McKee factors in Mississippi

2026In the chancery court’s first order ruling on attorney’s fees, the chancellor advised, “This Court previously determined, on December 14, 2023, that the Plaintiff is entitled to $180,000 in attorney fees.” However, the chancellor declared, “The Court now modifies its initial award of attorney fees in the amount of $180,000 to $130,000.00.” The order contains a general discussion listing the applicable McKee factors and some details about Bryan’s counsel’s representation, but at no point did the chancellor explain the reason for modifying the award or for picking the 12 See Mckee v. McKee, 418

2026Darryl argues that the chancellor’s award should be reversed because it lacks an accompanying McKee analysis.1 Additionally, he asserts that awards of attorney’s fees are 1 See McKee v. McKee, 418 So. 2d 764, 767 (Miss. 1982). 4 improper in child custody cases. ¶13.

2024Commc’ns LLC v. Bd of Sup’rs of Hinds Cnty., 912 So. 2d 436, 448 (¶39) (Miss. 2005)); see also McLemore v. McLemore, 63 So. 3d 468, 485 (¶46) (Miss. 2011) (“[A] chancellor is required to review the reasonableness of requests to charge fees to an estate, considering the McKee factors.” (emphasis added)). ¶41.

2024Commc’ns LLC v. Bd of Sup’rs of Hinds Cnty., 912 So. 2d 436, 448 (¶39) (Miss. 2005)); see also McLemore v. McLemore, 63 So. 3d 468, 485 (¶46) (Miss. 2011) (“[A] chancellor is required to review the reasonableness of requests to charge fees to an estate, considering the McKee factors.” (emphasis added)). ¶41.

2015Although chancellors are instructed to apply the factors in McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764 (Miss.1982), when granting or denying attorney’s fees, this Court has- held that “Establishment of the McKee factors is not necessary for [a] contemnee to recover attorney’s fees where the contemnor has willfully violated a lawful court order.” Howard v. Howard, 968 So.2d 961, 979 (¶ 48) (Miss.Ct.App.2007); Mixon v. Mixon, 724 So.2d 956, 964 (¶ 29) (Miss.Ct.App.1998).

2015Although chancellors are instructed to apply the factors in McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764 (Miss.1982), when granting or denying attorney’s fees, this Court has- held that “Establishment of the McKee factors is not necessary for [a] contemnee to recover attorney’s fees where the contemnor has willfully violated a lawful court order.” Howard v. Howard, 968 So.2d 961, 979 (¶ 48) (Miss.Ct.App.2007); Mixon v. Mixon, 724 So.2d 956, 964 (¶ 29) (Miss.Ct.App.1998).

2008Power & Light Co., 832 So.2d at 487 (¶42) (stating that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding an extreme amount of attorneys' fees without applying the McKee factors and making factual determinations).

2008Power & Light Co., 832 So.2d at 487 (¶42) (stating that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding an extreme amount of attorneys' fees without applying the McKee factors and making factual determinations).

2005Power & Light Co., we vacated the attorneys' fee award and remanded the matter back to the trial court stating, "[t]he trial judge should reconsider this issue in light of the McKee factors and support a new award, if any, based on findings of fact and conclusions of law." Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 34.

2005Power & Light Co., we vacated the attorneys' fee award and remanded the matter back to the trial court stating, "[t]he trial judge should reconsider this issue in light of the McKee factors and support a new award, if any, based on findings of fact and conclusions of law." Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 34.

2009However, we have held that an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate, after examination of the McKee factors, when “the only liquid asset is the alimony award and the party seeking fees has otherwise demonstrated an inability to pay the fees.” Wells, 800 So.2d at 1246 (¶ 17) (quoting East v. East, 775 So.2d 741, 747 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App.2000)). ¶ 59.

2009However, we have held that an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate, after examination of the McKee factors, when “the only liquid asset is the alimony award and the party seeking fees has otherwise demonstrated an inability to pay the fees.” Wells, 800 So.2d at 1246 (¶ 17) (quoting East v. East, 775 So.2d 741, 747 (¶ 16) (Miss.Ct.App.2000)). ¶ 59.

2009However, this Court has held that “failure to address the McKee factors is not necessarily a cause to reverse [an] award.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 823 So.2d 568, 573 (¶ 23) (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (citing Wells v. Wells, 800 So.2d 1239, 1246 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2001)). ¶ 8.

2009However, this Court has held that “failure to address the McKee factors is not necessarily a cause to reverse [an] award.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 823 So.2d 568, 573 (¶ 23) (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (citing Wells v. Wells, 800 So.2d 1239, 1246 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2001)). ¶ 8.

2024“Chancellors are instructed to apply the McKee factors in granting or denying attorney’s fees.” Id. (quoting Rogers v. Rogers, 94 So. 3d 1258, 1267 (¶30) (Miss.

2024“Chancellors are instructed to apply the McKee factors in granting or denying attorney’s fees.” Id. (quoting Rogers v. Rogers, 94 So. 3d 1258, 1267 (¶30) (Miss.

2019Ct. App. 2011), stated the following: “While this [C]ourt has held that a chancellor’s failure to apply the McKee factors is not necessarily itself reversible error, see Miley v. Daniel, 37 So. 3d 84, 87 (¶7) (Miss.

2019Ct. App. 2011), stated the following: “While this [C]ourt has held that a chancellor’s failure to apply the McKee factors is not necessarily itself reversible error, see Miley v. Daniel, 37 So. 3d 84, 87 (¶7) (Miss.

2019During the chancellor’s discussion of the custody issue, she stated the following: “[Emma] has just entered the work force again, but it sounds like she’s got a stable job at this 9 This Court in Evans v. Evans, 75 So. 3d 1083, 1090 (¶25) (Miss.

2019During the chancellor’s discussion of the custody issue, she stated the following: “[Emma] has just entered the work force again, but it sounds like she’s got a stable job at this 9 This Court in Evans v. Evans, 75 So. 3d 1083, 1090 (¶25) (Miss.

2007The first, Chesney v. Chesney, 849 So.2d 860, 868 (Miss.2002) applied the McKee factors, but the second, Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So.2d 583, 592 (Miss.2002) cited the Pittman ability to pay standard, however, finding that regardless of the movant’s ability to pay, the movant would be awarded attorney’s fees for reimbursement of extra legal costs incurred as a result of the defendant’s conduct. ¶ 46.

2007The first, Chesney v. Chesney, 849 So.2d 860, 868 (Miss.2002) applied the McKee factors, but the second, Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So.2d 583, 592 (Miss.2002) cited the Pittman ability to pay standard, however, finding that regardless of the movant’s ability to pay, the movant would be awarded attorney’s fees for reimbursement of extra legal costs incurred as a result of the defendant’s conduct. ¶ 46.

2009However, this Court has held that “failure to address the McKee factors is not necessarily a cause to reverse [an] award.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 823 So.2d 568, 573 (¶ 23) (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (citing Wells v. Wells, 800 So.2d 1239, 1246 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2001)). ¶ 8.

2009However, this Court has held that “failure to address the McKee factors is not necessarily a cause to reverse [an] award.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 823 So.2d 568, 573 (¶ 23) (Miss.Ct.App.2002) (citing Wells v. Wells, 800 So.2d 1239, 1246 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2001)). ¶ 8.

2012However, in contempt actions, attorney’s fees are awarded “to make the plaintiff whole.” Id.; see also Patterson, 20 So.3d at 73 (¶ 26) (stating that an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate when there is a finding of contempt, and “[n]o showing as to the McKee factors is required”); Bounds v. Bounds, 935 So.2d 407, 412 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.

2012However, in contempt actions, attorney’s fees are awarded “to make the plaintiff whole.” Id.; see also Patterson, 20 So.3d at 73 (¶ 26) (stating that an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate when there is a finding of contempt, and “[n]o showing as to the McKee factors is required”); Bounds v. Bounds, 935 So.2d 407, 412 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.

2024See Gillies v. Gillies (In re Est. of Gillies), 830 So. 2d 640, 645-46 (Miss. 2002). 19 the absence of a McKee analysis does not always amount to reversible error.

2024See Gillies v. Gillies (In re Est. of Gillies), 830 So. 2d 640, 645-46 (Miss. 2002). 19 the absence of a McKee analysis does not always amount to reversible error.

2012However, even in contempt actions, “[t]he reasonableness of at torney’s fees are controlled by the applicable [Rule] 1.5 factors and the McKee factors.” Mabus, 910 So.2d at 489 (¶ 10) (footnote omitted). ¶ 25.

2012However, even in contempt actions, “[t]he reasonableness of at torney’s fees are controlled by the applicable [Rule] 1.5 factors and the McKee factors.” Mabus, 910 So.2d at 489 (¶ 10) (footnote omitted). ¶ 25.

2024Grice v. Grice, 726 So. 2d 1242, 1255 (¶51) (Miss.

2024Grice v. Grice, 726 So. 2d 1242, 1255 (¶51) (Miss.

2012In West v. West, 88 So.3d 735, 747 (¶ 57) (Miss.2012), the supreme court upheld the chancellor’s award of attorney’s fees “because it was not manifestly wrong.” The court explained that “[a]l-though the trial judge did not include an analysis of the McKee factors in his judgment, his award was not unreasonable, so we affirm.” Id. at (¶ 58) (citation omitted). ¶ 27.

2012In West v. West, 88 So.3d 735, 747 (¶ 57) (Miss.2012), the supreme court upheld the chancellor’s award of attorney’s fees “because it was not manifestly wrong.” The court explained that “[a]l-though the trial judge did not include an analysis of the McKee factors in his judgment, his award was not unreasonable, so we affirm.” Id. at (¶ 58) (citation omitted). ¶ 27.

2019On appeal, this Court determined that the record contained “no indication that the chancery court adequately considered the McKee factors when assessing the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees.” Id. at 173 (¶25).

2019On appeal, this Court determined that the record contained “no indication that the chancery court adequately considered the McKee factors when assessing the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees.” Id. at 173 (¶25).

2015Although chancellors are instructed to apply the factors in McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764 (Miss.1982), when granting or denying attorney’s fees, this Court has- held that “Establishment of the McKee factors is not necessary for [a] contemnee to recover attorney’s fees where the contemnor has willfully violated a lawful court order.” Howard v. Howard, 968 So.2d 961, 979 (¶ 48) (Miss.Ct.App.2007); Mixon v. Mixon, 724 So.2d 956, 964 (¶ 29) (Miss.Ct.App.1998).

2015Although chancellors are instructed to apply the factors in McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764 (Miss.1982), when granting or denying attorney’s fees, this Court has- held that “Establishment of the McKee factors is not necessary for [a] contemnee to recover attorney’s fees where the contemnor has willfully violated a lawful court order.” Howard v. Howard, 968 So.2d 961, 979 (¶ 48) (Miss.Ct.App.2007); Mixon v. Mixon, 724 So.2d 956, 964 (¶ 29) (Miss.Ct.App.1998).

2015Kristy, as did the chancellor, cites Bounds v. Bounds, 935 So.2d 407, 412 (¶¶ 18-19) (Miss.Ct.App.2006), for the proposition that no McKee analysis was necessary.

2012However, in contempt actions, attorney’s fees are awarded “to make the plaintiff whole.” Id.; see also Patterson, 20 So.3d at 73 (¶ 26) (stating that an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate when there is a finding of contempt, and “[n]o showing as to the McKee factors is required”); Bounds v. Bounds, 935 So.2d 407, 412 (¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.

2007The first, Chesney v. Chesney, 849 So.2d 860, 868 (Miss.2002) applied the McKee factors, but the second, Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So.2d 583, 592 (Miss.2002) cited the Pittman ability to pay standard, however, finding that regardless of the movant’s ability to pay, the movant would be awarded attorney’s fees for reimbursement of extra legal costs incurred as a result of the defendant’s conduct. ¶ 46.

2007The first, Chesney v. Chesney, 849 So.2d 860, 868 (Miss.2002) applied the McKee factors, but the second, Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So.2d 583, 592 (Miss.2002) cited the Pittman ability to pay standard, however, finding that regardless of the movant’s ability to pay, the movant would be awarded attorney’s fees for reimbursement of extra legal costs incurred as a result of the defendant’s conduct. ¶ 46.

2003See Carpenter v. Carpenter, 519 So.2d 891 (Miss.1988) ($2800 award reversed and rendered where not justified by the evidence); Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 475 So.2d 455 (Miss.1985) ($2000 award reversed and remanded because there was practically no evidence presented as to the McKee factors).

2003See Carpenter v. Carpenter, 519 So.2d 891 (Miss.1988) ($2800 award reversed and rendered where not justified by the evidence); Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 475 So.2d 455 (Miss.1985) ($2000 award reversed and remanded because there was practically no evidence presented as to the McKee factors).

2024These factors, often referred to as the McKee factors,22 “are almost identical” to the “lodestar” factors established by the United States Supreme Court.” Mauck, 741 So. 2d at 270, 272 . ¶109.

2024These factors, often referred to as the McKee factors,22 “are almost identical” to the “lodestar” factors established by the United States Supreme Court.” Mauck, 741 So. 2d at 270, 272 . ¶109.

2024“Chancellors are instructed to apply the McKee factors in granting or denying attorney’s fees.” Id. (quoting Rogers v. Rogers, 94 So. 3d 1258, 1267 (¶30) (Miss.

2024“Chancellors are instructed to apply the McKee factors in granting or denying attorney’s fees.” Id. (quoting Rogers v. Rogers, 94 So. 3d 1258, 1267 (¶30) (Miss.

2003See Carpenter v. Carpenter, 519 So.2d 891 (Miss.1988) ($2800 award reversed and rendered where not justified by the evidence); Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 475 So.2d 455 (Miss.1985) ($2000 award reversed and remanded because there was practically no evidence presented as to the McKee factors).

2003See Carpenter v. Carpenter, 519 So.2d 891 (Miss.1988) ($2800 award reversed and rendered where not justified by the evidence); Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 475 So.2d 455 (Miss.1985) ($2000 award reversed and remanded because there was practically no evidence presented as to the McKee factors).

2024Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis added) (citing Black v. Black, 240 So. 3d 1226, 1235 (¶27) (Miss.

2024Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis added) (citing Black v. Black, 240 So. 3d 1226, 1235 (¶27) (Miss.

2019The Court of Appeals has held that, "in the case of an award for the purpose of sanctions, the recipient party need not show the McKee factors ... since the nature of such an award is punitive in nature against the payor ...." Martin v. Martin , 803 So.2d 511 , 513 (Miss.

2019The Court of Appeals has held that, "in the case of an award for the purpose of sanctions, the recipient party need not show the McKee factors ... since the nature of such an award is punitive in nature against the payor ...." Martin v. Martin , 803 So.2d 511 , 513 (Miss.

2009While written findings on the McKee factors is the better practice, the supreme court concluded that “absent an apparent abuse of discretion, this Court will assume the chancellor considered the appropriate factors in awarding attorney’s fees.” Id.

2009While written findings on the McKee factors is the better practice, the supreme court concluded that “absent an apparent abuse of discretion, this Court will assume the chancellor considered the appropriate factors in awarding attorney’s fees.” Id.