statutory time bar in New York

2016(Id.; see also Glamm v City of Amsterdam, 67 AD2d 1056 , 1057 [3d Dept 1979], affd for reasons stated below 49 NY2d 714 [1980], rearg denied 49 NY2d 918 [1980] [cited by the Yonkers Court and similarly holding that General Municipal Law § 50-e, which provided for service of a notice of claim within 90 days after the claim arose, was “not a time limitation” (i.e., a statute of limitations), but a “condition precedent” to suit to which CPLR 205 (a) did not apply to extend the time for compliance]; Benedetti, 129 AD3d at 1463 [citing Yonkers for the proposition that “CPLR 205 (a) does not apply w

1999Both CPLR 205 (a) and its equivalent predecessor statutes have been held to be inapplicable when the statutory time bar to the commencement of the second action falls into the latter category, as a condition precedent (Glamm v City of Amsterdam, 67 AD2d 1056, 1057 , affd for reasons stated below 49 NY2d 714 [“CPLR 205 does not apply to conditions precedent”]; Hill v Board of Supervisors, 119 NY 344, 347 [Code of Civil Procedure § 405 not applicable where new action did not comply with a “condition precedent”]; see also, Bernardez v Federal Deposit Ins.

2016(Id.; see also Glamm v City of Amsterdam, 67 AD2d 1056 , 1057 [3d Dept 1979], affd for reasons stated below 49 NY2d 714 [1980], rearg denied 49 NY2d 918 [1980] [cited by the Yonkers Court and similarly holding that General Municipal Law § 50-e, which provided for service of a notice of claim within 90 days after the claim arose, was “not a time limitation” (i.e., a statute of limitations), but a “condition precedent” to suit to which CPLR 205 (a) did not apply to extend the time for compliance]; Benedetti, 129 AD3d at 1463 [citing Yonkers for the proposition that “CPLR 205 (a) does not apply w

1999Both CPLR 205 (a) and its equivalent predecessor statutes have been held to be inapplicable when the statutory time bar to the commencement of the second action falls into the latter category, as a condition precedent (Glamm v City of Amsterdam, 67 AD2d 1056, 1057 , affd for reasons stated below 49 NY2d 714 [“CPLR 205 does not apply to conditions precedent”]; Hill v Board of Supervisors, 119 NY 344, 347 [Code of Civil Procedure § 405 not applicable where new action did not comply with a “condition precedent”]; see also, Bernardez v Federal Deposit Ins.

2024Accordingly, the mother's "appeal is untimely and, as the applicable statutory time bar is absolute and not subject to extension, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it" ( Matter of Benjamin GG. v Alexa II. , 198 AD3d 1194, 1195 [3d Dept 2021]; see Family Ct Act § 1113; Matter of Washington County Dept. of Social Servs. v Oudekerk , 205 AD3d 1108 , 1108-1109 [3d Dept 2022]; Matter of Ucci v Ucci , 93 AD3d 1110, 1111 [3d Dept 2012], lv dismissed 19 NY3d 941 [2012]).

2021The order appealed from was mailed to respondent on December 4, 2018, but respondent did not file his notice of appeal until February 1, 2019, well beyond the 35-day window in which to do so ( see Family Ct Act § 1113). [FN2] Thus, respondent's appeal is untimely and, as the applicable statutory time bar is absolute and not subject to extension, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it ( see Family Ct Act § 1113; Matter of Richard HH. v Saratoga County Dept. of Social Servs. , 163 AD3d 1082 , 1083 n 2 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 911 [2018]; Matter of Ucci v Ucci , 93 AD3d 1110, 1111 [2012],

2014Accordingly, as we find that the Board properly dismissed the appeals as untimely, we do not address the merits of claimant’s arguments (see Matter of Davis [Commissioner of Labor], 71 AD3d 1369, 1370 [2010]).

2014Accordingly, as we find that the Board properly dismissed the appeals as untimely, we do not address the merits of claimant’s arguments (see Matter of Davis [Commissioner of Labor], 71 AD3d 1369, 1370 [2010]).

1999Both CPLR 205 (a) and its equivalent predecessor statutes have been held to be inapplicable when the statutory time bar to the commencement of the second action falls into the latter category, as a condition precedent (Glamm v City of Amsterdam, 67 AD2d 1056, 1057 , affd for reasons stated below 49 NY2d 714 [“CPLR 205 does not apply to conditions precedent”]; Hill v Board of Supervisors, 119 NY 344, 347 [Code of Civil Procedure § 405 not applicable where new action did not comply with a “condition precedent”]; see also, Bernardez v Federal Deposit Ins.

1999Both CPLR 205 (a) and its equivalent predecessor statutes have been held to be inapplicable when the statutory time bar to the commencement of the second action falls into the latter category, as a condition precedent ( Glamm v City of Amsterdam, 67 AD2d 1056, 1057 , affd for reasons stated below 49 NY2d 714 ["CPLR 205 does not apply to conditions precedent"]; Hill v Board of Supervisors, 119 NY 344, 347 [Code of Civil Procedure § 405 not applicable where new action did not comply with a "condition precedent"]; see also, Bernardez v Federal Deposit Ins.

2026This argument relies on facts not appearing on the face of the appellate record and, as such, must be raised in a motion "for post-judgment relief under CPLR 5015" (<i>Matter of Skylar P.J. [Kerry M.T.]</i>, 204 AD3d 1001, 1002 [2d Dept 2022]; <i>see</i> <i>Matter of Liam DD. [Jamie CC.]</i>, 244 AD3d at 1626; <i>Matter of Ricardo T., Jr. [Ricardo T., Sr.]</i>, 172 AD3d 732 , 733 [2d Dept 2019]).FN2 "Accordingly, the mother's appeal is untimely and, as the applicable statutory time bar is absolute and not subject to extension, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it" (<i>Matter of Carrie

2025The import of the distinction is particularly relevant, as a deed "where the signature and authority for conveyance are acquired by fraudulent means" is merely voidable ( Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d at 224 ; see Weiss v Phillips , 157 AD3d 1 , 11 [1st Dept 2017]), as opposed to a forged deed or a deed obtained by false pretenses, which is void ab initio and, in turn, "is not subject to a statutory time bar" ( Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d at 230 ; see Rockwell v Despart , 212 AD3d 27 , 34 [3d Dept 2022], lv dismissed 40 NY3d 974 [2023]; Mazo v Mazo , 132 AD3d 1112, 1114 [3d Dept 2015]).

2025The import of the distinction is particularly relevant, as a deed "where the signature and authority for conveyance are acquired by fraudulent means" is merely voidable ( Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d at 224; see Weiss v Phillips , 157 AD3d 1, 11 [1st Dept 2017]), as opposed to a forged deed or a deed obtained by false pretenses, which is void ab initio and, in turn, "is not subject to a statutory time bar" ( Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d at 230; see Rockwell v Despart , 212 AD3d 27, 34 [3d Dept 2022], lv dismissed 40 NY3d 974 [2023]; Mazo v Mazo , 132 AD3d 1112, 1114 [3d Dept 2015]).

2025The import of the distinction is particularly relevant, as a deed "where the signature and authority for conveyance are acquired by fraudulent means" is merely voidable ( Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d at 224; see Weiss v Phillips , 157 AD3d 1, 11 [1st Dept 2017]), as opposed to a forged deed or a deed obtained by false pretenses, which is void ab initio and, in turn, "is not subject to a statutory time bar" ( Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d at 230; see Rockwell v Despart , 212 AD3d 27, 34 [3d Dept 2022], lv dismissed 40 NY3d 974 [2023]; Mazo v Mazo , 132 AD3d 1112, 1114 [3d Dept 2015]).

2025The import of the distinction is particularly relevant, as a deed "where the signature and authority for conveyance are acquired by fraudulent means" is merely voidable ( Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d at 224; see Weiss v Phillips , 157 AD3d 1, 11 [1st Dept 2017]), as opposed to a forged deed or a deed obtained by false pretenses, which is void ab initio and, in turn, "is not subject to a statutory time bar" ( Faison v Lewis , 25 NY3d at 230; see Rockwell v Despart , 212 AD3d 27, 34 [3d Dept 2022], lv dismissed 40 NY3d 974 [2023]; Mazo v Mazo , 132 AD3d 1112, 1114 [3d Dept 2015]).

2024Accordingly, the mother's "appeal is untimely and, as the applicable statutory time bar is absolute and not subject to extension, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it" ( Matter of Benjamin GG. v Alexa II. , 198 AD3d 1194, 1195 [3d Dept 2021]; see Family Ct Act § 1113; Matter of Washington County Dept. of Social Servs. v Oudekerk , 205 AD3d 1108 , 1108-1109 [3d Dept 2022]; Matter of Ucci v Ucci , 93 AD3d 1110, 1111 [3d Dept 2012], lv dismissed 19 NY3d 941 [2012]).

2005CPLR 205 (a) 2 authorizes a new action within six months after an action, which is timely commenced, is terminated other than “by a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judg ment upon the merits.” As noted by the Appellate Division, section 205 does not apply when the statutory time bar to the commencement of an action is not a statute of limitations but is a condition precedent (see Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 81 NY2d 721, 724 [1992]; Matter of Morris Invs

2005CPLR 205 (a) [2] authorizes a new action within six months after an action, which is timely commenced, is terminated other than "by a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment *210 upon the merits." As noted by the Appellate Division, section 205 does not apply when the statutory time bar to the commencement of an action is not a statute of limitations but is a condition precedent ( see Dreger v New York State Thruway Auth., 81 NY2d 721, 724 [1992]; Matter of Morr

1994This Court has declined to construe this statutory time requirement as merely directory (Philogene v Fuller Auto Leasing, 167 AD2d 178, 179 ; compare, Beardsley v Wyoming County Community Hosp., 42 AD2d 821 [4th Dept]) and has required compliance unless it is demonstrated that the plaintiffs have made "misleading statements as to their actual residence” (Berberich v York Scaffold Equip.

1994Corp., 177 AD2d 451, 452 ; Roman v Brereton, 182 AD2d 556, 557 ; Micale v Jones, 96 AD2d 791, 792 [Kassal, J., dissenting]).