wilful violation in Connecticut

2001"A judge may be sanctioned for a wilful violation of one of the canons of judicial conduct if he intended to engage in the conduct for which [he] is sanctioned whether or not he knows that he violates the rule." (Brackets omitted; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Flanagan, 240 Conn. 157 , 183 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 865 , 118 S.Ct. 172 , 139 L.Ed.2d 114 (1998).

1997Recently our Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle, In re Flanagan , 240 Conn. 157 , 183 : "A judge may be sanctioned for a wilful violation of one of the canons of judicial conduct for which he is sanctioned whether or not he knows that he violates the rule." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) The Plaintiff's claim that his violation is merely technical, fails under a similar analysis.

2014In re Flanagan, 240 Conn. 157, 183 , 690 A.2d 865 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 865 , 118 S. Ct. 172 , 139 L.

2001"A judge may be sanctioned for a wilful violation of one of the canons of judicial conduct if he intended to engage in the conduct for which [he] is sanctioned whether or not he knows that he violates the rule." (Brackets omitted; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Flanagan, 240 Conn. 157 , 183 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 865 , 118 S.Ct. 172 , 139 L.Ed.2d 114 (1998).

2014In re Flanagan, 240 Conn. 157, 183 , 690 A.2d 865 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 865 , 118 S. Ct. 172 , 139 L.

2001"A judge may be sanctioned for a wilful violation of one of the canons of judicial conduct if he intended to engage in the conduct for which [he] is sanctioned whether or not he knows that he violates the rule." (Brackets omitted; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Flanagan, 240 Conn. 157 , 183 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 865 , 118 S.Ct. 172 , 139 L.Ed.2d 114 (1998).

2014In re Flanagan, 240 Conn. 157, 183 , 690 A.2d 865 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 865 , 118 S. Ct. 172 , 139 L.

2001"A judge may be sanctioned for a wilful violation of one of the canons of judicial conduct if he intended to engage in the conduct for which [he] is sanctioned whether or not he knows that he violates the rule." (Brackets omitted; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Flanagan, 240 Conn. 157 , 183 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 865 , 118 S.Ct. 172 , 139 L.Ed.2d 114 (1998).

2010Marcil v. Marcil, 4 Conn. App. 403, 405 , 494 A.2d 620 (1985).

1993Disobedience of a Court order does not constitute a wilful violation where there is a legitimate dispute, see Bucy v. Bucy, 23 Conn. App. 98 , 579 A.2d 117 , 119 (1990), or a mistaken perception, see Marcil, supra at 405 , 494 A.2d at 622 , regarding the decree.

2001Wilson v. Wilson, 38 Conn. App. 263, 275-76 , 661 A.2d 621 (1995).

2001Wilson v. Wilson, 38 Conn. App. 263, 275-76 , 661 A.2d 621 (1995).

2022The Appellate Court observed that there was no evidence ‘‘that the defendant had been convicted of any offense in a criminal proceeding’’; id., 115; as required by this court’s decision in Gelinas v. West Hartford, 225 Conn. 575, 593 , 626 A.2d 259 (1993), and its decision in Gelinas v. West Hartford, 65 Conn. App. 265, 280 , 782 A.2d 679 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 926 , 783 A.2d 1028 (2001), which held that a criminal conviction was a predicate to the finding of wilfulness necessary to allow the imposition of fines of more than $100 per day pursuant to § 8-12.

2022The Appellate Court observed that there was no evidence ‘‘that the defendant had been convicted of any offense in a criminal proceeding’’; id., 115; as required by this court’s decision in Gelinas v. West Hartford, 225 Conn. 575, 593 , 626 A.2d 259 (1993), and its decision in Gelinas v. West Hartford, 65 Conn. App. 265, 280 , 782 A.2d 679 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 926 , 783 A.2d 1028 (2001), which held that a criminal conviction was a predicate to the finding of wilfulness necessary to allow the imposition of fines of more than $100 per day pursuant to § 8-12.

2022The Appellate Court observed that there was no evidence ‘‘that the defendant had been convicted of any offense in a criminal proceeding’’; id., 115; as required by this court’s decision in Gelinas v. West Hartford, 225 Conn. 575, 593 , 626 A.2d 259 (1993), and its decision in Gelinas v. West Hartford, 65 Conn. App. 265, 280 , 782 A.2d 679 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 926 , 783 A.2d 1028 (2001), which held that a criminal conviction was a predicate to the finding of wilfulness necessary to allow the imposition of fines of more than $100 per day pursuant to § 8-12.

2022The Appellate Court observed that there was no evidence ‘‘that the defendant had been convicted of any offense in a criminal proceeding’’; id., 115; as required by this court’s decision in Gelinas v. West Hartford, 225 Conn. 575, 593 , 626 A.2d 259 (1993), and its decision in Gelinas v. West Hartford, 65 Conn. App. 265, 280 , 782 A.2d 679 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 926 , 783 A.2d 1028 (2001), which held that a criminal conviction was a predicate to the finding of wilfulness necessary to allow the imposition of fines of more than $100 per day pursuant to § 8-12.

2022The Appellate Court observed that there was no evidence ‘‘that the defendant had been convicted of any offense in a criminal proceeding’’; id., 115; as required by this court’s decision in Gelinas v. West Hartford, 225 Conn. 575, 593 , 626 A.2d 259 (1993), and its decision in Gelinas v. West Hartford, 65 Conn. App. 265, 280 , 782 A.2d 679 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 926 , 783 A.2d 1028 (2001), which held that a criminal conviction was a predicate to the finding of wilfulness necessary to allow the imposition of fines of more than $100 per day pursuant to § 8-12.

2022The Appellate Court observed that there was no evidence ‘‘that the defendant had been convicted of any offense in a criminal proceeding’’; id., 115; as required by this court’s decision in Gelinas v. West Hartford, 225 Conn. 575, 593 , 626 A.2d 259 (1993), and its decision in Gelinas v. West Hartford, 65 Conn. App. 265, 280 , 782 A.2d 679 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 926 , 783 A.2d 1028 (2001), which held that a criminal conviction was a predicate to the finding of wilfulness necessary to allow the imposition of fines of more than $100 per day pursuant to § 8-12.

2020Although Justice Mullins was not present when the case was argued before the court, he has read the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to partici- pating in this decision. ** April 13, 2020, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes. 1 This court granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: ‘‘(1) Did the Appellate Court properly con- clude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the plaintiff in con

2020Although Justice Mullins was not present when the case was argued before the court, he has read the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to partici- pating in this decision. ** April 13, 2020, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes. 1 This court granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: ‘‘(1) Did the Appellate Court properly con- clude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the plaintiff in con

2005That reasoning equally is applicable to lawyers and, therefore, we conclude that the court properly held that rule 8.4 (4) does not have a scienter requirement.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2003In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Prial v. Prial, 67 Conn. App. 7, 9-10 , 787 A.2d 50 (2001).

2003In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Prial v. Prial, 67 Conn. App. 7, 9-10 , 787 A.2d 50 (2001).

2001Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 , 91 S. Ct. 974 , 28 L.

2001Ed. 2d 302 (1972) (wilful violation of federal securities law requires only wilfulness to commit act, rather than specific intent to knowingly violate law); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 , 91 S. Ct. 974 , 28 L.

1999Connolly v. Connolly, 191 Conn. 468 , 483 (1983).

1998For purposes of this subsection, a wilful violation occurs when the party committing the violation knew or should have known that his conduct was a violation of section 42-110b.” These sections vest the trial court with discretion to award relief and impose penalties as it deems appropriate under the circumstances of each case. “[A] defendant who seeks to reverse the exercise of judicial discretion assumes a heavy burden.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pieger, 240 Conn. 639, 648 , 692 A.2d 1273 (1997).

1998For purposes of this subsection, a wilful violation occurs when the party committing the violation knew or should have known that his conduct was a violation of section 42-110b.” These sections vest the trial court with discretion to award relief and impose penalties as it deems appropriate under the circumstances of each case. “[A] defendant who seeks to reverse the exercise of judicial discretion assumes a heavy burden.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pieger, 240 Conn. 639, 648 , 692 A.2d 1273 (1997).

1997Flanagan claims that our previous decisions in In re Zoarski, supra, 227 Conn. 793 -94, and Levinson v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 211 Conn. 508, 525 , 560 A.2d 403 (1989), require expert testimony in judicial review proceedings if a majority of the decisionmaking body is not composed of “experts,” i.e., either judges or lawyers.

1997Flanagan claims that our previous decisions in In re Zoarski, supra, 227 Conn. 793 -94, and Levinson v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 211 Conn. 508, 525 , 560 A.2d 403 (1989), require expert testimony in judicial review proceedings if a majority of the decisionmaking body is not composed of “experts,” i.e., either judges or lawyers.

1997A judge may be sanctioned for a wilful violation of one of the canons of judicial conduct if he intended to engage in the conduct for which he is sanctioned “whether or not [he] knows that he violates the rule.” Id.

1997Under the circumstances, therefore, the trial court reasonably concluded that the plaintiffs conduct constituted a wilful violation under Practice Book § 986 (4) of the prohibition against disobeying a judicial authority during a criminal pro ceeding; see footnote 1 of this opinion; as well as an affront to the court’s dignity and its authority to control its proceedings. 24 See In re Dodson, supra, 214 Conn. 359 -60; Naunchek v. Naunchek, 191 Conn. 110, 114 , 463 A.2d 603 (1983); see also United States v. Allocco, 994 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Lumumba, 794 F.2d 806, 810 (2d

1997Under the circumstances, therefore, the trial court reasonably concluded that the plaintiffs conduct constituted a wilful violation under Practice Book § 986 (4) of the prohibition against disobeying a judicial authority during a criminal pro ceeding; see footnote 1 of this opinion; as well as an affront to the court’s dignity and its authority to control its proceedings. 24 See In re Dodson, supra, 214 Conn. 359 -60; Naunchek v. Naunchek, 191 Conn. 110, 114 , 463 A.2d 603 (1983); see also United States v. Allocco, 994 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Lumumba, 794 F.2d 806, 810 (2d

1997Under the circumstances, therefore, the trial court reasonably concluded that the plaintiffs conduct constituted a wilful violation under Practice Book § 986 (4) of the prohibition against disobeying a judicial authority during a criminal pro ceeding; see footnote 1 of this opinion; as well as an affront to the court’s dignity and its authority to control its proceedings. 24 See In re Dodson, supra, 214 Conn. 359 -60; Naunchek v. Naunchek, 191 Conn. 110, 114 , 463 A.2d 603 (1983); see also United States v. Allocco, 994 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Lumumba, 794 F.2d 806, 810 (2d