16 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bruno v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.green1 sentence2019See Bruno v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 850 N.E.2d 940 , 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). [43] We reject James's claim that because Cindy did not raise the issue of *577 trial attorney fees in the proceeding below, she is not entitled to trial attorney fees, contending that the issue is res judicata. | 1 | 1 |
Canaan v. Stategreen1 sentence2016In Canaan v. State, 541 N.E.2d 894, 902 (Ind. 1989), the Indiana Supreme Court considered whether it violated the prohibitions against double jeopardy for the State to seek both the death penalty and a habitual offender enhancement. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mills v. Habluetzel
green
2 sentences1987James argues under the intermediate standard of review as set out in Pickett v. Brown (1983), 462 U.S. 1 , 103 S.Ct. 2199 , 76 L.Ed.2d 372 ; and Mills v. Habluetzel (1982), 456 U.S. 91 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 . 1987James argues under the intermediate standard of review as set out in Pickett v. Brown (1983), 462 U.S. 1 , 103 S.Ct. 2199 , 76 L.Ed.2d 372 ; and Mills v. Habluetzel (1982), 456 U.S. 91 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 . | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Pickett v. Brown
green
2 sentences1987James argues under the intermediate standard of review as set out in Pickett v. Brown (1983), 462 U.S. 1 , 103 S.Ct. 2199 , 76 L.Ed.2d 372 ; and Mills v. Habluetzel (1982), 456 U.S. 91 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 . 1987James argues under the intermediate standard of review as set out in Pickett v. Brown (1983), 462 U.S. 1 , 103 S.Ct. 2199 , 76 L.Ed.2d 372 ; and Mills v. Habluetzel (1982), 456 U.S. 91 , 102 S.Ct. 1549 , 71 L.Ed.2d 770 . | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Bishop v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF SOUTH BEND
green
1 sentence2024Id. [15] Although his arguments are difficult to discern, it appears that James’s claim is essentially that, although the trial court did not err in conducting the March 19, 2024, hearing without a jury and determining the immediate possession issue, the trial court violated his constitutional right to a jury trial when it issued an order that resolved “issues which were triable by jury, the existence of the agreement and the right to [final] possession of the Homestead.” Appellant’s Brief at 7. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Robinson v. State
green
1 sentence2020The gist of James’ claim is whether Marshall’s identification some five months after the murders qualifies as an identification made “shortly after perceiving” James. [30] In Robinson v. State, 682 N.E.2d 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), this Court held that an identification within two and a half months after shootings satisfied the purpose and requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(C). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Steven M. Sandleben v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2020Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Fairrow v. Fairrow
green
1 sentence2016Natasha objected to the interrogatory based on medical privilege and Fairrow v. Fairrow, 559 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. 1990). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
James v. State
green
1 sentence2016Id. [5] On November 30, 2015, James filed a pro se motion requesting the trial court to correct his allegedly erroneous sentence.1 Later that same day, the trial court denied James’s motion. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Corr v. American Family Insurance
green
1 sentence2012Id. at 537 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Spradlin v. State
green
1 sentence2011James’s claim that the jury should have been instructed on specific intent is based on our supreme court’s decision in Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948 (Ind.1991). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
James v. State
green
1 sentence2008Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Diesel Const. Co., Inc. v. Cotten
green
2 sentences2003We held in Diesel Constr. that if the plaintiff's claims concerned "only a question of debt, the nexus to the land would be too remote to meet TR. 75(A)(2)." Id. 2003We held in Diesel Constr. that if the plaintiff's claims concerned "only a question of debt, the nexus to the land would be too remote to meet T.R. 75(A)(2)." Id. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.
green
1 sentence1992See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Trial Rule 11; Ind.Code 34-1-32-1 (1988)(b); Mareno v. Rowe (2nd Cir.1990), 910 F.2d 1043 ; Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. (9th Cir.1988), 860 F.2d 877 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Antonio Mareno, Jr. v. Thomas Rowe and Jet Aviation of America, Inc.
green
1 sentence1992See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Trial Rule 11; Ind.Code 34-1-32-1 (1988)(b); Mareno v. Rowe (2nd Cir.1990), 910 F.2d 1043 ; Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. (9th Cir.1988), 860 F.2d 877 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
James v. State
neutral
1 sentence1991The James court-in rejecting a similar argument advanced by the State that the law in this area should be relaxed-held: We construe the observation that Peckinpaugh [ 447 N.E.2d 576 ] was 'a close case', and the court's admonition that the State should use caution when utilizing such evidence, to mean that the Potter-son rule was extended to its limit in Peckinpaugh. 481 N.E.2d at 423 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Peckinpaugh v. State
green
1 sentence1991The James court-in rejecting a similar argument advanced by the State that the law in this area should be relaxed-held: We construe the observation that Peckinpaugh [ 447 N.E.2d 576 ] was 'a close case', and the court's admonition that the State should use caution when utilizing such evidence, to mean that the Potter-son rule was extended to its limit in Peckinpaugh. 481 N.E.2d at 423 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Murphy v. Murphy
green
2 sentences1989Therefore, in fulfilling its goal of disposing all marital property in one final settlement, the trial court did not err in concluding that James's claim was not marital property." Id. 510 N.E.2d at 237 . 1989Therefore, in fulfilling its goal of disposing all marital property in one final settlement, the trial court did not err in concluding that James's claim was not marital property." Id. 510 N.E.2d at 237 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
GROSSMAN v. State
neutral
2 sentences1982Clouse contends that upon remand a new trial must be granted as to the whole case and cites us to Grossman v. State, (1961) 241 Ind. 369 , 172 N.E.2d 576 . 1982Clouse contends that upon remand a new trial must be granted as to the whole case and cites us to Grossman v. State, (1961) 241 Ind. 369 , 172 N.E.2d 576 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Cornell v. Cornell
neutral
2 sentences1976In support of her argument, Barbara has asserted that the case of Cornell v. Cornell (1974), 160 Ind. App. 150 , 310 N.E.2d 579 should control. 1976In support of her argument, Barbara has asserted that the case of Cornell v. Cornell (1974), 160 Ind. App. 150 , 310 N.E.2d 579 should control. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.