wilful violation in Illinois

1975Stat. 1971, ch. 48, par. 69) this court decided as early as 1914 in Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co., 264 Ill. 156, 166 , that to have a wilful violation of the statute it was not necessary that there should have been wilful misconduct or “a reckless disregard” of the statute’s provisions.

1972Instruction No. 5 is as follows: “When the statute uses the word ‘wilful’ it means that the owner, contractor, subcontractor or foreman knew, or should have known, by the exercise of reasonable care, that a certain condition existed.” In Schultz v. The Henry Ericsson Co. (1914), 264 Ill. 156 , the court construed the meaning of “wilful violation” of the Structural Work Act: “The word ‘wilfully’ is synonymous with ‘knowingly’, and to constitute a wilful violation of the statute it is not necessary that there should have been ‘a reckless disregard’ of its provisions.

1928An act consciously omitted is wilfully omitted within the meaning of the word “wilful.” (Kellyville Coal Co. v. Strine, 217 Ill. 516 .) The testimony of several witnesses for appellee tended to show that, while the sandblast room was in operation, during the time May worked for appellant, the pressure of the air and sand against the castings created a dust which remained in the sandblast room while the operator was working; that the suction equipment was operated over quite a period of time while it was faulty; that frequently holes were worn in the air pipes and, as a result, the suction pipe

1906And section 33 provides that: “For an injury to person or property, occasioned by any wilful violation of this act, or wilful failure to comply with any of its provisions, a right of action shall accrue to the party injured forvany direct damages sustained thereby.” “A wilful violation, within the meaning of the statute, signifies a conscious violation.” “An act consciously omitted is wilfully omitted, in the meaning of the word ‘ wilful, K as used in these enactments of our legislature relative to the duty of mine owners.” Kellyville Coal Co. v. Strine, 217 Ill. 516 (528).

1990(People v. Totten (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 124, 138 , 514 N.E.2d 959 .) Tri-State maintains that there was no valid court order upon which such a finding could be based.

1990(People v. Totten (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 124, 138 , 514 N.E.2d 959 .) Tri-State maintains that there was no valid court order upon which such a finding could be based.

1986The Act imposes liability for wilful violations of its provisions. ( Simmons v. Union Electric Co. (1984), 104 Ill.2d 444 , 473 N.E.2d 946 .) A wilful violation occurs when one having charge of the work knows that a dangerous condition exists on a scaffold or, by the exercise of reasonable care, could have discovered the existence of the dangerous condition. ( Simmons v. Union Electric Co. (1984), 104 Ill.2d 444 , 473 N.E.2d 946 ; Moore v. Clearing Industrial District, Inc. (1978), 64 Ill.

1984Since, according to the accepted test for the existence of a wilful violation, such a violation occurs if a dangerous condition could reasonably have been discovered (Moore v. Clearing Industrial District, Inc. (1978), 64 Ill.

1982Co. (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 305, 321 , 175 N.E.2d 785, 793 ; Huckabee v. Bell & Howell, Inc. (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 153, 157-58 , 265 N.E.2d 134, 137 .) A wilful violation exists if a party in charge of the work knows of the dangerous condition or by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered the existence of the dangerous condition, and does not correct the condition.

1982Co. (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 305, 321 , 175 N.E.2d 785, 793 ; Huckabee v. Bell & Howell, Inc. (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 153, 157-58 , 265 N.E.2d 134, 137 .) A wilful violation exists if a party in charge of the work knows of the dangerous condition or by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered the existence of the dangerous condition, and does not correct the condition.

1966Under these facts Pepper had charge of the alteration within the meaning and the provisions of the Act.” With reference to the question as to whether or not there was a wilful violation as required by the statute, the court in Lawler pointed out that the words “wilful violations” in the Act have been construed to be synonymous with the words “knowing violations.” (Citing Gannon and Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co., 13 Ill2d 431, 150 NE 2d 134 .) The court held that from the evidence the jury could have concluded that dangerous defects existed in the scaffold which were either known to the defendant o

1962“Wilful violations” of the Act or “wilful failure to comply with any of its provisions” means “knowing” violation or “knowing” failure to comply; to constitute a wilful violation it is not necessary that there should have been a reckless disregard of its provisions; the employer is liable when the dangerous condition is known to him, or when by the exercise of reasonable care the existence of such dangerous condition could have been discovered and become known to him: Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co. (1914), 264 Ill 156, 106 NE 236 ; Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co. (1958) 13 Ill2d 431, 150 NE2d 134 ; G

1918In the recent case of Piazzi v. Kerens-Donnewald Coal Co., supra, this court held that the mine owner or operator is liable for a wilful violation of the mining statute even though he had the place examined by a mine examiner, who in good faith believed that the place was not dangerous. * * * It was held in Aetitus v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 246 Ill. 32 , that if conditions in thq mine are in fact dangerous, the owner or operator cannot excuse himself from liability for a wilful violation of the Mines and Mining Act if he fails to cause the places where the dangerous conditions exist to be mar

1917The first case in which it was attempted to define what was meant by wilful violation of the statute was Aetitus v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 246 Ill. 32 , where there was a very thorough and exhaustive discussion of the question and it was held : “We do not think the owner or operator of a mine can excuse himself from liability growing out of a wilful violation of the Mines and Mining Act,—that is, from a conscious violation of the act,—in failing to properly examine the mine and mark dangerous places therein which are known to him, on the ground that his examiner or manager in good faith thoug

2004Simmons v. Union Electric Co., 104 Ill. 2d 444, 458 (1984); Vegich v. McDougal Hartmann Co., 84 Ill. 2d 461 (1981) (when the safety statute’s purpose of prevention is frustrated by a wilful violation and an accident follows, the full burden of the loss must be laid on the wrongdoer, even if the victim was himself negligent); Rost v. F.H.

2004Simmons v. Union Electric Co. , 104 Ill. 2d 444, 458 (1984); Vegich v. McDougal Hartmann Co. , 84 Ill. 2d 461 (1981) (when the safety statute's purpose of prevention is frustrated by a wilful violation and an accident follows, the full burden of the loss must be laid on the wrongdoer, even if the victim was himself negligent); Rost v. F.H.

1986App.2d 176 , 254 N.E.2d 117 (no wilful violation where plaintiff hitched a ride on a safe cable intended for equipment, not people, and was injured). • 4 In addition to establishing a wilful violation, plaintiff must establish that the defect in the scaffold proximately caused his injuries, and it is only when an injury has some connection with the hazardous nature of the scaffold that a cause of action may be maintained under the Act. ( Tenenbaum v. City of Chicago (1975), 60 Ill.2d 363 , 325 N.E.2d 607 .) Here, the injury to plaintiff when he fell backwards occurred when the unsecured door m

1983App. 2d 176 , 254 N.E.2d 117 .) It is not necessary that there be a reckless or deliberate disregard of the provisions of the Act in order to constitute a wilful violation.

1991Lyle v. Sester (1981), 103 Ill.

1987App. 2d 412 , 188 N.E.2d 532 .) As stated by the Lyle court: “To find a wilful violation here would place a heavy burden on a residential owner, such as the defendant, who hires an independent contractor to work on his house. *** In the vast majority of cases, as here, residential owners lack the requisite knowledge and skill that is essential to construction operations and, accordingly, cannot be expected to enforce safety provisions about which they have no knowledge or do not understand; thus, they must rely, in appropriate circumstances, upon independent contractors, who are knowledgeable

1988Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 , 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14 .) To prove a wilful violation of the Act, it is only necessary to show that the defendant knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the existence of the dangerous condition.

1988Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 , 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14 .) To prove a wilful violation of the Act, it is only necessary to show that the defendant knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the existence of the dangerous condition.

1985(Peoples v. Granite City Steel Co. (1982), 109 Ill.

1984(Peoples v. Granite City Steel Co. (1982), 109 Ill.

1985Plaintiff relies on the case of McInerney v. Hasbrook Construction Co. (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 93 , 338 N.E.2d 868 , a case in which a jury returned a verdict holding the contractor liable for a wilful violation of the Structural Work Act.

1985Plaintiff relies on the case of McInerney v. Hasbrook Construction Co. (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 93 , 338 N.E.2d 868 , a case in which a jury returned a verdict holding the contractor liable for a wilful violation of the Structural Work Act.

1983(Gundich v. Emerson-Comstock Co. (1960), 21 Ill. 2d 117 , 171 N.E.2d 60 .) The courts have declined to define the term “having charge of” and consider it a term of common usage and understanding.

1962“Wilful violations” of the Act or “wilful failure to comply with any of its provisions” means “knowing” violation or “knowing” failure to comply; to constitute a wilful violation it is not necessary that there should have been a reckless disregard of its provisions; the employer is liable when the dangerous condition is known to him, or when by the exercise of reasonable care the existence of such dangerous condition could have been discovered and become known to him: Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co. (1914), 264 Ill 156, 106 NE 236 ; Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co. (1958) 13 Ill2d 431, 150 NE2d 134 ; G

1919That case was cited and the opinion quoted from in Peebles v. O’Gara Coal Co., 239 Ill. 370 , where it was held not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant had actually discovered the dangerous conditions complained of, and that operators of mines are liable not only when dangerous conditions have been discovered but also where a proper examination required by the statute would have discovered the existence of such conditions.

1916Kellyville Coal Co. v. Strine, 217 Ill. 516 ; Davis v. Illinois Collieries Co., 232 Ill. 284 ; Peebles v. O’Gara Coal Co., 239 Ill. 370 ; Waschow v. Kelly Coal Co., 245 Ill. 516 ; Wilkerson v. Willis Coal & Mining Co., 158 Ill.

2004Noble & Co., 316 Ill. 357 (1925) (contributory negligence does not apply to injuries wilfully or intentionally inflicted); Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co., 264 Ill. 156 (1914) (the reason for casting aside contributory negligence applies equally to all safety statutes that limit violations of the statute to wilful acts).

2004Noble & Co. , 316 Ill. 357 (1925) (contributory negligence does not apply to injuries wilfully or intentionally inflicted); Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co. , 264 Ill. 156 (1914) (the reason for casting aside contributory negligence applies equally to all safety statutes that limit violations of the statute to wilful acts).

1999People v. Stack, 261 Ill.

1999People v. Stack , 261 Ill.

1995Rather than punishing the defendant under Rule 415(g)(i), the trial court could have sanctioned the attorney under Rule 415(g)(ii), which provides that `Wilful violation by counsel of an applicable discovery rule ... may subject counsel to appropriate sanctions by the court.' [Citation.] Direct sanctions against the attorney would have been particularly appropriate here since the discovery rule violated in this case places the obligation to comply with discovery not on the defendant, but directly on the attorney: providing that, upon motion by the State, a `defense counsel ... shall furnish th

1995Rather than punishing the defendant under Rule 415(g)(1), the trial court could have sanctioned the attorney under Rule 415(g)(ii), which provides that 'Wilful violation by counsel of an applicable discovery rule ... may subject counsel to appropriate sanctions by the court.’ [Citation.] Direct sanctions against the attorney would have been particularly appropriate here since the discovery rule violated in this case places the obligation to comply with discovery not on the defendant, but directly on the attorney: providing that, upon motion by the State, a 'defense counsel ... shall furnish th

1995Dec. 400 , 407, 639 N.E.2d 959, 966 .) If the court finds— as the record in the present case suggests—a wilful violation by counsel, then the court should consider two unrelated paths of action by asking both of the following questions: (1) how important and necessary is the new evidence being offered in violation of the discovery rules, and if the court admits it, how prejudicial and surprising will it be to the other side?

1995App. 3d 351, 361 , 639 N.E.2d 959, 966 .) If the court finds — as the record in the present case suggests — a wilful violation by counsel, then the court should consider two unrelated paths of action by asking both of the following questions: (1) how important and necessary is the new evidence being offered in violation of the discovery rules, and if the court admits it, how prejudicial and surprising will it be to the other side?

1992The primary purpose of the Structural Work Act is to encourage safe construction practices so as to prevent injury to persons employed in extrahazardous occupations. ( Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank (1973), 55 Ill.2d 121, 127 , 302 N.E.2d 64 .) Equally important to this preventive purpose, however, is the Act's objective of fully compensating those injured as a consequence of wilful violation of the Act. ( Simmons v. Union Electric Co. (1984), 104 Ill.2d 444, 459-60 , 85 Ill.Dec. 347 , 478 *1221 N.E.2d 946 (the purpose of the Act "is to prevent accidents before they occur; failing

1992The primary purpose of the Structural Work Act is to encourage safe construction practices so as to prevent injury to persons employed in extrahazardous occupations. ( Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank (1973), 55 Ill.2d 121, 127 , 302 N.E.2d 64 .) Equally important to this preventive purpose, however, is the Act's objective of fully compensating those injured as a consequence of wilful violation of the Act. ( Simmons v. Union Electric Co. (1984), 104 Ill.2d 444, 459-60 , 85 Ill.Dec. 347 , 478 *1221 N.E.2d 946 (the purpose of the Act "is to prevent accidents before they occur; failing

1988(See Totten, 118 Ill. 2d at 138-39 , citing People v. Mueller (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 378 , and Illinois v. Vitale (1980), 447 U.S. 410 , 65 L.

1988(See Totten, 118 Ill.2d at 138-39 , citing People v. Mueller (1985), 109 Ill.2d 378 , and Illinois v. Vitale (1980), 447 U.S. 410 , 65 L.Ed.2d 228 , 100 S.Ct. 2260 .) The two are, therefore, the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.

1988(Kohutko v. Four Columns, Ltd. (1986), 148 Ill.

1988(Kohutko, 148 Ill.

1988(See Totten, 118 Ill. 2d at 138-39 , citing People v. Mueller (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 378 , and Illinois v. Vitale (1980), 447 U.S. 410 , 65 L.

1988(See Totten, 118 Ill. 2d at 138-39 , citing People v. Mueller (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 378 , and Illinois v. Vitale (1980), 447 U.S. 410 , 65 L.

1986A wilful violation occurs when one having charge of the work knows that a dangerous condition *248 exists or by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered the existence of the dangerous condition. ( Simmons v. Union Electric Co. (1984), 121 Ill.

1986(Simmons v. Union Electric Co. (1984), 121 Ill.

1986App.2d 176 , 254 N.E.2d 117 (no wilful violation where plaintiff hitched a ride on a safe cable intended for equipment, not people, and was injured). • 4 In addition to establishing a wilful violation, plaintiff must establish that the defect in the scaffold proximately caused his injuries, and it is only when an injury has some connection with the hazardous nature of the scaffold that a cause of action may be maintained under the Act. ( Tenenbaum v. City of Chicago (1975), 60 Ill.2d 363 , 325 N.E.2d 607 .) Here, the injury to plaintiff when he fell backwards occurred when the unsecured door m

1986App.2d 176 , 254 N.E.2d 117 (no wilful violation where plaintiff hitched a ride on a safe cable intended for equipment, not people, and was injured). • 4 In addition to establishing a wilful violation, plaintiff must establish that the defect in the scaffold proximately caused his injuries, and it is only when an injury has some connection with the hazardous nature of the scaffold that a cause of action may be maintained under the Act. ( Tenenbaum v. City of Chicago (1975), 60 Ill.2d 363 , 325 N.E.2d 607 .) Here, the injury to plaintiff when he fell backwards occurred when the unsecured door m

1986The court in Katz v. Shaf Home Builders, Inc. (1981), 94 Ill.

1981Katz v. Shaf Home Builders, Inc. (1981), 94 Ill.