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16 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bowers v. Stategreen2 sentences2024“A statute is not vague under the fair notice principle if the meaning ‘of the words in controversy can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises or even the words themselves, if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.’” Id. (quoting Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 125 (1978)); see also Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 72 436, 461 (1990) (“[W]e . . . apply normal meanings to words of common understanding[.]”). 2024“A statute is not vague under the fair notice principle if the meaning ‘of the words in controversy can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises or even the words themselves, if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.’” Id. (quoting Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 125 (1978)); see also Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 72 436, 461 (1990) (“[W]e . . . apply normal meanings to words of common understanding[.]”). | 6 | 13 |
Eanes v. Stategreen2 sentences2009A statute is not vague under the fair notice principle if the meaning “of the words in controversy can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises or even the words themselves, if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.” Bowers, 283 Md. at 125 , 389 A.2d at 348 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see Eanes, 318 Md. at 460 , 569 A.2d at 615-16 . 2009A statute is not vague under the fair notice principle if the meaning “of the words in controversy can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises or even the words themselves, if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.” Bowers, 283 Md. at 125 , 389 A.2d at 348 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see Eanes, 318 Md. at 460 , 569 A.2d at 615-16 . | 4 | 6 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2009The first rationale is the fair notice principle that “persons of ordinary intelligence and experience be afforded a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that they may govern their behavior accordingly.” Williams, 329 Md. at 8 , 616 A.2d at 1278 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bowers, 283 Md. at 121 , 389 A.2d 341 ); see Ferro v. Lewis, 348 Md. 593, 607 , 705 A.2d 311, 318 (1998). 2009The first rationale is the fair notice principle that “persons of ordinary intelligence and experience be afforded a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that they may govern their behavior accordingly.” Williams, 329 Md. at 8 , 616 A.2d at 1278 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bowers, 283 Md. at 121 , 389 A.2d 341 ); see Ferro v. Lewis, 348 Md. 593, 607 , 705 A.2d 311, 318 (1998). | 3 | 4 |
Ferro v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2009The first rationale is the fair notice principle that “persons of ordinary intelligence and experience be afforded a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that they may govern their behavior accordingly.” Williams, 329 Md. at 8 , 616 A.2d at 1278 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bowers, 283 Md. at 121 , 389 A.2d 341 ); see Ferro v. Lewis, 348 Md. 593, 607 , 705 A.2d 311, 318 (1998). 2009The first rationale is the fair notice principle that “persons of ordinary intelligence and experience be afforded a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that they may govern their behavior accordingly.” Williams, 329 Md. at 8 , 616 A.2d at 1278 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bowers, 283 Md. at 121 , 389 A.2d 341 ); see Ferro v. Lewis, 348 Md. 593, 607 , 705 A.2d 311, 318 (1998). | 3 | 3 |
Grayned v. City of Rockfordgreen2 sentences2000Additionally, we must find a statute void for vagueness when "it lacks fixed enforcement standards or guidelines and thus `impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution.'" Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 459 , 569 A.2d 604 (quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 , 110 S.Ct. 3218 , 110 L.Ed.2d 665 (1990). 2000Additionally, we must find a statute void for vagueness when "it lacks fixed enforcement standards or guidelines and thus `impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution.'" Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 459 , 569 A.2d 604 (quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 , 110 S.Ct. 3218 , 110 L.Ed.2d 665 (1990). | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Galloway v. State
green
2 sentences2024“A statute is not vague under the fair notice principle if the meaning ‘of the words in controversy can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises or even the words themselves, if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.’” Id. (quoting Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 125 (1978)); see also Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 72 436, 461 (1990) (“[W]e . . . apply normal meanings to words of common understanding[.]”). 2024“A statute is not vague under the fair notice principle if the meaning ‘of the words in controversy can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises or even the words themselves, if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.’” Id. (quoting Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 125 (1978)); see also Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 72 436, 461 (1990) (“[W]e . . . apply normal meanings to words of common understanding[.]”). | 6 | 2005–2024 |
Broadrick v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences2009The standard for determining whether a statute provides fair notice is *482 “whether persons ‘of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the statute’s] meaning.’ ” Williams, 329 Md. at 8 , 616 A.2d at 1278 (alteration in original) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 , 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2913 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). 2009The standard for determining whether a statute provides fair notice is *482 “whether persons ‘of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the statute’s] meaning.’ ” Williams, 329 Md. at 8 , 616 A.2d at 1278 (alteration in original) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 , 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2913 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). | 4 | 2001–2009 |
Michigan v. Grzegorczyk
green
2 sentences2000Additionally, we must find a statute void for vagueness when “it lacks fixed enforcement standards or guidelines and thus ‘impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution.’ ” Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 459 , 569 A.2d 604 (quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 , 110 S.Ct. 3218 , 110 L.Ed.2d 665 (1990). 2000Additionally, we must find a statute void for vagueness when "it lacks fixed enforcement standards or guidelines and thus `impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution.'" Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 459 , 569 A.2d 604 (quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 , 110 S.Ct. 3218 , 110 L.Ed.2d 665 (1990). | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Sapia v. Charter Marketing Co.
green
2 sentences2000Additionally, we must find a statute void for vagueness when “it lacks fixed enforcement standards or guidelines and thus ‘impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution.’ ” Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 459 , 569 A.2d 604 (quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 , 110 S.Ct. 3218 , 110 L.Ed.2d 665 (1990). 2000Additionally, we must find a statute void for vagueness when "it lacks fixed enforcement standards or guidelines and thus `impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution.'" Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 459 , 569 A.2d 604 (quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 , 110 S.Ct. 3218 , 110 L.Ed.2d 665 (1990). | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Tapp v. Frank
green
2 sentences2000Additionally, we must find a statute void for vagueness when “it lacks fixed enforcement standards or guidelines and thus ‘impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution.’ ” Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 459 , 569 A.2d 604 (quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 , 110 S.Ct. 3218 , 110 L.Ed.2d 665 (1990). 2000Additionally, we must find a statute void for vagueness when "it lacks fixed enforcement standards or guidelines and thus `impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges and juries for resolution.'" Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 459 , 569 A.2d 604 (quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 , 110 S.Ct. 3218 , 110 L.Ed.2d 665 (1990). | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore
green
2 sentences2005Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, 387 Md. 1, 11-12 , 874 A.2d 439 (2005). 2005Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, 387 Md. 1, 11-12 , 874 A.2d 439 (2005). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Connally v. General Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1990In Bowers , we described this “as the fair notice principle [which] is grounded on the assumption that one should be free to choose between lawful and unlawful conduct.” Id. at 121 , 389 A.2d at 345 . 1990In Bowers , we described this "as the fair notice principle [which] is grounded on the assumption that one should be free to choose between lawful and unlawful conduct." Id. at 121 , 389 A.2d at 345 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.