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16 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 2022–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2026By that time, the relevant proportionate penalties legal landscape was largely shaped by People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273 , People v. Buford, 2023 IL App (1st) 201176 , and Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186 , none of which would provide Savage—an adult subject to a discretionary sentence—with relief on a Miller-based proportionate penalties clause claim. ¶ 42 In Clark, after observing that it had not barred young adult defendants of 18 or 19 from “raising as-applied proportionate penalties clause challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development,” our 2025Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151 , ¶ 44 and Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48 ); see also People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 27 (repeating this narrow view and adding that the Miller-based proportionate penalties challenge in House, 2021 IL 125124 , ¶ 5 also involved an initial postconviction petition). | 4 | 4 |
People v. Hilliardgreen2 sentences2026Id. ¶¶ 42, 44. -5- No. 1-23-2431 ¶ 21 Finally, in People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186 , the supreme court reiterated its narrow view of Thompson and Harris, and it noted that the Miller-based proportionate penalties challenge in People v. House, 2021 IL 125124 , involved both a mandatory life sentence and an initial postconviction petition. 2026By that time, the relevant proportionate penalties legal landscape was largely shaped by People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273 , People v. Buford, 2023 IL App (1st) 201176 , and Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186 , none of which would provide Savage—an adult subject to a discretionary sentence—with relief on a Miller-based proportionate penalties clause claim. ¶ 42 In Clark, after observing that it had not barred young adult defendants of 18 or 19 from “raising as-applied proportionate penalties clause challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development,” our | 3 | 5 |
People v. Housegreen2 sentences2026Id. ¶¶ 42, 44. -5- No. 1-23-2431 ¶ 21 Finally, in People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186 , the supreme court reiterated its narrow view of Thompson and Harris, and it noted that the Miller-based proportionate penalties challenge in People v. House, 2021 IL 125124 , involved both a mandatory life sentence and an initial postconviction petition. 2025Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151 , ¶ 44 and Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48 ); see also People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 27 (repeating this narrow view and adding that the Miller-based proportionate penalties challenge in House, 2021 IL 125124 , ¶ 5 also involved an initial postconviction petition). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Mooregreen2 sentences2026See Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42 (defendant “had the essential legal tools to raise his present proposed claim under the proportionate-penalties clause when he filed his previous postconviction petitions” (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶ 75 In summary, I find no reason to depart from the consistent rulings of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Districts, which have concluded that young-adult offenders like Conwell cannot demonstrate cause for a Miller-based proportionate penalties claim through a successive postconviction petition, irrespective of whether their sentence is discretionary or mand 2023Id. ¶ 50; see also People v. Moore, 2020 IL App (4th) 190528, ¶ 40 , 170 N.E.3d 204 , aff’d, 2023 IL 126461 (affirming the trial court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition because the “[d]efendant’s flat assertion that a 19-year-old’s brain is more like a 17-year-old adolescent’s in terms of development [was] simply insufficient to survive the more exacting standard that would warrant the filing of a successive postconviction petition”). ¶ 83 Like the petition in Thomas, defendant’s petition failed to allege any particularized facts that would demonstrate Miller shoul | 2 | 2 |
People v. Kulpingreen2 sentences2026The court therefore concluded that, based on the supreme court’s decisions in Clark, Hilliard, and People v. Williams, 2024 IL 127304 , the defendant’s Miller-based proportionate penalties clause claim “is without merit, as Miller is not applicable to his discretionary sentence.” Kulpin, 2025 IL App (2d) 240065, ¶ 21 . 2025As such, our holding today is that, to the extent defendant is now seeking to raise a proportionate penalties challenge based only on Miller, the claim is without merit as a matter of law. ¶ 23 Moreover, even if defendant could raise a Miller-based proportionate penalties challenge to his discretionary life sentence and he was able to connect the evolving neuroscience underlying - 11 - 2025 IL App (2d) 240065 Miller to his particular circumstances, our decision would be the same. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Aikensgreen1 sentence2024See supra ¶ 33 (distinguishing Huff); Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 27 (noting as-applied constitutional claims cannot be raised without a sufficiently developed evidentiary record); see, e.g., People v. Aikens, 2016 IL App (1st) 133578, ¶¶ 37-38 (finding the as-applied mandatory sentencing scheme, which included a 20-year mandatory firearm enhancement and resulted in a 40-year sentence, violated the proportionate penalties clause, where the defendant committed attempted murder at age 17 but without any criminal history and great potential for rehabilitation). 23 Nos. 1-22-0807 & 1-22-1122 (cons | 1 | 1 |
People v. Herringgreen1 sentence2023The court noted that “[p]ointing to a few basic facts the trial court already knew when it imposed sentence is insufficient.” Id. ¶ 52. ¶ 81 Thomas can be contrasted with another First District decision, People v. Herring, 2022 IL App (1st) 210355, ¶¶ 2, 48 , in which the appellate court advanced the 19-year-old defendant’s postconviction petition alleging a Miller-based proportionate penalties claim to the second stage because he alleged that “he was functionally a juvenile at the time of the offense.” Specifically, the defendant alleged that he (1) “suffered from impulse control disorders ** | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mooregreen1 sentence2023Id. ¶ 50; see also People v. Moore, 2020 IL App (4th) 190528, ¶ 40 , 170 N.E.3d 204 , aff’d, 2023 IL 126461 (affirming the trial court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition because the “[d]efendant’s flat assertion that a 19-year-old’s brain is more like a 17-year-old adolescent’s in terms of development [was] simply insufficient to survive the more exacting standard that would warrant the filing of a successive postconviction petition”). ¶ 83 Like the petition in Thomas, defendant’s petition failed to allege any particularized facts that would demonstrate Miller shoul | 1 | 1 |
People v. Turnergreen2 sentences2022In support of his argument that postconviction counsel should have asserted a Miller-based proportionate-penalties claim in the amended petition, defendant cites -7- 2022 IL App (2d) 210753 People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932 . 2022As for defendant’s argument that his sentence did not reflect his rehabilitative potential, Gunn construed and rejected this argument as a “garden-variety” claim of sentencing error (People v. LaPointe, 2018 IL App (2d) -9- 2022 IL App (2d) 210753 160903, ¶ 62)—not as a constitutional argument, much less a Miller-based argument, For these reasons, Gunn provides no support for a Miller-based proportionate-penalties challenge to defendant’s sentence here. ¶ 22 In Parker, the defendant, who was 16 years old when arrested for murder, was permitted to challenge his guilty plea on the grounds that t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Harris
green
2 sentences2025Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151 , ¶ 44 and Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48 ); see also People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 27 (repeating this narrow view and adding that the Miller-based proportionate penalties challenge in House, 2021 IL 125124 , ¶ 5 also involved an initial postconviction petition). 2025Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151 , ¶ 44 and Harris, 2018 IL 121932 , ¶ 48); see also People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 27 (repeating this narrow view and adding that the Miller-based proportionate penalties challenge in House, 2021 IL 125124 , ¶ 5 also involved both a mandatory life sentence and an initial postconviction petition.) ¶ 65 As such, the petitioner here cannot establish cause for failing to challenge the 12 Because the petitioner was sentenced in 1997 “before the truth-in-sentencing statute was validly enacted” he is eligible for day-for-day good con | 4 | 2022–2025 |
People v. Dorsey
green
2 sentences2025This court has also explained that, under the proportionate penalties clause, young adults may make “as-applied challenges to their life sentences using the proportionate penalties clause and the principles contained within Miller.” Horshaw, 2024 IL App (1st) 182047-B, ¶ 50 . ¶ 54 However, our supreme court has “opened the door only wide enough to accommodate claims involving mandatory life sentences that were raised in initial postconviction petitions.” Id. ¶ 62 ; People v. Davis, 2025 IL App (1st) 231499-U, ¶¶ 19, 24 (“Although the court opened the door for young adult offenders to assert a 2025(Emphasis in original.) Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 50 . | 3 | 2024–2025 |
People v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2025Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151 , ¶ 44 and Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48 ); see also People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 27 (repeating this narrow view and adding that the Miller-based proportionate penalties challenge in House, 2021 IL 125124 , ¶ 5 also involved an initial postconviction petition). 2025Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151 , ¶ 44 and Harris, 2018 IL 121932 , ¶ 48); see also People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 27 (repeating this narrow view and adding that the Miller-based proportionate penalties challenge in House, 2021 IL 125124 , ¶ 5 also involved both a mandatory life sentence and an initial postconviction petition.) ¶ 65 As such, the petitioner here cannot establish cause for failing to challenge the 12 Because the petitioner was sentenced in 1997 “before the truth-in-sentencing statute was validly enacted” he is eligible for day-for-day good con | 2 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Parker
green
2 sentences2024Parker, 2019 IL App (5th) 150192, ¶¶ 16-18 . 2022Parker, 2019 IL App (5th) 150192, ¶¶ 16-18 . | 2 | 2022–2024 |
People v. Buford
green
2 sentences2026By that time, the relevant proportionate penalties legal landscape was largely shaped by People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273 , People v. Buford, 2023 IL App (1st) 201176 , and Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186 , none of which would provide Savage—an adult subject to a discretionary sentence—with relief on a Miller-based proportionate penalties clause claim. ¶ 42 In Clark, after observing that it had not barred young adult defendants of 18 or 19 from “raising as-applied proportionate penalties clause challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development,” our 2026Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶¶ 87, 88 . - 12 - No. 1-24-0760 ¶ 43 This court similarly recognized in Buford that nearly all of the cases that the defendant cited in support of his Miller-based claim that “his de facto life sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause because his brain was akin to that of a juvenile when he committed the offenses at age 22,” were “advanced by defendants who were 18 or 19 years old at the time they committed the offenses, rather than 22 years old.” Buford, 2023 IL App (1st) 201176, ¶ 45 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Vega
green
1 sentence2026See also People v. Hartsfield, 2025 IL App (1st) 232389-U, ¶ 44 ; People v. Merriweather, 2023 IL App (1st) 220440-U, ¶ 21 ; People v. Carter, 2023 IL App (1st) 220491-U, ¶ 21 ; People v. Chavez, 2025 IL App (1st) 231823-U, ¶ 16 ; Leach, 2024 IL App (4th) 230298, ¶ 86 ; People v. Vega, 2023 IL App (1st) 200663 -UB, ¶¶ 14, 54 (all holding that Dorsey, Clark, and Moore preclude young adults like Conwell from using Miller- 22 No. 1-24-0714 based claims as cause for successive postconviction petitions on proportionate penalties grounds, regardless of whether the sentence is mandatory or discretion | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Minniefield
green
1 sentence2026See also People v. Hartsfield, 2025 IL App (1st) 232389-U, ¶ 44 ; People v. Merriweather, 2023 IL App (1st) 220440-U, ¶ 21 ; People v. Carter, 2023 IL App (1st) 220491-U, ¶ 21 ; People v. Chavez, 2025 IL App (1st) 231823-U, ¶ 16 ; Leach, 2024 IL App (4th) 230298, ¶ 86 ; People v. Vega, 2023 IL App (1st) 200663 -UB, ¶¶ 14, 54 (all holding that Dorsey, Clark, and Moore preclude young adults like Conwell from using Miller- 22 No. 1-24-0714 based claims as cause for successive postconviction petitions on proportionate penalties grounds, regardless of whether the sentence is mandatory or discretion | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2026The court therefore concluded that, based on the supreme court’s decisions in Clark, Hilliard, and People v. Williams, 2024 IL 127304 , the defendant’s Miller-based proportionate penalties clause claim “is without merit, as Miller is not applicable to his discretionary sentence.” Kulpin, 2025 IL App (2d) 240065, ¶ 21 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Leach
green
1 sentence2026See also People v. Hartsfield, 2025 IL App (1st) 232389-U, ¶ 44 ; People v. Merriweather, 2023 IL App (1st) 220440-U, ¶ 21 ; People v. Carter, 2023 IL App (1st) 220491-U, ¶ 21 ; People v. Chavez, 2025 IL App (1st) 231823-U, ¶ 16 ; Leach, 2024 IL App (4th) 230298, ¶ 86 ; People v. Vega, 2023 IL App (1st) 200663 -UB, ¶¶ 14, 54 (all holding that Dorsey, Clark, and Moore preclude young adults like Conwell from using Miller- 22 No. 1-24-0714 based claims as cause for successive postconviction petitions on proportionate penalties grounds, regardless of whether the sentence is mandatory or discretion | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Blalock
green
1 sentence2025As such, the petitioner here cannot establish cause for failing to challenge the constitutionality of his sentence in his original postconviction petition because “a proportionate penalties claim was always available to him in some form.” Horshaw, 2024 IL App (1st) 182047-B, ¶ 62 (citing Moore, 2023 IL 12646, ¶¶ 40-42). ¶ 50 The petitioner’s reliance on People v. Blalock, 2022 IL 126682 does not lead us to a different result. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Savage
green
1 sentence2025In People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135 , this court held that a 22-year-old petitioner pleaded a Miller-based proportionate penalties claim and remanded for second-stage proceedings. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Cortez
green
1 sentence2025To establish a proportionate penalties challenge to a life sentence, based on Miller principles, the defendant must show: “(1) at the time of the commission of the underlying offense, his or her own specific characteristics—those related to youth, level of maturity, and brain development—placed him or her in the same category as juvenile offenders described in Miller and (2) his or her sentencing was not Miller compliant, in that a life sentence was imposed without regard for the offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics.” People v. Cortez, 2021 IL App (4th) 190158, ¶ 47 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Coty
green
1 sentence2023In Coty, we rejected the defendant’s Miller-based proportionate penalties clause challenge of a 46-year-old intellectually disabled adult, acknowledging that the intellectual disabilities made him less culpable but that the permanency of his disabilities also made him “less likely to be rehabilitated and thus more likely to reoffend.” Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶¶ 40-42 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Humphrey
green
1 sentence2022Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.