fatal error in Ohio

2024Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 , 107 S.Ct. 2658 , 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987). {¶ 15} At the outset, we note that Said made no request to be present at the witness competency hearing and Said’s counsel did not object to Said’s absence at the hearing.

2002In Green, supra , the Supreme Court explicitly held that a, "defendant's absence from a witness competency hearing is not a fatal error." Green , at 371, quoting Kentucky v. Stincer (1987), 482 U.S. 730 , 736-744 .

2010State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 604 , 605 N.E.2d 916 . “[The rule’s] purpose is practical: to prevent the defensive trial tactic of remaining silent on a fatal error during trial with the Pickaway App. No. 10CA12 6 expectation of demanding a reversal on appeal if the verdict is guilty.” State v. Craft (1977), 52 Ohio App.2d 1, 4-5 , 367 N.E.2d 1221 . {¶19} However, in the context of criminal appeals, the harshness of this general rule is mitigated by Crim.R. 52(B).

2010State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 604 , 605 N.E.2d 916 . “[The rule’s] purpose is practical: to prevent the defensive trial tactic of remaining silent on a fatal error during trial with the Pickaway App. No. 10CA12 6 expectation of demanding a reversal on appeal if the verdict is guilty.” State v. Craft (1977), 52 Ohio App.2d 1, 4-5 , 367 N.E.2d 1221 . {¶19} However, in the context of criminal appeals, the harshness of this general rule is mitigated by Crim.R. 52(B).

2004Id. {¶ 28} In this matter, the glaring errors with the translation process in Pina are not present.

2003Under the latter perfunctory method, there is no way by which the court can personally address the defendant and no possibility that the court can find or be factually assured that the defendant understands and knowingly waives and pleads guilty.” Id. at 398, 3 O.O.3d 457 , 361 N.E.2d 262 . {¶ 10} Here, the court put the reporter it had appointed under oath and charged her to “translate accurately all that the Court will state to Mr. Alvarez and he to the Court.” The interpreter replied that she would.

2012The contestees’ reliance on other materials that were available, such as mailings by groups supporting Issue 6, does not rectify this fatal error, because none of these materials expressed the tax-levy amount in the terms required by R.C. 505.481(B) — dollars and cents per $1,000 of taxable valuation. {¶ 16} Therefore, we uphold the trial court’s determination that the election contest is not barred by laches or equitable estoppel. *103 Election Contest {¶ 17} To prevail in their election contest, contestors “had to establish by clear and convincing evidence that one or more election irregular

2012The contestees’ reliance on other materials that were available, such as mailings by groups supporting Issue 6, does not rectify this fatal error, because none of these materials expressed the tax-levy amount in the terms required by R.C. 505.481(B) — dollars and cents per $1,000 of taxable valuation. {¶ 16} Therefore, we uphold the trial court’s determination that the election contest is not barred by laches or equitable estoppel. *103 Election Contest {¶ 17} To prevail in their election contest, contestors “had to establish by clear and convincing evidence that one or more election irregular

2012No. CR-2002-0011 (Nov. 21, 2006), slip op. at 4, on remand from State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53 , 2005-Ohio-5981 , 836 N.E.2d 1173 . {¶ 20} However, it is relevant to note that voir dire is not a substantive part of trial; rather, it is a mechanism to seat an impartial jury so that the due process rights of a defendant are protected.

2012No. CR-2002-0011 (Nov. 21, 2006), slip op. at 4, on remand from State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 53 , 2005-Ohio-5981 , 836 N.E.2d 1173 . {¶ 20} However, it is relevant to note that voir dire is not a substantive part of trial; rather, it is a mechanism to seat an impartial jury so that the due process rights of a defendant are protected.

2011Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 467-471 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 .

2011Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 467-471 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 .

2010“The rule provides that: ‘Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.’ This rule allows the appellate court, at the request of appellate counsel or sua sponte, to consider a trial error that was not objected to when that error was a ‘plain error.’” Slagle at 604 , quoting Crim.R. 52(B). {¶20} For a reviewing court to find plain error: (1) there must be an error, i.e., “a deviation from a legal rule”; (2) the error must be plain, i.e., “an ‘obvious' defect in the trial proceedings”; and (3) the error must have

2010“The rule provides that: ‘Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.’ This rule allows the appellate court, at the request of appellate counsel or sua sponte, to consider a trial error that was not objected to when that error was a ‘plain error.’” Slagle at 604 , quoting Crim.R. 52(B). {¶20} For a reviewing court to find plain error: (1) there must be an error, i.e., “a deviation from a legal rule”; (2) the error must be plain, i.e., “an ‘obvious' defect in the trial proceedings”; and (3) the error must have

2004However, in Mitchell v. Esparza (2003), 540 U.S. 12 , 124 S.Ct. 7 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 , the Supreme Court held that the failure to allege that the defendant acted as the principal offender did not constitute a fatal error. {¶ 35} Based on the foregoing, we reject Foust’s argument that there is a constitutional requirement that the indictment specify every element of the *145 offense in either the felony-murder counts or the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specifications. {¶ 36} Finally, Foust has not shown that he was prejudiced in the defense of his case or that he would have proceeded differently if each o

2004However, in Mitchell v. Esparza (2003), 540 U.S. 12 , 124 S.Ct. 7 , 157 L.Ed.2d 263 , the Supreme Court held that the failure to allege that the defendant acted as the principal offender did not constitute a fatal error. {¶ 35} Based on the foregoing, we reject Foust’s argument that there is a constitutional requirement that the indictment specify every element of the *145 offense in either the felony-murder counts or the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specifications. {¶ 36} Finally, Foust has not shown that he was prejudiced in the defense of his case or that he would have proceeded differently if each o

1999Akron v. Rowland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 374, 378 , 618 N.E.2d 138, 142-143 .

1999Akron v. Rowland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 374, 378 , 618 N.E.2d 138, 142-143 .

1988The city’s motion for relief from judgment does not meet the test set forth in GTE Electric v. ARC Industries (1976), 47 Ohio St. 2d 146 , 1 O.O. 3d 86, 351 N.E. 2d 113 , and should not be granted.

1988The city’s motion for relief from judgment does not meet the test set forth in GTE Electric v. ARC Industries (1976), 47 Ohio St. 2d 146 , 1 O.O. 3d 86, 351 N.E. 2d 113 , and should not be granted.