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8 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Swettgreen2 sentences1982In its opinion, Bennett v. Bennett, 162 Ga. App. 311 (2) ( 290 SE2d 206 ) (1982), the Court of Appeals, citing Jones v. Swett, 244 Ga. 715 ( 261 SE2d 610 ) (1979), held as follows: “Because the father would, if he were living, be barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity from bringing a personal injury action against his wife, and because the appellant’s right of action for wrongful death is derivative from his father, the trial court was correct in granting Mrs. Bennett’s motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of interspousal immunity.” There is no question that the Court of 1982In its opinion, Bennett v. Bennett, 162 Ga. App. 311 (2) ( 290 SE2d 206 ) (1982), the Court of Appeals, citing Jones v. Swett, 244 Ga. 715 ( 261 SE2d 610 ) (1979), held as follows: “Because the father would, if he were living, be barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity from bringing a personal injury action against his wife, and because the appellant’s right of action for wrongful death is derivative from his father, the trial court was correct in granting Mrs. Bennett’s motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of interspousal immunity.” There is no question that the Court of | 1 | 2 |
West v. City of Albanygreen2 sentences2022“The General Assembly did not draft the language of the statute in this manner, and we will not construe the statute as if it did.” West v. City of Albany, 300 Ga. 743, 746 ( 797 SE2d 809 ) (2017). 9 We also reject Bennett’s claim that Progressive Insurance’s request to add John Bennett to the release was reasonable under OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (2019),3 the statute that governs limited liability releases. 2022“The General Assembly did not draft the language of the statute in this manner, and we will not construe the statute as if it did.” West v. City of Albany, 300 Ga. 743, 746 ( 797 SE2d 809 ) (2017). 9 We also reject Bennett’s claim that Progressive Insurance’s request to add John Bennett to the release was reasonable under OCGA § 33-24-41.1 (2019),3 the statute that governs limited liability releases. | 1 | 1 |
Reid v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authoritygreen1 sentence2021See Bankston v. Warbington, 332 Ga. App. 29, 32 (1) ( 771 SE2d 726 ) (2015); OCGA § 19-9-3 (b). | 1 | 1 |
BANKSTON v. WARBINGTON; And Vice Versagreen1 sentence2021See Bankston v. Warbington, 332 Ga. App. 29, 32 (1) ( 771 SE2d 726 ) (2015); OCGA § 19-9-3 (b). | 1 | 1 |
Hartz v. Hartzgreen1 sentence2011See Mayor &c. of Washington v. Harris, 144 Ga. 102, 103 (b) ( 86 SE 220 ) (1915) (The Court ruled that, in a suit based on damages to a home as the result of a nuisance, “it is *462 essential that the court in its charge to the jury should give them instructions as to the measure of damages, and a failure to do so is ground for a new trial. | 1 | 1 |
Mayor of Washington v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2011See Mayor &c. of Washington v. Harris, 144 Ga. 102, 103 (b) ( 86 SE 220 ) (1915) (The Court ruled that, in a suit based on damages to a home as the result of a nuisance, “it is *462 essential that the court in its charge to the jury should give them instructions as to the measure of damages, and a failure to do so is ground for a new trial. | 1 | 1 |
McCunney v. Clarygreen2 sentences2011Co., 272 Ga. 583 ( 533 SE2d 82 ) (2000); 11 McCunney v. Clary, 259 Ga. App. 260, 261 (1) ( 576 SE2d 635 ) (2003). 12 In fact, we conclude that the only proper outcome of Bennett’s motion for partial summary judgment was so obvious, given the plain and undisputed facts and the well-established legal precedent, that the trial court committed clear error in failing to rule on the motion before trial and, especially, in deferring its ruling until all of the evidence — much of it irrelevant and prejudicial to Bennett — had been presented. 2011Co., 272 Ga. 583 ( 533 SE2d 82 ) (2000); 11 McCunney v. Clary, 259 Ga. App. 260, 261 (1) ( 576 SE2d 635 ) (2003). 12 In fact, we conclude that the only proper outcome of Bennett’s motion for partial summary judgment was so obvious, given the plain and undisputed facts and the well-established legal precedent, that the trial court committed clear error in failing to rule on the motion before trial and, especially, in deferring its ruling until all of the evidence — much of it irrelevant and prejudicial to Bennett — had been presented. | 1 | 1 |
Womack v. Burgessgreen2 sentences2011Womack v. Burgess, 200 Ga. App. 347, 347-348 (1) ( 408 SE2d 159 ) (1991); Bridges Farm v. Blue, 221 Ga. App. at 774-775 (1); F.A.F. 2011Womack v. Burgess, 200 Ga. App. 347, 347-348 (1) ( 408 SE2d 159 ) (1991); Bridges Farm v. Blue, 221 Ga. App. at 774-775 (1); F.A.F. | 1 | 1 |
Bridges Farm, Inc. v. Bluegreen1 sentence2011Womack v. Burgess, 200 Ga. App. 347, 347-348 (1) ( 408 SE2d 159 ) (1991); Bridges Farm v. Blue, 221 Ga. App. at 774-775 (1); F.A.F. | 1 | 1 |
Wheeler v. Stewartgreen2 sentences2011The rule contemplates an inquiry in advance of trial as to whether there is a genuine issue and may be invoked for the purpose of striking sham claims and defenses which obstruct a prompt determination of the truth.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 14 As noted above, in addition to partially granting Bennett’s motion in limine, the court also allowed Bennett to have a continuing objection to any evidence or arguments that were only relevant and admissible as to Count 3. 15 “Evidence that is both irrelevant and prejudicial is inadmissible.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wheeler v. S 2011The rule contemplates an inquiry in advance of trial as to whether there is a genuine issue and may be invoked for the purpose of striking sham claims and defenses which obstruct a prompt determination of the truth.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 14 As noted above, in addition to partially granting Bennett’s motion in limine, the court also allowed Bennett to have a continuing objection to any evidence or arguments that were only relevant and admissible as to Count 3. 15 “Evidence that is both irrelevant and prejudicial is inadmissible.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wheeler v. S | 1 | 1 |
Mathis v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See Mathis v. State, 199 Ga. App. 538 ( 405 SE2d 528 ) (1991). 2 Bennett also attempted to file an untimely application for discretionary review in this Court, which was denied. 2008See Mathis v. State, 199 Ga. App. 538 ( 405 SE2d 528 ) (1991). 2 Bennett also attempted to file an untimely application for discretionary review in this Court, which was denied. | 1 | 1 |
McMann v. Mocklergreen2 sentences1999See McMann v. Mockler, 233 Ga. App. 279, 280-281 (1) ( 503 SE2d 894 ) (1998) (claimant unable to show causation in professional negligence action due to failure to provide transcript or record of underlying workers’ compensation case). 4. 1999See McMann v. Mockler, 233 Ga. App. 279, 280-281 (1) ( 503 SE2d 894 ) (1998) (claimant unable to show causation in professional negligence action due to failure to provide transcript or record of underlying workers’ compensation case). 4. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Atwood v. Southeast Bedding Co., Inc.
green
1 sentence2021Id. 4 And because this finding is the basis of the trial court’s denial of Bennett’s motion for OCGA § 9-15-14 (a) attorney fees, we must affirm. 2. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Lee v. State Farm Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2011Co., 272 Ga. 583 ( 533 SE2d 82 ) (2000); 11 McCunney v. Clary, 259 Ga. App. 260, 261 (1) ( 576 SE2d 635 ) (2003). 12 In fact, we conclude that the only proper outcome of Bennett’s motion for partial summary judgment was so obvious, given the plain and undisputed facts and the well-established legal precedent, that the trial court committed clear error in failing to rule on the motion before trial and, especially, in deferring its ruling until all of the evidence — much of it irrelevant and prejudicial to Bennett — had been presented. 2011Co., 272 Ga. 583 ( 533 SE2d 82 ) (2000); 11 McCunney v. Clary, 259 Ga. App. 260, 261 (1) ( 576 SE2d 635 ) (2003). 12 In fact, we conclude that the only proper outcome of Bennett’s motion for partial summary judgment was so obvious, given the plain and undisputed facts and the well-established legal precedent, that the trial court committed clear error in failing to rule on the motion before trial and, especially, in deferring its ruling until all of the evidence — much of it irrelevant and prejudicial to Bennett — had been presented. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Guilford v. Marriott International, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010Indeed, nothing in Bennett’s brief can be construed as legal argument, “which requires, at a minimum, a discussion of the appropriate law as applied to the relevant facts.” (Punctuation omitted.) Guilford v. Marriott Intl., supra, 296 Ga. App. at 505 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Bennett v. Bennett
neutral
2 sentences1982In its opinion, Bennett v. Bennett, 162 Ga. App. 311 (2) ( 290 SE2d 206 ) (1982), the Court of Appeals, citing Jones v. Swett, 244 Ga. 715 ( 261 SE2d 610 ) (1979), held as follows: “Because the father would, if he were living, be barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity from bringing a personal injury action against his wife, and because the appellant’s right of action for wrongful death is derivative from his father, the trial court was correct in granting Mrs. Bennett’s motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of interspousal immunity.” There is no question that the Court of 1982In its opinion, Bennett v. Bennett, 162 Ga. App. 311 (2) ( 290 SE2d 206 ) (1982), the Court of Appeals, citing Jones v. Swett, 244 Ga. 715 ( 261 SE2d 610 ) (1979), held as follows: “Because the father would, if he were living, be barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity from bringing a personal injury action against his wife, and because the appellant’s right of action for wrongful death is derivative from his father, the trial court was correct in granting Mrs. Bennett’s motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine of interspousal immunity.” There is no question that the Court of | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Williams v. Ray
green
2 sentences1982See Jones v. Swett, 244 Ga. 715 ( 261 SE2d 610 ) (1979); Williams v. Ray, 146 Ga. App. 333 ( 246 SE2d 387 ) (1978). 1982See Jones v. Swett, 244 Ga. 715 ( 261 SE2d 610 ) (1979); Williams v. Ray, 146 Ga. App. 333 ( 246 SE2d 387 ) (1978). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.