next assignment error in Mississippi

1983Assuming that we are required to say that the entire proof of the state was circumstantial proof, we have held that the accused under such a set of facts is only entitled to an instruction requiring the state to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond every reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." In Walton v. State, 212 Miss. 270 , 54 So.2d 391 (1951), this Court discussed the meaning of the phrase "to a moral certainty," and noted the word "reasonable doubt" and "moral certainty" to be used interchangeably and to be synonymous: *704 The next assignme

1983Assuming that we are required to say that the entire proof of the state was circumstantial proof, we have held that the accused under such a set of facts is only entitled to an instruction requiring the state to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond every reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." In Walton v. State, 212 Miss. 270 , 54 So.2d 391 (1951), this Court discussed the meaning of the phrase "to a moral certainty," and noted the word "reasonable doubt" and "moral certainty" to be used interchangeably and to be synonymous: *704 The next assignme

1968There we reaffirmed our former interpretation of section 6998-04 with all justices concurring except Justice Robertson who dissented and said: The next assignment of error relating to apportionment of compensation being effective from the date of the injury rather than from the date of the attorney-referee's order is not well taken as this issue was decided to the contrary in Sanders v. Walker Construction Company, 251 Miss. 352 , 169 So.2d 803 (1964), which was followed by Dillingham Manufacturing Company v. Upton, 252 Miss. 281, 288-289 , 172 So.2d 766, 769 (1965), wherein we stated: The rul

1968There we reaffirmed our former interpretation of section 6998-04 with all justices concurring except Justice Robertson who dissented and said: The next assignment of error relating to apportionment of compensation being effective from the date of the injury rather than from the date of the attorney-referee's order is not well taken as this issue was decided to the contrary in Sanders v. Walker Construction Company, 251 Miss. 352 , 169 So.2d 803 (1964), which was followed by Dillingham Manufacturing Company v. Upton, 252 Miss. 281, 288-289 , 172 So.2d 766, 769 (1965), wherein we stated: The rul

1987Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d 952 (Miss. 1985); Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136 (Miss. 1985); Jones v. State, 461 So.2d 686 (Miss. 1984); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1984).

1987Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d 952 (Miss. 1985); Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136 (Miss. 1985); Jones v. State, 461 So.2d 686 (Miss. 1984); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1984).

1987Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d 952 (Miss. 1985); Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136 (Miss. 1985); Jones v. State, 461 So.2d 686 (Miss. 1984); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1984).

1987Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d 952 (Miss. 1985); Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136 (Miss. 1985); Jones v. State, 461 So.2d 686 (Miss. 1984); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1984).

1987"Whether a witness ... possessed the required degree of specialized knowledge within a particular field to testify as an expert generally rests within the trial judge's sound discretion." Hooten v. State, 492 So.2d 948 (Miss. 1986).

1984Relying upon International Order of Twelve, Knights and Daughters of Tabor v. Marshall, 195 So.2d 66 (Miss.1967), they contend that before an employee can. be held liable to an employer for misappropriation of funds, it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence that the employee actually received the funds.

1983Assuming that we are required to say that the entire proof of the state was circumstantial proof, we have held that the accused under such a set of facts is only entitled to an instruction requiring the state to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond every reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." In Walton v. State, 212 Miss. 270 , 54 So.2d 391 (1951), this Court discussed the meaning of the phrase "to a moral certainty," and noted the word "reasonable doubt" and "moral certainty" to be used interchangeably and to be synonymous: *704 The next assignme

1983Assuming that we are required to say that the entire proof of the state was circumstantial proof, we have held that the accused under such a set of facts is only entitled to an instruction requiring the state to prove the guilt of the accused "beyond every reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." In Walton v. State, 212 Miss. 270 , 54 So.2d 391 (1951), this Court discussed the meaning of the phrase "to a moral certainty," and noted the word "reasonable doubt" and "moral certainty" to be used interchangeably and to be synonymous: *704 The next assignme

1979We have reached the conclusion that the presumption of invalidity was rebutted by the evidence; Hall v. Clements, 214 Miss. 445 , 58 So.2d 925 (1942); and surely we cannot state that the chancellor was manifestly wrong even though he did not mention the confidential relationship. ****** The next assignment of error is that the court erred in not cancelling the deed executed by the complainant to the defendant.

1979We have reached the conclusion that the presumption of invalidity was rebutted by the evidence; Hall v. Clements, 214 Miss. 445 , 58 So.2d 925 (1942); and surely we cannot state that the chancellor was manifestly wrong even though he did not mention the confidential relationship. ****** The next assignment of error is that the court erred in not cancelling the deed executed by the complainant to the defendant.

1973As long ago as 1856 in the divorce case of Armstrong v. Armstrong, 32 Miss. 279 , we stated with regard to support for the wife: There appears to be no fixed rule upon this subject, but it depends upon the discretion of the court, to be exercised with reference to an equitable view of all the circumstances of the particular case, the only general rule being, that *450 the wife is entitled to a support corresponding to her rank and condition in life, and the estate of her husband.

1968This question has been foreclosed in Mississippi by Pendergraft v. State, 191 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1966), and State v. Hall, 187 So.2d 861 (Miss. 1966), both cases being based upon Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated section 1762 (1956) wherein the legislative intent was expressed as to who are competent jurors, "[e]very male citizen not under the age of twenty-one years * * *." It is the opinion of this Court that legislative enactment rather than judicial action is necessary to modify or change the plain intent of the statute.

1968This question has been foreclosed in Mississippi by Pendergraft v. State, 191 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1966), and State v. Hall, 187 So.2d 861 (Miss. 1966), both cases being based upon Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated section 1762 (1956) wherein the legislative intent was expressed as to who are competent jurors, "[e]very male citizen not under the age of twenty-one years * * *." It is the opinion of this Court that legislative enactment rather than judicial action is necessary to modify or change the plain intent of the statute.

1965The next assignment of error, that the lower court erred in failing to discharge the defendant on the grounds that he was illegally arrested in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and that the court erred in admitting* the confessions of the defendant, both oral and written, pistol and articles of clothing, into evidence as they were the fruit of this *777 illegal arrest, is based upon the case of Gatlin v. United States, 326 F. 2d 666 (D.C.

1964The case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Paul Sims, 77 Miss. 325 , 27 So. 527 , made this comment upon the negligence of a gratitous bailee: ‘ ‘ Why the contributory negligence of a gratitous bailee, while using the property for the very purpose for which it was loaned, should not be imputed to the bailor who intrusted it to the bailee to be thus used, we are unable to see.

1962In the case of Reed v. Reed, 98 Miss. 350 , 53 So. 691 , this Court held a tax deed was void because no grantee was named in the deed, and pointed out that a deed in blank does not pass title or interest.

1962In the case of Reed v. Reed, 98 Miss. 350 , 53 So. 691 , this Court held a tax deed was void because no grantee was named in the deed, and pointed out that a deed in blank does not pass title or interest.

1923As said in King v. State, 66 Miss. 502 , 6 So. 188 , the general rule is that the issue on a criminal trial shall be single, and the testimony must be confined to the issue, and on a trial of a person for one offense the prosecution cannot aid the proof against him by evidence that he committed other offenses.