 602 A.2d 358 .

1990See Commonwealth v. Blount, 387 Pa.Super. 603, 618 , 564 A.2d 952, 960 (1989); Commonwealth v. Nicholson, 308 Pa.Super. 370 , 380 n. 5, 454 A.2d 581 , 586 n. 5 (1982) (citing cases) I find the suggestion that the instruction is prejudicial, because it draws attention to the defendant’s silence, thoroughly unpersuasive.

1990See Commonwealth v. Blount, 387 Pa.Super. 603, 618 , 564 A.2d 952, 960 (1989); Commonwealth v. Nicholson, 308 Pa.Super. 370 , 380 n. 5, 454 A.2d 581 , 586 n. 5 (1982) (citing cases) I find the suggestion that the instruction is prejudicial, because it draws attention to the defendant’s silence, thoroughly unpersuasive.

1965The statement of the United States Attorney prayed specifically that “. . . the said vessel proceeded against herein be declared immune from the jurisdiction and process of this court”: 318 U. S., at page 581 .

1965By contrast, and by way of distinguishing the holding in Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F. 2d 24 (4th Cir., 1961), in which the court gave effect to the suggestion of immunity, we note that the opinion of the district court reveals that the basis for the filing of the suggestion was that it was, in effect, required by the foreign policy interests of the United States; and at 197 F. Supp. 710 , at page 714, the Secretary of State is quoted as having written to the Attorney General: . . this is to inform you that it has been determined that the release of this vessel would avoid further distu

1965By contrast, and by way of distinguishing the holding in Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F. 2d 24 (4th Cir., 1961), in which the court gave effect to the suggestion of immunity, we note that the opinion of the district court reveals that the basis for the filing of the suggestion was that it was, in effect, required by the foreign policy interests of the United States; and at 197 F. Supp. 710 , at page 714, the Secretary of State is quoted as having written to the Attorney General: . . this is to inform you that it has been determined that the release of this vessel would avoid further distu

1965The communication from the secretary recited that the State Department accepted as true the statements made by Mexico’s diplomatic representatives to the effect that defendant corporation was a public agency or instrumentality of the Republic of Mexico, and added: “Consequently, this Government recognizes and allows the claim of the Government of Mexico that Petróleos Mexicanos is immune from suit and its property from attachment”: 352 Pa. at page 15 .

1941In this case there is a clear legal right in petitioners and — no other defense having been asserted — a positive duty of defendants to be performed: Chilli v. McKees-port School District et al., 334 Pa. 581 (1939).

1939In other words, the ambiguity is not in the act but only arises by rea *399 son of the suggestion that a clause be supplied.” To the same effect see Grayson v. Aiman, Inc., 252 Pa. 461, 97 A. 695 .

1939In other words, the ambiguity is not in the act but only arises by rea *399 son of the suggestion that a clause be supplied.” To the same effect see Grayson v. Aiman, Inc., 252 Pa. 461, 97 A. 695 .

1925In Com. v. Murrano, 276 Pa. 239, 243 , we said: “Whether appellant or any of his fellow bandits fired the fatal shot makes no difference,” and in Com. v. Spardute, 278 Pa. 37, 50 , “If he did take part in the assault which resulted from the conspiracy......then whether he actually inflicted the fatal stab on the deceased is immaterial in determining his guilt.” The third complaint is that one of the jurors had apparently been asleep during a portion of the charge and, for this reason, the court should have granted a new trial.

1925In Com. v. Murrano, 276 Pa. 239, 243 , we said: “Whether appellant or any of his fellow bandits fired the fatal shot makes no difference,” and in Com. v. Spardute, 278 Pa. 37, 50 , “If he did take part in the assault which resulted from the conspiracy......then whether he actually inflicted the fatal stab on the deceased is immaterial in determining his guilt.” The third complaint is that one of the jurors had apparently been asleep during a portion of the charge and, for this reason, the court should have granted a new trial.

1919The court held the Commonwealth strictly to the rule that it must satisfy the jury, beyond any reasonable doubt, as to the guilt of the defendant, and following Commonwealth v. Berney, 66 Pa. Superior Ct. 434 -440, and the same case on appeal to the Supreme Court, 262 Pa. 174 , the instruction was adequate.

1919The court held the Commonwealth strictly to the rule that it must satisfy the jury, beyond any reasonable doubt, as to the guilt of the defendant, and following Commonwealth v. Berney, 66 Pa. Superior Ct. 434 -440, and the same case on appeal to the Supreme Court, 262 Pa. 174 , the instruction was adequate.

1904In answer to the suggestion that the clause is invalid as applied to an execution upon a judgment by confession which contains the stipulation of “release of all errors and without stay of execution,” because it would impair the obligation of a contract entered into before the passage of the act it seems sufficient to quote the language of Chief Justice Fuller in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, supra: “ The subject bankruptcies includes the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts and legal liabilities, as well as to distribute his property.

1904As to the suggestion that a claim to recover three times the value of the coal removed and converted to the defendant’s use, and a claim to recover single damages for the injury to the mine caused by negligence in mining the coal so removed and converted, cannot be joined in one action, even though both grew out of the same trespass; we refer to Welsh v. Anthony, 16 Pa. 254 , and Fairchild v. Dunbar Furnace Co., supra, where as we read the opinions, a contrary doctrine was held.

1902In answer to the suggestion that the rule, should not have been to strike, off or set, aside, but to, open,, the- counsel for the appellee say that the, rule framed by them and presented to the court below “ was in effect and substantially a rule to open the judgment, its purpose being to have the answer of the garnishee admitted and the issue brought to trial.” To open a judgment, however, is not to set it aside, and the opening of it deprives it of no, quality but maturity for execution: Gallup v. Reynolds, 8 Watts, 424 .