superior-right doctrine in Illinois

2003It does not "rise to the level of a presumption so as to `neutralize' the superior-right doctrine." Townsend, 86 Ill.2d at 515 , 56 Ill.Dec. 685 , 427 N.E.2d 1231 .

2003It does not "rise to the level of a presumption so as to `neutralize' the superior-right doctrine." Townsend, 86 Ill.2d at 515 , 56 Ill.Dec. 685 , 427 N.E.2d 1231 .

2003Since Townsend was decided, courts have consistently applied its principles to guardianship and custody cases arising under both the Probate Act ( Webb, 286 Ill.App.3d 99 , 221 Ill.Dec. 285 , 675 N.E.2d 192 (1996)) and the Act ( In re Marriage of Rudsell, 291 Ill.App.3d 626 , 225 Ill.Dec. 736 , 684 N.E.2d 421 (1997); In re Custody of Krause, 111 Ill.App.3d 604 , 67 Ill.Dec. 408 , 444 N.E.2d 644 (1982)).

2003Since Townsend was decided, courts have consistently applied its principles to guardianship and custody cases arising under both the Probate Act ( Webb, 286 Ill.App.3d 99 , 221 Ill.Dec. 285 , 675 N.E.2d 192 (1996)) and the Act ( In re Marriage of Rudsell, 291 Ill.App.3d 626 , 225 Ill.Dec. 736 , 684 N.E.2d 421 (1997); In re Custody of Krause, 111 Ill.App.3d 604 , 67 Ill.Dec. 408 , 444 N.E.2d 644 (1982)).

2003Since Townsend was decided, courts have consistently applied its principles to guardianship and custody cases arising under both the Probate Act ( Webb, 286 Ill.App.3d 99 , 221 Ill.Dec. 285 , 675 N.E.2d 192 (1996)) and the Act ( In re Marriage of Rudsell, 291 Ill.App.3d 626 , 225 Ill.Dec. 736 , 684 N.E.2d 421 (1997); In re Custody of Krause, 111 Ill.App.3d 604 , 67 Ill.Dec. 408 , 444 N.E.2d 644 (1982)).

2003Since Townsend was decided, courts have consistently applied its principles to guardianship and custody cases arising under both the Probate Act ( Webb, 286 Ill.App.3d 99 , 221 Ill.Dec. 285 , 675 N.E.2d 192 (1996)) and the Act ( In re Marriage of Rudsell, 291 Ill.App.3d 626 , 225 Ill.Dec. 736 , 684 N.E.2d 421 (1997); In re Custody of Krause, 111 Ill.App.3d 604 , 67 Ill.Dec. 408 , 444 N.E.2d 644 (1982)).

1995It remains simply a factor to consider in ascertaining what will best serve the interests of the child.” (Townsend, 86 Ill. 2d at 515 , 427 N.E.2d at 1237-38 .) We also find support for our holding in the recent supreme court case In re Petition of Doe (1994), 159 Ill. 2d 347, 351 , 638 N.E.2d 181, 182-83 , in which the court stated: "These laws are designed to protect natural parents in their preemptive rights to their own children wholly apart from any consideration of the so-called best interests of the child.

1995It remains simply a factor to consider in ascertaining what will best serve the interests of the child.” (Townsend, 86 Ill. 2d at 515 , 427 N.E.2d at 1237-38 .) We also find support for our holding in the recent supreme court case In re Petition of Doe (1994), 159 Ill. 2d 347, 351 , 638 N.E.2d 181, 182-83 , in which the court stated: "These laws are designed to protect natural parents in their preemptive rights to their own children wholly apart from any consideration of the so-called best interests of the child.

1982App.3d 621 , 410 N.E.2d 1086 .) In Townsend, the Illinois Supreme Court stated, however, that although this may be an important factor, it does not rise to the level of a presumption so as to neutralize the superior right doctrine and does not transfer the superior right from the natural parent to the third person.

1982App. 3d 621 , 410 N.E.2d 1086 .) In Townsend, the Illinois Supreme Court stated, however, that although this may be an important factor, it does not rise to the level of a presumption so as to neutralize the superior right doctrine and does not transfer the superior right from the natural parent to the third person.

2004Finally, the Newsome court concluded that "[b]ecause of the statutory adoption of the superior right doctrine into the Probate Act * * * the standing requirement of the Marriage Act applies equally to the guardianship proceedings of the Probate Act." Newsome, 173 Ill.App.3d at 379, 123 Ill.Dec. 61 , 527 N.E.2d at 525.

2003Since Townsend was decided, courts have consistently applied its principles to guardianship and custody cases arising under both the Probate Act ( Webb, 286 Ill.App.3d 99 , 221 Ill.Dec. 285 , 675 N.E.2d 192 (1996)) and the Act ( In re Marriage of Rudsell, 291 Ill.App.3d 626 , 225 Ill.Dec. 736 , 684 N.E.2d 421 (1997); In re Custody of Krause, 111 Ill.App.3d 604 , 67 Ill.Dec. 408 , 444 N.E.2d 644 (1982)).

2003App.3d at 606, 67 Ill.Dec. 408 , 444 N.E.2d 644 ) in support of her contention that the superior right doctrine should not be a part of the best interest analysis.

1991App. 3d 454, 458 , 315 N.E.2d 623, 626 .) While the fact that the nonparent has had physical custody of the child for a substantial length of time does not neutralize the superior-right doctrine, it may, in a given case, be the determining factor in the custody decision.

1987In re Estate of Becton (1985), 130 Ill.

1981App. 3d 729 ) and the best-interests standard are applied (In re Abdullah (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 300 ), though in this setting, a court, before permitting adoption by a third party, may not terminate all parental rights, including custody, unless the parent or parents consent or are found to be “unfit.” Here, of course, the proceeding does not involve a custody dispute incident to a divorce or an adoption proceeding, nor is the Juvenile Court Act applicable, which would require that the minor child be found to be delinquent, in need of supervision, or neglected or dependent before the child could

1981Stat. 1979, ch. 40, par. 1501 et seq.), on the other hand, both the superior-right doctrine (see, e.g., In re Woods (1977), 54 Ill.