contact sports exception in Illinois

2010Participants in such games assume a greater risk of injury resulting from negligent conduct of co[-]participants. *** *** *** The contact sports exception allows recovery for injuries resulting from willful and wanton and intentional misconduct while taking into account the voluntary nature of participation in games where physical contact is anticipated and where the risk of injury caused by this conduct is inherent." Pfister, 167 Ill. 2d at 426-27 , 657 N.E.2d at 1018 .

2010Participants in such games assume a greater risk of injury resulting from negligent conduct of co[-]participants. *** *** *** The contact sports exception allows recovery for injuries resulting from willful and wanton and intentional misconduct while taking into account the voluntary nature of participation in games where physical contact is anticipated and where the risk of injury caused by this conduct is inherent." Pfister, 167 Ill. 2d at 426-27 , 657 N.E.2d at 1018 .

2011See Karas, 227 Ill.2d at 461 , 318 Ill.Dec. 567 , 884 N.E.2d at 135 (noting that the question of "[w]hether the contact sports exception may be applied to a nonparticipant in a sporting event" was an issue of first impression). ¶ 13 In Karas , our supreme court considered the applicability of the exception to nonparticipant defendants where a plaintiff was injured during an amateur hockey game.

2011See Karas, 227 Ill.2d at 461 , 318 Ill.Dec. 567 , 884 N.E.2d at 135 (noting that the question of "[w]hether the contact sports exception may be applied to a nonparticipant in a sporting event" was an issue of first impression). ¶ 13 In Karas , our supreme court considered the applicability of the exception to nonparticipant defendants where a plaintiff was injured during an amateur hockey game.

2008See also Azzano v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 304 Ill.App.3d 713, 718 , 237 Ill.Dec. 694 , 710 N.E.2d 117 (1999) ("the public policy underlying the contact sports exception today is the need to strike a balance between protecting participants in sporting activities and the voluntary nature of participation in games where physical contact is inherent and inevitable").

2008See also Azzano v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 304 Ill.App.3d 713, 718 , 237 Ill.Dec. 694 , 710 N.E.2d 117 (1999) ("the public policy underlying the contact sports exception today is the need to strike a balance between protecting participants in sporting activities and the voluntary nature of participation in games where physical contact is inherent and inevitable").

2008See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability §2, Comment j, at 27 (2000) (“What courts often call ‘primary assumption of risk’ is actually a doctrine about the defendant’s liability or duty”); Barrett v. Fritz, 42 Ill. 2d 529, 535 (1969) (assumption of the risk concepts are generally duplicative of other doctrines, including scope of duty); Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 80-81 , 508 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1998); Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tenn. 1994); Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 437-39 , 502 N.E.2d 964, 967-68 , 510 N.Y.

2008See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 2, Comment j, at 27 (2000) ("What courts often call `primary assumption of risk' is actually a doctrine about the defendant's liability or duty"); Barrett v. Fritz, 42 Ill.2d 529, 535 , 248 N.E.2d 111 (1969) (assumption of the risk concepts are generally duplicative of other doctrines, including scope of duty); Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 80-81 , 508 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1998); Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tenn. 1994); Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 437-39 , 502 N.E.2d 964,

2011Rather, the court held as follows: "[W]hether the contact sports exception applies to a nonparticipant defendant is a policy determination that rests on the circumstances of the sport and its inherent risks, the relationship of the parties to the sport and to each other, and whether imposing broader liability on the defendant `would harm the sport or cause it to be changed or abandoned.'" Karas, 227 Ill.2d at 465 [ 318 Ill.Dec. 567 ], 884 N.E.2d at 137 (quoting Kahn v. East Side Union High School District [ 31 Cal.4th 990 , 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103 ], 75 P.3d 30, 39 (Cal.2003)). ¶ 15 In applying this

2011Rather, the court held as follows: "[W]hether the contact sports exception applies to a nonparticipant defendant is a policy determination that rests on the circumstances of the sport and its inherent risks, the relationship of the parties to the sport and to each other, and whether imposing broader liability on the defendant `would harm the sport or cause it to be changed or abandoned.'" Karas, 227 Ill.2d at 465 [ 318 Ill.Dec. 567 ], 884 N.E.2d at 137 (quoting Kahn v. East Side Union High School District [ 31 Cal.4th 990 , 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103 ], 75 P.3d 30, 39 (Cal.2003)). ¶ 15 In applying this

2006Football players owe one another a generally lower duty of care than do softball players. [3] Those below-cited Illinois contact sports cases that do discuss assumption of the risk apparently assume the existence of or overlook the requirement for a contractual or employment relationship, or rely on the assumption doctrine, just as we do, to describe the rationale of the contact sports exception. [4] That said, we note that the statement in Landrum is based on a passage from Keller in which the court concluded that the players' descriptions of the game "`reveal[ed] the adaptation of ordinary h

2006Football players owe one another a generally lower duty of care than do softball players. [3] Those below-cited Illinois contact sports cases that do discuss assumption of the risk apparently assume the existence of or overlook the requirement for a contractual or employment relationship, or rely on the assumption doctrine, just as we do, to describe the rationale of the contact sports exception. [4] That said, we note that the statement in Landrum is based on a passage from Keller in which the court concluded that the players' descriptions of the game "`reveal[ed] the adaptation of ordinary h

2008App. 3d 942, 947 (1994) (whether a particular case is subject to the contact sports exception “is properly resolved by examining the objective factors surrounding the game itself, not on the subjective expectations of the parties”); see generally Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315 , 834 P.2d at 708 , 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14 (a court need not ask what risks a particular plaintiff subjectively knew of and chose to encounter, but instead must evaluate the fundamental nature of the sport and the defendant’s role in or relationship to that sport in order to determine whether the defendant owes a duty to prot

2008App. 3d 942, 947 (1994) (whether a particular case is subject to the contact sports exception “is properly resolved by examining the objective factors surrounding the game itself, not on the subjective expectations of the parties”); see generally Knight, 3 Cal. 4th at 315 , 834 P.2d at 708 , 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14 (a court need not ask what risks a particular plaintiff subjectively knew of and chose to encounter, but instead must evaluate the fundamental nature of the sport and the defendant’s role in or relationship to that sport in order to determine whether the defendant owes a duty to prot

2006As stated in those cases, the other policy considerations underlying the contact sports exception are that sports injuries due to negligence are inevitable and that " '[i]f every time a negligent foul resulted in injury, and liability was imposed, [sports] as we know [them] would not be played.' " Pfister, 167 Ill. 2d at 427 , quoting Pfister v. Shusta, 256 Ill.

2006As stated in those cases, the other policy considerations underlying the contact sports exception are that sports injuries due to negligence are inevitable and that “ ‘[i]f every time a negligent foul resulted in injury, and liability was imposed, [sports] as we know [them] would not be played.’ ” Pfister, 167 Ill. 2d at 427 , quoting Pfister v. Shusta, 256 Ill.

2006The supreme court reasoned that, even in games where there are rules to govern the permissible degree of physical contact among participants, "it is difficult to determine what may be an acceptable amount of physical contact," and " 'rule infractions, deliberate or intentional, are virtually inevitable.' " Pfister, 167 Ill. 2d at 424 , quoting Oswald v. Township High School District No. 214, 84 Ill.

2006The supreme court reasoned that, even in games where there are rules to govern the permissible degree of physical contact among participants, “it is difficult to determine what may he an acceptable amount of physical contact,” and “ ‘rule infractions, deliberate or intentional, are virtually inevitable.’ ” Pfister, 167 Ill. 2d at 424 , quoting Oswald v. Township High School District No. 214, 84 Ill.

2008See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability §2, Comment j, at 27 (2000) (“What courts often call ‘primary assumption of risk’ is actually a doctrine about the defendant’s liability or duty”); Barrett v. Fritz, 42 Ill. 2d 529, 535 (1969) (assumption of the risk concepts are generally duplicative of other doctrines, including scope of duty); Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 80-81 , 508 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1998); Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tenn. 1994); Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 437-39 , 502 N.E.2d 964, 967-68 , 510 N.Y.

2008See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 2, Comment j, at 27 (2000) ("What courts often call `primary assumption of risk' is actually a doctrine about the defendant's liability or duty"); Barrett v. Fritz, 42 Ill.2d 529, 535 , 248 N.E.2d 111 (1969) (assumption of the risk concepts are generally duplicative of other doctrines, including scope of duty); Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 80-81 , 508 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1998); Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tenn. 1994); Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 437-39 , 502 N.E.2d 964,

2008See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability §2, Comment j, at 27 (2000) (“What courts often call ‘primary assumption of risk’ is actually a doctrine about the defendant’s liability or duty”); Barrett v. Fritz, 42 Ill. 2d 529, 535 (1969) (assumption of the risk concepts are generally duplicative of other doctrines, including scope of duty); Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 80-81 , 508 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1998); Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tenn. 1994); Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 437-39 , 502 N.E.2d 964, 967-68 , 510 N.Y.

2008See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability §2, Comment j, at 27 (2000) (“What courts often call ‘primary assumption of risk’ is actually a doctrine about the defendant’s liability or duty”); Barrett v. Fritz, 42 Ill. 2d 529, 535 (1969) (assumption of the risk concepts are generally duplicative of other doctrines, including scope of duty); Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 80-81 , 508 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1998); Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tenn. 1994); Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 437-39 , 502 N.E.2d 964, 967-68 , 510 N.Y.

2008See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability §2, Comment j, at 27 (2000) (“What courts often call ‘primary assumption of risk’ is actually a doctrine about the defendant’s liability or duty”); Barrett v. Fritz, 42 Ill. 2d 529, 535 (1969) (assumption of the risk concepts are generally duplicative of other doctrines, including scope of duty); Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 80-81 , 508 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1998); Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tenn. 1994); Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 437-39 , 502 N.E.2d 964, 967-68 , 510 N.Y.

2008See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability §2, Comment j, at 27 (2000) (“What courts often call ‘primary assumption of risk’ is actually a doctrine about the defendant’s liability or duty”); Barrett v. Fritz, 42 Ill. 2d 529, 535 (1969) (assumption of the risk concepts are generally duplicative of other doctrines, including scope of duty); Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 80-81 , 508 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1998); Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tenn. 1994); Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 437-39 , 502 N.E.2d 964, 967-68 , 510 N.Y.

2006Wreglesworth, 316 Ill.

2006Wreglesworth, 316 Ill.

2006App. 3d 215, 221 (1997), quoting Thompson v. McNeill, 53 Ohio St. 3d 102, 106 , 559 N.E.2d 705, 709 (1990) (rejecting the Illinois formulation of a contact sports exception because “ £[t]he *** distinction does not sufficiently take into account that we are dealing with a spectrum of duties and risks rather than an either-or distinction’ ”).

2006App. 3d 215, 221 (1997), quoting Thompson v. McNeill, 53 Ohio St. 3d 102, 106 , 559 N.E.2d 705, 709 (1990) (rejecting the Illinois formulation of a contact sports exception because “ £[t]he *** distinction does not sufficiently take into account that we are dealing with a spectrum of duties and risks rather than an either-or distinction’ ”).

2006See Godee v. Illinois Youth Soccer Ass'n, 327 Ill.

2006See Godee v. Illinois Youth Soccer Ass’n, 327 Ill.

2006See Pfister, 167 Ill. 2d at 425 (“Participants in team sports *** assume greater risks of injury than nonparticipants’ ’); Savino v. Robertson, 273 Ill.

2006Savino, 273 Ill.

2008Dec. 165 , 629 N.E.2d 710 (1994) (whether a particular case is subject to the contact sports exception "is properly resolved by examining the objective factors surrounding the game itself, not on the subjective expectations of the parties"); see generally Knight, 3 Cal.4th at 315 , 834 P.2d at 708 , 11 Cal.Rptr.2d at 14 (a court need not ask what risks a particular plaintiff subjectively knew of and chose to encounter, but instead must evaluate the fundamental nature of the sport and the defendant's role in or relationship to that sport in order to determine whether the defendant owes a duty t

2006Football players owe one another a generally lower duty of care than do softball players. [3] Those below-cited Illinois contact sports cases that do discuss assumption of the risk apparently assume the existence of or overlook the requirement for a contractual or employment relationship, or rely on the assumption doctrine, just as we do, to describe the rationale of the contact sports exception. [4] That said, we note that the statement in Landrum is based on a passage from Keller in which the court concluded that the players' descriptions of the game "`reveal[ed] the adaptation of ordinary h

2006Zurla, the case upon which Sullivan-Coughlin relied, examined the contact sports exception before holding that "golf is not properly characterized as a 'contact sport' for purposes of the Nabozny rule." Zurla, 289 Ill.

2006Zurla, the case upon which Sullivan-Coughlin relied, examined the contact sports exception before holding that “golf is not properly characterized as a ‘contact sport’ for purposes of the Nabozny rule.” Zurla, 289 Ill.

2011See Karas, 227 Ill.2d at 459 , 318 Ill.Dec. 567 , 884 N.E.2d at 134 (holding that participant liability for injuries in full-contact sports such as ice hockey or tackle football may be premised either on intentional injury or on conduct outside the ordinary activities associated with the sport); Pickel v. Springfield Stallions, Inc., 398 Ill.App.3d 1063, 1067-68 , 339 Ill.Dec. 402 , 926 N.E.2d 877, 882-83 (2010) (explaining that in other contact sports, participant liability may be premised on intentional misconduct or "conscious disregard" for another participant's safety).

2011See Karas, 227 Ill.2d at 459 , 318 Ill.Dec. 567 , 884 N.E.2d at 134 (holding that participant liability for injuries in full-contact sports such as ice hockey or tackle football may be premised either on intentional injury or on conduct outside the ordinary activities associated with the sport); Pickel v. Springfield Stallions, Inc., 398 Ill.App.3d 1063, 1067-68 , 339 Ill.Dec. 402 , 926 N.E.2d 877, 882-83 (2010) (explaining that in other contact sports, participant liability may be premised on intentional misconduct or "conscious disregard" for another participant's safety).