114 California opinions name it 3 courts 1946–2026 37 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shafer v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstonegreen2 sentences2026(Id. at p. 397; see Klotz, supra, at p. 1351 .) In Shafer v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 54 , the conspiracy claim alleged an insurance company’s coverage counsel misrepresented the policy limits to a party that had obtained a judgment against the company’s insured. 2026(Id. at p. 397; see Klotz, supra, at p. 1351 .) In Shafer v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 54 , the conspiracy claim alleged an insurance company’s coverage counsel misrepresented the policy limits to a party that had obtained a judgment against the company’s insured. | 3 | 4 |
Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd.green2 sentences2022For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the SAC adequately pled conspiracy to fraudulently transfer as to many of the defendants, and thus the trial court erred by denying leave to amend as to them. “ ‘Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.’ (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503 , 510–511.)” (AREI II Cases (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1021 (AREI II).) “To support 2016It is based on the alleged misrepresentations and alleges that all defendants “have formed and continue to operate a scheme to facilitate wrongful foreclosure for economic gain and profit.” “Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 510-511 .) “To support a conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege the following elements: ‘(1) the fo | 2 | 10 |
People v. Pahlgreen2 sentences2024(See, e.g., People v. Pahl (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1651, 1659-1660 [Hamilton accurately describes the conspiracy exception, “but it generalizes as if the exception applies to all crimes. 2023(See People v. Pahl (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1651 (Pahl).) The language in Hamilton upon which Record relies is derived from Johnston, but Johnston itself limited its application to conspiracy cases. ( Pahl, supra, at p. 1658 ; Johnston, supra, 3 Cal.2d at p. 36 , italics added [“we cannot construe [section 954] to mean that an indictment or information charging conspiracy is sufficient” without an allegation of an overt act or when a defendant has been acquitted of all overt acts].) Hamilton accurately describes the conspiracy exception, “but it generalizes as if the exception applies to all cri | 2 | 8 |
People v. Washingtongreen2 sentences1994It is firmly established that evidence of conspiracy may be admitted even if the defendant is not charged with the crime of conspiracy. ( People v. Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 790, citing with approval People v. Jourdain (1980) 111 Cal. App.3d 396, 404 [ 168 Cal. Rptr. 702 ]; People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1174 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 5 , 459 P.2d 259 , 39 A.L.R.3d 541 ].) Once there is proof of the existence of the conspiracy there is no error in instructing the jury on the law of conspiracy. ( Ibid. ) To determine whether there was sufficient proof of a conspiracy in this case, we 1994It is firmly established that evidence of conspiracy may be admitted even if the defendant is not charged with the crime of conspiracy. ( People v. Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 790, citing with approval People v. Jourdain (1980) 111 Cal. App.3d 396, 404 [ 168 Cal. Rptr. 702 ]; People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1174 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 5 , 459 P.2d 259 , 39 A.L.R.3d 541 ].) Once there is proof of the existence of the conspiracy there is no error in instructing the jury on the law of conspiracy. ( Ibid. ) To determine whether there was sufficient proof of a conspiracy in this case, we | 2 | 4 |
Favila v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLPgreen2 sentences2026(Id. at p. 1352; see also Favila v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 189 , 209–210 (Favila) [“If the plaintiff seeks to plead a conspiracy claim against an attorney based on fraud or virtually any other common law tort theory, the claim falls within section 1714.10, subdivision (c)(1); the procedural requirements of section 1714.10, subdivision (a), do not apply (that is, the plaintiff need not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits)”].) Alternatively, Ballidis and the Law Firm argue that the independent duty exception does not apply because the duty was owed to 2024Code, § 1714.10, subd. (c); see Favila, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 209 .)14 The allegations of the complaint are sufficient to establish the conspiracy claim is not barred by the agent’s immunity rule because Lucas (and Buchalter) had an independent legal duty not to defraud Williams. | 2 | 3 |
Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc.green2 sentences2021As stated in Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 802, 834 , ‘[c]ases have interpreted the “financial advantage” exception to the agent’s immunity rule to mean a personal advantage or gain that is over and above ordinary professional fees earned as compensation for performance of the agency.’ Berg & Berg involved a statutory provision with exceptions that allowed a conspiracy claim against an attorney; the exceptions mirrored those carved out from the agent’s immunity rule. 2015And no facts are alleged that respondents' "acts go beyond the performance of a professional duty to serve the client and involve a conspiracy to violate a legal duty in furtherance of the attorney's financial gain." (§ 1714.10, subd. (c)(2); Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 818 [discussing exceptions to agent immunity rule].) "If the plaintiff seeks to assert a conspiracy claim against an attorney based on the violation of a duty owed by the client, but not the attorney, and the attorney was acting within the scope of his or her professiona | 2 | 3 |
People v. Buffumgreen2 sentences2017It would contravene that policy to hold that the very passage of the Mann Act effected a withdrawal by the conspiracy statute of that immunity which the Mann Act itself confers." ( Gebardi v. United States , supra , 287 U.S. at p. 123 , 53 S.Ct. at p. 38 , 77 L.Ed. at pp. 211-212, italics added; see People v. Buffum (1953) 40 Cal.2d 709 , 722, 256 P.2d 317 [abortion-seekers not deemed accomplices under § 1111, whose testimony required corroboration in prosecution for conspiracy to commit abortions, because the conspiracy rule "does not apply where the statutes defining the substantive offense 2017It would contravene that policy to hold that the very passage of the Mann Act effected a withdrawal by the conspiracy statute of that immunity which the Mann Act itself confers." ( Gebardi v. United States , supra , 287 U.S. at p. 123 , 53 S.Ct. at p. 38 , 77 L.Ed. at pp. 211-212, italics added; see People v. Buffum (1953) 40 Cal.2d 709 , 722, 256 P.2d 317 [abortion-seekers not deemed accomplices under § 1111, whose testimony required corroboration in prosecution for conspiracy to commit abortions, because the conspiracy rule "does not apply where the statutes defining the substantive offense | 2 | 3 |
People v. Curielgreen2 sentences2025(See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463 [stating liability requirements for aiding and abetting express and implied malice murder]; see also People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981 , 992.) Appellant further asserts that a person “may enter into a conspiracy to commit murder, and be convicted of conspiracy, without actually committing murder.” She contends that may have happened in this case, albeit with regard to the attempted 16 murder counts, because the conspiracy instruction the jury received contained the same error as the instruction given in Whitson, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 22 . 2024(See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463 [stating liability requirements for aiding and abetting express and implied malice murder]; see also People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981 , 992.) Appellant further asserts that a person “may enter into a conspiracy to commit murder, and be convicted of conspiracy, without actually committing murder.” She contends that may have happened in this case, albeit with regard to the attempted 16 murder counts, because the conspiracy instruction the jury received contained the same error as the instruction given in Whitson, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 22 . | 2 | 2 |
Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lackgreen2 sentences2023(McCann, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 906 ; see also Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1136 [“Where fraud is alleged to be the object of the conspiracy, the claim must be pleaded with particularity”].) Defendants argue that Edelweiss’s conspiracy claim suffers from a “threshold failure” because its underlying allegations for CFCA violation are not sufficient. 2023(McCann, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 906 ; see also Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1136 [“Where fraud is alleged to be the object of the conspiracy, the claim must be pleaded with particularity”].) Defendants argue that Edelweiss’s conspiracy claim suffers from a “threshold failure” because its underlying allegations for CFCA violation are not sufficient. | 2 | 2 |
Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Goregreen2 sentences2022Standards of Review “We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion” and “exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected activity.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 ; see also Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 769 , 784 (Neurelis).) Similarly, “[w]e review the applicability of the commercial speech exemption independently.” (Simpson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 26 ; see Neurelis, supra, at p. 786.) “ ‘In addi 2021Standards of Review “We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion” and “exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected activity.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 ; see also Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 769 , 784 (Neurelis).) Similarly, “[w]e review the applicability of the commercial speech exemption independently.” (Simpson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 26 ; see Neurelis, supra, at p. 786.) “ ‘In addi | 2 | 2 |
Symmonds v. Mahoneygreen2 sentences2022Standards of Review “We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion” and “exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected activity.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 ; see also Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 769 , 784 (Neurelis).) Similarly, “[w]e review the applicability of the commercial speech exemption independently.” (Simpson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 26 ; see Neurelis, supra, at p. 786.) “ ‘In addi 2021Standards of Review “We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion” and “exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected activity.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 ; see also Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 769 , 784 (Neurelis).) Similarly, “[w]e review the applicability of the commercial speech exemption independently.” (Simpson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 26 ; see Neurelis, supra, at p. 786.) “ ‘In addi | 2 | 2 |
People v. Frederickgreen2 sentences2021(CALCRIM No. 1804, see People v. Martinez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 686, 693 [enhancement based on Corporations Code violations and grand theft and conspiracy]; People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 16 [applying enhancement to grand theft]; People v. Mozes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1129 [defendant pled guilty to multiple counts of theft by false pretenses and admitted enhancement based on that charge]; People v. Frederick (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 400, 404 [enhancement based on grand theft and securities fraud counts].) Finally, in an argument similar to his prior assertion that the conspira 2021(CALCRIM No. 1804, see People v. Martinez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 686, 693 [enhancement based on Corporations Code violations and grand theft and conspiracy]; People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 16 [applying enhancement to grand theft]; People v. Mozes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1129 [defendant pled guilty to multiple counts of theft by false pretenses and admitted enhancement based on that charge]; People v. Frederick (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 400, 404 [enhancement based on grand theft and securities fraud counts].) Finally, in an argument similar to his prior assertion that the conspira | 2 | 2 |
People v. Nilssongreen2 sentences2021(CALCRIM No. 1804, see People v. Martinez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 686, 693 [enhancement based on Corporations Code violations and grand theft and conspiracy]; People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 16 [applying enhancement to grand theft]; People v. Mozes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1129 [defendant pled guilty to multiple counts of theft by false pretenses and admitted enhancement based on that charge]; People v. Frederick (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 400, 404 [enhancement based on grand theft and securities fraud counts].) Finally, in an argument similar to his prior assertion that the conspira 2021(CALCRIM No. 1804, see People v. Martinez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 686, 693 [enhancement based on Corporations Code violations and grand theft and conspiracy]; People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 16 [applying enhancement to grand theft]; People v. Mozes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1129 [defendant pled guilty to multiple counts of theft by false pretenses and admitted enhancement based on that charge]; People v. Frederick (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 400, 404 [enhancement based on grand theft and securities fraud counts].) Finally, in an argument similar to his prior assertion that the conspira | 2 | 2 |
People v. Mozesgreen2 sentences2021(CALCRIM No. 1804, see People v. Martinez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 686, 693 [enhancement based on Corporations Code violations and grand theft and conspiracy]; People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 16 [applying enhancement to grand theft]; People v. Mozes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1129 [defendant pled guilty to multiple counts of theft by false pretenses and admitted enhancement based on that charge]; People v. Frederick (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 400, 404 [enhancement based on grand theft and securities fraud counts].) Finally, in an argument similar to his prior assertion that the conspira 2021(CALCRIM No. 1804, see People v. Martinez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 686, 693 [enhancement based on Corporations Code violations and grand theft and conspiracy]; People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 16 [applying enhancement to grand theft]; People v. Mozes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1129 [defendant pled guilty to multiple counts of theft by false pretenses and admitted enhancement based on that charge]; People v. Frederick (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 400, 404 [enhancement based on grand theft and securities fraud counts].) Finally, in an argument similar to his prior assertion that the conspira | 2 | 2 |
People v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2021(CALCRIM No. 1804, see People v. Martinez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 686, 693 [enhancement based on Corporations Code violations and grand theft and conspiracy]; People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 16 [applying enhancement to grand theft]; People v. Mozes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1129 [defendant pled guilty to multiple counts of theft by false pretenses and admitted enhancement based on that charge]; People v. Frederick (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 400, 404 [enhancement based on grand theft and securities fraud counts].) Finally, in an argument similar to his prior assertion that the conspira 2021(CALCRIM No. 1804, see People v. Martinez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 686, 693 [enhancement based on Corporations Code violations and grand theft and conspiracy]; People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 16 [applying enhancement to grand theft]; People v. Mozes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1129 [defendant pled guilty to multiple counts of theft by false pretenses and admitted enhancement based on that charge]; People v. Frederick (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 400, 404 [enhancement based on grand theft and securities fraud counts].) Finally, in an argument similar to his prior assertion that the conspira | 2 | 2 |
| Hutchins v. Municipal Courtgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Belmontesgreen | 2 | 2 |
AREI II Casesgreen2 sentences2023Conspiracy Claim In addition to its claim that defendants violated the CFCA by submitting false claims, Edelweiss also alleges that defendants conspired to commit a violation of the CFCA by colluding to inflate interest rates on California VRDOs. (§ 12651, subd. (a)(3).) “To support a conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege the following elements: ‘(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct.’ ” (AREI II Cases (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1022 .) A conspiracy claim under the CFCA i 2023Conspiracy Claim In addition to its claim that defendants violated the CFCA by submitting false claims, Edelweiss also alleges that defendants conspired to commit a violation of the CFCA by colluding to inflate interest rates on California VRDOs. (§ 12651, subd. (a)(3).) “To support a conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege the following elements: ‘(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct.’ ” (AREI II Cases (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1022 .) A conspiracy claim under the CFCA i | 1 | 5 |
Rickley v. Goodfriendgreen2 sentences2023If the plaintiff seeks to plead a conspiracy claim against an attorney based on fraud or virtually any other common law tort theory, the claim falls within section 1714.10, subdivision (c)(1); the procedural requirements of section 1714.10, subdivision (a) do not apply (that is, the plaintiff need not demonstrate a 10. probability of prevailing on the merits); and the statute serves no screening function whatsoever.’” (Rickley v. Goodfriend (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1136 , 1150–1151.) “Put another way, ‘the effect of the [1991 amendment to section 1714.10] is anomalous. 2013The court shall order service of the petition upon the party against whom the action is proposed to be filed and permit that party to submit opposing affidavits prior to making its determination . . . .” However, section 1714.10, subdivision (a) does not apply to a conspiracy claim against an attorney if “(1) the attorney has an independent legal duty to the plaintiff, or (2) the attorney‟s acts go beyond the performance of a professional duty to serve the client and involve a conspiracy to violate a legal duty in furtherance of the attorney‟s financial gain.” (§ 1714.10, subd. (c).) This appe | 1 | 3 |
Central Concrete Supply Co., Inc. v. Bursakgreen2 sentences2026(Stueve, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 331 .) The first exception provides: “This section shall not apply to a cause of action against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his or her client, where (1) the attorney has an independent legal duty to the plaintiff[.]” (§ 1714.10, subd. (c).) This exception, codified in 1991, “mirror the limits on an attorney’s liability for conspiracy established by our Supreme Court in Doctors’ Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 39 .” (Central Concrete Supply Co., Inc. v. Bursak (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1092 , 1099–1100.) The Supreme Court concluded a conspir 2013The court shall order service of the petition upon the party against whom the action is proposed to be filed and permit that party to submit opposing affidavits prior to making its determination . . . .” However, section 1714.10, subdivision (a) does not apply to a conspiracy claim against an attorney if “(1) the attorney has an independent legal duty to the plaintiff, or (2) the attorney‟s acts go beyond the performance of a professional duty to serve the client and involve a conspiracy to violate a legal duty in furtherance of the attorney‟s financial gain.” (§ 1714.10, subd. (c).) This appe | 1 | 2 |
Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp.green2 sentences2025Allegations of Conspiracy The doctrine of civil conspiracy imposes liability on those who do not themselves commit a tort but who “ ‘share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.’ ” (Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581 .) To plead a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the formation and operation 5 of the conspiracy; wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy; and damages arising from the wrongful conduct. 2013To support a conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege the following elements: “(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful conduct.” (Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1581 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 752 ]; see Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 511 .) It is well settled that “ ‘[b]are’ allegations and ‘rank’ conjecture do not suffice for a civil conspiracy.” (Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 312, 333 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Kauffmangreen2 sentences2025Each is responsible for everything done by his confederates, which follows incidentally in the execution of the common design as one of its probable and natural consequences, even though it was not intended as a part of the original design or common plan.’” (People v. Kauffman, supra, at p. 334 ; see People v. Smith, supra, at pp. 616–617.) The authorities cited by defendant may illustrate the state of the law applicable to the issues discussed in those cases, but they do not 5 Not only did defendant fail to raise the issue in his opening brief, he also did not file a reply brief, although the 2016Each is responsible for everything done by his confederates, which follows incidentally in the execution of the common design as one of its probable and natural consequences, even though it was not intended as a part of the original design or common plan. . . .” (People v. Kauffman (1907) 152 Cal. 331, 334 (Kauffman); see also People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 261 .)9 The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of conspiracy and the criminal responsibility of each member of the conspiracy for the statements and acts of each other member of the conspiracy, for the purpose of ac | 1 | 2 |
| Gebardi v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Jourdaingreen | 1 | 2 |
| Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarchegreen | 1 | 2 |
| Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfieldgreen | 1 | 2 |
| College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Remirogreen | 1 | 2 |
| Klotz v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy CA2/1green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lewisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bouzasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Filip v. Bucurenciugreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Letner and Tobingreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Prettymanred | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rodriguesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Juradogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gonzalesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pavicich v. Santucci
green
2 sentences2026(Ibid.) In Pavicich v. Santucci (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 382 , the conspiracy claim alleged a corporation and its attorney conspired to conceal from the plaintiff, a potential investor, that other investors had threatened litigation against the venture. 2024The statute achieved this goal by requiring a prefiling judicial determination of a reasonable probability that the conspiracy claim was meritorious. ‘Both houses of the Legislature expressed concern over use of such claims as a tactical ploy, particularly in actions against insurance companies.’ [Citation.]” ( Pavicich, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 390–391.) 11 Subsequent to enactment of section 1714.10, our Supreme Court in Doctors’ Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 39 , 41–42 overruled Wolfrich, holding that “a conspiracy cause of action cannot lie ‘if the alleged conspirator, though a | 6 | 2005–2026 |
Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2026(Stueve, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 331 .) The first exception provides: “This section shall not apply to a cause of action against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his or her client, where (1) the attorney has an independent legal duty to the plaintiff[.]” (§ 1714.10, subd. (c).) This exception, codified in 1991, “mirror the limits on an attorney’s liability for conspiracy established by our Supreme Court in Doctors’ Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 39 .” (Central Concrete Supply Co., Inc. v. Bursak (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1092 , 1099–1100.) The Supreme Court concluded a conspir 2024The statute achieved this goal by requiring a prefiling judicial determination of a reasonable probability that the conspiracy claim was meritorious. ‘Both houses of the Legislature expressed concern over use of such claims as a tactical ploy, particularly in actions against insurance companies.’ [Citation.]” ( Pavicich, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 390–391.) 11 Subsequent to enactment of section 1714.10, our Supreme Court in Doctors’ Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 39 , 41–42 overruled Wolfrich, holding that “a conspiracy cause of action cannot lie ‘if the alleged conspirator, though a | 6 | 1994–2026 |
In Re Johnston
green
2 sentences2023(See People v. Pahl (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1651 (Pahl).) The language in Hamilton upon which Record relies is derived from Johnston, but Johnston itself limited its application to conspiracy cases. ( Pahl, supra, at p. 1658 ; Johnston, supra, 3 Cal.2d at p. 36 , italics added [“we cannot construe [section 954] to mean that an indictment or information charging conspiracy is sufficient” without an allegation of an overt act or when a defendant has been acquitted of all overt acts].) Hamilton accurately describes the conspiracy exception, “but it generalizes as if the exception applies to all cri 2023(See People v. Pahl (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1651 (Pahl).) The language in Hamilton upon which Record relies is derived from Johnston, but Johnston itself limited its application to conspiracy cases. ( Pahl, supra, at p. 1658 ; Johnston, supra, 3 Cal.2d at p. 36 , italics added [“we cannot construe [section 954] to mean that an indictment or information charging conspiracy is sufficient” without an allegation of an overt act or when a defendant has been acquitted of all overt acts].) Hamilton accurately describes the conspiracy exception, “but it generalizes as if the exception applies to all cri | 4 | 1991–2023 |
People v. Hamilton
green
2 sentences2023Because it does not, [the language in Hamilton] is inaccurate and misleading.” ( Pahl, supra, at p. 1660 .) Moreover, the language that Record relies on in Hamilton is dicta; Hamilton did not apply Johnston’s limited judicial exception to the case at bench—the Hamilton court ultimately declined to apply any exception as two charged offenses were not identical. ( Hamilton, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at pp. 130-131.) Finally, Record claims that there are several post-Johnston cases that have applied the exception described in Johnston to non-conspiracy cases. 1991(Id., at pp. 129-130.) Then, using language applicable to the conspiracy cases, the court said: “However, there is a limited judicial exception to this rule where all of the essential elements of the crime of which the defendant was acquitted are identical to some or all of the essential elements of the crime of which he was convicted, and proof of the crime of which the defendant was acquitted is necessary to sustain a conviction of the crime of which the defendant was found guilty. [Citing Guerrero, Johnston, and several Court of Appeal decisions.]” (Pe ople v. Hamilton, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d | 2 | 1991–2023 |
State ex rel. McCann v. Bank of America, N.A.
green
2 sentences2023(McCann, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 906 ; see also Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1136 [“Where fraud is alleged to be the object of the conspiracy, the claim must be pleaded with particularity”].) Defendants argue that Edelweiss’s conspiracy claim suffers from a “threshold failure” because its underlying allegations for CFCA violation are not sufficient. 2023(McCann, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 906 ; see also Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1136 [“Where fraud is alleged to be the object of the conspiracy, the claim must be pleaded with particularity”].) Defendants argue that Edelweiss’s conspiracy claim suffers from a “threshold failure” because its underlying allegations for CFCA violation are not sufficient. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Beck
green
2 sentences2023Referring to implied malice “ ‘could confuse jurors’ ” because “ ‘conspiracy to commit murder, may not be based on a theory of implied malice.’ ” (Beck and Cruz, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 642 .) When giving the conspiracy instruction, the murder instruction should be modified to delete references to implied malice. 2020As the Supreme Court recently explained in parallel circumstances in People v. Beck & Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 645 , despite the fact the court had mentioned the natural and probable consequences doctrine in the conspiracy instruction, “Beck and Cruz were charged with conspiracy to murder, not conspiracy to commit a lesser crime that resulted in murder. | 2 | 2020–2023 |
Park v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ.
green
2 sentences2022Standards of Review “We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion” and “exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected activity.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 ; see also Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 769 , 784 (Neurelis).) Similarly, “[w]e review the applicability of the commercial speech exemption independently.” (Simpson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 26 ; see Neurelis, supra, at p. 786.) “ ‘In addi 2021Standards of Review “We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion” and “exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected activity.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 ; see also Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 769 , 784 (Neurelis).) Similarly, “[w]e review the applicability of the commercial speech exemption independently.” (Simpson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 26 ; see Neurelis, supra, at p. 786.) “ ‘In addi | 2 | 2021–2022 |
Rusheen v. Cohen
green
2 sentences2021There, the Court of Appeal concluded the gravamen of the cross-complaint was a conspiracy to enforce the judgment (a noncommunicative act) that had been obtained by use of perjured declarations of service. ( Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1061-1062.) But the operative cross- complaint had abandoned a conspiracy claim, leaving only the filing of the perjured declarations of service as the allegedly wrongful conduct. 2013The majority argues that Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 516 , 128 P.3d 713 ] (Rusheen) is distinguishable because it applied the litigation privilege to postjudgment enforcement activities, but here defendants were obstructing rather than enforcing the judgment. | 2 | 2013–2021 |
People v. Palmer
green
2 sentences2020Therefore, the conspiracy exception, to the extent it 21 remains viable (see People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 860-865 ), does not apply ( Pahl, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1657-1660). 2015However, even in the context of conspiracy claims, the Supreme Court has “conclude[d] that the rule of consistency is a vestige of the past with no continuing validity.” (People v. Palmer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 856, 858 .) Even if the conspiracy exception were still viable, it would not apply here. | 2 | 2015–2020 |
Taye Addisu Mokhtar Al-Saeed Ghassan Abu Hemdeh v. Fred Meyer, Inc., a Delaware Corporation
green
2 sentences2018B&B and Paylock joined in the City’s brief; there is no indication the Parking Citation Assistance Center is independent of the City. 2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code. 2 On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting the demurrer as to the conspiracy claim because defendants “agreed to a plan that would allow City agent [B&B] and Paylock to boot and seize vehicles, and keep surplus proceeds from sale.” The SAC alleges the meetings took place in 2013–2015, but the SAC alleges the “black chev” was sold in 2010, before the alleged formation of the c 2018On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting the demurrer as to the conspiracy claim because defendants "agreed to a plan that would allow City agent [B&B] and Paylock to boot and seize vehicles, and keep surplus proceeds from sale." The SAC alleges the meetings took place in 2013-2015, but the SAC alleges the "black chev" was sold in 2010, before the alleged formation of the conspiracy . 3 Therefore, assuming there were proceeds left over from the sale that could have been used to pay the unpaid parking tickets, any failure of defendants to do so *764 in 2010 was not "an ac | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Morante green | 2 | 2017–2017 |
| Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures and Television green | 2 | 2015–2015 |
| Richard B. LeVine, Inc. v. Higashi green | 2 | 2013–2014 |
| Hazelwerdt v. Industrial Indemnity Exchange green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. Washington green | 2 | 1980–1994 |
| People v. Morales green | 2 | 1980–1988 |
| Adams v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Stueve v. Berger Kahn green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| People v. Chiu red | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Endres v. Moran green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Cortez green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Neal v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Young green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| United States v. Claiborne green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Von Villas green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Taylor v. Regents of University of California green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Lukovsky v. City and County of San Francisco green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Bland green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Armin v. Riverside Community Hospital green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Davis green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Forum Insurance v. Devere Ltd. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Gray1 CPB, LLC v. SCC Acquisitions, Inc. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Palmer v. Zaklama green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Wawanesa Mutual Ins. Co. v. Matlock green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Mattel, Inc. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Orloff v. Metropolitan Trust Co. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Chavers v. Gatke Corp. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Swain green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.