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17 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jacobsgreen2 sentences2006See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (quoting In re Det. of Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 27 , 804 P.2d 1 (1990) (“ ‘[W]here the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference of legislative intent.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roberts, 117 Wn.2d 576, 586 , 817 P.2d 855 (1991)))). ¶38 In short, pregnancy and any related condition is not a disability under Washington law and, therefore, the trial court erred in considering this claim to be a disability discrimination claim. 17 Thus, we revi 2006See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (quoting In re Det. of Swanson, 115 Wash.2d 21, 27 , 804 P.2d 1 (1990)) ("[W]here the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference of legislative intent."). ¶ 38 In short, pregnancy and any related condition is not a disability under Washington law and, therefore, the trial court erred in considering this claim to be a disability discrimination claim. [17] Thus, we review the evidence under the standards applicable to a sex discrimination case as pled by Hegw | 2 | 2 |
State v. Jacobsgreen2 sentences2006See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (quoting In re Det. of Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 27 , 804 P.2d 1 (1990) (“ ‘[W]here the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference of legislative intent.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roberts, 117 Wn.2d 576, 586 , 817 P.2d 855 (1991)))). ¶38 In short, pregnancy and any related condition is not a disability under Washington law and, therefore, the trial court erred in considering this claim to be a disability discrimination claim. 17 Thus, we revi 2006See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (quoting In re Det. of Swanson, 115 Wash.2d 21, 27 , 804 P.2d 1 (1990)) ("[W]here the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference of legislative intent."). ¶ 38 In short, pregnancy and any related condition is not a disability under Washington law and, therefore, the trial court erred in considering this claim to be a disability discrimination claim. [17] Thus, we review the evidence under the standards applicable to a sex discrimination case as pled by Hegw | 2 | 2 |
In Re the Detention Swansongreen2 sentences2006See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (quoting In re Det. of Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 27 , 804 P.2d 1 (1990) (“ ‘[W]here the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference of legislative intent.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roberts, 117 Wn.2d 576, 586 , 817 P.2d 855 (1991)))). ¶38 In short, pregnancy and any related condition is not a disability under Washington law and, therefore, the trial court erred in considering this claim to be a disability discrimination claim. 17 Thus, we revi 2006See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (quoting In re Det. of Swanson, 115 Wash.2d 21, 27 , 804 P.2d 1 (1990)) ("[W]here the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference of legislative intent."). ¶ 38 In short, pregnancy and any related condition is not a disability under Washington law and, therefore, the trial court erred in considering this claim to be a disability discrimination claim. [17] Thus, we review the evidence under the standards applicable to a sex discrimination case as pled by Hegw | 2 | 2 |
Bruce v. Northwest Metal Products Co.green2 sentences2005Co., 79 Wash.App. 505, 513 , 903 P.2d 506 (1995) ("Under Washington law, a disability discrimination claim arises out of statute, the WLAD, and is not preempted by any contractual or CBA [collective bargaining agreement] requirements or remedies."); Ervin v. Columbia Distrib., Inc., 84 Wash.App. 882, 891 , 930 P.2d 947 (1997) (holding that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 , does not preempt claims brought under Washington's Minimum Wage Act, chapter 49.46 RCW). 2005Co., 79 Wash.App. 505, 513 , 903 P.2d 506 (1995) ("Under Washington law, a disability discrimination claim arises out of statute, the WLAD, and is not preempted by any contractual or CBA [collective bargaining agreement] requirements or remedies."); Ervin v. Columbia Distrib., Inc., 84 Wash.App. 882, 891 , 930 P.2d 947 (1997) (holding that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 , does not preempt claims brought under Washington's Minimum Wage Act, chapter 49.46 RCW). | 2 | 2 |
Pulcino v. Federal Express Corp.green2 sentences2000See Pulcino, 94 Wn. 2000See Pulcino, 94 Wash.App. at 422-24 , 972 P.2d 522 (citing Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 125 Wash.2d 745, 758 , 888 P.2d 147 (1995) and Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash.2d 827, 846 , 400 P.2d 72 (1965)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Robertsgreen2 sentences2006See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (quoting In re Det. of Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 27 , 804 P.2d 1 (1990) (“ ‘[W]here the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference of legislative intent.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roberts, 117 Wn.2d 576, 586 , 817 P.2d 855 (1991)))). ¶38 In short, pregnancy and any related condition is not a disability under Washington law and, therefore, the trial court erred in considering this claim to be a disability discrimination claim. 17 Thus, we revi 2006See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 603 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (quoting In re Det. of Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 27 , 804 P.2d 1 (1990) (“ ‘[W]here the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference of legislative intent.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roberts, 117 Wn.2d 576, 586 , 817 P.2d 855 (1991)))). ¶38 In short, pregnancy and any related condition is not a disability under Washington law and, therefore, the trial court erred in considering this claim to be a disability discrimination claim. 17 Thus, we revi | 1 | 1 |
Bravo v. Dolsen Companiesgreen2 sentences2000See Pulcino, 94 Wash.App. at 422-24 , 972 P.2d 522 (citing Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 125 Wash.2d 745, 758 , 888 P.2d 147 (1995) and Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash.2d 827, 846 , 400 P.2d 72 (1965)). 2000See Pulcino, 94 Wash.App. at 422-24 , 972 P.2d 522 (citing Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 125 Wash.2d 745, 758 , 888 P.2d 147 (1995) and Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash.2d 827, 846 , 400 P.2d 72 (1965)). | 1 | 1 |
Krystad v. Laugreen2 sentences2000See Pulcino, 94 Wash.App. at 422-24 , 972 P.2d 522 (citing Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 125 Wash.2d 745, 758 , 888 P.2d 147 (1995) and Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash.2d 827, 846 , 400 P.2d 72 (1965)). 2000See Pulcino, 94 Wash.App. at 422-24 , 972 P.2d 522 (citing Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 125 Wash.2d 745, 758 , 888 P.2d 147 (1995) and Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash.2d 827, 846 , 400 P.2d 72 (1965)). | 1 | 1 |
Morales v. Westinghouse Hanford Co.green1 sentence1995Commodore, 120 Wn.2d at 128-33 (adopting and applying "Marcus model” 3 to analyze preemption of racial discrimination claim; the court holds "non-negotiable state law rights [such as discrimination] . . . that cannot be waived in contract” are "independent of CBA’s by definition”); Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Wn.2d 563, 578 , 731 P.2d 497 (1987) ("employees may choose to vindicate their civil rights by immediately filing a civil action under RCW 49.60 or they may wait, pursue a remedy under their [CBA], and if their civil rights remain unenforced, file a civil discrimination action purs | 1 | 1 |
Commodore v. University Mechanical Contractors, Inc.green1 sentence1995Commodore, 120 Wn.2d at 128-33 (adopting and applying "Marcus model” 3 to analyze preemption of racial discrimination claim; the court holds "non-negotiable state law rights [such as discrimination] . . . that cannot be waived in contract” are "independent of CBA’s by definition”); Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Wn.2d 563, 578 , 731 P.2d 497 (1987) ("employees may choose to vindicate their civil rights by immediately filing a civil action under RCW 49.60 or they may wait, pursue a remedy under their [CBA], and if their civil rights remain unenforced, file a civil discrimination action purs | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co.
green
2 sentences2014Hegwine rejected the employer's argument that a pregnancy discrimination claim should be viewed as a disability discrimination claim and analyzed under the "reasonable accommodation" standard. 162 Wn.2d at 352 . 2014Hegwine rejected the employer’s argument that a pregnancy discrimination claim should be viewed as a disability discrimination claim and analyzed under the “reasonable accommodation” standard. 162 Wn.2d at 352 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Pulcino v. Federal Express Corp.
green
2 sentences2006The record below plainly shows that Totem Electric’s motion for summary judgment on the disability discrimination claim was based exclusively on McClarty’s alleged failure to prove the first element of his prima facie case — the existence of a “disability.” Totem Electric argued that the Pulcino definition of “disability” applied and that, based on McClarty’s deposition testimony that he could do “anything” the job required, Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 96, McClarty could not satisfy the second prong of the Pulcino definition — proof that his carpal tunnel syndrome “had a substantially limiting effe 2006The record below plainly shows that Totem Electric's motion for summary judgment on the disability discrimination claim was based exclusively on McClarty's alleged failure to prove the first element of his prima facie case—the existence of a "disability." Totem Electric argued that the Pulcino definition of "disability" applied and that, based on McClarty's deposition testimony that he could do "anything" the job required, CP at 96, McClarty could not satisfy the second prong of the Pulcino definition—proof that his carpal tunnel syndrome "had a substantially limiting effect upon [his] ability | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Ervin v. Columbia Distributing, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Co., 79 Wash.App. 505, 513 , 903 P.2d 506 (1995) ("Under Washington law, a disability discrimination claim arises out of statute, the WLAD, and is not preempted by any contractual or CBA [collective bargaining agreement] requirements or remedies."); Ervin v. Columbia Distrib., Inc., 84 Wash.App. 882, 891 , 930 P.2d 947 (1997) (holding that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 , does not preempt claims brought under Washington's Minimum Wage Act, chapter 49.46 RCW). 2005Co., 79 Wash.App. 505, 513 , 903 P.2d 506 (1995) ("Under Washington law, a disability discrimination claim arises out of statute, the WLAD, and is not preempted by any contractual or CBA [collective bargaining agreement] requirements or remedies."); Ervin v. Columbia Distrib., Inc., 84 Wash.App. 882, 891 , 930 P.2d 947 (1997) (holding that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 , does not preempt claims brought under Washington's Minimum Wage Act, chapter 49.46 RCW). | 2 | 2004–2005 |
Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017App. 449, 457 , 381 P.3d 142 (2016), review 6 State denied, 187 Wn.2d 1011 (2017). 7 Millies v. LandAmerica Transnation, 185 Wn.2d 302, 316 , 372 P.3d 111 (2016). 8 Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138, 145 , 94 P.3d 930 (2004). 9 Id. 19 RCW 49.60.180(3); Riehl, 152 Wn.2d at 144-45 . 4 No. 73847-0-1/5 Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of a disability discrimination claim. 2017App. 449, 457 , 381 P.3d 142 (2016), review 6 State denied, 187 Wn.2d 1011 (2017). 7 Millies v. LandAmerica Transnation, 185 Wn.2d 302, 316 , 372 P.3d 111 (2016). 8 Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138, 145 , 94 P.3d 930 (2004). 9 Id. 19 RCW 49.60.180(3); Riehl, 152 Wn.2d at 144-45 . 4 No. 73847-0-1/5 Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of a disability discrimination claim. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Robel v. Roundup Corp.
green
1 sentence2017Robel, 148 Wn.2d at 43-44 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017App. 449, 457 , 381 P.3d 142 (2016), review 6 State denied, 187 Wn.2d 1011 (2017). 7 Millies v. LandAmerica Transnation, 185 Wn.2d 302, 316 , 372 P.3d 111 (2016). 8 Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138, 145 , 94 P.3d 930 (2004). 9 Id. 19 RCW 49.60.180(3); Riehl, 152 Wn.2d at 144-45 . 4 No. 73847-0-1/5 Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of a disability discrimination claim. 2017App. 449, 457 , 381 P.3d 142 (2016), review 6 State denied, 187 Wn.2d 1011 (2017). 7 Millies v. LandAmerica Transnation, 185 Wn.2d 302, 316 , 372 P.3d 111 (2016). 8 Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138, 145 , 94 P.3d 930 (2004). 9 Id. 19 RCW 49.60.180(3); Riehl, 152 Wn.2d at 144-45 . 4 No. 73847-0-1/5 Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of a disability discrimination claim. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Duque
neutral
1 sentence2017App. 449, 457 , 381 P.3d 142 (2016), review 6 State denied, 187 Wn.2d 1011 (2017). 7 Millies v. LandAmerica Transnation, 185 Wn.2d 302, 316 , 372 P.3d 111 (2016). 8 Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138, 145 , 94 P.3d 930 (2004). 9 Id. 19 RCW 49.60.180(3); Riehl, 152 Wn.2d at 144-45 . 4 No. 73847-0-1/5 Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of a disability discrimination claim. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Millies v. LandAmerica Transnation
green
2 sentences2017App. 449, 457 , 381 P.3d 142 (2016), review 6 State denied, 187 Wn.2d 1011 (2017). 7 Millies v. LandAmerica Transnation, 185 Wn.2d 302, 316 , 372 P.3d 111 (2016). 8 Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138, 145 , 94 P.3d 930 (2004). 9 Id. 19 RCW 49.60.180(3); Riehl, 152 Wn.2d at 144-45 . 4 No. 73847-0-1/5 Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of a disability discrimination claim. 2017App. 449, 457 , 381 P.3d 142 (2016), review 6 State denied, 187 Wn.2d 1011 (2017). 7 Millies v. LandAmerica Transnation, 185 Wn.2d 302, 316 , 372 P.3d 111 (2016). 8 Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138, 145 , 94 P.3d 930 (2004). 9 Id. 19 RCW 49.60.180(3); Riehl, 152 Wn.2d at 144-45 . 4 No. 73847-0-1/5 Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of a disability discrimination claim. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State Of Washington, V Justin Michael Hart
green
1 sentence2017App. 449, 457 , 381 P.3d 142 (2016), review 6 State denied, 187 Wn.2d 1011 (2017). 7 Millies v. LandAmerica Transnation, 185 Wn.2d 302, 316 , 372 P.3d 111 (2016). 8 Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138, 145 , 94 P.3d 930 (2004). 9 Id. 19 RCW 49.60.180(3); Riehl, 152 Wn.2d at 144-45 . 4 No. 73847-0-1/5 Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of a disability discrimination claim. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Fey v. State
green
2 sentences2016Fev v. State, 174 Wn. 2016"A failure to engage in an interactive process does not form the basis of a disability discrimination claim in the absence of evidence that accommodation was possible." Fev, 174 Wn. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook
green
1 sentence2013Co., 66 F .3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 68 -69 in the context of a disability discrimination claim asserted under the WLAD). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Pulcino v. Federal Express Corp.
green
1 sentence2006The record below plainly shows that Totem Electric's motion for summary judgment on the disability discrimination claim was based exclusively on McClarty's alleged failure to prove the first element of his prima facie case—the existence of a "disability." Totem Electric argued that the Pulcino definition of "disability" applied and that, based on McClarty's deposition testimony that he could do "anything" the job required, CP at 96, McClarty could not satisfy the second prong of the Pulcino definition—proof that his carpal tunnel syndrome "had a substantially limiting effect upon [his] ability | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
green
2 sentences2005The United States Supreme Court, however, has held that in instances where a valid individual employee-employer arbitration agreement exists, the FAA requires that employees arbitrate federal and state law discrimination claims. [5] See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson *781 Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 , 111 S.Ct. 1647 , 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) (holding that the FAA requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists); Perry, 482 U.S. at 491 , 107 S.Ct. 2520 (FAA preempts state minimum wage law requiring a judicial forum for vindication of wage claims). 2005The United States Supreme Court, however, has held that in instances where a valid individual employee-employer arbitration agreement exists, the FAA requires that employees arbitrate federal and state law discrimination claims. [5] See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson *781 Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 , 111 S.Ct. 1647 , 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) (holding that the FAA requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists); Perry, 482 U.S. at 491 , 107 S.Ct. 2520 (FAA preempts state minimum wage law requiring a judicial forum for vindication of wage claims). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Gray v. Pierce County Housing Authority
green
1 sentence2005Id. at 624-26 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Josephinium Associates v. Kahli
green
1 sentence2005Id. at 624-26, 45 P.3d 627 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Perry v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2005The United States Supreme Court, however, has held that in instances where a valid individual employee-employer arbitration agreement exists, the FAA requires that employees arbitrate federal and state law discrimination claims. [5] See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson *781 Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 , 111 S.Ct. 1647 , 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) (holding that the FAA requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists); Perry, 482 U.S. at 491 , 107 S.Ct. 2520 (FAA preempts state minimum wage law requiring a judicial forum for vindication of wage claims). 2005The United States Supreme Court, however, has held that in instances where a valid individual employee-employer arbitration agreement exists, the FAA requires that employees arbitrate federal and state law discrimination claims. [5] See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson *781 Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 , 111 S.Ct. 1647 , 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) (holding that the FAA requires arbitration of age discrimination claims when a valid arbitration agreement exists); Perry, 482 U.S. at 491 , 107 S.Ct. 2520 (FAA preempts state minimum wage law requiring a judicial forum for vindication of wage claims). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Phillips v. City of Seattle
green
2 sentences1995Commodore, 120 Wn.2d at 128-33 (adopting and applying "Marcus model” 3 to analyze preemption of racial discrimination claim; the court holds "non-negotiable state law rights [such as discrimination] . . . that cannot be waived in contract” are "independent of CBA’s by definition”); Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Wn.2d 563, 578 , 731 P.2d 497 (1987) ("employees may choose to vindicate their civil rights by immediately filing a civil action under RCW 49.60 or they may wait, pursue a remedy under their [CBA], and if their civil rights remain unenforced, file a civil discrimination action purs 1995Commodore, 120 Wn.2d at 128-33 (adopting and applying "Marcus model” 3 to analyze preemption of racial discrimination claim; the court holds "non-negotiable state law rights [such as discrimination] . . . that cannot be waived in contract” are "independent of CBA’s by definition”); Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Wn.2d 563, 578 , 731 P.2d 497 (1987) ("employees may choose to vindicate their civil rights by immediately filing a civil action under RCW 49.60 or they may wait, pursue a remedy under their [CBA], and if their civil rights remain unenforced, file a civil discrimination action purs | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
green
2 sentences1995Commodore, 120 Wn.2d at 128-33 (adopting and applying "Marcus model” 3 to analyze preemption of racial discrimination claim; the court holds "non-negotiable state law rights [such as discrimination] . . . that cannot be waived in contract” are "independent of CBA’s by definition”); Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Wn.2d 563, 578 , 731 P.2d 497 (1987) ("employees may choose to vindicate their civil rights by immediately filing a civil action under RCW 49.60 or they may wait, pursue a remedy under their [CBA], and if their civil rights remain unenforced, file a civil discrimination action purs 1995Commodore, 120 Wn.2d at 128-33 (adopting and applying "Marcus model” 3 to analyze preemption of racial discrimination claim; the court holds "non-negotiable state law rights [such as discrimination] . . . that cannot be waived in contract” are "independent of CBA’s by definition”); Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Wn.2d 563, 578 , 731 P.2d 497 (1987) ("employees may choose to vindicate their civil rights by immediately filing a civil action under RCW 49.60 or they may wait, pursue a remedy under their [CBA], and if their civil rights remain unenforced, file a civil discrimination action purs | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.