seventh affirmative defense in New York

2024The plaintiffs further established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the defendants' sixth affirmative defense, alleging the failure to use seatbelts ( see Giwa v Bloom , 154 AD3d 921, 923 ), the defendants' seventh affirmative defense, alleging lack of personal jurisdiction ( see Simonds v Grobman , 277 AD2d 369 ), and the defendants' eighth affirmative defense, alleging that the action was time-barred ( see CPLR 214[5]).

2024The plaintiffs further established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the defendants' sixth affirmative defense, alleging the failure to use seatbelts ( see Giwa v Bloom , 154 AD3d 921, 923 ), the defendants' seventh affirmative defense, alleging lack of personal jurisdiction ( see Simonds v Grobman , 277 AD2d 369 ), and the defendants' eighth affirmative defense, alleging that the action was time-barred ( see CPLR 214[5]).

2024In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact to warrant denial of those branches of the plaintiffs' motion ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp. , 68 NY2d at 324 ).

2021Plaintiff's other argument to strike this affirmative defense based on CPLR 4401 is improperly raised for the first time on appeal, and we decline to consider it ( see Trafelet v Cipolla & Co., LLC , __ AD3d __, 2021 NY Slip Op 00274 [1st Dept 2021]).

2021Plaintiff could not use the motion in limine as a vehicle for partial summary judgment striking the seventh affirmative defense ( see Downtown Art Co. v Zimmerman , 232 AD2d 270 , 270 [1st Dept 1996]).

2021Plaintiff could not use the motion in limine as a vehicle for partial summary judgment striking the seventh affirmative defense ( see Downtown Art Co. v Zimmerman , 232 AD2d 270 , 270 [1st Dept 1996]).

2017Eckstein v New York Univ., 270 AD2d 208 [1st Dept 2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 760 [2000]).

2017Eckstein v New York Univ. , 270 AD2d 208 [1st Dept 2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 760 [2000]).

2010Finally, with respect to the seventh affirmative defense, based on promissory estoppel, we conclude that defendant does not allege that plaintiffs breached any duty independent of the leases and thus that promissory estoppel does not apply herein (see generally Celle v Barclays Bank P.L.C., 48 AD3d 301, 303 [2008]; Brown v Brown, 12 AD3d 176 [2004]).

2002Corp., 290 AD2d 228 ), and thus the court properly dismissed the seventh affirmative defense.

2000Sufficiency of a notice of claim depends upon whether the defendant is able to adequately investigate the claim (O’Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 358 ; Miles v City of New York, 173 AD2d 298 ).

2000Sufficiency of a notice of claim depends upon whether the defendant is able to adequately investigate the claim (O’Brien v City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 358 ; Miles v City of New York, 173 AD2d 298 ).

1996However, there was no evidence presented to establish that the Village created the dangerous or defective condition which caused the injuries (see, Tyschak v Incorporated Vil. of Westbury, 193 AD2d 670 ; Messina v City of New York, 190 AD2d 659 ; Monteleone v Incorporated Vil. of Floral Park, 143 AD2d 647 , affd 74 NY2d 917 ).

1996However, there was no evidence presented to establish that the Village created the dangerous or defective condition which caused the injuries (see, Tyschak v Incorporated Vil. of Westbury, 193 AD2d 670 ; Messina v City of New York, 190 AD2d 659 ; Monteleone v Incorporated Vil. of Floral Park, 143 AD2d 647 , affd 74 NY2d 917 ).

1996However, there was no evidence presented to establish that the Village created the dangerous or defective condition which caused the injuries (see, Tyschak v Incorporated Vil. of Westbury, 193 AD2d 670 ; Messina v City of New York, 190 AD2d 659 ; Monteleone v Incorporated Vil. of Floral Park, 143 AD2d 647 , affd 74 NY2d 917 ).

1996However, there was no evidence presented to establish that the Village created the dangerous or defective condition which caused the injuries (see, Tyschak v Incorporated Vil. of Westbury, 193 AD2d 670 ; Messina v City of New York, 190 AD2d 659 ; Monteleone v Incorporated Vil. of Floral Park, 143 AD2d 647 , affd 74 NY2d 917 ).

1995The seventh affirmative defense states, "[t]he claims asserted are barred by the statute of frauds.” There are several writings here that clearly take the matter out of the Statute of Frauds (see, Brylgrove Ltd. v Tompkins, PLC, 172 AD2d 452, 454 ).

1995The seventh affirmative defense states, "[t]he claims asserted are barred by the statute of frauds.” There are several writings here that clearly take the matter out of the Statute of Frauds (see, Brylgrove Ltd. v Tompkins, PLC, 172 AD2d 452, 454 ).

1994Corp., 122 Misc 2d 597 [Sup Ct, NY County 1984]), petitioner’s cross motion to strike the amended seventh affirmative defense and counterclaim is denied. [Portions of opinion omitted for purposes of publication.]

1987It is well settled that prior to an accounting, one partner cannot sue another partner in an action at law (see, Arnold v Arnold, 90 NY 580 ; Pace v Perk, 81 AD2d 444 ; Bassett v American Meter Co., 20 AD2d 956 ).

1987It is well settled that prior to an accounting, one partner cannot sue another partner in an action at law (see, Arnold v Arnold, 90 NY 580 ; Pace v Perk, 81 AD2d 444 ; Bassett v American Meter Co., 20 AD2d 956 ).

1987It is well settled that prior to an accounting, one partner cannot sue another partner in an action at law (see, Arnold v Arnold, 90 NY 580 ; Pace v Perk, 81 AD2d 444 ; Bassett v American Meter Co., 20 AD2d 956 ).

1985In any event, the seventh affirmative defense does not, in any respect, affect the support order of the Family Court or its power to direct support irrespective of any agreement (see, Matter of Brescia v Fitts, supra).