terminable doctrine (Washington) · Go Syfert
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terminable doctrine in Washington

17 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Companygreen
wash · 1984 · cited in 11 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1991–2011
2 sentences

2002The public policy exception to the terminable at will doctrine is founded on the premise that the common law doctrine "cannot be used to shield an employer's action which otherwise frustrates a clear manifestation of public policy." Thompson, 102 Wash.2d at 231 , 685 P.2d 1081 .

2002I The public policy exception to the terminable at will doctrine is founded on the premise that the common law doctrine “cannot be used to shield an employer’s action which otherwise frustrates a clear manifestation of public policy.” Thompson, 102 Wn.2d at 231 .

211

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co. green
wash · 1977
2 sentences

2000We explained "The exception has been utilized in instances where application of the terminable at will doctrine would have led to a result clearly inconsistent with a stated public policy and the community interest it advances." Id. (citing Roberts v. ARCO, 88 Wash.2d 887, 897 , 568 P.2d 764 (1977)).

2000We explained "The exception has been utilized in instances where application of the terminable at will doctrine would have led to a result clearly inconsistent with a stated public policy and the community interest it advances." Id. (citing Roberts v. ARCO, 88 Wash.2d 887, 897 , 568 P.2d 764 (1977)).

41984–2000
Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc. green
wash · 1996
2 sentences

2001Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash.2d 931 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996) is also contrary to the majority's pronouncement of a reasonable belief standard.

2000Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wn.2d 931 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996) is also contrary to the majority’s pronouncement of a reasonable belief standard.

22000–2001
Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc. green
wash · 1996
2 sentences

2001Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash.2d 931 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996) is also contrary to the majority's pronouncement of a reasonable belief standard.

2000Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wn.2d 931 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996) is also contrary to the majority’s pronouncement of a reasonable belief standard.

22000–2001
Jennings v. Marralle green
cal · 1994
2 sentences

2000Id.

2000Id.

22000–2000
Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont green
wva · 1978
2 sentences

2000To clarify the purpose underlying the public policy exception, we compared two cases from other jurisdictions: [I]n Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W.Va. 116 , 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) a bank employee was discharged after attempting to make his employer comply with the state consumer credit and protection laws. *1140 The West Virginia Supreme Court held that despite the general rule, the bank could be liable for wrongful discharge because the discharge would otherwise frustrate a clear manifestation of public policy, protection of consumers of credit.

2000To clarify the purpose underlying the public policy exception, we compared two cases from other jurisdictions: [I]n Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W.Va. 116 , 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) a bank employee was discharged after attempting to make his employer comply with the state consumer credit and protection laws. *1140 The West Virginia Supreme Court held that despite the general rule, the bank could be liable for wrongful discharge because the discharge would otherwise frustrate a clear manifestation of public policy, protection of consumers of credit.

22000–2000
Havens v. C & D PLASTICS, INC. green
wash · 1994
1 sentence

2025In Havens, the court held, “We agree with the weight of authority that where the terminable-at-will doctrine is concerned, the promise for promissory estoppel must be a ‘clear and definite promise.’ ” 124 Wn.2d at 173 (quoting 1 Paul H.

12025–2025
Bellingham Firefighters Local 106 v. City of Bellingham green
washctapp · 1976
1 sentence

1991App. 662, 665-66 , 551 P.2d 142 (1976). 6 Under Thompson , which partly involved a public policy exception to the terminable at will rule of employment, the burden is on the employee to show that "his discharge may have been motivated by reasons that contravene a clear mandate of public policy[.]" Thompson, at 232.

11991–1991
Public Utility District No. 1 v. Kottsick green
wash · 1976
2 sentences

1991Further "courts should proceed cautiously if called upon to declare public policy. . .." For all of these reasons we need not rule with respect to whether the discharge may be subject to the "contravention of a clear mandate of public policy" exception, even though appellants have expended considerable energy in arguing this issue. 2 In PUD 1 v. Kottsick, 86 Wn.2d 388, 390 , 545 P.2d 1 (1976) the Supreme Court stated that "[a] court may grant attorney fees to the prevailing party if the losing party's conduct constitutes bad faith or wantonness" (citing State ex rel.

1991Further "courts should proceed cautiously if called upon to declare public policy. . .." For all of these reasons we need not rule with respect to whether the discharge may be subject to the "contravention of a clear mandate of public policy" exception, even though appellants have expended considerable energy in arguing this issue. 2 In PUD 1 v. Kottsick, 86 Wn.2d 388, 390 , 545 P.2d 1 (1976) the Supreme Court stated that "[a] court may grant attorney fees to the prevailing party if the losing party's conduct constitutes bad faith or wantonness" (citing State ex rel.

11991–1991

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 49.17.160 (5) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 49.12.200 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 49.44.090 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030 (3) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

WA 17 (1984–2025) MD 5 (1988–2016) MS 4 (1992–2020) NC 3 (1985–1993) NM 2 (1983–1994) TN 2 (1988–1994)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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