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17 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc.green2 sentences2025However, the trial court erred when it treated this one factor as dispositive of the entire design-defect analysis. {¶52} Under R.C. 2307.75, “a product liability plaintiff may recover under two theories: the risk-benefit standard and the consumer-expectation standard.” Kerg v. Atlantic Tool & Die Co., 2008-Ohio-2364, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), citing Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 83 Ohio St.3d 507, 508 (1998). “[A] product is defective in design ‘if it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner or if the benefits of the challe 2007(Internal citations omitted.) {¶ 54} Knitz and Cremeans "stand for the proposition that a product may be found defective in design under the risk-benefit test where the manufacturer fails to incorporate feasible safety features to prevent harm caused by foreseeable human error." Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 507 , 511 . | 1 | 3 |
Temple v. Wean United, Inc.green2 sentences2007See Temple v. Wean , supra. Therefore, appellants' claims are threefold. {¶ 59} First, appellants have a claim that Hayward is strictly liable pursuant to the risk-benefit analysis test codified in R.C. 2307.75 . 1988Reflecting the common-law heritage of strict liability in Ohio, the formal respect accorded consumer expectations echoes the standard under “implied warranty in tort” where a product was found defective if “not ‘of good and merchantable quality, fit and safe for * * * [its] ordinary intended use.’ Lonzrick, supra, at 235 [35 O.O. 2d at 409, 218 N.E. 2d at 191 ].” Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, at 321 , 4 O.O. 3d 466, at 468, 364 N.E. 2d 267, at 270 . “[U]nder the risk-benefit standard prong, a defendant will be subject to liability if the plaintiff proves, by using rel | 1 | 2 |
Kerg v. Atlantic Tool & Die Co.green1 sentence2025However, the trial court erred when it treated this one factor as dispositive of the entire design-defect analysis. {¶52} Under R.C. 2307.75, “a product liability plaintiff may recover under two theories: the risk-benefit standard and the consumer-expectation standard.” Kerg v. Atlantic Tool & Die Co., 2008-Ohio-2364, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), citing Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 83 Ohio St.3d 507, 508 (1998). “[A] product is defective in design ‘if it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner or if the benefits of the challe | 1 | 1 |
Colboch v. Uniroyal Tire Co., Inc.green2 sentences2006The Sours court found that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the consumer-expectation test and held that the risk-benefit test did not `eclipse the consumer-expectation standard; rather it was intended to serve as a refinement of that general principle in those situations where expectations were likely to be distorted.' Id. at 1515 ; see also Colboch v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 108 Ohio App.3d 448 , 670 N.E.2d 1366 , 1371 (Ohio Ct.App. 1996) (applying consumer-expectation test to explosion of vehicle tire and stating that test focuses on `whether the hazard is unexpected'). 2006The Sours court found that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the consumer-expectation test and held that the risk-benefit test did not `eclipse the consumer-expectation standard; rather it was intended to serve as a refinement of that general principle in those situations where expectations were likely to be distorted.' Id. at 1515 ; see also Colboch v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 108 Ohio App.3d 448 , 670 N.E.2d 1366 , 1371 (Ohio Ct.App. 1996) (applying consumer-expectation test to explosion of vehicle tire and stating that test focuses on `whether the hazard is unexpected'). | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Kimwood MacHine Companygreen2 sentences1981Compare Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc. (1978), 20 Cal. 3d 413 , 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (no need to prove that a product is unreasonably dangerous as well as in a defective condition), with Phillips v. Kimwood, Machine Co. (1974), 269 Ore. 485 , 525 P. 2d 1033 (adopting a risk-benefit analysis test to determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous). 1981Compare Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc. (1978), 20 Cal. 3d 413 , 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (no need to prove that a product is unreasonably dangerous as well as in a defective condition), with Phillips v. Kimwood, Machine Co. (1974), 269 Ore. 485 , 525 P. 2d 1033 (adopting a risk-benefit analysis test to determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous). | 1 | 1 |
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.green2 sentences1981Compare Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc. (1978), 20 Cal. 3d 413 , 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (no need to prove that a product is unreasonably dangerous as well as in a defective condition), with Phillips v. Kimwood, Machine Co. (1974), 269 Ore. 485 , 525 P. 2d 1033 (adopting a risk-benefit analysis test to determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous). 1981Compare Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc. (1978), 20 Cal. 3d 413 , 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (no need to prove that a product is unreasonably dangerous as well as in a defective condition), with Phillips v. Kimwood, Machine Co. (1974), 269 Ore. 485 , 525 P. 2d 1033 (adopting a risk-benefit analysis test to determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Knitz v. Minster Machine Co.
green
2 sentences2025However, the trial court erred when it treated this one factor as dispositive of the entire design-defect analysis. {¶52} Under R.C. 2307.75, “a product liability plaintiff may recover under two theories: the risk-benefit standard and the consumer-expectation standard.” Kerg v. Atlantic Tool & Die Co., 2008-Ohio-2364, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), citing Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 83 Ohio St.3d 507, 508 (1998). “[A] product is defective in design ‘if it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner or if the benefits of the challe 1998In Knitz, 69 Ohio St.2d at 467 , 23 O.O.3d at 407 , 432 N.E.2d at 819 , we held the risk-benefit test applicable to determine whether the “press design was defective by allowing accidental tripping of the foot pedal control and in failing to provide a point of operation guard when the foot pedal is operative.” However, these design inadequacies did not cause the press to malfunction. | 9 | 1985–2025 |
Cremeans v. International Harvester Co.
green
2 sentences2007This standard is often referred to as the risk-benefit standard." Id. at 234 . *Page 18 {¶ 53} Although the test is a "single, two-pronged test," a plaintiff need not prove both but may proceed with one theory. 1998Similarly, in Cremeans, 6 Ohio St.3d at 233 , 6 OBR at 303, 452 N.E.2d at 1283 , we held the risk-benefit test applicable to determine “whether the design of the tractor without roll-over protection was in a defective condition.” However, it was an error in judgment, not a malfunction or design inadequacy, that caused the tractor in Cremeans to overturn. | 6 | 1985–2007 |
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Chrysler Corp.
red
2 sentences2003R.C. 2307.75 (A)(1)-(2). {¶ 66} The risk-benefit analysis requires plaintiffs to prove only that the design risks outweigh the benefits, not that a product is "unreasonably dangerous." Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 507 , 512 , 700 N.E.2d 1247 ; and State Farm Fire Cas. v. Chrysler (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 1 , 7 , 523 N.E.2d 489 . 2003R.C. 2307.75 (A)(1)-(2). {¶ 66} The risk-benefit analysis requires plaintiffs to prove only that the design risks outweigh the benefits, not that a product is "unreasonably dangerous." Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 507 , 512 , 700 N.E.2d 1247 ; and State Farm Fire Cas. v. Chrysler (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 1 , 7 , 523 N.E.2d 489 . | 3 | 1998–2003 |
Mary M. Camp (87-3275/3279), Alfred E. Combs, (87-3275/3279), Joseph Benton, (87-4015) v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
green
2 sentences1998There is absolutely no basis under the common or statutory law of Ohio for creating a dichotomy between properly and improperly functioning products when applying the risk-benefit test. {¶ 14} Nevertheless, the district court relied heavily on Caveny v. Raven Arms Co. (S.D.Ohio 1987), 665 F.Supp. 530 , affirmed without published opinion (C.A.6, 1988), 849 F.2d 608 , and Koepke v. Crosman Arms Co. (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 1 , 582 N.E.2d 1000 , for the proposition that Ohio’s statutory risk-benefit test is not applicable to a properly functioning disposable lighter. {¶ 15} In Caveny, plaintiffs so 1998Nevertheless, the district court relied heavily on Caveny v. Raven Arms Co. (S.D.Ohio 1987), 665 F.Supp. 530 , affirmed without published opinion (C.A.6, 1988), 849 F.2d 608 , and Koepke v. Crosman Arms Co. (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 1 , 582 N.E.2d 1000 , for the proposition that Ohio’s statutory risk-benefit test is not applicable to a properly functioning disposable lighter. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Caveny v. Raven Arms Co.
green
2 sentences1998There is absolutely no basis under the common or statutory law of Ohio for creating a dichotomy between properly and improperly functioning products when applying the risk-benefit test. {¶ 14} Nevertheless, the district court relied heavily on Caveny v. Raven Arms Co. (S.D.Ohio 1987), 665 F.Supp. 530 , affirmed without published opinion (C.A.6, 1988), 849 F.2d 608 , and Koepke v. Crosman Arms Co. (1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 1 , 582 N.E.2d 1000 , for the proposition that Ohio’s statutory risk-benefit test is not applicable to a properly functioning disposable lighter. {¶ 15} In Caveny, plaintiffs so 1998In other words, the risk/utility test is only proper when the product could be made safer through an alternative design and not when the product is by its nature dangerous.” Id., 665 F.Supp. at 532-533 . {¶ 16} In Koepke, the court relied on Caveny to find that “[i]n the absence of any allegation by appellants that the BB gun functioned improperly, we conclude that the risk-benefit test does not apply in this case * * *.” Id., 65 Ohio App.3d at 3 , 582 N.E.2d at 1001 . {¶ 17} According to respondents, “[t]he risk-utility test may only be applied when something goes wrong with the product,” i.e | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Koepke v. Crosman Arms Co.
green
2 sentences1998In Koepke , the court relied on Caveny to find that “[i]n the absence of any allegation by appellants that the BB gun functioned improperly, we conclude that the risk-benefit test does not apply in this case * * Id., 65 Ohio App.3d at 3 , 582 N.E.2d at 1001 . 1998In Koepke , the court relied on Caveny to find that “[i]n the absence of any allegation by appellants that the BB gun functioned improperly, we conclude that the risk-benefit test does not apply in this case * * Id., 65 Ohio App.3d at 3 , 582 N.E.2d at 1001 . | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
green
1 sentence2007City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S. Corp. , 95 Ohio St.3d 416 , 424 , *Page 20 2002-Ohio-2480 , ¶ 31 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
green
1 sentence2007City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S. Corp. , 95 Ohio St.3d 416 , 424 , *Page 20 2002-Ohio-2480 , ¶ 31 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Dennis C. Sours v. General Motors Corporation
green
1 sentence2006The Sours court found that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the consumer-expectation test and held that the risk-benefit test did not `eclipse the consumer-expectation standard; rather it was intended to serve as a refinement of that general principle in those situations where expectations were likely to be distorted.' Id. at 1515 ; see also Colboch v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 108 Ohio App.3d 448 , 670 N.E.2d 1366 , 1371 (Ohio Ct.App. 1996) (applying consumer-expectation test to explosion of vehicle tire and stating that test focuses on `whether the hazard is unexpected'). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Holman v. Mark Industries, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006Id. {¶ 52} R.C. 2307.75 (C) sets forth the following factors that courts consider when evaluating the benefits of a product design: (1) The intended or actual utility of the product, including any performance or safety advantages associated with that design or formulation; (2) The technical and economic feasibility, when the product left the control of its manufacturer, of using an alternative design or formulation; (3) The nature and magnitude of any foreseeable risks associated with an alternative design or formulation. * * * {¶ 53} In the case at bar, we believe that genuine issues of mater | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc.
green
1 sentence1998ET AL. [Cite as Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 1998-Ohio-16 .] Torts—Products liability—Risk-benefit test of the Ohio Products Liability Act may be used in attempting to prove a design defect in a properly functioning disposable cigarette lighter. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
James A. McKinnon v. Skil Corporation
green
1 sentence1997Renfro v. Black (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 27 , 556 N.E.2d 150 , citing McKinnon v. Skil Corp (C.A.1, 1981), 638 F.2d 270, 277 . 15 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Renfro v. Black
green
2 sentences1997Renfro v. Black (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 27 , 556 N.E.2d 150 , citing McKinnon v. Skil Corp (C.A.1, 1981), 638 F.2d 270, 277 . 15 . 1997Renfro v. Black (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 27 , 556 N.E.2d 150 , citing McKinnon v. Skil Corp (C.A.1, 1981), 638 F.2d 270, 277 . 15 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Whiteleather v. Yosowitz
green
2 sentences1991See Civ.R. 56(E); Whiteleather v. Yosowitz (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 272 , 10 OBR 386, 461 N.E.2d 1331 . 1991See Civ.R. 56(E); Whiteleather v. Yosowitz (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 272 , 10 OBR 386, 461 N.E.2d 1331 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp.
green
1 sentence1988Reflecting the common-law heritage of strict liability in Ohio, the formal respect accorded consumer expectations echoes the standard under “implied warranty in tort” where a product was found defective if “not ‘of good and merchantable quality, fit and safe for * * * [its] ordinary intended use.’ Lonzrick, supra, at 235 [35 O.O. 2d at 409, 218 N.E. 2d at 191 ].” Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, at 321 , 4 O.O. 3d 466, at 468, 364 N.E. 2d 267, at 270 . “[U]nder the risk-benefit standard prong, a defendant will be subject to liability if the plaintiff proves, by using rel | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.