Bennett claim in Texas

2011Bennett v. Reynolds, 315 S.W.3d 867, 874 (Tex.2010) (citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 ). 17 We find that the exemplary damages awarded to Variyam were not excessive because the ratio of general damages to exemplary damages was less than 1 to 1; see Bennett, 315 S.W.3d at 877 (“an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety”) (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 ), and we have two Bennett factors present that establish the reprehensibility of Hancock’s conduct, i.e., his defamatory

2011Bennett v. Reynolds, 315 S.W.3d 867, 874 (Tex.2010) (citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 ). 17 We find that the exemplary damages awarded to Variyam were not excessive because the ratio of general damages to exemplary damages was less than 1 to 1; see Bennett, 315 S.W.3d at 877 (“an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety”) (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 ), and we have two Bennett factors present that establish the reprehensibility of Hancock’s conduct, i.e., his defamatory

2011Bennett v. Reynolds, 315 S.W.3d 867, 874 (Tex.2010) (citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 ). 17 We find that the exemplary damages awarded to Variyam were not excessive because the ratio of general damages to exemplary damages was less than 1 to 1; see Bennett, 315 S.W.3d at 877 (“an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety”) (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 ), and we have two Bennett factors present that establish the reprehensibility of Hancock’s conduct, i.e., his defamatory

2011Bennett v. Reynolds, 315 S.W.3d 867, 874 (Tex.2010) (citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 ). 17 We find that the exemplary damages awarded to Variyam were not excessive because the ratio of general damages to exemplary damages was less than 1 to 1; see Bennett, 315 S.W.3d at 877 (“an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety”) (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 ), and we have two Bennett factors present that establish the reprehensibility of Hancock’s conduct, i.e., his defamatory

2011App. P. 34.6(c)(4). 8 See Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex. 2005) (stating that a reporter’s record is required only for proceedings in which evidence is introduced and that ―for nonevidentiary hearings, it is superfluous‖). 9 CMM Grain Co. v. Ozgunduz, 991 S.W.2d 437 , 439–40 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2002) (allowing consideration of the merits of Bennett’s claim when he requested a partial record and filed his statement of points almost two months late but stating that ―[t]here is no quest

2011App. P. 34.6(c)(4). [8] See Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten , 168 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex. 2005) (stating that a reporter’s record is required only for proceedings in which evidence is introduced and that “for nonevidentiary hearings, it is superfluous”). [9] CMM Grain Co. v. Ozgunduz , 991 S.W.2d 437 , 439–40 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Bennett v. Cochran , 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2002) (allowing consideration of the merits of Bennett’s claim when he requested a partial record and filed his statement of points almost two months late but stating that “[t]here is n

2011App. P. 34.6(c)(4). 8 See Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex. 2005) (stating that a reporter’s record is required only for proceedings in which evidence is introduced and that ―for nonevidentiary hearings, it is superfluous‖). 9 CMM Grain Co. v. Ozgunduz, 991 S.W.2d 437 , 439–40 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2002) (allowing consideration of the merits of Bennett’s claim when he requested a partial record and filed his statement of points almost two months late but stating that ―[t]here is no quest

2011App. P. 34.6(c)(4). [8] See Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten , 168 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex. 2005) (stating that a reporter’s record is required only for proceedings in which evidence is introduced and that “for nonevidentiary hearings, it is superfluous”). [9] CMM Grain Co. v. Ozgunduz , 991 S.W.2d 437 , 439–40 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Bennett v. Cochran , 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2002) (allowing consideration of the merits of Bennett’s claim when he requested a partial record and filed his statement of points almost two months late but stating that “[t]here is n

2011App. P. 34.6(c)(4). 8 See Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex. 2005) (stating that a reporter’s record is required only for proceedings in which evidence is introduced and that ―for nonevidentiary hearings, it is superfluous‖). 9 CMM Grain Co. v. Ozgunduz, 991 S.W.2d 437 , 439–40 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2002) (allowing consideration of the merits of Bennett’s claim when he requested a partial record and filed his statement of points almost two months late but stating that ―[t]here is no quest

2011App. P. 34.6(c)(4). [8] See Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten , 168 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex. 2005) (stating that a reporter’s record is required only for proceedings in which evidence is introduced and that “for nonevidentiary hearings, it is superfluous”). [9] CMM Grain Co. v. Ozgunduz , 991 S.W.2d 437 , 439–40 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Bennett v. Cochran , 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2002) (allowing consideration of the merits of Bennett’s claim when he requested a partial record and filed his statement of points almost two months late but stating that “[t]here is n

2011App. P. 34.6(c)(4). 8 See Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex. 2005) (stating that a reporter’s record is required only for proceedings in which evidence is introduced and that ―for nonevidentiary hearings, it is superfluous‖). 9 CMM Grain Co. v. Ozgunduz, 991 S.W.2d 437 , 439–40 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2002) (allowing consideration of the merits of Bennett’s claim when he requested a partial record and filed his statement of points almost two months late but stating that ―[t]here is no quest

2011App. P. 34.6(c)(4). 8 See Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex. 2005) (stating that a reporter’s record is required only for proceedings in which evidence is introduced and that ―for nonevidentiary hearings, it is superfluous‖). 9 CMM Grain Co. v. Ozgunduz, 991 S.W.2d 437 , 439–40 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2002) (allowing consideration of the merits of Bennett’s claim when he requested a partial record and filed his statement of points almost two months late but stating that ―[t]here is no quest

2011App. P. 34.6(c)(4). 8 See Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex. 2005) (stating that a reporter’s record is required only for proceedings in which evidence is introduced and that ―for nonevidentiary hearings, it is superfluous‖). 9 CMM Grain Co. v. Ozgunduz, 991 S.W.2d 437 , 439–40 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2002) (allowing consideration of the merits of Bennett’s claim when he requested a partial record and filed his statement of points almost two months late but stating that ―[t]here is no quest

2011App. P. 34.6(c)(4). [8] See Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten , 168 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex. 2005) (stating that a reporter’s record is required only for proceedings in which evidence is introduced and that “for nonevidentiary hearings, it is superfluous”). [9] CMM Grain Co. v. Ozgunduz , 991 S.W.2d 437 , 439–40 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.); see also Bennett v. Cochran , 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2002) (allowing consideration of the merits of Bennett’s claim when he requested a partial record and filed his statement of points almost two months late but stating that “[t]here is n

2018Cf. Smith v. Shar-Alan Oil Co., 799 S.W.2d 368, 374 (Tex. App.—Waco 1990, writ denied) (concluding trial court had authority to award attorney’s fees in favor parties brought into declaratory action by appellant under section 37.006(a)); see also Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 20 (award of attorneys’ fees within sound discretion of the trial court).

2018Cf. Smith v. Shar-Alan Oil Co., 799 S.W.2d 368, 374 (Tex. App.—Waco 1990, writ denied) (concluding trial court had authority to award attorney’s fees in favor parties brought into declaratory action by appellant under section 37.006(a)); see also Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 20 (award of attorneys’ fees within sound discretion of the trial court).

2015See Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, 341 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex. 2011) (holding that final judgment impliedly and necessarily replaced interlocutory summary judgment which merged into the judgment); Hernandez v. Ebrom, 289 S.W.3d 316, 319 (Tex. 2009) (concluding appeals of some interlocutory orders are mooted by subsequent orders); Deep Water Slender Wells, Ltd. v. Shell Intern.

2015See Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, 341 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex. 2011) (holding that final judgment impliedly and necessarily replaced interlocutory summary judgment which merged into the judgment); Hernandez v. Ebrom, 289 S.W.3d 316, 319 (Tex. 2009) (concluding appeals of some interlocutory orders are mooted by subsequent orders); Deep Water Slender Wells, Ltd. v. Shell Intern.

2015See City of Keller, The second exception in which a defendant may be 168 S.W.3d at 827 .

2015See 5 Deep Water Slender Wells, 234 S.W.3d at 695–96.

2011Compare Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell , 450 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1970) (“A judgment is in fact rendered whenever the trial judge officially announces his decision in open court . . . in his official capacity for his official guidance whether orally or by written memorandum the sentence of law pronounced by him in any cause.”) and S amples Exterminators v. Samples , 640 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. 1982) (quoting Comet ) with S & A Restaurant Corp. v. Leal , 892 S.W.2d 855 , 857–58 (Tex. 1995) (judgment is rendered when the court makes an official announcement, “either orally in open court or by memora

2011Compare Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell , 450 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1970) (“A judgment is in fact rendered whenever the trial judge officially announces his decision in open court . . . in his official capacity for his official guidance whether orally or by written memorandum the sentence of law pronounced by him in any cause.”) and S amples Exterminators v. Samples , 640 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. 1982) (quoting Comet ) with S & A Restaurant Corp. v. Leal , 892 S.W.2d 855 , 857–58 (Tex. 1995) (judgment is rendered when the court makes an official announcement, “either orally in open court or by memora

2011Compare Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell , 450 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1970) (“A judgment is in fact rendered whenever the trial judge officially announces his decision in open court . . . in his official capacity for his official guidance whether orally or by written memorandum the sentence of law pronounced by him in any cause.”) and S amples Exterminators v. Samples , 640 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. 1982) (quoting Comet ) with S & A Restaurant Corp. v. Leal , 892 S.W.2d 855 , 857–58 (Tex. 1995) (judgment is rendered when the court makes an official announcement, “either orally in open court or by memora

2011Compare Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell , 450 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1970) (“A judgment is in fact rendered whenever the trial judge officially announces his decision in open court . . . in his official capacity for his official guidance whether orally or by written memorandum the sentence of law pronounced by him in any cause.”) and S amples Exterminators v. Samples , 640 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. 1982) (quoting Comet ) with S & A Restaurant Corp. v. Leal , 892 S.W.2d 855 , 857–58 (Tex. 1995) (judgment is rendered when the court makes an official announcement, “either orally in open court or by memora

2007See In re Pilgrims Pride Corp., 187 S.W.3d 197, 199 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2006, orig. proceeding) ("Without a reporter's record, we could only speculate whether there was evidence to support the trial court's denial of [relator's] motions to compel discovery, to delay the trial date, and to enter a scheduling order.").