Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
17 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rowellgreen2 sentences2020See State v. Klasner, 1914-NMSC-015 , ¶ 1, 19 N.M. 474 , 145 P. 679 . {23} The traditional iteration of the single-larceny doctrine is that “when several articles of property are stolen by the defendant from the same owner at the same time and at the same place, only one larceny is committed.” State v. Rowell, 1995-NMSC- 079, ¶ 15, 121 N.M. 111 , 908 P.2d 1379 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 2020See State v. Klasner, 1914-NMSC-015 , ¶ 1, 19 N.M. 474 , 145 P. 679 . {23} The traditional iteration of the single-larceny doctrine is that “when several articles of property are stolen by the defendant from the same owner at the same time and at the same place, only one larceny is committed.” State v. Rowell, 1995-NMSC- 079, ¶ 15, 121 N.M. 111 , 908 P.2d 1379 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). | 5 | 6 |
State v. Morrogreen2 sentences2022Cf. Morro, 1999-NMCA-118, ¶ 22 (noting potential inconsistency between the unit-of-prosecution analysis and the single-larceny doctrine because “[t]he single-larceny doctrine is a departure from the general rule that multiple charges are appropriate when there are multiple victims”). 2022Cf. Morro, 1999-NMCA-118, ¶ 23 (“When there is a long 3 history regarding the unit of prosecution under a particular statute, as there is with 4 the single-larceny doctrine, then principles of stare decisis in statutory interpretation 5 argue strongly for continuing that interpretation, even when the tools—that is, 6 canons—of statutory interpretation have evolved with respect to analyzing the 7 question.”). | 4 | 8 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2022See State v. Brown, 1992-NMCA-028 , ¶ 13, 113 N.M. 631 , 830 P.2d 183 (analyzing the unit of prosecution of generic larceny under the Herron framework and noting that “had we applied [the single-larceny doctrine] rather than Herron, we would have reached the same result”). 2022See State v. Brown, 1992-NMCA-028 , ¶ 13, 113 N.M. 631 , 830 P.2d 183 (analyzing the unit of prosecution of generic larceny under the Herron framework and noting that “had we applied [the single-larceny doctrine] rather than Herron, we would have reached the same result”). | 3 | 6 |
State v. Boergadinegreen2 sentences2022See Rowell, 1995-NMSC-079 , ¶¶ 15-20 (noting that the 2 Legislature worked to restrict the application of the single-larceny doctrine to 3 embezzlement cases after State v. Brooks, 1994-NMSC-062 , 117 N.M. 751 , 877 4 P.2d 557 , and declining incidentally to extend the doctrine to attempted fraud under 5 the Computer Crimes Act); see also State v. Boergadine, 2005-NMCA-028, ¶ 29 , 6 137 N.M. 92 , 107 P.3d 532 (declining to extend the single-larceny doctrine to fraud 7 pursuant to legislative outcomes of Brooks). 2022See Rowell, 1995-NMSC-079 , ¶¶ 15-20 (noting that the 2 Legislature worked to restrict the application of the single-larceny doctrine to 3 embezzlement cases after State v. Brooks, 1994-NMSC-062 , 117 N.M. 751 , 877 4 P.2d 557 , and declining incidentally to extend the doctrine to attempted fraud under 5 the Computer Crimes Act); see also State v. Boergadine, 2005-NMCA-028, ¶ 29 , 6 137 N.M. 92 , 107 P.3d 532 (declining to extend the single-larceny doctrine to fraud 7 pursuant to legislative outcomes of Brooks). | 3 | 5 |
State v. Bernalgreen2 sentences2020See Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 30 (declining to extend the single-larceny doctrine to the crime of robbery); State v. Baca, 1997-NMSC-018, ¶ 11 , 123 N.M. 124 , 934 P.2d 1053 (declining to extend the single-larceny doctrine to the crime of forgery); Rowell, 1995-NMSC-079 , ¶ 20 (declining to extend the doctrine where the larcenous scheme involved multiple victims, locations, and time periods); Bernard, 2015-NMCA-089, ¶ 21 (declining to extend the single- larceny doctrine to the crime of possession of a stolen vehicle); State v. Boergadine, 2005-NMCA-028, ¶ 29 , 137 N.M. 92 , 107 P.3d 532 (declin 2015See e.g., Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 30 (declining to extend 3 the single-larceny doctrine to determine the unit of prosecution for the crime of 4 robbery); State v. Boergadine, 2005-NMCA-028, ¶ 29 , 137 N.M. 92 , 107 P.3d 532 5 (declining to extend the single-larceny doctrine to determine the unit of prosecution 6 for the crime of fraud); State v. Morro, 1999-NMCA-118, ¶ 26 , 127 N.M. 763 , 987 7 P.2d 420 (declining to extend the single-larceny doctrine to determine the unit of 8 prosecution for the crime of defacing tombs). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Brooksgreen2 sentences2022See Rowell, 1995-NMSC-079 , ¶¶ 15- 20 (noting that the Legislature worked to restrict the application of the single-larceny doctrine to embezzlement cases after State v. Brooks, 1994-NMSC-062 , 117 N.M. 751 , 877 P.2d 557 , and declining incidentally to extend the doctrine to attempted fraud under the Computer Crimes Act); see also State v. Boergadine, 2005-NMCA-028, ¶ 29 , 137 N.M. 92 , 107 P.3d 532 (declining to extend the single-larceny doctrine to fraud pursuant to legislative outcomes of Brooks). 2022See Rowell, 1995-NMSC-079 , ¶¶ 15-20 (noting that the 2 Legislature worked to restrict the application of the single-larceny doctrine to 3 embezzlement cases after State v. Brooks, 1994-NMSC-062 , 117 N.M. 751 , 877 4 P.2d 557 , and declining incidentally to extend the doctrine to attempted fraud under 5 the Computer Crimes Act); see also State v. Boergadine, 2005-NMCA-028, ¶ 29 , 6 137 N.M. 92 , 107 P.3d 532 (declining to extend the single-larceny doctrine to fraud 7 pursuant to legislative outcomes of Brooks). | 2 | 5 |
State v. Alvarez-Lopezgreen2 sentences2022However, we will not apply the single-larceny doctrine if legislative intent is unambiguous, id., or if the doctrine appears contrary to legislative intent. 2020Single-Larceny Doctrine {22} The single-larceny doctrine, also known as the single criminal intent doctrine, is “a canon of construction used when the Legislature’s intent regarding multiple punishments is ambiguous.” Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 43 (holding that the doctrine was inapplicable in that case because the Legislature’s intent was clear). | 1 | 6 |
State v. Brooksgreen2 sentences2022See Rowell, 1995-NMSC-079 , ¶¶ 15- 20 (noting that the Legislature worked to restrict the application of the single-larceny doctrine to embezzlement cases after State v. Brooks, 1994-NMSC-062 , 117 N.M. 751 , 877 P.2d 557 , and declining incidentally to extend the doctrine to attempted fraud under the Computer Crimes Act); see also State v. Boergadine, 2005-NMCA-028, ¶ 29 , 137 N.M. 92 , 107 P.3d 532 (declining to extend the single-larceny doctrine to fraud pursuant to legislative outcomes of Brooks). 2019State v. Brooks, 1994-NMSC-062 , ¶¶ 6, 9, 117 N.M. 751 , 877 P.2d 557 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-017 , ¶ 9, 121 N.M. 337 , 911 P.2d 231 (“Under the single[-]larceny doctrine, if a series of acts cannot be said as a matter of law to be either a single crime or separate crimes, the factual question of intent must be decided by the jury.”). {9} While defendants often rely on the single-larceny doctrine as a means of avoiding multiple convictions for a series of acts, sometimes, as in this case, the doctrine may work to the advantage of the Sta | 1 | 4 |
State v. Klasnergreen2 sentences2020See State v. Klasner, 1914-NMSC-015 , ¶ 1, 19 N.M. 474 , 145 P. 679 . {23} The traditional iteration of the single-larceny doctrine is that “when several articles of property are stolen by the defendant from the same owner at the same time and at the same place, only one larceny is committed.” State v. Rowell, 1995-NMSC- 079, ¶ 15, 121 N.M. 111 , 908 P.2d 1379 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 1999Thus, it is not surprising that we reaffirmed the single-larceny doctrine using the Herron approach, see Brown, 113 N.M. at 632-34 , 830 P.2d at 184-86 , even though prior decisions had used a different analysis in support of the doctrine, see State v. Klasner, 19 N.M. 474, 477-78 , 145 P. 679 , 680 (1914); State v. Boeglin, 90 N.M. 93, 94-96 , 559 P.2d 1220, 1221-23 (Ct.App.1977). {24} In any event, there are important features of the crime of larceny that can explain why the existence of multiple victims may not be dispositive. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Bernardgreen2 sentences2022Cf. State v. Bernard, 2015-NMCA-089, ¶ 21 , 355 P.3d 831 (“We decline to extend the single-larceny doctrine to this case. 2022Cf. State v. Bernard, 2015-NMCA-089, ¶ 21 , 355 P.3d 831 (“We decline 9 to extend the single-larceny doctrine to this case. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Pedroncelligreen2 sentences2020See State v. Pedroncelli, 1984- NMSC-009, ¶ 10, 100 N.M. 678 , 675 P.2d 127 (affirming the defendant’s single conviction for embezzlement after considering the single-larceny doctrine and noting that a fact-finder may determine whether the successive takings or conversions are associated with a single, sustained criminal intent); Allen, 1955-NMSC-015 , ¶ 8 (applying the single-larceny doctrine to a series of takings); Klasner, 1914-NMSC-015 , ¶ 1 (holding that the taking of property from the same location at the same time, although belonging to separate individuals, could be punished as a sing 2020See State v. Pedroncelli, 1984- NMSC-009, ¶ 10, 100 N.M. 678 , 675 P.2d 127 (affirming the defendant’s single conviction for embezzlement after considering the single-larceny doctrine and noting that a fact-finder may determine whether the successive takings or conversions are associated with a single, sustained criminal intent); Allen, 1955-NMSC-015 , ¶ 8 (applying the single-larceny doctrine to a series of takings); Klasner, 1914-NMSC-015 , ¶ 1 (holding that the taking of property from the same location at the same time, although belonging to separate individuals, could be punished as a sing | 1 | 3 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2020Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2019) (non-precedential) (applying the single-larceny doctrine to the defendant’s multiple acts of embezzlement); State v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-017 , ¶¶ 8-10, 121 N.M. 337 , 911 P.2d 231 (applying the single-larceny doctrine to the defendant’s multiple convictions for unlawful dealing in food coupons over time, a form of larceny); Brown, 1992-NMCA-028 , ¶ 13 (concluding that application of the single-larceny doctrine to the defendant’s multiple convictions for larceny from two separate victims would lead to a single larceny because there was only one taking); State v. Boeglin, 1 2020Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2019) (non-precedential) (applying the single-larceny doctrine to the defendant’s multiple acts of embezzlement); State v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-017 , ¶¶ 8-10, 121 N.M. 337 , 911 P.2d 231 (applying the single-larceny doctrine to the defendant’s multiple convictions for unlawful dealing in food coupons over time, a form of larceny); Brown, 1992-NMCA-028 , ¶ 13 (concluding that application of the single-larceny doctrine to the defendant’s multiple convictions for larceny from two separate victims would lead to a single larceny because there was only one taking); State v. Boeglin, 1 | 1 | 2 |
State v. Boeglingreen2 sentences2020Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2019) (non-precedential) (applying the single-larceny doctrine to the defendant’s multiple acts of embezzlement); State v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-017 , ¶¶ 8-10, 121 N.M. 337 , 911 P.2d 231 (applying the single-larceny doctrine to the defendant’s multiple convictions for unlawful dealing in food coupons over time, a form of larceny); Brown, 1992-NMCA-028 , ¶ 13 (concluding that application of the single-larceny doctrine to the defendant’s multiple convictions for larceny from two separate victims would lead to a single larceny because there was only one taking); State v. Boeglin, 1 2020Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2019) (non-precedential) (applying the single-larceny doctrine to the defendant’s multiple acts of embezzlement); State v. Johnson, 1996-NMCA-017 , ¶¶ 8-10, 121 N.M. 337 , 911 P.2d 231 (applying the single-larceny doctrine to the defendant’s multiple convictions for unlawful dealing in food coupons over time, a form of larceny); Brown, 1992-NMCA-028 , ¶ 13 (concluding that application of the single-larceny doctrine to the defendant’s multiple convictions for larceny from two separate victims would lead to a single larceny because there was only one taking); State v. Boeglin, 1 | 1 | 2 |
Vuilleumier v. Kelleygreen1 sentence2022See Rowell, 1995-NMSC-079 , ¶¶ 15-20 (noting that the 2 Legislature worked to restrict the application of the single-larceny doctrine to 3 embezzlement cases after State v. Brooks, 1994-NMSC-062 , 117 N.M. 751 , 877 4 P.2d 557 , and declining incidentally to extend the doctrine to attempted fraud under 5 the Computer Crimes Act); see also State v. Boergadine, 2005-NMCA-028, ¶ 29 , 6 137 N.M. 92 , 107 P.3d 532 (declining to extend the single-larceny doctrine to fraud 7 pursuant to legislative outcomes of Brooks). | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. Morgangreen1 sentence2020Thus, while the State may be correct in asserting that Defendant, through separate transactions involving separate property, committed both fraud and embezzlement, we cannot conclude that the complaint supplied Defendant with an adequate understanding that that was what he was pleading guilty to. most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit[,]” Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976), such a presumption is only appropriate if there is a factual basis for applying it. | 1 | 1 |
Sangre De Cristo Development Corp. v. City of Santa Fegreen2 sentences2020See id. ¶¶ 28-30 (examining, for purposes of the second step of the analysis, the state’s regulatory scheme as evidence of the Legislature’s intent). 84 N.M. 343 , 503 P.2d 323 (“The general rule is that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.”). {27} As the State correctly observes, our courts have never squarely reconciled the single-larceny doctrine with the modern unit of prosecution analysis. 2020See id. ¶¶ 28-30 (examining, for purposes of the second step of the analysis, the state’s regulatory scheme as evidence of the Legislature’s intent). 84 N.M. 343 , 503 P.2d 323 (“The general rule is that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.”). {27} As the State correctly observes, our courts have never squarely reconciled the single-larceny doctrine with the modern unit of prosecution analysis. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2006State v. Collins, 174 W.Va. 767 , 329 S.E.2d 839, 842 (1984). 2006State v. Collins, 174 W.Va. 767 , 329 S.E.2d 839, 842 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Patterson v. McLean Credit Unionred2 sentences1999See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 , 109 S.Ct. 2363 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (stare decisis has “special force” in statutory interpretation). 1999See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 , 109 S.Ct. 2363 , 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (stare decisis has “special force” in statutory interpretation). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Maggardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Perlsteingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hall v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Allen
green
2 sentences2022The single-larceny doctrine was expressly adopted by this Court in State v. Allen, 1955-NMSC-015 , ¶¶ 4-7, 59 N.M. 139 , 280 P.2d 298 . 2022The single-larceny doctrine was expressly adopted by this Court in State v. Allen, 1955-NMSC-015 , ¶¶ 4-7, 59 N.M. 139 , 280 P.2d 298 . | 3 | 2019–2022 |
State v. Torres
green
2 sentences2022Torres, 2021-NMCA-045, ¶¶ 22-28 . 2022Stepping outside of the Herron framework, the Court of Appeals relied on 11 the common-law rule known as the single-larceny doctrine, stating that “[w]hen we 12 apply the single-larceny doctrine to interpret the unit of prosecution in the larceny 13 of livestock provision, it clarifies that a taking of multiple head of cattle at the same 14 time and place (single transaction), or a series of takings from a single owner with a 15 single criminal intent (single intent), constitute[s] but one larceny” and holding that 16 Defendants Torres and Hendrix could be prosecuted for each episode of 1 The | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Sanchez v. State
green
2 sentences2015Additionally, the single-larceny doctrine by its own definition refers to the taking of property, and application of the single-larceny doctrine is inappropriate in this case because the jury was not required to find that Defendant actually unlawfully took the vehicles. {22} In support of his argument for extension of the single-larceny doctrine to possession of a stolen vehicle, Defendant cites Sanchez v. State for the proposition that “[t]he simultaneous possession of stolen items owned by different individuals is a single act constituting one offense.” 1982-NMSC-012 , ¶ 10, 97 N.M. 445 , 64 2015Additionally, the single-larceny 9 doctrine by its own definition refers to the taking of property, and application of the 10 single-larceny doctrine is inappropriate in this case because the jury was not required 11 to find that Defendant actually unlawfully took the vehicles. 12 {22} In support of his argument for extension of the single-larceny doctrine to 13 possession of a stolen vehicle, Defendant cites Sanchez v. State for the proposition 14 that “[t]he simultaneous possession of stolen items owned by different individuals is 15 a single act constituting one offense.” 1982-NMSC-012 , ¶ | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Watkins
green
2 sentences2015Defendant’s reliance 15 on State v. Watkins, 2008-NMCA-060 , 144 N.M. 66 , 183 P.3d 951 , as evidence of 16 our application of the doctrine in a unit of prosecution case, is misplaced. 2015Defendant’s reliance 15 on State v. Watkins, 2008-NMCA-060 , 144 N.M. 66 , 183 P.3d 951 , as evidence of 16 our application of the doctrine in a unit of prosecution case, is misplaced. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Brooks
green
2 sentences1994The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, State v. Brooks, 116 N.M. 309 , 862 P.2d 57 (Ct.App.1993), and we issued our writ of certiorari to review the single-larceny question. 1994The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, State v. Brooks, 116 N.M. 309 , 862 P.2d 57 (Ct.App.1993), and we issued our writ of certiorari to review the single-larceny question. | 2 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Baca
green
2 sentences2020See Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 30 (declining to extend the single-larceny doctrine to the crime of robbery); State v. Baca, 1997-NMSC-018, ¶ 11 , 123 N.M. 124 , 934 P.2d 1053 (declining to extend the single-larceny doctrine to the crime of forgery); Rowell, 1995-NMSC-079 , ¶ 20 (declining to extend the doctrine where the larcenous scheme involved multiple victims, locations, and time periods); Bernard, 2015-NMCA-089, ¶ 21 (declining to extend the single- larceny doctrine to the crime of possession of a stolen vehicle); State v. Boergadine, 2005-NMCA-028, ¶ 29 , 137 N.M. 92 , 107 P.3d 532 (declin 2020See Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 30 (declining to extend the single-larceny doctrine to the crime of robbery); State v. Baca, 1997-NMSC-018, ¶ 11 , 123 N.M. 124 , 934 P.2d 1053 (declining to extend the single-larceny doctrine to the crime of forgery); Rowell, 1995-NMSC-079 , ¶ 20 (declining to extend the doctrine where the larcenous scheme involved multiple victims, locations, and time periods); Bernard, 2015-NMCA-089, ¶ 21 (declining to extend the single- larceny doctrine to the crime of possession of a stolen vehicle); State v. Boergadine, 2005-NMCA-028, ¶ 29 , 137 N.M. 92 , 107 P.3d 532 (declin | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Natoni
green
2 sentences2015State v. Richardson, 1992-NMCA-041 , ¶ 5, 113 N.M. 740 , 832 P.2d 801 (“[A] ‘motor vehicle’ is but a subset or subgroup of the larger category ‘vehicle’[.]”); cf. State v. Natoni, 2012-NMCA-062, ¶ 14 , 282 P.3d 769 (holding that an ATV qualifies as a “vehicle” for purposes of Section 66-1-4.19(B) and the Motor Vehicle Code’s DWI statute, NMSA 1978, § 66-8-102(A) (2010)). 8 {21} We decline to extend the single-larceny doctrine to this case. 2015State v. Richardson, 1992-NMCA-041 , ¶ 5, 113 N.M. 740 , 832 P.2d 801 (“[A] ‘motor vehicle’ is but a subset or subgroup of the larger category ‘vehicle’[.]”); cf. State v. Natoni, 2012-NMCA-062, ¶ 14 , 282 P.3d 769 (holding that an ATV qualifies as a “vehicle” for purposes of Section 66-1-4.19(B) and the Motor Vehicle Code’s DWI statute, NMSA 1978, § 66-8-102(A) (2010)). 8 {21} We decline to extend the single-larceny doctrine to this case. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Richardson
green
2 sentences2015State v. Richardson, 1992-NMCA-041 , ¶ 5, 113 N.M. 740 , 832 P.2d 801 (“[A] ‘motor vehicle’ is but a subset or subgroup of the larger category ‘vehicle’[.]”); cf. State v. Natoni, 2012-NMCA-062, ¶ 14 , 282 P.3d 769 (holding that an ATV qualifies as a “vehicle” for purposes of Section 66-1-4.19(B) and the Motor Vehicle Code’s DWI statute, NMSA 1978, § 66-8-102(A) (2010)). 8 {21} We decline to extend the single-larceny doctrine to this case. 2015State v. Richardson, 1992-NMCA-041 , ¶ 5, 113 N.M. 740 , 832 P.2d 801 (“[A] ‘motor vehicle’ is but a subset or subgroup of the larger category ‘vehicle’[.]”); cf. State v. Natoni, 2012-NMCA-062, ¶ 14 , 282 P.3d 769 (holding that an ATV qualifies as a “vehicle” for purposes of Section 66-1-4.19(B) and the Motor Vehicle Code’s DWI statute, NMSA 1978, § 66-8-102(A) (2010)). 8 {21} We decline to extend the single-larceny doctrine to this case. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Sanchez v. State
green
2 sentences2015Additionally, the single-larceny doctrine by its own definition refers to the taking of property, and application of the single-larceny doctrine is inappropriate in this case because the jury was not required to find that Defendant actually unlawfully took the vehicles. {22} In support of his argument for extension of the single-larceny doctrine to possession of a stolen vehicle, Defendant cites Sanchez v. State for the proposition that “[t]he simultaneous possession of stolen items owned by different individuals is a single act constituting one offense.” 1982-NMSC-012 , ¶ 10, 97 N.M. 445 , 64 2015Additionally, the single-larceny doctrine by its own definition refers to the taking of property, and application of the single-larceny doctrine is inappropriate in this case because the jury was not required to find that Defendant actually unlawfully took the vehicles. {22} In support of his argument for extension of the single-larceny doctrine to possession of a stolen vehicle, Defendant cites Sanchez v. State for the proposition that “[t]he simultaneous possession of stolen items owned by different individuals is a single act constituting one offense.” 1982-NMSC-012 , ¶ 10, 97 N.M. 445 , 64 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. White
green
2 sentences2004Although the single-larceny doctrine has been adopted and applied in many different ways in a number of other jurisdictions, see, e.g., State v. White, 348 Md. 179 , 702 A.2d 1263 (1997), the doctrine is a canon of construction used when the Legislature's intent regarding multiple punishments is ambiguous. 2004Although the single-larceny doctrine has been adopted and applied in many different ways in a number of other jurisdictions, see, e.g., State v. White, 348 Md. 179 , 702 A.2d 1263 (1997), the doctrine is a canon of construction used when the Legislature's intent regarding multiple punishments is ambiguous. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Herron v. State
green
2 sentences1999In contrast, if we were to adopt Defendant’s view of Section 30-12-13, there would be no additional statutory penalty for continuing a destructive episode to include more and more gravestones. {26} We recognize the tension between the single-larceny doctrine and the general rule expressed in Herron and Barr that “ ‘multiple victims will likely give rise to multiple offenses.’ ” Barr, 1999-NMCA-081, ¶ 16 , 127 N.M. 504 , 984 P.2d 185 (quoting Herron, 111 N.M. at 361 , 805 P.2d at 628 ). 1999In contrast, if we were to adopt Defendant’s view of Section 30-12-13, there would be no additional statutory penalty for continuing a destructive episode to include more and more gravestones. {26} We recognize the tension between the single-larceny doctrine and the general rule expressed in Herron and Barr that “ ‘multiple victims will likely give rise to multiple offenses.’ ” Barr, 1999-NMCA-081, ¶ 16 , 127 N.M. 504 , 984 P.2d 185 (quoting Herron, 111 N.M. at 361 , 805 P.2d at 628 ). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Barr
green
2 sentences1999In contrast, if we were to adopt Defendant’s view of Section 30-12-13, there would be no additional statutory penalty for continuing a destructive episode to include more and more gravestones. {26} We recognize the tension between the single-larceny doctrine and the general rule expressed in Herron and Barr that “ ‘multiple victims will likely give rise to multiple offenses.’ ” Barr, 1999-NMCA-081, ¶ 16 , 127 N.M. 504 , 984 P.2d 185 (quoting Herron, 111 N.M. at 361 , 805 P.2d at 628 ). 1999In contrast, if we were to adopt Defendant’s view of Section 30-12-13, there would be no additional statutory penalty for continuing a destructive episode to include more and more gravestones. {26} We recognize the tension between the single-larceny doctrine and the general rule expressed in Herron and Barr that “ ‘multiple victims will likely give rise to multiple offenses.’ ” Barr, 1999-NMCA-081, ¶ 16 , 127 N.M. 504 , 984 P.2d 185 (quoting Herron, 111 N.M. at 361 , 805 P.2d at 628 ). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Hambley green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Downing v. Securities & Exchange Commission green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Colbert v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.