Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
17 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Edmundsgreen2 sentences2025Observing that our Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that Article I, Section 8 “is meant to embody a strong notion of privacy, carefully safeguarded in this Commonwealth for the past two centuries,” the Edmunds Court concluded that its history “indicates that the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this Commonwealth is quite distinct from the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule under the 4th Amendment.” Id. at 897 . 2020Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (“The history of Article I, Section 8 . . . indicates that the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this Commonwealth is quite distinct from the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule under the 4th Amendment[.]”); Mason, 637 A.2d at 257 n.3 (“[F]ederal courts place less importance than we do on the right of privacy. | 6 | 13 |
Herring v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025Our High Court explained that “the sole purpose for the exclusionary rule under the [Fourth] Amendment [is] to deter police misconduct” and that the federal exclusionary rule operates as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” Id. (emphasis in original; quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Alexander, 243 A.3d at 203 (“[P]romoting effective law enforcement is the driving force explaining the United States Supreme Court’s applications of the | 1 | 1 |
COM. EX REL. BARNES v. Pennsylvania Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2020Therefore, they balance the interests differently and reach a different conclusion as to the relative importance of privacy as against securing criminal convictions.”); Commonwealth v. Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. 2010) (“Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution . . . generally provides greater protection than that provided by the Fourth Amendment, because the core of its exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while the [J-83-2019] [MO: Dougherty, J.] - 23 federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police misconduct.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sellgreen2 sentences2020While Edmunds involved [J-51-2020] - 6 an application of the exclusionary rule, our holding was tethered to the fundamental concern for privacy within our own constitution, and our decision reiterated our statement in Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 65 , 470 A.2d 457, 467 (1983), that “the survival of the language now employed in Article I, Section 8 through over 200 years of profound change in other areas demonstrates that the paramount concern for privacy first adopted as part of our organic law in 1776 continues to enjoy the mandate of the people of this Commonwealth. 2020While Edmunds involved [J-51-2020] - 6 an application of the exclusionary rule, our holding was tethered to the fundamental concern for privacy within our own constitution, and our decision reiterated our statement in Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 65 , 470 A.2d 457, 467 (1983), that “the survival of the language now employed in Article I, Section 8 through over 200 years of profound change in other areas demonstrates that the paramount concern for privacy first adopted as part of our organic law in 1776 continues to enjoy the mandate of the people of this Commonwealth. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2016Furthermore, our cases reveal that, while probationers and parolees have “a more narrowly protected privacy interest” than an individual not on probation or parole, Williams, 692 A.2d at 1036 , they nonetheless have a protected privacy interest, and searches of probationers and parolees must be “reasonable.” Id. at 1035 . 2016Furthermore, our cases reveal that, while probationers and parolees have “a more narrowly protected privacy interest” than an individual not on probation or parole, Williams, 692 A.2d at 1036 , they nonetheless have a protected privacy interest, and searches of probationers and parolees must be “reasonable.” Id. at 1035 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Leon
green
2 sentences1997After its review [of this provision], the Court stated: The history of Article I, Section 8, thus indicated that the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this Commonwealth is quite distinct from the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment, as articulated by the majority in [United States v.] Leon, [ 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) ]. “[A]s this Court has stated repeatedly in interpreting Article I, Section 8, that provision is meant to embody a strong notion of privacy, carefully safeguarded in this Commonwealth for the past two centurie 1997After its review [of this provision], the Court stated: The history of Article I, Section 8, thus indicated that the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this Commonwealth is quite distinct from the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment, as articulated by the majority in [United States v.] Leon, [ 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) ]. “[A]s this Court has stated repeatedly in interpreting Article I, Section 8, that provision is meant to embody a strong notion of privacy, carefully safeguarded in this Commonwealth for the past two centurie | 6 | 1991–2009 |
Mapp v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2008To be precise, tire Court was looking to the histoiy of the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule, i.e., the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, and not the history of the exclusionary rule itself, which became applicable to the slates in 1961 pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule is applicable to state criminal trials because the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause of th 2008To be precise, tire Court was looking to the histoiy of the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule, i.e., the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, and not the history of the exclusionary rule itself, which became applicable to the slates in 1961 pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule is applicable to state criminal trials because the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause of th | 2 | 1993–2008 |
Commonwealth v. Mason
green
1 sentence2020Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991) (“The history of Article I, Section 8 . . . indicates that the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this Commonwealth is quite distinct from the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule under the 4th Amendment[.]”); Mason, 637 A.2d at 257 n.3 (“[F]ederal courts place less importance than we do on the right of privacy. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Commonwealth v. Miller
green
1 sentence2017This concept is second to none in its importance in delineating the dignity of the individual living in a free society. ' Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 899 (citing Miller, 518 A.2d at 1191-92 ), Accordingly, this Court.in Edmunds emphasized that “the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this Commonwealth is quite distinct from the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule under the [Fourth] Amendment.” Id. at 897. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Matos
green
1 sentence1997After its review [of this provision], the Court stated: The history of Article I, Section 8, thus indicated that the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this Commonwealth is quite distinct from the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment, as articulated by the majority in [United States v.] Leon, [ 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) ]. “[A]s this Court has stated repeatedly in interpreting Article I, Section 8, that provision is meant to embody a strong notion of privacy, carefully safeguarded in this Commonwealth for the past two centurie | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Weeks v. United States
red
2 sentences1993The United States Supreme Court in Leon made clear that, in its view, the sole purpose for the exclusionary rule under the 4th Amendment was to deter police misconduct____ The Leon majority also made clear that, under the Federal Constitution, the exclusionary rule operated as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” This reinterpretation differs from the way the exclusionary rule has evolved in Pennsylvania since the decision of Mapp v. Ohio[, 367 U.S. 1993The United States Supreme Court in Leon made clear that, in its view, the sole purpose for the exclusionary rule under the 4th Amendment was to deter police misconduct____ The Leon majority also made clear that, under the Federal Constitution, the exclusionary rule operated as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” This reinterpretation differs from the way the exclusionary rule has evolved in Pennsylvania since the decision of Mapp v. Ohio[, 367 U.S. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Mains v. United States
green
1 sentence1993The United States Supreme Court in Leon made clear that, in its view, the sole purpose for the exclusionary rule under the 4th Amendment was to deter police misconduct____ The Leon majority also made clear that, under the Federal Constitution, the exclusionary rule operated as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” This reinterpretation differs from the way the exclusionary rule has evolved in Pennsylvania since the decision of Mapp v. Ohio[, 367 U.S. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Commonwealth v. Blystone
green
1 sentence1991Id. 468 U.S. at 916 , 104 S.Ct. at 3417 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.