17 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1977–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ohio v. Robertsred2 sentences2010Noting that “judges, like other government officers, [can] not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people,” id. at 67 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , the Court concluded that the “unpardonable vice of the Roberts test ... [is] its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.” Id, at 63, 100 S.Ct. 2531 . 2010Noting that “judges, like other government officers, [can] not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people,” id. at 67 , 100 S.Ct. 2531 , the Court concluded that the “unpardonable vice of the Roberts test ... [is] its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.” Id, at 63, 100 S.Ct. 2531 . | 1 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Younggreen2 sentences2002Concerning the question of firm rooting, on reargument in Commonwealth v. Young, 561 Pa. 34 , 748 A.2d 166 (2000), this Court acknowledged that the lead opinion in Lilly represented the view of a plurality of Justices but nonetheless was able to discern a majority holding on a point of law from among the various expressions. 12 This Court summarized that holding as follows: “[Statements made to the authorities by a non-testifying accomplice which inculpate the defendant more than the accomplice are not admissible pursuant to a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay doctrine and thus do not sat 2002Concerning the question of firm rooting, on reargument in Commonwealth v. Young, 561 Pa. 34 , 748 A.2d 166 (2000), this Court acknowledged that the lead opinion in Lilly represented the view of a plurality of Justices but nonetheless was able to discern a majority holding on a point of law from among the various expressions. 12 This Court summarized that holding as follows: “[Statements made to the authorities by a non-testifying accomplice which inculpate the defendant more than the accomplice are not admissible pursuant to a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay doctrine and thus do not sat | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. McAfeegreen1 sentence2023See McAfee, 849 A.2d at 277 .6 Thus, we conclude ____________________________________________ 6 We also note that a defendant may also challenge the legality of the sentence imposed following revocation. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Greengreen1 sentence2019Before reviewing the merits of Roberts’ claim, we must determine whether: “(1) the appeal is timely; (2) the appellant has preserved his issue; (3) his brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of an appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of his sentence; and (4) the concise statement raises a substantial question whether - 13 - J-S52045-19 the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 488 (Pa.Super. 2019). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Byrdgreen1 sentence2017Following the clear language of section 9771(b) and the rationale of Wallace, as well as various Superior Court cases subsequent to Anderson that declined to follow Anderson,8 we agree that Roberts’ challenge to the ____________________________________________ 8 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 669 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Super. 1996) (holding Anderson incorrectly held that trial court, upon resentencing, was limited to maximum term contemplated in guilty plea and explicitly stating that under Supreme Court’s holding in Pierce, trial court has same sentencing options available to it upon resentencing | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Coolbaughgreen1 sentence2017Following the clear language of section 9771(b) and the rationale of Wallace, as well as various Superior Court cases subsequent to Anderson that declined to follow Anderson,8 we agree that Roberts’ challenge to the ____________________________________________ 8 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 669 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Super. 1996) (holding Anderson incorrectly held that trial court, upon resentencing, was limited to maximum term contemplated in guilty plea and explicitly stating that under Supreme Court’s holding in Pierce, trial court has same sentencing options available to it upon resentencing | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fishgreen1 sentence2017Following the clear language of section 9771(b) and the rationale of Wallace, as well as various Superior Court cases subsequent to Anderson that declined to follow Anderson,8 we agree that Roberts’ challenge to the ____________________________________________ 8 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 669 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Super. 1996) (holding Anderson incorrectly held that trial court, upon resentencing, was limited to maximum term contemplated in guilty plea and explicitly stating that under Supreme Court’s holding in Pierce, trial court has same sentencing options available to it upon resentencing | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Fryegreen1 sentence2015Commonwealth v. Frye, 909 A.2d 853, 859 (Pa.Super.2006) (delay resulting from court congestion constitutes excusable delay). 4. 56 day delay due to Roberts’ motion for funds to hire an expert and motion for continuance. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Camachogreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 134 (3d Cir.2007) (admissibility of nontestimonial evidence governed by Roberts); State v. Camacho, 282 Conn. 328 , 924 A.2d 99, 116 (2007) (stating that nontestimonial hearsay statements may still be admitted as evidence against an accused in a criminal trial if they satisfy both prongs of the Roberts test); U.S. v. Myton, 224 Fed.Appx. 125, 129 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that the admissibility of nontestimonial, out-of-court statements are evaluated under the “two-part test” of Roberts). 2009See, e.g., Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 134 (3d Cir.2007) (admissibility of nontestimonial evidence governed by Roberts); State v. Camacho, 282 Conn. 328 , 924 A.2d 99, 116 (2007) (stating that nontestimonial hearsay statements may still be admitted as evidence against an accused in a criminal trial if they satisfy both prongs of the Roberts test); U.S. v. Myton, 224 Fed.Appx. 125, 129 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that the admissibility of nontestimonial, out-of-court statements are evaluated under the “two-part test” of Roberts). | 1 | 1 |
Alfred Albrecht, Sr., in No. 04-9006 v. Martin Horn, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, in No. 04-9005green2 sentences2009See, e.g., Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 134 (3d Cir.2007) (admissibility of nontestimonial evidence governed by Roberts); State v. Camacho, 282 Conn. 328 , 924 A.2d 99, 116 (2007) (stating that nontestimonial hearsay statements may still be admitted as evidence against an accused in a criminal trial if they satisfy both prongs of the Roberts test); U.S. v. Myton, 224 Fed.Appx. 125, 129 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that the admissibility of nontestimonial, out-of-court statements are evaluated under the “two-part test” of Roberts). 2009See, e.g., Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 134 (3d Cir.2007) (admissibility of nontestimonial evidence governed by Roberts); State v. Camacho, 282 Conn. 328 , 924 A.2d 99, 116 (2007) (stating that nontestimonial hearsay statements may still be admitted as evidence against an accused in a criminal trial if they satisfy both prongs of the Roberts test); U.S. v. Myton, 224 Fed.Appx. 125, 129 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that the admissibility of nontestimonial, out-of-court statements are evaluated under the “two-part test” of Roberts). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mytongreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 134 (3d Cir.2007) (admissibility of nontestimonial evidence governed by Roberts); State v. Camacho, 282 Conn. 328 , 924 A.2d 99, 116 (2007) (stating that nontestimonial hearsay statements may still be admitted as evidence against an accused in a criminal trial if they satisfy both prongs of the Roberts test); U.S. v. Myton, 224 Fed.Appx. 125, 129 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that the admissibility of nontestimonial, out-of-court statements are evaluated under the “two-part test” of Roberts). 2009See, e.g., Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 134 (3d Cir.2007) (admissibility of nontestimonial evidence governed by Roberts); State v. Camacho, 282 Conn. 328 , 924 A.2d 99, 116 (2007) (stating that nontestimonial hearsay statements may still be admitted as evidence against an accused in a criminal trial if they satisfy both prongs of the Roberts test); U.S. v. Myton, 224 Fed.Appx. 125, 129 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that the admissibility of nontestimonial, out-of-court statements are evaluated under the “two-part test” of Roberts). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Schwartzgreen2 sentences1979Finally, it is appropriate to observe that the PCHA judge in the instant case was the same judge who presided at the guilty plea colloquy “thereby satisfying the reason for the Roberts rule, which is to permit the judge who accepted the plea an opportunity to review its validity.” Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 251 Pa.Super. 36 , 379 A.2d 319, 321 (1977). 3 . 1979Finally, it is appropriate to observe that the PCHA judge in the instant case was the same judge who presided at the guilty plea colloquy “thereby satisfying the reason for the Roberts rule, which is to permit the judge who accepted the plea an opportunity to review its validity.” Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 251 Pa.Super. 36 , 379 A.2d 319, 321 (1977). 3 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2007The Crawford Court stated: “The Roberts test departs from historical principles because it admits statements consisting of ex parte testimony upon a mere reliability finding.” 541 U.S. at 60 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 . 2007The Crawford Court stated: “The Roberts test departs from historical principles because it admits statements consisting of ex parte testimony upon a mere reliability finding.” 541 U.S. at 60 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 . | 3 | 2004–2010 |
Com. v. Roberts, W.
green
1 sentence2024In Commonwealth v. Roberts, 293 A.3d 1221 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal granted, 304 A.3d 329 (Pa. 2023), a panel of this Court examined Roberts’s claim that he subjectively believed that he was required to register only for ten years. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Smith
green
1 sentence2017Following the clear language of section 9771(b) and the rationale of Wallace, as well as various Superior Court cases subsequent to Anderson that declined to follow Anderson,8 we agree that Roberts’ challenge to the ____________________________________________ 8 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 669 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Super. 1996) (holding Anderson incorrectly held that trial court, upon resentencing, was limited to maximum term contemplated in guilty plea and explicitly stating that under Supreme Court’s holding in Pierce, trial court has same sentencing options available to it upon resentencing | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Adebaike
green
1 sentence2017Following the clear language of section 9771(b) and the rationale of Wallace, as well as various Superior Court cases subsequent to Anderson that declined to follow Anderson,8 we agree that Roberts’ challenge to the ____________________________________________ 8 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 669 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Super. 1996) (holding Anderson incorrectly held that trial court, upon resentencing, was limited to maximum term contemplated in guilty plea and explicitly stating that under Supreme Court’s holding in Pierce, trial court has same sentencing options available to it upon resentencing | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Davis v. Washington
green
2 sentences2009Nevertheless, in the instant case, Appellant concedes that the threshold question is whether the statements are testimonial, because, if the statements are nontestimonial, “the confrontation clause places no restriction on their introduction except for the ‘traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence.’ ” Appellant’s Brief at 35 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 821 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 ). 2009Nevertheless, in the instant case, Appellant concedes that the threshold question is whether the statements are testimonial, because, if the statements are nontestimonial, “the confrontation clause places no restriction on their introduction except for the ‘traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence.’ ” Appellant’s Brief at 35 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 821 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. James Saget, Also Known as Hesh
green
2 sentences2006Accordingly, as the rule announced in Crawford is only applicable to “testimonial” evidence, it does not apply to bar the admission of Ms. Fitts’ statements. ¶ 23 The Saget court stated that “while the continued viability of Roberts with respect to nontestimonial statements is somewhat in doubt, [the United States Court of Appeals] will assume for purposes of [their] opinion that its reliability analysis continues to apply to control nontesti-monial hearsay, and that [the] precedents applying the Roberts analysis to such statements retain their force.” Saget, 377 F.3d at 230 . 2006Accordingly, as the rule announced in Crawford is only applicable to “testimonial” evidence, it does not apply to bar the admission of Ms. Fitts’ statements. ¶ 23 The Saget court stated that “while the continued viability of Roberts with respect to nontestimonial statements is somewhat in doubt, [the United States Court of Appeals] will assume for purposes of [their] opinion that its reliability analysis continues to apply to control nontesti-monial hearsay, and that [the] precedents applying the Roberts analysis to such statements retain their force.” Saget, 377 F.3d at 230 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
White v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2004Cf. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (finding that a “spontaneous declaration” was a firmly-rooted hearsay exception — in accordance with the Roberts standard — and, therefore, the Sixth Amendment did not bar its admissibility at trial). 2004Cf. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 , 112 S.Ct. 736 , 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (finding that a “spontaneous declaration” was a firmly-rooted hearsay exception — in accordance with the Roberts standard — and, therefore, the Sixth Amendment did not bar its admissibility at trial). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Lilly v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2004Young, 748 A.2d at 191 (emphasis added) (construing Lilly, 527 U.S. at 116 , 119 S.Ct. at 1887 ). 2004Young, 748 A.2d at 191 (emphasis added) (construing Lilly, 527 U.S. at 116 , 119 S.Ct. at 1887 ). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Idaho v. Wright
green
2 sentences1999This issue had been conclusively settled well prior to Lilly when a clear majority of the Court stated that “[t]o be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.” Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). 1999This issue had been conclusively settled well prior to Lilly when a clear majority of the Court stated that “[t]o be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.” Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Rivera v. State
green
2 sentences1982My research indicates, instead, that no discernible majority position has emerged. , Other responses to this argument worth noting may be found in Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.App.2d 303 , 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, supra; Troppi v. Scarf, supra; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra; Rivera v. State, 94 Misc.2d 157 , 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41 , 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); See also Comment, Pregnancy Añer Sterilization: Causes of Action for Parent and Child, 12 J.Fam.L. 635 (1972-73). . 1982My research indicates, instead, that no discernible majority position has emerged. , Other responses to this argument worth noting may be found in Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.App.2d 303 , 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, supra; Troppi v. Scarf, supra; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra; Rivera v. State, 94 Misc.2d 157 , 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41 , 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); See also Comment, Pregnancy Añer Sterilization: Causes of Action for Parent and Child, 12 J.Fam.L. 635 (1972-73). . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Commonwealth v. Norris
green
2 sentences1982I believe the case law of this Commonwealth, as fully set forth in my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Norris, 498 Pa. 308 , 446 A.2d 246 (1982), mandates that police announce both their identity and purpose prior to executing a forcible entry. 1982I believe the case law of this Commonwealth, as fully set forth in my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Norris, 498 Pa. 308 , 446 A.2d 246 (1982), mandates that police announce both their identity and purpose prior to executing a forcible entry. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic
green
2 sentences1982My research indicates, instead, that no discernible majority position has emerged. [2] Other responses to this argument worth noting may be found in Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.App.2d 303 , 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, supra ; Troppi v. Scarf, supra ; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra ; Rivera v. State, 94 Misc.2d 157 , 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41 , 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); See also Comment, Pregnancy After Sterilization: Causes of Action for Parent and Child, 12 J.Fam.L. 635 (1972-73). [1] While it troubles me to conclude that an express promise to 1982My research indicates, instead, that no discernible majority position has emerged. , Other responses to this argument worth noting may be found in Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.App.2d 303 , 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, supra; Troppi v. Scarf, supra; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra; Rivera v. State, 94 Misc.2d 157 , 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41 , 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); See also Comment, Pregnancy Añer Sterilization: Causes of Action for Parent and Child, 12 J.Fam.L. 635 (1972-73). . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Roe v. Wade
red
2 sentences1982My research indicates, instead, that no discernible majority position has emerged. [2] Other responses to this argument worth noting may be found in Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.App.2d 303 , 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, supra ; Troppi v. Scarf, supra ; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra ; Rivera v. State, 94 Misc.2d 157 , 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41 , 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); See also Comment, Pregnancy After Sterilization: Causes of Action for Parent and Child, 12 J.Fam.L. 635 (1972-73). [1] While it troubles me to conclude that an express promise to 1982My research indicates, instead, that no discernible majority position has emerged. [2] Other responses to this argument worth noting may be found in Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.App.2d 303 , 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, supra ; Troppi v. Scarf, supra ; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra ; Rivera v. State, 94 Misc.2d 157 , 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41 , 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); See also Comment, Pregnancy After Sterilization: Causes of Action for Parent and Child, 12 J.Fam.L. 635 (1972-73). [1] While it troubles me to conclude that an express promise to | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Bowman v. Davis
green
2 sentences1982My research indicates, instead, that no discernible majority position has emerged. , Other responses to this argument worth noting may be found in Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.App.2d 303 , 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, supra; Troppi v. Scarf, supra; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra; Rivera v. State, 94 Misc.2d 157 , 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41 , 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); See also Comment, Pregnancy Añer Sterilization: Causes of Action for Parent and Child, 12 J.Fam.L. 635 (1972-73). . 1982My research indicates, instead, that no discernible majority position has emerged. , Other responses to this argument worth noting may be found in Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.App.2d 303 , 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, supra; Troppi v. Scarf, supra; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra; Rivera v. State, 94 Misc.2d 157 , 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41 , 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); See also Comment, Pregnancy Añer Sterilization: Causes of Action for Parent and Child, 12 J.Fam.L. 635 (1972-73). . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Custodio v. Bauer
green
2 sentences1982My research indicates, instead, that no discernible majority position has emerged. , Other responses to this argument worth noting may be found in Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.App.2d 303 , 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, supra; Troppi v. Scarf, supra; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra; Rivera v. State, 94 Misc.2d 157 , 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41 , 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); See also Comment, Pregnancy Añer Sterilization: Causes of Action for Parent and Child, 12 J.Fam.L. 635 (1972-73). . 1982My research indicates, instead, that no discernible majority position has emerged. , Other responses to this argument worth noting may be found in Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.App.2d 303 , 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, supra; Troppi v. Scarf, supra; Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, supra; Rivera v. State, 94 Misc.2d 157 , 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St.2d 41 , 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); See also Comment, Pregnancy Añer Sterilization: Causes of Action for Parent and Child, 12 J.Fam.L. 635 (1972-73). . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Steagald v. United States
green
2 sentences1982While I agree with Mr. Justice Roberts' analysis concerning Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 , 101 S.Ct. 1642 , 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), I must disagree with both him and the majority that the police conduct in executing the arrest warrant was reasonable. 1982While I agree with Mr. Justice Roberts' analysis concerning Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 , 101 S.Ct. 1642 , 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), I must disagree with both him and the majority that the police conduct in executing the arrest warrant was reasonable. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Commonwealth Ex Rel. Washington v. Maroney
green
2 sentences1977Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599 , 235 A.2d 349 (1967). [5] We are at a complete loss to understand Mr. Justice ROBERTS' analysis of our decision in Cockfield . 1977Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599 , 235 A.2d 349 (1967). [5] We are at a complete loss to understand Mr. Justice ROBERTS' analysis of our decision in Cockfield . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.