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17 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Companygreen2 sentences2002The public policy exception to the terminable at will doctrine is founded on the premise that the common law doctrine "cannot be used to shield an employer's action which otherwise frustrates a clear manifestation of public policy." Thompson, 102 Wash.2d at 231 , 685 P.2d 1081 . 2002I The public policy exception to the terminable at will doctrine is founded on the premise that the common law doctrine “cannot be used to shield an employer’s action which otherwise frustrates a clear manifestation of public policy.” Thompson, 102 Wn.2d at 231 . | 2 | 11 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
green
2 sentences2000We explained "The exception has been utilized in instances where application of the terminable at will doctrine would have led to a result clearly inconsistent with a stated public policy and the community interest it advances." Id. (citing Roberts v. ARCO, 88 Wash.2d 887, 897 , 568 P.2d 764 (1977)). 2000We explained "The exception has been utilized in instances where application of the terminable at will doctrine would have led to a result clearly inconsistent with a stated public policy and the community interest it advances." Id. (citing Roberts v. ARCO, 88 Wash.2d 887, 897 , 568 P.2d 764 (1977)). | 4 | 1984–2000 |
Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash.2d 931 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996) is also contrary to the majority's pronouncement of a reasonable belief standard. 2000Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wn.2d 931 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996) is also contrary to the majority’s pronouncement of a reasonable belief standard. | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash.2d 931 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996) is also contrary to the majority's pronouncement of a reasonable belief standard. 2000Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wn.2d 931 , 913 P.2d 377 (1996) is also contrary to the majority’s pronouncement of a reasonable belief standard. | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Jennings v. Marralle
green
2 sentences2000Id. 2000Id. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont
green
2 sentences2000To clarify the purpose underlying the public policy exception, we compared two cases from other jurisdictions: [I]n Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W.Va. 116 , 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) a bank employee was discharged after attempting to make his employer comply with the state consumer credit and protection laws. *1140 The West Virginia Supreme Court held that despite the general rule, the bank could be liable for wrongful discharge because the discharge would otherwise frustrate a clear manifestation of public policy, protection of consumers of credit. 2000To clarify the purpose underlying the public policy exception, we compared two cases from other jurisdictions: [I]n Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W.Va. 116 , 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) a bank employee was discharged after attempting to make his employer comply with the state consumer credit and protection laws. *1140 The West Virginia Supreme Court held that despite the general rule, the bank could be liable for wrongful discharge because the discharge would otherwise frustrate a clear manifestation of public policy, protection of consumers of credit. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Havens v. C & D PLASTICS, INC.
green
1 sentence2025In Havens, the court held, “We agree with the weight of authority that where the terminable-at-will doctrine is concerned, the promise for promissory estoppel must be a ‘clear and definite promise.’ ” 124 Wn.2d at 173 (quoting 1 Paul H. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bellingham Firefighters Local 106 v. City of Bellingham
green
1 sentence1991App. 662, 665-66 , 551 P.2d 142 (1976). 6 Under Thompson , which partly involved a public policy exception to the terminable at will rule of employment, the burden is on the employee to show that "his discharge may have been motivated by reasons that contravene a clear mandate of public policy[.]" Thompson, at 232. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Public Utility District No. 1 v. Kottsick
green
2 sentences1991Further "courts should proceed cautiously if called upon to declare public policy. . .." For all of these reasons we need not rule with respect to whether the discharge may be subject to the "contravention of a clear mandate of public policy" exception, even though appellants have expended considerable energy in arguing this issue. 2 In PUD 1 v. Kottsick, 86 Wn.2d 388, 390 , 545 P.2d 1 (1976) the Supreme Court stated that "[a] court may grant attorney fees to the prevailing party if the losing party's conduct constitutes bad faith or wantonness" (citing State ex rel. 1991Further "courts should proceed cautiously if called upon to declare public policy. . .." For all of these reasons we need not rule with respect to whether the discharge may be subject to the "contravention of a clear mandate of public policy" exception, even though appellants have expended considerable energy in arguing this issue. 2 In PUD 1 v. Kottsick, 86 Wn.2d 388, 390 , 545 P.2d 1 (1976) the Supreme Court stated that "[a] court may grant attorney fees to the prevailing party if the losing party's conduct constitutes bad faith or wantonness" (citing State ex rel. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.