Forbes standard in Pennsylvania

2015This, the Commonwealth asserts, is manifestly contrary to the weight of authority in other jurisdictions and warrants correction. 6 Appellee, in his brief, embraces the per se approach to innocence claims, arguing that it derives specifically from Forbes , and has been implemented by this Court in Commonwealth v. Woods, 452 Pa. 546, 550-51 , 307 A.2d 880, 881-82 (1973), and in a strong admonishment of the Superior Court’s departures in Randolph, 553 Pa. at 230 , 718 A.2d at 1244-45 (criticizing the intermediate court’s refusal to give weight to an innocence assertion as a “cavalier disregard o

2015This, the Commonwealth asserts, is manifestly contrary to the weight of authority in other jurisdictions and warrants correction. 6 Appellee, in his brief, embraces the per se approach to innocence claims, arguing that it derives specifically from Forbes , and has been implemented by this Court in Commonwealth v. Woods, 452 Pa. 546, 550-51 , 307 A.2d 880, 881-82 (1973), and in a strong admonishment of the Superior Court’s departures in Randolph, 553 Pa. at 230 , 718 A.2d at 1244-45 (criticizing the intermediate court’s refusal to give weight to an innocence assertion as a “cavalier disregard o

2016Subsequently, an en banc panel of this Court, in Commonwealth v. Katonka, 33 A.3d 44, 49 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc), distinguished Tennison by limiting that decision to its facts, and re-asserted the Forbes standard.

2016Subsequently, an en banc panel of this Court, in Commonwealth v. Katonka, 33 A.3d 44, 49 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc), distinguished Tennison by limiting that decision to its facts, and re-asserted the Forbes standard.

2015This, the Commonwealth asserts, is manifestly contrary to the weight of authority in other jurisdictions and warrants correction. 6 Appellee, in his brief, embraces the per se approach to innocence claims, arguing that it derives specifically from Forbes , and has been implemented by this Court in Commonwealth v. Woods, 452 Pa. 546, 550-51 , 307 A.2d 880, 881-82 (1973), and in a strong admonishment of the Superior Court’s departures in Randolph, 553 Pa. at 230 , 718 A.2d at 1244-45 (criticizing the intermediate court’s refusal to give weight to an innocence assertion as a “cavalier disregard o

2015This, the Commonwealth asserts, is manifestly contrary to the weight of authority in other jurisdictions and warrants correction. 6 Appellee, in his brief, embraces the per se approach to innocence claims, arguing that it derives specifically from Forbes , and has been implemented by this Court in Commonwealth v. Woods, 452 Pa. 546, 550-51 , 307 A.2d 880, 881-82 (1973), and in a strong admonishment of the Superior Court’s departures in Randolph, 553 Pa. at 230 , 718 A.2d at 1244-45 (criticizing the intermediate court’s refusal to give weight to an innocence assertion as a “cavalier disregard o

1992We agree with Commonwealth v. Turiano, 411 Pa.Super. 391 , 601 A.2d 846, 852 (1992) that a guilty plea colloquy ensures that a criminal defendant understands the significance of the constitutional rights he is waiving.

1992We agree with Commonwealth v. Turiano, 411 Pa.Super. 391 , 601 A.2d 846, 852 (1992) that a guilty plea colloquy ensures that a criminal defendant understands the significance of the constitutional rights he is waiving.

2016A divided en banc panel of this Court later reversed based upon the Forbes standard, noting “trial courts are ‘not permitted to make a determination regarding the sincerity of [defendants’] unambiguous claims of innocence.’” Id. at 1288 .

2016A divided en banc panel of this Court later reversed based upon the Forbes standard, noting “trial courts are ‘not permitted to make a determination regarding the sincerity of [defendants’] unambiguous claims of innocence.’” Id. at 1288 .

1999The Court then provided the following test: [I]n determining whether to grant a pre-sentence motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea, “the test to be applied by the trial courts is fairness and justice.” If the trial court finds “any fair and just reason”, withdrawal of the plea before sentence should be freely permitted, un *787 less the prosecution had been “substantially prejudiced.” Id., 299 A.2d at 271 . ¶ 10 In applying the “Forbes test”, our Supreme Court has been quick to reverse lower courts for deviating from this liberal standard.

1999The Court then provided the following test: [I]n determining whether to grant a pre-sentence motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea, “the test to be applied by the trial courts is fairness and justice.” If the trial court finds “any fair and just reason”, withdrawal of the plea before sentence should be freely permitted, un *787 less the prosecution had been “substantially prejudiced.” Id., 299 A.2d at 271 . ¶ 10 In applying the “Forbes test”, our Supreme Court has been quick to reverse lower courts for deviating from this liberal standard.

2015The Commonwealth traces what it views as a perversion of the Forbes standard to an en banc decision of the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Cole, 387 Pa.Super. 328 , 564 A.2d 203 (1989).

2015The Commonwealth traces what it views as a perversion of the Forbes standard to an en banc decision of the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Cole, 387 Pa.Super. 328 , 564 A.2d 203 (1989).

2016See Carrasquillo, supra at 1291 ; see also Commonwealth v. Farabaugh, 128 A.3d 1191, 1193 (Pa. 2015).

2016See Carrasquillo, supra at 1291 ; see also Commonwealth v. Farabaugh, 128 A.3d 1191, 1193 (Pa. 2015).

2015Appellee 5 See Brief for Appellant at 19 n.5 (citing Tennison, 969 A.2d at 575 (indicating that “a fair and just reason has to be a credible reason”), and Commonwealth v. Miller, 432 Pa. Super. 619, 628-29 , 639 A.2d 815, 819 (1994) (upholding a common pleas court’s refusal to permit withdrawal of a plea, in part, because the defendant’s “alleged assertion of innocence rings hollow”)). 6 The following decisions exemplify the proposition that a mere, bare, or non-colorable assertion of innocence is insufficient, in and of itself, to support withdrawal of a plea: United States v. Buholtz, 562 Fe

2015Appellee 5 See Brief for Appellant at 19 n.5 (citing Tennison, 969 A.2d at 575 (indicating that “a fair and just reason has to be a credible reason”), and Commonwealth v. Miller, 432 Pa. Super. 619, 628-29 , 639 A.2d 815, 819 (1994) (upholding a common pleas court’s refusal to permit withdrawal of a plea, in part, because the defendant’s “alleged assertion of innocence rings hollow”)). 6 The following decisions exemplify the proposition that a mere, bare, or non-colorable assertion of innocence is insufficient, in and of itself, to support withdrawal of a plea: United States v. Buholtz, 562 Fe

2015Appellee 5 See Brief for Appellant at 19 n.5 (citing Tennison, 969 A.2d at 575 (indicating that “a fair and just reason has to be a credible reason”), and Commonwealth v. Miller, 432 Pa. Super. 619, 628-29 , 639 A.2d 815, 819 (1994) (upholding a common pleas court’s refusal to permit withdrawal of a plea, in part, because the defendant’s “alleged assertion of innocence rings hollow”)). 6 The following decisions exemplify the proposition that a mere, bare, or non-colorable assertion of innocence is insufficient, in and of itself, to support withdrawal of a plea: United States v. Buholtz, 562 Fe

2015Appellee 5 See Brief for Appellant at 19 n.5 (citing Tennison, 969 A.2d at 575 (indicating that “a fair and just reason has to be a credible reason”), and Commonwealth v. Miller, 432 Pa. Super. 619, 628-29 , 639 A.2d 815, 819 (1994) (upholding a common pleas court’s refusal to permit withdrawal of a plea, in part, because the defendant’s “alleged assertion of innocence rings hollow”)). 6 The following decisions exemplify the proposition that a mere, bare, or non-colorable assertion of innocence is insufficient, in and of itself, to support withdrawal of a plea: United States v. Buholtz, 562 Fe

2015Appellee 5 See Brief for Appellant at 19 n.5 (citing Tennison, 969 A.2d at 575 (indicating that “a fair and just reason has to be a credible reason”), and Commonwealth v. Miller, 432 Pa. Super. 619, 628-29 , 639 A.2d 815, 819 (1994) (upholding a common pleas court’s refusal to permit withdrawal of a plea, in part, because the defendant’s “alleged assertion of innocence rings hollow”)). 6 The following decisions exemplify the proposition that a mere, bare, or non-colorable assertion of innocence is insufficient, in and of itself, to support withdrawal of a plea: United States v. Buholtz, 562 Fe

2015Appellee 5 See Brief for Appellant at 19 n.5 (citing Tennison, 969 A.2d at 575 (indicating that “a fair and just reason has to be a credible reason”), and Commonwealth v. Miller, 432 Pa. Super. 619, 628-29 , 639 A.2d 815, 819 (1994) (upholding a common pleas court’s refusal to permit withdrawal of a plea, in part, because the defendant’s “alleged assertion of innocence rings hollow”)). 6 The following decisions exemplify the proposition that a mere, bare, or non-colorable assertion of innocence is insufficient, in and of itself, to support withdrawal of a plea: United States v. Buholtz, 562 Fe

1992At one time, it was readily apparent that “the mere assertion of innocence is a ‘fair and just reason’ for permitting the withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing.” Commonwealth v. McCall, 320 Pa.Super. 473, 480 , 467 A.2d 631, 634 (1983); Accord Commonwealth v. Woods, 452 Pa. 546, 551 , 307 A.2d 880, 882 (1973); Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 334 Pa.Super. 117, 120 , 482 A.2d 1110, 1111 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kay, 330 Pa.Super. 89, 94 , 478 A.2d 1366, 1368 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1010 , 105 S.Ct. 2009 , 85 L.Ed.2d 293 (1985); Commonwealth v. Whittall, 304 Pa.Super. 258, 264 , 450 A.2d

1992At one time, it was readily apparent that “the mere assertion of innocence is a ‘fair and just reason’ for permitting the withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing.” Commonwealth v. McCall, 320 Pa.Super. 473, 480 , 467 A.2d 631, 634 (1983); Accord Commonwealth v. Woods, 452 Pa. 546, 551 , 307 A.2d 880, 882 (1973); Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 334 Pa.Super. 117, 120 , 482 A.2d 1110, 1111 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kay, 330 Pa.Super. 89, 94 , 478 A.2d 1366, 1368 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1010 , 105 S.Ct. 2009 , 85 L.Ed.2d 293 (1985); Commonwealth v. Whittall, 304 Pa.Super. 258, 264 , 450 A.2d

1992At one time, it was readily apparent that “the mere assertion of innocence is a ‘fair and just reason’ for permitting the withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing.” Commonwealth v. McCall, 320 Pa.Super. 473, 480 , 467 A.2d 631, 634 (1983); Accord Commonwealth v. Woods, 452 Pa. 546, 551 , 307 A.2d 880, 882 (1973); Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 334 Pa.Super. 117, 120 , 482 A.2d 1110, 1111 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kay, 330 Pa.Super. 89, 94 , 478 A.2d 1366, 1368 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1010 , 105 S.Ct. 2009 , 85 L.Ed.2d 293 (1985); Commonwealth v. Whittall, 304 Pa.Super. 258, 264 , 450 A.2d

1992At one time, it was readily apparent that “the mere assertion of innocence is a ‘fair and just reason’ for permitting the withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing.” Commonwealth v. McCall, 320 Pa.Super. 473, 480 , 467 A.2d 631, 634 (1983); Accord Commonwealth v. Woods, 452 Pa. 546, 551 , 307 A.2d 880, 882 (1973); Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 334 Pa.Super. 117, 120 , 482 A.2d 1110, 1111 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kay, 330 Pa.Super. 89, 94 , 478 A.2d 1366, 1368 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1010 , 105 S.Ct. 2009 , 85 L.Ed.2d 293 (1985); Commonwealth v. Whittall, 304 Pa.Super. 258, 264 , 450 A.2d

1992As the Forbes standard indicates, “ ‘[a] trial court, [in presentence situations], abuses its discretion by not allowing a guilty plea to be freely withdrawn prior to sentencing when the Commonwealth would not be substantially prejudiced by the plea withdrawal.’ ” McLaughlin, supra, 469 Pa. at 412 , 366 A.2d at 241 , quoting Commonwealth v. Santos, 450 Pa. 492, 496 , 301 A.2d 829, 831 (1973).

1992As the Forbes standard indicates, “ ‘[a] trial court, [in presentence situations], abuses its discretion by not allowing a guilty plea to be freely withdrawn prior to sentencing when the Commonwealth would not be substantially prejudiced by the plea withdrawal.’ ” McLaughlin, supra, 469 Pa. at 412 , 366 A.2d at 241 , quoting Commonwealth v. Santos, 450 Pa. 492, 496 , 301 A.2d 829, 831 (1973).

1992At one time, it was readily apparent that “the mere assertion of innocence is a ‘fair and just reason’ for permitting the withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing.” Commonwealth v. McCall, 320 Pa.Super. 473, 480 , 467 A.2d 631, 634 (1983); Accord Commonwealth v. Woods, 452 Pa. 546, 551 , 307 A.2d 880, 882 (1973); Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 334 Pa.Super. 117, 120 , 482 A.2d 1110, 1111 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kay, 330 Pa.Super. 89, 94 , 478 A.2d 1366, 1368 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1010 , 105 S.Ct. 2009 , 85 L.Ed.2d 293 (1985); Commonwealth v. Whittall, 304 Pa.Super. 258, 264 , 450 A.2d

1992At one time, it was readily apparent that “the mere assertion of innocence is a ‘fair and just reason’ for permitting the withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing.” Commonwealth v. McCall, 320 Pa.Super. 473, 480 , 467 A.2d 631, 634 (1983); Accord Commonwealth v. Woods, 452 Pa. 546, 551 , 307 A.2d 880, 882 (1973); Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 334 Pa.Super. 117, 120 , 482 A.2d 1110, 1111 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kay, 330 Pa.Super. 89, 94 , 478 A.2d 1366, 1368 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1010 , 105 S.Ct. 2009 , 85 L.Ed.2d 293 (1985); Commonwealth v. Whittall, 304 Pa.Super. 258, 264 , 450 A.2d

1992At one time, it was readily apparent that “the mere assertion of innocence is a ‘fair and just reason’ for permitting the withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing.” Commonwealth v. McCall, 320 Pa.Super. 473, 480 , 467 A.2d 631, 634 (1983); Accord Commonwealth v. Woods, 452 Pa. 546, 551 , 307 A.2d 880, 882 (1973); Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 334 Pa.Super. 117, 120 , 482 A.2d 1110, 1111 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kay, 330 Pa.Super. 89, 94 , 478 A.2d 1366, 1368 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1010 , 105 S.Ct. 2009 , 85 L.Ed.2d 293 (1985); Commonwealth v. Whittall, 304 Pa.Super. 258, 264 , 450 A.2d

1992At one time, it was readily apparent that “the mere assertion of innocence is a ‘fair and just reason’ for permitting the withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing.” Commonwealth v. McCall, 320 Pa.Super. 473, 480 , 467 A.2d 631, 634 (1983); Accord Commonwealth v. Woods, 452 Pa. 546, 551 , 307 A.2d 880, 882 (1973); Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 334 Pa.Super. 117, 120 , 482 A.2d 1110, 1111 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kay, 330 Pa.Super. 89, 94 , 478 A.2d 1366, 1368 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1010 , 105 S.Ct. 2009 , 85 L.Ed.2d 293 (1985); Commonwealth v. Whittall, 304 Pa.Super. 258, 264 , 450 A.2d

1988Neither requirement under Forbes having been met at bar, we can find no support in the record for the trial court’s factual determination that “the Defendant withdrew his guilty pleas.” Cf. Commonwealth v. Iannaccio, 304 Pa.Super. 307, 314-15 , 450 A.2d 694, 698 (1982), cert. denied sub nom.

1988Neither requirement under Forbes having been met at bar, we can find no support in the record for the trial court’s factual determination that “the Defendant withdrew his guilty pleas.” Cf. Commonwealth v. Iannaccio, 304 Pa.Super. 307, 314-15 , 450 A.2d 694, 698 (1982), cert. denied sub nom.