McLen-don standard in Alabama

2015See Rehfeld, 885 So.2d at 795 (applying Rule 45, Ala. R.

2015See Rehfeld, 885 So.2d at 795 (applying Rule 45, Ala. R.

2016The McLen-don standard requires- that, when physical custody of a child has been removed from a parent by prior court order, in order to modify custody, the parent requesting the modification must demonstrate that the proposed “ ‘change of ... custody will materially promote [the] child’s welfare,’ ” 455 So.2d at 865 (quoting Greene v. Greene, 249 Ala. 155, 157 , 30 So.2d 444, 445 (1947)), and that the “ ‘positive good brought about by the modification’ ” would “ ‘more than offset the inherently disruptive effect caused by uprooting the child.’ ” Id. (quoting Wood v. Wood, 333 So.2d 826, 828 (

2016The McLen-don standard requires- that, when physical custody of a child has been removed from a parent by prior court order, in order to modify custody, the parent requesting the modification must demonstrate that the proposed “ ‘change of ... custody will materially promote [the] child’s welfare,’ ” 455 So.2d at 865 (quoting Greene v. Greene, 249 Ala. 155, 157 , 30 So.2d 444, 445 (1947)), and that the “ ‘positive good brought about by the modification’ ” would “ ‘more than offset the inherently disruptive effect caused by uprooting the child.’ ” Id. (quoting Wood v. Wood, 333 So.2d 826, 828 (

1996However, where the parents have joint legal custody, but a previous judicial determination grants primary custody to one parent and secondary custody to the other, ‘the trial court [is] correct in applying the McLen-don standard and requiring the [parent] to show that a change in custody would materially promote the welfare and best interests of the child, offsetting the disruptive effect of uprooting the child.’ Blackmon v. Scott, 622 So.2d 393, 394 (Ala.Civ.App.1993).” Scholl v. Parsons, 655 So.2d 1060, 1062 (Ala. Civ.App.1995).

1996However, where the parents have joint legal custody, but a previous judicial determination grants primary custody to one parent and secondary custody to the other, ‘the trial court [is] correct in applying the McLen-don standard and requiring the [parent] to show that a change in custody would materially promote the welfare and best interests of the child, offsetting the disruptive effect of uprooting the child.’ Blackmon v. Scott, 622 So.2d 393, 394 (Ala.Civ.App.1993).” Scholl v. Parsons, 655 So.2d 1060, 1062 (Ala. Civ.App.1995).

2016The McLen-don standard requires- that, when physical custody of a child has been removed from a parent by prior court order, in order to modify custody, the parent requesting the modification must demonstrate that the proposed “ ‘change of ... custody will materially promote [the] child’s welfare,’ ” 455 So.2d at 865 (quoting Greene v. Greene, 249 Ala. 155, 157 , 30 So.2d 444, 445 (1947)), and that the “ ‘positive good brought about by the modification’ ” would “ ‘more than offset the inherently disruptive effect caused by uprooting the child.’ ” Id. (quoting Wood v. Wood, 333 So.2d 826, 828 (

2016The McLen-don standard requires- that, when physical custody of a child has been removed from a parent by prior court order, in order to modify custody, the parent requesting the modification must demonstrate that the proposed “ ‘change of ... custody will materially promote [the] child’s welfare,’ ” 455 So.2d at 865 (quoting Greene v. Greene, 249 Ala. 155, 157 , 30 So.2d 444, 445 (1947)), and that the “ ‘positive good brought about by the modification’ ” would “ ‘more than offset the inherently disruptive effect caused by uprooting the child.’ ” Id. (quoting Wood v. Wood, 333 So.2d 826, 828 (

2016The McLen-don standard requires- that, when physical custody of a child has been removed from a parent by prior court order, in order to modify custody, the parent requesting the modification must demonstrate that the proposed “ ‘change of ... custody will materially promote [the] child’s welfare,’ ” 455 So.2d at 865 (quoting Greene v. Greene, 249 Ala. 155, 157 , 30 So.2d 444, 445 (1947)), and that the “ ‘positive good brought about by the modification’ ” would “ ‘more than offset the inherently disruptive effect caused by uprooting the child.’ ” Id. (quoting Wood v. Wood, 333 So.2d 826, 828 (

2016The McLen-don standard requires- that, when physical custody of a child has been removed from a parent by prior court order, in order to modify custody, the parent requesting the modification must demonstrate that the proposed “ ‘change of ... custody will materially promote [the] child’s welfare,’ ” 455 So.2d at 865 (quoting Greene v. Greene, 249 Ala. 155, 157 , 30 So.2d 444, 445 (1947)), and that the “ ‘positive good brought about by the modification’ ” would “ ‘more than offset the inherently disruptive effect caused by uprooting the child.’ ” Id. (quoting Wood v. Wood, 333 So.2d 826, 828 (

2016(Ala.Civ.App.2014) (citing P.A.T. v. K.T.G., 749 So.2d 454, 456 (Ala.Civ.App.1999))(applying the McLen-don standard to custody-modification case where the parents shared joint legal custody and one of the parents had primary physical custody of the child).

2016(Ala.Civ.App.2014) (citing P.A.T. v. K.T.G., 749 So.2d 454, 456 (Ala.Civ.App.1999))(applying the McLen-don standard to custody-modification case where the parents shared joint legal custody and one of the parents had primary physical custody of the child).

2014See Cochran v. Cochran, 5 So.3d 1220, 1226 (Ala.2008) (The McLen-don standard applies when a party seeks to modify an award of primary physical custody to an award of joint physical custody.); and Adams v. Adams, 21 So.Sd 1247, 1252 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (“A parent seeking to modify a custody judgment awarding primary physical custody to the other parent must meet the standard for modification of custody set forth in Ex parte McLendon.”).

2014See Cochran v. Cochran, 5 So.3d 1220, 1226 (Ala.2008) (The McLen-don standard applies when a party seeks to modify an award of primary physical custody to an award of joint physical custody.); and Adams v. Adams, 21 So.Sd 1247, 1252 (Ala.Civ.App.2008) (“A parent seeking to modify a custody judgment awarding primary physical custody to the other parent must meet the standard for modification of custody set forth in Ex parte McLendon.”).

2013Thus, the noncustodial relatives were required to meet the McLen-don standard in order to be entitled to a modification of the custody of the children.” B.C., 143 So.3d at 205 ; Ex parte J.P., 641 So.2d 276, 279 (Ala.1994) (“Therefore, the maternal aunt and uncle’s petition for custody filed almost two years later was a petition for modification of custody; it was governed by the McLendon rule.”).

2013Thus, the noncustodial relatives were required to meet the McLen-don standard in order to be entitled to a modification of the custody of the children.” B.C., 143 So.3d at 205 ; Ex parte J.P., 641 So.2d 276, 279 (Ala.1994) (“Therefore, the maternal aunt and uncle’s petition for custody filed almost two years later was a petition for modification of custody; it was governed by the McLendon rule.”).

2013Our supreme court has previously stated that “[t]he burden imposed by the McLen-don standard is typically a heavy one” and that it is “meant to minimize disruptive changes of custody because this Court presumes that stability is inherently more beneficial to a child than disruption.” Ex parte Cleghom, 993 So.2d 462, 468 (Ala.2008) (citing Ex parte McLendon, 455 So.2d at 865 ).

2013Our supreme court has previously stated that “[t]he burden imposed by the McLen-don standard is typically a heavy one” and that it is “meant to minimize disruptive changes of custody because this Court presumes that stability is inherently more beneficial to a child than disruption.” Ex parte Cleghom, 993 So.2d 462, 468 (Ala.2008) (citing Ex parte McLendon, 455 So.2d at 865 ).

2010Id.” C.D.K.S. v. K.W.K., 40 So.3d 736, 740 (Ala.Civ.App.2009).

2010Id.” C.D.K.S. v. K.W.K., 40 So.3d 736, 740 (Ala.Civ.App.2009).

2009The trial court made no specific findings of fact regarding its holding “that there has been a material change of circumstance as to custody.” This court has often stated that “ ‘[w]here a trial court does not make specific findings of fact concerning an issue, this Court will assume that the trial court made those findings necessary to support its judgment, unless such findings would be clearly erroneous.’ ” Ex parte Fann, 810 So.2d 631, 636 (Ala.2001) (quoting Lemon v. Golf Terrace Owners Ass’n, 611 So.2d 263, 265 (Ala.1992)).

2009The trial court made no specific findings of fact regarding its holding “that there has been a material change of circumstance as to custody.” This court has often stated that “ ‘[w]here a trial court does not make specific findings of fact concerning an issue, this Court will assume that the trial court made those findings necessary to support its judgment, unless such findings would be clearly erroneous.’ ” Ex parte Fann, 810 So.2d 631, 636 (Ala.2001) (quoting Lemon v. Golf Terrace Owners Ass’n, 611 So.2d 263, 265 (Ala.1992)).

2009The trial court made no specific findings of fact regarding its holding “that there has been a material change of circumstance as to custody.” This court has often stated that “ ‘[w]here a trial court does not make specific findings of fact concerning an issue, this Court will assume that the trial court made those findings necessary to support its judgment, unless such findings would be clearly erroneous.’ ” Ex parte Fann, 810 So.2d 631, 636 (Ala.2001) (quoting Lemon v. Golf Terrace Owners Ass’n, 611 So.2d 263, 265 (Ala.1992)).

2009The trial court made no specific findings of fact regarding its holding “that there has been a material change of circumstance as to custody.” This court has often stated that “ ‘[w]here a trial court does not make specific findings of fact concerning an issue, this Court will assume that the trial court made those findings necessary to support its judgment, unless such findings would be clearly erroneous.’ ” Ex parte Fann, 810 So.2d 631, 636 (Ala.2001) (quoting Lemon v. Golf Terrace Owners Ass’n, 611 So.2d 263, 265 (Ala.1992)).

2002See Ex parte McLendon, supra. See also Ex parte R.C.L., 627 So.2d 920 (Ala.1993); Fricks v. Wood, 807 So.2d 561 (Ala.Civ.App.2001); E.M.C. v. K.C.Y., 735 So.2d 1225 (Ala.Civ.App.1999).

2002See Ex parte McLendon, supra. See also Ex parte R.C.L., 627 So.2d 920 (Ala.1993); Fricks v. Wood, 807 So.2d 561 (Ala.Civ.App.2001); E.M.C. v. K.C.Y., 735 So.2d 1225 (Ala.Civ.App.1999).

2000Williams v. Williams, 402 So.2d 1029, 1032 (Ala.Civ.App.1981).” In its judgment, the trial court noted that the applicable standard to be used in determining whether to modify a custody order was “the best-interest” standard set forth in Ex parte Couch, 521 So.2d 987 (Ala.1988), and not the McLen-don standard, based on the fact that the parties had previously been awarded joint legal and physical custody of the minor child.

2000Williams v. Williams, 402 So.2d 1029, 1032 (Ala.Civ.App.1981).” In its judgment, the trial court noted that the applicable standard to be used in determining whether to modify a custody order was “the best-interest” standard set forth in Ex parte Couch, 521 So.2d 987 (Ala.1988), and not the McLen-don standard, based on the fact that the parties had previously been awarded joint legal and physical custody of the minor child.

1996However, where the parents have joint legal custody, but a previous judicial determination grants primary custody to one parent and secondary custody to the other, ‘the trial court [is] correct in applying the McLen-don standard and requiring the [parent] to show that a change in custody would materially promote the welfare and best interests of the child, offsetting the disruptive effect of uprooting the child.’ Blackmon v. Scott, 622 So.2d 393, 394 (Ala.Civ.App.1993).” Scholl v. Parsons, 655 So.2d 1060, 1062 (Ala. Civ.App.1995).

1996However, where the parents have joint legal custody, but a previous judicial determination grants primary custody to one parent and secondary custody to the other, ‘the trial court [is] correct in applying the McLen-don standard and requiring the [parent] to show that a change in custody would materially promote the welfare and best interests of the child, offsetting the disruptive effect of uprooting the child.’ Blackmon v. Scott, 622 So.2d 393, 394 (Ala.Civ.App.1993).” Scholl v. Parsons, 655 So.2d 1060, 1062 (Ala. Civ.App.1995).