17 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1978–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hernandez v. Kaismangreen2 sentences2018Similarly, in Hernandez ( 103 AD3d at 106 ), where the issue of termination was not before us, we did not apply the Bennett test in concluding that summary judgment should be denied under the City Human Rights Law based on comments and emails which objectified women's bodies. 2018Similarly, in Hernandez ( 103 AD3d at 106 ), where the issue of termination was not before us, we did not apply the Bennett test in concluding that summary judgment should be denied under the City Human Rights Law based on comments and emails which objectified women's bodies. | 2 | 2 |
Chin v. New York City Housing Authoritygreen2 sentences2018Auth. , 106 AD3d at 444-445 [City HRL retaliation and hostile work environment claims], where, as here, no evidence is presented to rebut any of defendants' proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions, plaintiff's discrimination claims must fail ( see Arifi , 147 AD3d at 551 [the plaintiff's failure to present any evidence of discriminatory animus in response to the defendant corporation's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for its actions was "fatal" to the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, citing Cadet-Legros at 202 ; Bennett at 39-40 ]; see also Chin , 106 AD3d at 444-44 2018Auth. , 106 AD3d at 444-445 [City HRL retaliation and hostile work environment claims], where, as here, no evidence is presented to rebut any of defendants' proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions, plaintiff's discrimination claims must fail ( see Arifi , 147 AD3d at 551 [the plaintiff's failure to present any evidence of discriminatory animus in response to the defendant corporation's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for its actions was "fatal" to the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, citing Cadet-Legros at 202 ; Bennett at 39-40 ]; see also Chin , 106 AD3d at 444-44 | 2 | 2 |
Kim v. Goldberg, Weprin, Finkel, Goldstein, LLPgreen2 sentences2018In Kim , we applied the Bennett framework to a plaintiff's claim that she was terminated in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity, and we found triable issues of fact as to whether the employer's workforce reduction was a pretext for that termination ( see id. at 25). 2018In Kim , we applied the Bennett framework to a plaintiff's claim that she was terminated in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity, and we found triable issues of fact as to whether the employer's workforce reduction was a pretext for that termination ( see id. at 25). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Torrientegreen2 sentences2018Co., Inc. , 147 AD3d 551 , 551 [1st Dept 2017] [applying Bennett analysis to City HRL hostile work environment claim]; Ji Sun Jennifer Kim v Goldberg, Weprin, Finkel, Goldstein, LLP , 120 AD3d 18, 25-26 [1st Dept 2014] [City HRL retaliatory discharge and gender/pregnancy discrimination claims]; Chin v New York City Hous. 2018Co., Inc. , 147 AD3d 551 , 551 [1st Dept 2017] [applying Bennett analysis to City HRL hostile work environment claim]; Ji Sun Jennifer Kim v Goldberg, Weprin, Finkel, Goldstein, LLP , 120 AD3d 18, 25-26 [1st Dept 2014] [City HRL retaliatory discharge and gender/pregnancy discrimination claims]; Chin v New York City Hous. | 2 | 2 |
Sandiford v. City of New York Department of Educationgreen2 sentences2012Sandiford v City of New York Dept. of Educ., 94 AD3d 593, 595 [2012]). . 2012Sandiford v City of New York Dept. of Educ., 94 AD3d 593, 595 [2012]). . | 2 | 2 |
Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Associatesgreen2 sentences2011Addressing first the motion of the Bennett defendants, we conclude that the court properly granted that part of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action against them inasmuch as “[plaintiff’s fall . . . was not an elevation-related risk that calls for any of the protective devices of the types listed in Labor Law § 240 (1)” (Lessard v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 277 AD2d 941, 941 [2000]; see generally Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]). 2011Addressing first the motion of the Bennett defendants, we conclude that the court properly granted that part of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action against them inasmuch as “[p]laintiff’s fall . . . was not an elevation-related risk that calls for any of the protective devices of the types listed in Labor Law § 240 (1)” (Lessard v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 277 AD2d 941, 941 ; see generally Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 ). | 2 | 2 |
Amantia v. Barden & Robeson Corp.green2 sentences2011We further conclude that the court properly granted that part of the motion of the Bennett defendants with respect to the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action against them inasmuch as the specific Industrial Code section upon which plaintiff relies on appeal does not apply to the facts of this case. 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (f), entitled “[v]ertical passage,” provides that “[stairways, ramps or runways shall be provided as the means of access to working levels above or below ground except where the nature or the progress of the work prevents their installation in which case ladders or other safe means o 2011We further conclude that the court properly granted that part of the motion of the Bennett defendants with respect to the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action against them inasmuch as the specific Industrial Code section upon which plaintiff relies on appeal does not apply to the facts of this case. 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (f), entitled “[v]ertical passage,” provides that “[s]tairways, ramps or runways shall be provided as the means of access to working levels above or below ground except where the nature or the progress of the work prevents their installation in which case ladders or other safe means | 2 | 2 |
Bennett v. Jeffreysgreen2 sentences2008Finally, support for the position that an equity test is not appropriate in a surrendered grandparent visitation case is the Court of Appeals decision Ronald FF. v Cindy GG.: “[Visitation is a subspecies of custody, but the differences in degree in these relational categories is so great and so fundamental that rules like the Bennett rule, which have been carefully crafted and made available only to custody disputes, should not be casually extended to the visitation field.” ( 70 NY2d 141, 144 [1987], citing Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543 [1976].) Ronald FF. stands for the propositio 2008Finally, support for the position that an equity test is not appropriate in a surrendered grandparent visitation case is the Court of Appeals decision Ronald FF. v Cindy GG.: “[Visitation is a subspecies of custody, but the differences in degree in these relational categories is so great and so fundamental that rules like the Bennett rule, which have been carefully crafted and made available only to custody disputes, should not be casually extended to the visitation field.” ( 70 NY2d 141, 144 [1987], citing Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543 [1976].) Ronald FF. stands for the propositio | 1 | 4 |
McCormick v. 257 W. Genesee, LLCgreen2 sentences2011Genesee, LLC, 78 AD3d 1581, 1583 [2010]; Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984 [1994]). 2011Genesee, LLC, 78 AD3d 1581, 1583 ; Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984 ). | 1 | 2 |
Lessard v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.green2 sentences2011Addressing first the motion of the Bennett defendants, we conclude that the court properly granted that part of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action against them inasmuch as “[plaintiff’s fall . . . was not an elevation-related risk that calls for any of the protective devices of the types listed in Labor Law § 240 (1)” (Lessard v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 277 AD2d 941, 941 [2000]; see generally Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]). 2011Addressing first the motion of the Bennett defendants, we conclude that the court properly granted that part of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action against them inasmuch as “[p]laintiff’s fall . . . was not an elevation-related risk that calls for any of the protective devices of the types listed in Labor Law § 240 (1)” (Lessard v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 277 AD2d 941, 941 ; see generally Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 ). | 1 | 2 |
Plump v. Wyoming Countygreen2 sentences2011It is well established that “the surface of a flatbed truck does not constitute an elevated work surface for purposes of Labor Law § 240 (1)” (Plump v Wyoming County, 298 AD2d 886, 886 [2002]; see Toefer v Long Is. 2011It is well established that “the surface of a flatbed truck does not constitute an elevated work surface for purposes of Labor Law § 240 (1)” (Plump v Wyoming County, 298 AD2d 886, 886 ; see Toefer v Long Is. | 1 | 2 |
Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG.green2 sentences2008Finally, support for the position that an equity test is not appropriate in a surrendered grandparent visitation case is the Court of Appeals decision Ronald FF. v Cindy GG.: “[Visitation is a subspecies of custody, but the differences in degree in these relational categories is so great and so fundamental that rules like the Bennett rule, which have been carefully crafted and made available only to custody disputes, should not be casually extended to the visitation field.” ( 70 NY2d 141, 144 [1987], citing Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543 [1976].) Ronald FF. stands for the propositio 2008Finally, support for the position that an equity test is not appropriate in a surrendered grandparent visitation case is the Court of Appeals decision Ronald FF. v Cindy GG.: “[Visitation is a subspecies of custody, but the differences in degree in these relational categories is so great and so fundamental that rules like the Bennett rule, which have been carefully crafted and made available only to custody disputes, should not be casually extended to the visitation field.” ( 70 NY2d 141, 144 [1987], citing Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543 [1976].) Ronald FF. stands for the propositio | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux North America, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Instead, we considered the totality of the circumstances, and, using a reasonable person standard, determined whether the behavior fell within the broad range of conduct between severe and pervasive on the one hand and petty slight or trivial inconvenience on the other (see Hernandez , 103 AD3d at 114-115 [internal quotation marks omitted]). [FN10] In addition to the fact that cases such as Kim and Hernandez have not applied the Bennett burden-shifting framework to every aspect of a gender discrimination claim, we find the reasoning in Mihalik v Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N.A., Inc. ( 715 F3d 1 2018Instead, we considered the totality of the circumstances, and, using a reasonable person standard, determined whether the behavior fell within the broad range of conduct between severe and pervasive on the one hand and petty slight or trivial inconvenience on the other (see Hernandez , 103 AD3d at 114-115 [internal quotation marks omitted]). [FN10] In addition to the fact that cases such as Kim and Hernandez have not applied the Bennett burden-shifting framework to every aspect of a gender discrimination claim, we find the reasoning in Mihalik v Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N.A., Inc. ( 715 F3d 1 | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Farrell v. Blue Circle Cement, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011We further conclude that the court properly granted that part of the motion of the Bennett defendants with respect to the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action against them inasmuch as the specific Industrial Code section upon which plaintiff relies on appeal does not apply to the facts of this case. 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (f), entitled “[v]ertical passage,” provides that “[stairways, ramps or runways shall be provided as the means of access to working levels above or below ground except where the nature or the progress of the work prevents their installation in which case ladders or other safe means o 2011We further conclude that the court properly granted that part of the motion of the Bennett defendants with respect to the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action against them inasmuch as the specific Industrial Code section upon which plaintiff relies on appeal does not apply to the facts of this case. 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (f), entitled “[v]ertical passage,” provides that “[s]tairways, ramps or runways shall be provided as the means of access to working levels above or below ground except where the nature or the progress of the work prevents their installation in which case ladders or other safe means | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Ciesinski v. Town of Aurora
green
2 sentences2011Genesee, LLC, 78 AD3d 1581, 1583 [2010]; Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984 [1994]). 2011Genesee, LLC, 78 AD3d 1581, 1583 ; Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984 ). | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Lavore v. Kir Munsey Park 020
green
2 sentences2011We further conclude that the court properly granted that part of the motion of the Bennett defendants with respect to the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action against them inasmuch as the specific Industrial Code section upon which plaintiff relies on appeal does not apply to the facts of this case. 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (f), entitled “[v]ertical passage,” provides that “[stairways, ramps or runways shall be provided as the means of access to working levels above or below ground except where the nature or the progress of the work prevents their installation in which case ladders or other safe means o 2011We further conclude that the court properly granted that part of the motion of the Bennett defendants with respect to the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action against them inasmuch as the specific Industrial Code section upon which plaintiff relies on appeal does not apply to the facts of this case. 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (f), entitled “[v]ertical passage,” provides that “[s]tairways, ramps or runways shall be provided as the means of access to working levels above or below ground except where the nature or the progress of the work prevents their installation in which case ladders or other safe means | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Stanley v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1990The State may not interfere with that fundamental right unless it shows some compelling State purpose which furthers the child’s best interests (see, Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 651 ). 1990The State may not interfere with that fundamental right unless it shows some compelling State purpose which furthers the child’s best interests (see, Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 651 ). | 2 | 1987–1990 |
Broder v. Pallotta & Assoc. Dev., Inc.
green
1 sentence2025CPLR 3215 permits a plaintiff to seek a default judgment against a defendant who does not appear, but, "[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned" ( id. § 3215[c]). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Huntington Hebrew Congregation v. Tanenbaum
green
1 sentence2025MHL incorrectly argues that the relief sought in Bennett's motion was unavailable because MHL was a bona fide purchaser for value ( cf. Matter of Huntington Hebrew Congregation of Huntington v Tanenbaum , 62 AD3d 704 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Vainer v. DiSalvo
green
1 sentence2014The Bennett defendants’ assertion that Sansotta could have avoided the accident is pure speculation (see Sirlin v Schreib, 117 AD3d 819 [2014]; Colandrea v Choku, 94 AD3d 1034 [2012]; Vainer v DiSalvo, 79 AD3d 1023 [2010]). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Colandrea v. Choku
green
1 sentence2014The Bennett defendants’ assertion that Sansotta could have avoided the accident is pure speculation (see Sirlin v Schreib, 117 AD3d 819 [2014]; Colandrea v Choku, 94 AD3d 1034 [2012]; Vainer v DiSalvo, 79 AD3d 1023 [2010]). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Sirlin v. Schreib
green
1 sentence2014The Bennett defendants’ assertion that Sansotta could have avoided the accident is pure speculation (see Sirlin v Schreib, 117 AD3d 819 [2014]; Colandrea v Choku, 94 AD3d 1034 [2012]; Vainer v DiSalvo, 79 AD3d 1023 [2010]). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Green v. Green
green
1 sentence2011We further conclude that the court properly granted that part of the motion of the Bennett defendants with respect to the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action against them inasmuch as the specific Industrial Code section upon which plaintiff relies on appeal does not apply to the facts of this case. 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (f), entitled “[v]ertical passage,” provides that “[stairways, ramps or runways shall be provided as the means of access to working levels above or below ground except where the nature or the progress of the work prevents their installation in which case ladders or other safe means o | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Janet S. M. M. v. Commissioner of Social Services
green
2 sentences2006In Janet S.M.M. v. Commissioner of Social Services, 158 Misc 2d 851 , 601 NYS2d 781 (Fam. 2006In Janet S.M.M. v. Commissioner of Social Services, 158 Misc 2d 851 , 601 NYS2d 781 (Fam. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
FID. & DEPOSIT CO. OF MARYLAND v. Arthur Andersen & Co.
green
2 sentences1999In light of the strong public policy favoring resolution of actions on their merits (see, Heinrichs v City of Albany, 239 AD2d 639, 640 ), the fact that failure to serve a timely answer was the result of inadvertent excusable error (see, Almond v Town of Massena, 243 AD2d 1021, 1022 ), coupled with Bennett’s demonstration of a potentially meritorious defense (see, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v Anderson & Co., 60 NY2d 693, 695 ) — according to Drake, Bennett has no records and Drake no recollection of work being done on the destroyed home’s propane appliances or system — and as there is no indicatio 1999In light of the strong public policy favoring resolution of actions on their merits (see, Heinrichs v City of Albany, 239 AD2d 639, 640 ), the fact that failure to serve a timely answer was the result of inadvertent excusable error (see, Almond v Town of Massena, 243 AD2d 1021, 1022 ), coupled with Bennett’s demonstration of a potentially meritorious defense (see, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v Anderson & Co., 60 NY2d 693, 695 ) — according to Drake, Bennett has no records and Drake no recollection of work being done on the destroyed home’s propane appliances or system — and as there is no indicatio | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Heinrichs v. City of Albany
green
2 sentences1999In light of the strong public policy favoring resolution of actions on their merits (see, Heinrichs v City of Albany, 239 AD2d 639, 640 ), the fact that failure to serve a timely answer was the result of inadvertent excusable error (see, Almond v Town of Massena, 243 AD2d 1021, 1022 ), coupled with Bennett’s demonstration of a potentially meritorious defense (see, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v Anderson & Co., 60 NY2d 693, 695 ) — according to Drake, Bennett has no records and Drake no recollection of work being done on the destroyed home’s propane appliances or system — and as there is no indicatio 1999In light of the strong public policy favoring resolution of actions on their merits (see, Heinrichs v City of Albany, 239 AD2d 639, 640 ), the fact that failure to serve a timely answer was the result of inadvertent excusable error (see, Almond v Town of Massena, 243 AD2d 1021, 1022 ), coupled with Bennett’s demonstration of a potentially meritorious defense (see, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v Anderson & Co., 60 NY2d 693, 695 ) — according to Drake, Bennett has no records and Drake no recollection of work being done on the destroyed home’s propane appliances or system — and as there is no indicatio | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Almond v. Town of Massena
green
2 sentences1999In light of the strong public policy favoring resolution of actions on their merits (see, Heinrichs v City of Albany, 239 AD2d 639, 640 ), the fact that failure to serve a timely answer was the result of inadvertent excusable error (see, Almond v Town of Massena, 243 AD2d 1021, 1022 ), coupled with Bennett’s demonstration of a potentially meritorious defense (see, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v Anderson & Co., 60 NY2d 693, 695 ) — according to Drake, Bennett has no records and Drake no recollection of work being done on the destroyed home’s propane appliances or system — and as there is no indicatio 1999In light of the strong public policy favoring resolution of actions on their merits (see, Heinrichs v City of Albany, 239 AD2d 639, 640 ), the fact that failure to serve a timely answer was the result of inadvertent excusable error (see, Almond v Town of Massena, 243 AD2d 1021, 1022 ), coupled with Bennett’s demonstration of a potentially meritorious defense (see, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v Anderson & Co., 60 NY2d 693, 695 ) — according to Drake, Bennett has no records and Drake no recollection of work being done on the destroyed home’s propane appliances or system — and as there is no indicatio | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Matter of O.
green
2 sentences1980The court further stated (p 611): "The Bennett standard is applicable despite the fact that the abandonment has terminated prior to the initiation of the proceeding.” True, in cases such as this, the decision of the nisi prius court is entitled to the greatest respect (see Matter of Irene O., 38 NY2d 776, 777 ). 1980The court further stated (p 611): "The Bennett standard is applicable despite the fact that the abandonment has terminated prior to the initiation of the proceeding.” True, in cases such as this, the decision of the nisi prius court is entitled to the greatest respect (see Matter of Irene O., 38 NY2d 776, 777 ). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
In re Sanjivini K.
green
2 sentences1978I submit that the majority is misconstruing the principles of Bennett and misreading the Court of Appeals conclusion in Matter of Sanjivini K. ( 40 NY2d 1025, 1026 , supra) that "The interests of the child, her natural mother and her foster parents will best be served by resolving the status of the child and the rights and obligations of the parties in that permanent neglect proceeding in conformity with the standards we have enunciated (Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543 ).” The majority, in bypassing the Bennett hearing to determine the "best interests of the child”, and in reaching i 1978I submit that the majority is misconstruing the principles of Bennett and misreading the Court of Appeals conclusion in Matter of Sanjivini K. ( 40 NY2d 1025, 1026 , supra) that "The interests of the child, her natural mother and her foster parents will best be served by resolving the status of the child and the rights and obligations of the parties in that permanent neglect proceeding in conformity with the standards we have enunciated (Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543 ).” The majority, in bypassing the Bennett hearing to determine the "best interests of the child”, and in reaching i | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.