50 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2026 30 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Browngreen2 sentences2026See Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 499 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“Crucial to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the timeliness of the underlying petition. 2024Prior to addressing the merits of Redmond’s claim, the threshold question we must address is whether he timely filed his second PCRA petition or, alternatively, whether he satisfied an exception to the statutory time bar. 2 See Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 499 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“Crucial to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the timeliness of the underlying petition. | 19 | 19 |
Com. v. Fantauzzi, R.green2 sentences2026Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 499 (Pa. Super. 2016). “[T]he timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and [] if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition and cannot grant relief.” Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022). 2025Because Rytsar’s June 7 filing is a PCRA petition, we must address whether this serial PCRA petition was timely filed or, alternatively, satisfies an exception to the statutory time bar. “[T]he timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional and [] if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the -5- J-S47042-24 petition and cannot grant relief.” Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d at 994 (citations omitted). | 9 | 9 |
Gorsline v. Bd of Sup. of Fairfield Twpgreen2 sentences2020As such, this statutory time bar implicates the [C]ourt’s very power to adjudicate a controversy and prohibits a court from ____________________________________________ 2 “The question of whether a petition is timely raises a question of law. [Hence], our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.” Taylor, infra at 468 (citations omitted). -3- J-S64032-19 extending filing periods except as the statute permits.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 185 (Pa. 2016) (citations omitted). 2017The statutory time bar “implicates the court’s very power to adjudicate a controversy and prohibits a court from extending filing periods except as the statute permits.” Robinson, 139 A.3d at 185 (citing Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313 , 737 A.2d 214, 222 (1999)). | 2 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Fahygreen2 sentences2017The statutory time bar “implicates the court’s very power to adjudicate a controversy and prohibits a court from extending filing periods except as the statute permits.” Robinson, 139 A.3d at 185 (citing Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313 , 737 A.2d 214, 222 (1999)). 2017The statutory time bar “implicates the court’s very power to adjudicate a controversy and prohibits a court from extending filing periods except as the statute permits.” Robinson, 139 A.3d at 185 (citing Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313 , 737 A.2d 214, 222 (1999)). | 2 | 2 |
Batson v. Kentuckygreen1 sentence2026See Brief in Support of Petition to Withdraw, ____________________________________________ 2 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Callahangreen1 sentence2025“As the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Smithgreen1 sentence2024Because “[a] Brady claim is premised on the -8- J-S15039-24 Commonwealth’s suppression of material evidence,” Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 888 (Pa. 2011), Appellant’s reiteration of his claim as a complaint that the Commonwealth changed the theory of the case against him is neither a Brady claim nor an exception to the statutory time bar. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Appeal of Kreidergreen2 sentences2020However, these points are essentially moot, because, again, Resolution 2005-02 had no substantive effect upon whether Lot 9 was, or is, buildable. 46 regulation] would result in hardship, ordinarily that the value of the expenditures would be lost.” In re Kreider, 808 A.2d 340, 343 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (emphasis added). “[Equitable e]stoppel . . . is an unusual remedy granted only in extraordinary circumstances and the [party seeking to invoke it] bears the burden of proving [their] entitlement to [such] relief.” Id. 2020However, these points are essentially moot, because, again, Resolution 2005-02 had no substantive effect upon whether Lot 9 was, or is, buildable. 46 regulation] would result in hardship, ordinarily that the value of the expenditures would be lost.” In re Kreider, 808 A.2d 340, 343 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (emphasis added). “[Equitable e]stoppel . . . is an unusual remedy granted only in extraordinary circumstances and the [party seeking to invoke it] bears the burden of proving [their] entitlement to [such] relief.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2019See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 718 A.2d 1262, 1264-65 (Pa. Super. 1998); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b) (providing that a criminal homicide constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(b) (providing that a person who has been convicted of murder of the second degree shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment). -9- J-S21024-19 actual innocence standards for sentences . . . are so unconstitutionally vague as to its application to over-come the statutory time bar.” | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Breakirongreen1 sentence2018See Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001). -5- J-S76024-17 discovered facts exception allows him to avoid the statutory time- bar. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fairirorgreen1 sentence2018Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396, 398 (Pa. Super. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Carrgreen1 sentence2018In regards to after-discovered evidence and claims of counsel ineffectiveness, the Court in Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1165, 1167 (Pa. Super. 2001), held that a defendant's recent discovery of Trial Counsel's failure to file a direct appeal on his behalf, does not constitute after-discovered evidence, and that such claims cannot be used to circumvent the PCRA's statutory time bar. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Millergreen1 sentence2018If a PCRA petition is untimely, “neither this Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction over the petition.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylorgreen1 sentence2017See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(i)-(iii); see also Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hawkinsgreen1 sentence2017See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa. 2008). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hernandezgreen1 sentence2016See Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 651 . 5 In this PCRA petition, Appellant acknowledged the statutory time bar and conceded that his petition is untimely if no exception applies. | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Leegreen1 sentence2014Even assuming Appellant was unaware until September 2012 that counsel had not filed either a motion to modify his sentence or a direct appeal on the basis that the court had not granted him credit for time- served, he was required to file his petition “within sixty days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2); see also Commonwealth v. Geer, 936 A.2d 1075, 1078 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 948 A.2d 803 (Pa. 2008) (noting that “before a petitioner may benefit from Subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii)’s exception, the petitioner must plead he filed his PCRA petition | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Phillipsgreen1 sentence2014Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 A.3d 317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 A.2d 479 , ____________________________________________ 8 For the benefit of counsel, we note that we could find Appellan boilerplate question waived for vagueness. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Geergreen1 sentence2014Even assuming Appellant was unaware until September 2012 that counsel had not filed either a motion to modify his sentence or a direct appeal on the basis that the court had not granted him credit for time- served, he was required to file his petition “within sixty days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2); see also Commonwealth v. Geer, 936 A.2d 1075, 1078 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 948 A.2d 803 (Pa. 2008) (noting that “before a petitioner may benefit from Subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii)’s exception, the petitioner must plead he filed his PCRA petition | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Spotz, M., Aplt.
green
2 sentences2025The statutory time bar “implicates the court’s very power to adjudicate a controversy and prohibits a court from extending filing periods except as the statute permits.” Id. (citation omitted). 2019As our Supreme Court observed in Spotz, “The statutory time bar implicates the court’s very power to adjudicate a controversy and prohibits a court from extending filing periods except as the statute permits.” Id. (quotations omitted). | 2 | 2019–2025 |
Alleyne v. United States
green
2 sentences2016Appellant now attempts to invoke the “new constitutional right” exception to the statutory time bar per Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), relying on Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (holding any fact increasing mandatory minimum sentence for crime is considered element of crime to be submitted to fact-finder and found beyond reasonable doubt). 2016Appellant now attempts to invoke the “new constitutional right” exception to the statutory time bar per Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), relying on Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2151 , 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (holding any fact increasing mandatory minimum sentence for crime is considered element of crime to be submitted to fact-finder and found beyond reasonable doubt). | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Commonwealth v. Murray
green
1 sentence2025Commonwealth Commonwealth v. v. Taylor, 933 A.2d, Taylor, 933 A.2d. 1035, 1035 , 1033: 103 (Pa.Super. 2007) (Pa.Super. 2007) citing citing Commonwealth Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 4 , Pa. 1, 4, 753 753 A.2d A.2d 201, 201, 203 203 (2000). (2000). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Taylor
green
1 sentence2025Commonwealth Commonwealth v. v. Taylor, 933 A.2d, Taylor, 933 A.2d. 1035, 1035 , 1033: 103 (Pa.Super. 2007) (Pa.Super. 2007) citing citing Commonwealth Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 4 , Pa. 1, 4, 753 753 A.2d A.2d 201, 201, 203 203 (2000). (2000). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Murphy
green
1 sentence2019Here, Muniz does not serve as an exception to the statutory time bar or excuse the patent untimeliness of Appellant’s current petition. -3- J-S70034-18 Murphy, 180 A.3d 402 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 195 A.3d 559 (2018) (stating petitioner cannot rely on Muniz to meet timeliness exception under Section 9545(b) unless and until Supreme Court allows). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Murphy
green
1 sentence2019Here, Muniz does not serve as an exception to the statutory time bar or excuse the patent untimeliness of Appellant’s current petition. -3- J-S70034-18 Murphy, 180 A.3d 402 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 195 A.3d 559 (2018) (stating petitioner cannot rely on Muniz to meet timeliness exception under Section 9545(b) unless and until Supreme Court allows). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Zeigler
green
1 sentence2019Therefore, Appellant’s petition remains time-barred; and the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review it on the merits.3 See Zeigler, supra. Accordingly, we affirm. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Brown
green
1 sentence2018Finally, as stated above, federal habeas corpus decisions regarding claims of ineffectiveness and actual innocence are “irrelevant to our construction of the timeliness provisions set forth in the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 143 A.3d 418 , 420–421 (Pa. Super. 2016). -7- J-S46021-18 Consequently, because the PCRA petition was untimely and Appellant has failed to plead and prove an exception to the statutory time bar, the PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s petition. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Montgomery v. Louisiana
green
1 sentence2017Id. at *3-4. -2- J-S69006-17 On June 28, 2016, Appellant filed the instant petition, styled as a motion for re-sentencing pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act, contending that the Supreme Court’s rulings in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 132 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), entitled him to resentencing. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Berry
green
1 sentence2014Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 A.3d 317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 A.2d 479 , ____________________________________________ 8 For the benefit of counsel, we note that we could find Appellan boilerplate question waived for vagueness. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
green
2 sentences1980And even in Basham v. Finance American Corp., 583 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 , 100 S.Ct. 47 , 62 L.Ed.2d 32 (1979), a case heavily relied on by appellee, the court had no difficulty in finding that a TILA claim can be asserted defensively. 1980And even in Basham v. Finance American Corp., 583 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825 , 100 S.Ct. 47 , 62 L.Ed.2d 32 (1979), a case heavily relied on by appellee, the court had no difficulty in finding that a TILA claim can be asserted defensively. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Sherman v. American Federation of Musicians green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Michel v. United States green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Wynn v. Insurance Company green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.