imposition of a fitness requirement in District of Columbia

2018In order to justify the imposition of a fitness requirement as a condition of reinstatement, "the record in the disciplinary proceeding must contain clear and convincing evidence that casts a serious doubt upon the attorney's continuing fitness to practice law." In re Cater , 887 A.2d 1 , 24 (D.C. 2005).

2013In order to justify the imposition of a fitness requirement, “ ‘the record in the disciplinary proceeding must contain clear and convincing evidence that casts a serious doubt upon the attorney’s continuing fitness to practice law.’ ” In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 24 (D.C.2005) (quoting Board report).

2005Thus, in determining whether to impose a fitness requirement in cases involving violation of rules 8.4(d) and XI, § 2(b)(3), our focus has been “upon the egregiousness of the attorneys’ deliberate disregard for the disciplinary process.” Delaney, supra, 697 A.2d at 1214 . (b) Level of Egregiousness In this case, the Board concluded that respondent’s conduct was not so egregious as to warrant the imposition of a fitness requirement.

2005Thus, in determining whether to impose a fitness requirement in cases involving violation of rules 8.4(d) and XI, § 2(b)(3), our focus has been “upon the egregiousness of the attorneys’ deliberate disregard for the disciplinary process.” Delaney, supra, 697 A.2d at 1214 . (b) Level of Egregiousness In this case, the Board concluded that respondent’s conduct was not so egregious as to warrant the imposition of a fitness requirement.

2007We acknowledged that in other types of disciplinary proceedings, the factors identified in In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215 (D.C. 1985), would continue to be useful in determining whether a serious doubt exists as to the attorney’s continued fitness.

2007Id. at 25 (adopting "clear and convincing" evidence standard for reinstatement enhancement, in part, in recognition that a fitness requirement "can transform a thirty-day suspension into one that lasts for years"). [2] See Cater, supra note 1 , 887 A.2d at 24 (approving the Board's proposed test for the imposition of a fitness requirement). [3] We acknowledged that in other types of disciplinary proceedings, the factors identified in In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215 (D.C. 1985), would continue to be useful in determining whether a serious doubt exists as to the attorney's continued fitness.

2020See, e.g., In re Thompson, 195 A.3d 64, 64-65 (D.C. 2018) (respondent’s continued failure to cooperate with disciplinary investigations may be considered when imposing discipline); In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 24 (D.C. 2015) (discussing the considerations for imposing a fitness requirement).

2015See In re Ras, 884 A.2d 44, 46 (D.C.2005) (equating Illinois’s “reinstatement subject to further order of the court” to the District of Columbia’s “fitness requirement”); In re Lea, 969 A.2d 881, 891 (D.C.2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that evidence of “deliberate disregard for the disciplinary process” is a factor in imposing a fitness requirement, and that such disregard may, in itself, “raise[] a serious question about the attorney’s continuing capacity and willingness to fulfill his or her professional obligations”).

2015See In re Ras, 884 A.2d 44, 46 (D.C.2005) (equating Illinois’s “reinstatement subject to further order of the court” to the District of Columbia’s “fitness requirement”); In re Lea, 969 A.2d 881, 891 (D.C.2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that evidence of “deliberate disregard for the disciplinary process” is a factor in imposing a fitness requirement, and that such disregard may, in itself, “raise[] a serious question about the attorney’s continuing capacity and willingness to fulfill his or her professional obligations”).

2014In re Martin, 67 A.3d 1032, 1039 (D.C. 2013).

2013See In re Boykins, 999 A.2d 166, 177-78 (D.C.2010) (imposing fitness requirement where attorney negligently misappropriated client funds and neglected client matters); In re Slaughter, 929 A.2d 433, 448 (D.C.2007) (imposing fitness requirement and three-year suspension upon attorney who engaged in forgery and dishonest conduct during a three-year period); In re Ukwu, 926 A.2d at 1106 (imposing fitness requirement and a two-year suspension upon attorney who engaged in dishonest conduct in the representation of five clients and neglected the interests of one client).

2013See In re Boykins, 999 A.2d 166, 177-78 (D.C.2010) (imposing fitness requirement where attorney negligently misappropriated client funds and neglected client matters); In re Slaughter, 929 A.2d 433, 448 (D.C.2007) (imposing fitness requirement and three-year suspension upon attorney who engaged in forgery and dishonest conduct during a three-year period); In re Ukwu, 926 A.2d at 1106 (imposing fitness requirement and a two-year suspension upon attorney who engaged in dishonest conduct in the representation of five clients and neglected the interests of one client).

2013See In re Boykins, 999 A.2d 166, 177-78 (D.C.2010) (imposing fitness requirement where attorney negligently misappropriated client funds and neglected client matters); In re Slaughter, 929 A.2d 433, 448 (D.C.2007) (imposing fitness requirement and three-year suspension upon attorney who engaged in forgery and dishonest conduct during a three-year period); In re Ukwu, 926 A.2d at 1106 (imposing fitness requirement and a two-year suspension upon attorney who engaged in dishonest conduct in the representation of five clients and neglected the interests of one client).

2012See In re Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964 (D.C.2003); In re D’Onofrio, 764 A.2d 797 (D.C.2001)(in considering reciprocal discipline, the functional equivalent of the initiating court’s reinstatement requirement is the imposition of a fitness requirement in this court).

2007See, e.g., In re Wright, 702 A.2d 1251, 1253-54, 1257 (D.C.1997) (per curiam) (Attached Board Report); [In re] Delaney, 697 A.2d [1212,] 1213 n. 3 [(D.C.1997)]; see also In re Cater, Bar Docket Nos. 337-99 et al. at 30 (BPR June 26, 2003) (pending before the [c]ourt).

2007See, e.g., In re Wright, 702 A.2d 1251, 1253-54, 1257 (D.C.1997) (per curiam) (Attached Board Report); [In re] Delaney, 697 A.2d [1212,] 1213 n. 3 [(D.C.1997)]; see also In re Cater, Bar Docket Nos. 337-99 et al. at 30 (BPR June 26, 2003) (pending before the [c]ourt).

2005In re Smith, 649 A.2d 299, 300 (D.C.1994).

2005In re Smith, 649 A.2d 299, 300 (D.C.1994).

2005For a more extended discussion of the meaning of fitness, see In re Dortch, 860 A.2d 346, 355 (D.C.2004). 25 .

2003See, e.g., In re Small, 760 A.2d 612, 614 (D.C.2000) (identifying respondent’s “lack of candor with respect to his application for admission” as one factor justifying the imposition of a fitness requirement); In re Delate, 579 A.2d 1177, 1181 (D.C.1990) (“given respondent’s behavior revealed in this record — virtual abandonment of her conservatorship responsibilities in two cases — she should not be permitted to resume practice automatically upon expiration of her suspension”).

2003See, e.g., In re Small, 760 A.2d 612, 614 (D.C.2000) (identifying respondent’s “lack of candor with respect to his application for admission” as one factor justifying the imposition of a fitness requirement); In re Delate, 579 A.2d 1177, 1181 (D.C.1990) (“given respondent’s behavior revealed in this record — virtual abandonment of her conservatorship responsibilities in two cases — she should not be permitted to resume practice automatically upon expiration of her suspension”).

1999See Lewis, supra, 689 A.2d 561 (30-day suspension with requirement to show fitness before reinstatement for completely abandoning client in trial-level criminal proceeding, where attorney was seriously depressed at the time and never treated, even though attorney cooperative with Bar Counsel and no prejudice to client); In re Lyles, 680 A.2d 408, 418-19 (D.C.1996) (per curiam) (six-month suspension with fitness requirement where neglect of multiple clients, where no showing that attorney recovered from serious depression, no understanding of lapse in obligation to her clients, and other pendin

1999See Lewis, supra, 689 A.2d 561 (30-day suspension with requirement to show fitness before reinstatement for completely abandoning client in trial-level criminal proceeding, where attorney was seriously depressed at the time and never treated, even though attorney cooperative with Bar Counsel and no prejudice to client); In re Lyles, 680 A.2d 408, 418-19 (D.C.1996) (per curiam) (six-month suspension with fitness requirement where neglect of multiple clients, where no showing that attorney recovered from serious depression, no understanding of lapse in obligation to her clients, and other pendin

1999See Lewis, supra, 689 A.2d 561 (30-day suspension with requirement to show fitness before reinstatement for completely abandoning client in trial-level criminal proceeding, where attorney was seriously depressed at the time and never treated, even though attorney cooperative with Bar Counsel and no prejudice to client); In re Lyles, 680 A.2d 408, 418-19 (D.C.1996) (per curiam) (six-month suspension with fitness requirement where neglect of multiple clients, where no showing that attorney recovered from serious depression, no understanding of lapse in obligation to her clients, and other pendin

1999See Lewis, supra, 689 A.2d 561 (30-day suspension with requirement to show fitness before reinstatement for completely abandoning client in trial-level criminal proceeding, where attorney was seriously depressed at the time and never treated, even though attorney cooperative with Bar Counsel and no prejudice to client); In re Lyles, 680 A.2d 408, 418-19 (D.C.1996) (per curiam) (six-month suspension with fitness requirement where neglect of multiple clients, where no showing that attorney recovered from serious depression, no understanding of lapse in obligation to her clients, and other pendin

1999See Lewis, supra, 689 A.2d 561 (30-day suspension with requirement to show fitness before reinstatement for completely abandoning client in trial-level criminal proceeding, where attorney was seriously depressed at the time and never treated, even though attorney cooperative with Bar Counsel and no prejudice to client); In re Lyles, 680 A.2d 408, 418-19 (D.C.1996) (per curiam) (six-month suspension with fitness requirement where neglect of multiple clients, where no showing that attorney recovered from serious depression, no understanding of lapse in obligation to her clients, and other pendin

1998See, e.g., Sumner, supra, 665 A.2d at 986 ; Ross, supra, 658 A.2d at 209 ; McGann, supra, 666 A.2d at 489 ; Dietz, supra, 633 A.2d at 851 ; Foster, supra, 581 A.2d at 389 ; see also Joyner, supra, 670 A.2d at 1370 . [4] Bar Counsel contends that the guidelines outlined in In re Chisholm, supra, 679 A.2d 495 support the imposition of a fitness requirement in this case.

1998See, e.g., Sumner, supra, 665 A.2d at 986 ; Ross, supra, 658 A.2d at 209 ; McGann, supra, 666 A.2d at 489 ; Dietz, supra, 633 A.2d at 851 ; Foster, supra, 581 A.2d at 389 ; see also Joyner, supra, 670 A.2d at 1370 . [4] Bar Counsel contends that the guidelines outlined in In re Chisholm, supra, 679 A.2d 495 support the imposition of a fitness requirement in this case.

1998See, e.g., Sumner, supra, 665 A.2d at 986 ; Ross, supra, 658 A.2d at 209 ; McGann, supra, 666 A.2d at 489 ; Dietz, supra, 633 A.2d at 851 ; Foster, supra, 581 A.2d at 389 ; see also Joyner, supra, 670 A.2d at 1370 . [4] Bar Counsel contends that the guidelines outlined in In re Chisholm, supra, 679 A.2d 495 support the imposition of a fitness requirement in this case.

1998See, e.g., Sumner, supra, 665 A.2d at 986 ; Ross, supra, 658 A.2d at 209 ; McGann, supra, 666 A.2d at 489 ; Dietz, supra, 633 A.2d at 851 ; Foster, supra, 581 A.2d at 389 ; see also Joyner, supra, 670 A.2d at 1370 . [4] Bar Counsel contends that the guidelines outlined in In re Chisholm, supra, 679 A.2d 495 support the imposition of a fitness requirement in this case.

1998See, e.g., Sumner, supra, 665 A.2d at 986 ; Ross, supra, 658 A.2d at 209 ; McGann, supra, 666 A.2d at 489 ; Dietz, supra, 633 A.2d at 851 ; Foster, supra, 581 A.2d at 389 ; see also Joyner, supra, 670 A.2d at 1370 . [4] Bar Counsel contends that the guidelines outlined in In re Chisholm, supra, 679 A.2d 495 support the imposition of a fitness requirement in this case.

1998See, e.g., Sumner, supra, 665 A.2d at 986 ; Ross, supra, 658 A.2d at 209 ; McGann, supra, 666 A.2d at 489 ; Dietz, supra, 633 A.2d at 851 ; Foster, supra, 581 A.2d at 389 ; see also Joyner, supra, 670 A.2d at 1370 . [4] Bar Counsel contends that the guidelines outlined in In re Chisholm, supra, 679 A.2d 495 support the imposition of a fitness requirement in this case.