benefit of an alleged immunity in Ohio

2024Chapter 2744, “that order denies the benefit of an alleged immunity and, therefore is a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C).” Hubble v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77 , 2007-Ohio-4839 , 873 N.E.2d 878 , syllabus. {¶44} The court in Hubble also noted policy reasons for its “broad interpretation of R.C. 2744.02(B).” Slonsky v. J.W.

2024Chapter 2744, “that order denies the benefit of an alleged immunity and, therefore is a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C).” Hubble v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77 , 2007-Ohio-4839 , 873 N.E.2d 878 , syllabus. {¶44} The court in Hubble also noted policy reasons for its “broad interpretation of R.C. 2744.02(B).” Slonsky v. J.W.

2016See Nagel v. Horner, 162 Ohio App.3d 221 , 2005-Ohio-3574 , 833 N.E.2d 300, ¶ 21 (stating that R.C. 2744.02(C) limits appellate review to denial of immunity and does not authorize court to review merits of the action); Makowski v. Kohler, Summit App. No. 25219, 2011-Ohio-2382, ¶ 7 (stating that an R.C. 2744.02(C) appeal “is limited to the review of alleged errors in the portion of the trial court's decision which denied the political subdivision the benefit of immunity”); see, also, Essman [v. Portsmouth, 4th Dist.

2016See Nagel v. Horner, 162 Ohio App.3d 221 , 2005-Ohio-3574 , 833 N.E.2d 300, ¶ 21 (stating that R.C. 2744.02(C) limits appellate review to denial of immunity and does not authorize court to review merits of the action); Makowski v. Kohler, Summit App. No. 25219, 2011-Ohio-2382, ¶ 7 (stating that an R.C. 2744.02(C) appeal “is limited to the review of alleged errors in the portion of the trial court's decision which denied the political subdivision the benefit of immunity”); see, also, Essman [v. Portsmouth, 4th Dist.

2020In Sullivan v. Anderson Twp., 122 Ohio S.3d 83, 2009-Ohio- 1971, 909 N.E.2d 88 , the Supreme Court of Ohio considered the appealability of the trial court's order which denied the township the benefit of an alleged immunity in a multiparty, multiclaim lawsuit, but did not include the language required by Civ.R. 54(B), that “there is no just reason for delay.” The Court concluded that such an order is a final, appealable order.

2017But under R.C. 2744.02(C), “[a]n order that denies a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as provided in this chapter or any other provision of the law is a final order.” See also Sullivan v. Anderson Twp., 122 Ohio St.3d 83 , 2009-Ohio-1971 , 909 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 13 .

2024Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977).

2021Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977).

2016See Nagel v. Horner, 162 Ohio App.3d 221 , 2005-Ohio-3574 , 833 N.E.2d 300, ¶ 21 (stating that R.C. 2744.02(C) limits appellate review to denial of immunity and does not authorize court to review merits of the action); Makowski v. Kohler, Summit App. No. 25219, 2011-Ohio-2382, ¶ 7 (stating that an R.C. 2744.02(C) appeal “is limited to the review of alleged errors in the portion of the trial court's decision which denied the political subdivision the benefit of immunity”); see, also, Essman [v. Portsmouth, 4th Dist.

2011See Nagel v. Horner, 162 Ohio App.3d 221 , 2005-Ohio-3574 , 833 N.E.2d 300, ¶21 (stating that R.C. 2744.02(C) limits appellate review to denial of immunity and does not authorize court to review merits of the action); Makowski v. Kohler, Summit App. No. 25219, 2011-Ohio-2382, ¶7 (stating that an R.C. 2744.02(C) appeal “is limited to the review of alleged errors in the portion of the trial court’s decision which denied the political subdivision the benefit of immunity”); see, LAWRENCE, 09CA30 6 also, Essman; CAC Bldg.

2025“An order denying a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability generally constitutes a final order.” Hopkins at ¶ 10 , citing Hubbell v. Xenia, 2007-Ohio-4839 , ¶ 12, and Supportive Solutions, L.L.C. v. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, 2013-Ohio-2410, ¶ 11 .

2025The trial court’s denial of the City’s motion for leave to file a motion for summary judgment, while not a substantive decision on immunity, nevertheless denied the City the benefit of an alleged immunity. “[T]he General Assembly’s use of the words ‘benefit’ of an ‘alleged’ immunity in R.C. 2744.02(C) illustrates that the statute is not limited to orders that finally resolve the immunity question[.]” Supportive Solutions, L.L.C., 2013-Ohio-2410, at ¶ 13 .

2011Chapter 2744, that order denies the benefit of an alleged immunity and thus is a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C).” Id. at ¶ 12, 27. {¶ 9} The Hubbell court explained the policy reasons for its broad interpretation of R.C. 2744.02(C) as follows: {¶ 10} “‘As the General Assembly envisioned, the determination of immunity [should] be made prior to investing the time, effort, and expense of the courts, attorneys, parties, and witnesses * * *.’” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting Burger v. Cleveland Hts. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 188, 199-200 , 718 N.E.2d 912 . {¶ 11} Since Hubbell was decided, th

2011Chapter 2744, that order denies the benefit of an alleged immunity and thus is a final, appealable order pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C).” Id. at ¶ 12, 27. {¶ 9} The Hubbell court explained the policy reasons for its broad interpretation of R.C. 2744.02(C) as follows: {¶ 10} “‘As the General Assembly envisioned, the determination of immunity [should] be made prior to investing the time, effort, and expense of the courts, attorneys, parties, and witnesses * * *.’” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting Burger v. Cleveland Hts. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 188, 199-200 , 718 N.E.2d 912 . {¶ 11} Since Hubbell was decided, th

2006Brown v. Akron Bd. of Edn. (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 352 , 358 .

2003Overmeyer v. Walinski (1966), 8 Ohio St.2d 23 , 23 . {¶ 5} In the present matter, Appellants have attempted to appeal the denial of summary judgment pursuant to R.C. 2744.02 (C) which provides: "An order that denies a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as provided in this chapter or any other provision of the law is a final order." (Emphasis added.) {¶ 6} However, this Court has previously held that "a decision dealing solely `with the fact-related legal issues that underlie [a] plaintiff's claim on the merits' is n

2025“We may only examine ‘alleged errors in the portion of the trial court’s decision that denied the benefit of immunity.’” (Cleaned up.) Id., quoting id.

2025“We may only examine ‘alleged errors in the portion of the trial court’s decision that denied the benefit of immunity.’” (Cleaned up.) Id., quoting id.

2020However, as relevant here, the General Assembly carved out an exception for certain immunity rulings: “An order that denies a political subdivision * * * the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability * * * is a final order.” R.C. 2744.02(C). {¶7} But this exception does not throw open the door to all interlocutory matters: “appellate review under R.C. 2744.02(C) is limited to the denial of immunity.” Leasure v. Adena Local School Dist., 2012-Ohio-3071 , 973 N.E.2d 810 , ¶ 43 (4th Dist.); Bonkoski v. Lorain Cty., 2018-Ohio-2540 , 115 N.E.3d 859, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.) (“An appeal taken under R.C.

2013See, e.g., Leasure, supra (trial court’s denial of summary judgment based on open and obvious doctrine did not deny appellant the benefit of an alleged immunity; therefore, appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review it under R.C. 2744.02(C)) (citations omitted); McGuire v. Lorain, 9th Dist.

2017DiGiorgio v. Cleveland, 196 Ohio App.3d 575 , 2011- Ohio-5824, 964 N.E.2d 495, ¶¶ 4-11, 15 (8th Dist.).

2017DiGiorgio v. Cleveland, 196 Ohio App.3d 575 , 2011- Ohio-5824, 964 N.E.2d 495, ¶¶ 4-11, 15 (8th Dist.).

2026Estate of Sample v. Xenos Christian Fellowship, Inc., 2021-Ohio-3898, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.).

2026In other words, we are prohibited by statute from considering the merits of Musson’s intentional tort claim and whether the evidence in the record warrants summary judgment. {¶39} Decisions denying summary judgment on the issue of immunity are reviewed de novo, “i.e., independently and without deference to the trial court’s decision.” Kubala v. Smith, 2023-Ohio-991, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.).

2026However, pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C), “‘[a]n order that denies a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as provided in this chapter or any other provision of the law is a final order.’” Garvey v. Vermilion, 2012-Ohio-1258, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.), quoting R.C. 2977.02(C); Accord Hall v. Wooster, 2024-Ohio- 5540, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.).

2026However, pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C), “‘[a]n order that denies a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as provided in this chapter or any other provision of the law is a final order.’” Garvey v. Vermilion, 2012-Ohio-1258, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.), quoting R.C. 2977.02(C); Accord Hall v. Wooster, 2024-Ohio- 5540, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.).

2025Jurisdiction {¶6} R.C. 2744.02(C) provides: “An order that denies a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as provided in this chapter or any other provision of the law is a final order.” {¶7} “While we are authorized to review the trial court’s decision, the scope of that review is limited.” Garmback v. Cleveland, 2022-Ohio-1490, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), quoting Ceasor v. E.

2025Hill v. Schildmeyer, 2024-Ohio-3261, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.), citing Doe v. Licate, 2019-Ohio-412, ¶ 27 (11th Dist.); Morelia Group-De LLC v. Weidman, 2023-Ohio-386, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.). 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS “Our review ‘is limited to the review of alleged errors that involve the denial of the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability.’” Schildmeyer at ¶ 14 , quoting Doe at ¶ 28-29 .

2025Hill v. Schildmeyer, 2024-Ohio-3261, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.), citing Doe v. Licate, 2019-Ohio-412, ¶ 27 (11th Dist.); Morelia Group-De LLC v. Weidman, 2023-Ohio-386, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.). 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS “Our review ‘is limited to the review of alleged errors that involve the denial of the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability.’” Schildmeyer at ¶ 14 , quoting Doe at ¶ 28-29 .

2025Ohio Regional Sewer Dist., 2016-Ohio-4865, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), another case cited by plaintiff- appellee, this court held: “prevented the political subdivision from presenting its immunity defense in a dispositive motion.” Id. at ¶ 30 and 40. [W]e have jurisdiction to consider only whether the trial court properly denied appellants’ motion to dismiss on immunity grounds, i.e., whether the trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion to dismiss denied appellants “the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability” — not whether the trial court correctly concluded that the allegations of the amended

2025Ohio Regional Sewer Dist., 2016-Ohio-4865, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), another case cited by plaintiff- appellee, this court held: “prevented the political subdivision from presenting its immunity defense in a dispositive motion.” Id. at ¶ 30 and 40. [W]e have jurisdiction to consider only whether the trial court properly denied appellants’ motion to dismiss on immunity grounds, i.e., whether the trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion to dismiss denied appellants “the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability” — not whether the trial court correctly concluded that the allegations of the amended

2025Hill v. Schildmeyer, 2024-Ohio-3261, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.), citing Doe v. Licate, 2019-Ohio-412, ¶ 27 (11th Dist.); Morelia Group-De LLC v. Weidman, 2023-Ohio-386, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.). 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS “Our review ‘is limited to the review of alleged errors that involve the denial of the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability.’” Schildmeyer at ¶ 14 , quoting Doe at ¶ 28-29 .

2022See Coterel v. Reed, 2016-Ohio- 7411, 72 N.E.3d 1159, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.). {¶ 13} However, R.C. 2744.02(C) provides that “[a]n order that denies a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as provided in this chapter or any other provision of the law is a final order.” A summary judgment ruling that denies a claim of alleged immunity is a final appealable order under R.C. 2744.02(C).