pretrial suppression hearing in Minnesota

2009In State v. Grey, 256 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn.1977), we found that a defendant’s absence from a pretrial suppression hearing was harmful error because “it [was] impossible on this record to determine what contribution or assistance to counsel defendant could have rendered had he been present to hear the oral testimony of [the testifying officer].” Not only are the facts in this case similar to Grey , Holt was a pro se defendant, and the denial of his right to be present facilitated the violation of his right to self-representation.

2009In State v. Grey, 256 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn. 1977), we found that a defendant's absence from a pretrial suppression hearing was harmful error because "it [was] impossible on this record to determine what contribution or assistance to counsel defendant could have rendered had he been present to hear the oral testimony of [the testifying officer]." Not only are the facts in this case similar to Grey , Holt was a pro se defendant, and the denial of his right to be present facilitated the violation of his right to self-representation.

1986At a pretrial suppression hearing, the trial court acts as a fact finder, “deciding for purposes of admissibility which evidence to believe and whether the state has met its burden of proof.” State v. LaFrance, 302 Minn. 245, 246 , 223 N.W.2d 813, 814 (1974) (quoted in Kvam, 336 N.W.2d at 528 ).

1986At a pretrial suppression hearing, the trial court acts as a fact finder, “deciding for purposes of admissibility which evidence to believe and whether the state has met its burden of proof.” State v. LaFrance, 302 Minn. 245, 246 , 223 N.W.2d 813, 814 (1974) (quoted in Kvam, 336 N.W.2d at 528 ).

2015Cf. State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn. 1983) (stating that, when reviewing a pretrial suppression hearing, a remand for findings is not necessary when there is “no conflict in the evidence and the trial court’s conclusions were consistent with the evidence”).

1986At a pretrial suppression hearing, the trial court acts as a fact finder, “deciding for purposes of admissibility which evidence to believe and whether the state has met its burden of proof.” State v. LaFrance, 302 Minn. 245, 246 , 223 N.W.2d 813, 814 (1974) (quoted in Kvam, 336 N.W.2d at 528 ).

2016See id. at 47, 104 S.Ct. 2210 .

2012The purpose of the public trial guarantee is “ ‘for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions.’ ” Waller, 467 U.S. at 47-48 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 ,- 99 S.Ct -. 2898, 61 L.Ed. 2d 608 (1979)) (holding that the total closure of a courtroom from all spectators or press during a pretrial suppression hearing violated the Sixth Amendment’

2015“At a pretrial suppression hearing[,] the [district] court acts as finder of facts, deciding for purposes of admissibility which evidence to believe and whether the state has met its burden of proof.” Schultz, 271 N.W.2d at 837 (quotation omitted).

1999Cf. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739-40 , 107 S.Ct. 2658 , 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987) (distinguishing competency hearing as a “pretrial proceeding” and therefore not a stage of trial is not helpful as it does not take into account the hearing’s direct impact on the trial); State v. Grey, 256 N.W.2d 74, 76-77 (Minn.1977) (a pretrial suppression hearing is a stage of trial); State v. Staveneau, 158 Minn. 329, 330-31 , 197 N.W. 667, 668 (1924) (judge’s answer to jury questions after jury entered deliberations requires defendant’s presence).

1999Cf. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739-40 , 107 S.Ct. 2658 , 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987) (distinguishing competency hearing as a “pretrial proceeding” and therefore not a stage of trial is not helpful as it does not take into account the hearing’s direct impact on the trial); State v. Grey, 256 N.W.2d 74, 76-77 (Minn.1977) (a pretrial suppression hearing is a stage of trial); State v. Staveneau, 158 Minn. 329, 330-31 , 197 N.W. 667, 668 (1924) (judge’s answer to jury questions after jury entered deliberations requires defendant’s presence).

1991As we made clear in State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Minn.1987), whether or not to suppress evidence because police obtained the evidence in violation of a statute or rule is "quintessentially a judicial issue." In a number of cases, we have already made clear our judicial intent that a violation of a procedure such as that set forth in Fed.

1991As we made clear in State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Minn.1987), whether or not to suppress evidence because police obtained the evidence in violation of a statute or rule is “quintessentially a judicial issue.” In a number of cases, we have already made clear our judicial intent that a violation of a procedure such as that set forth in Fed.

1977Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 554 , 141 N.W.2d 3, 13 (1965), where we outlined constitutionally required pretrial procedures: “If the defendant elects to contest the admissibility of the evidence under Federal constitutional grounds, a pretrial fact hearing on the admissibility of the evidence will be held in open court with the defendant present and represented or advised by counsel.” (Italics supplied.) In adherence to these fundamental precepts, we hold that defendant’s absence from the pretrial suppression hearing was a violation of the due process and confrontation clauses found in

1977Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 554 , 141 N.W.2d 3, 13 (1965), where we outlined constitutionally required pretrial procedures: “If the defendant elects to contest the admissibility of the evidence under Federal constitutional grounds, a pretrial fact hearing on the admissibility of the evidence will be held in open court with the defendant present and represented or advised by counsel.” (Italics supplied.) In adherence to these fundamental precepts, we hold that defendant’s absence from the pretrial suppression hearing was a violation of the due process and confrontation clauses found in