pretrial suppression hearing in Massachusetts

2018See Commonwealth v. Madigan , 449 Mass. 702 , 706 n.8, 871 N.E.2d 478 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Snyder , 413 Mass. 521 , 532, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (1992) ("[n]ondisclosure of a source of information that bears on a preliminary question, such as the suppression of evidence, 'is more readily tolerated than the nondisclosure at trial of a source of evidence, where guilt or innocence is directly involved' "); Snyder , supra (mere possibility that disclosure of informant identity might be helpful on preliminary question, such as suppression of evidence, not sufficient to require disclosure); Amral

2018See Commonwealth v. Madigan , 449 Mass. 702 , 706 n.8, 871 N.E.2d 478 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Snyder , 413 Mass. 521 , 532, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (1992) ("[n]ondisclosure of a source of information that bears on a preliminary question, such as the suppression of evidence, 'is more readily tolerated than the nondisclosure at trial of a source of evidence, where guilt or innocence is directly involved' "); Snyder , supra (mere possibility that disclosure of informant identity might be helpful on preliminary question, such as suppression of evidence, not sufficient to require disclosure); Amral

2018Again, in making the determination that the Commonwealth's privilege should give way, the judge failed to distinguish between "the need for disclosure at a pretrial suppression hearing and at the trial proper." Lugo , 406 Mass. at 570 -571 , 548 N.E.2d 1263 ("nondisclosure is rather readily countenanced at pre-trial hearings, but not so at the trial itself").

2018Again, in making the determination that the Commonwealth's privilege should give way, the judge failed to distinguish between "the need for disclosure at a pretrial suppression hearing and at the trial proper." Lugo , 406 Mass. at 570 -571 , 548 N.E.2d 1263 ("nondisclosure is rather readily countenanced at pre-trial hearings, but not so at the trial itself").

2015In Waller, supra, the United States Supreme Court determined that the public trial right attaches to a pretrial suppression hearing.

2015The outcome of a rape shield hearing, then, like that of a pretrial suppression hearing, “frequently depends on a resolution of factual matters.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 47 .

2002(See part 3, infra.) Both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Judicial Court have “distinguished between the need for disclosure at a pretrial suppression hearing and at the trial proper,” Commonwealth v. Lugo, 406 Mass. 565, 570 (1990), citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957), and, in so doing, “have maintained the distinction between a demand for disclosure at a pretrial hearing, where the issue is probable cause for arrest or a search, and a demand for disclosure at trial, where the issue is the defendant’s ultimate guilt or innocence.” Commonwealth v. Lugo, s

1990Id. at 61-62 .

1988In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of a defendant’s fair trial right when considering a claim of access to a pretrial suppression hearing.

1988In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of a defendant's fair trial right when considering a claim of access to a pretrial suppression hearing.

2018See Commonwealth v. Madigan , 449 Mass. 702 , 706 n.8, 871 N.E.2d 478 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Snyder , 413 Mass. 521 , 532, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (1992) ("[n]ondisclosure of a source of information that bears on a preliminary question, such as the suppression of evidence, 'is more readily tolerated than the nondisclosure at trial of a source of evidence, where guilt or innocence is directly involved' "); Snyder , supra (mere possibility that disclosure of informant identity might be helpful on preliminary question, such as suppression of evidence, not sufficient to require disclosure); Amral

2018See Commonwealth v. Madigan , 449 Mass. 702 , 706 n.8, 871 N.E.2d 478 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Snyder , 413 Mass. 521 , 532, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (1992) ("[n]ondisclosure of a source of information that bears on a preliminary question, such as the suppression of evidence, 'is more readily tolerated than the nondisclosure at trial of a source of evidence, where guilt or innocence is directly involved' "); Snyder , supra (mere possibility that disclosure of informant identity might be helpful on preliminary question, such as suppression of evidence, not sufficient to require disclosure); Amral

2015Citing a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v. Vazquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 37, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2008), the Commonwealth contends that the rape shield hearing is “more akin to ‘question-and-answer’ offer of proof hearings . . . than to potentially dispositive suppression hearings to which the public trial right applies.” In that decision, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit expressly “le[ft] open the possibility that the public-trial right may apply to some offer-of-proof hearings,” only “declin[ing] to recognize such a

2015Citing a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in United States v. Vazquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 37, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2008), the Commonwealth contends that the rape shield hearing is “more akin to ‘question-and-answer’ offer of proof hearings . . . than to potentially dispositive suppression hearings to which the public trial right applies.” In that decision, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit expressly “le[ft] open the possibility that the public-trial right may apply to some offer-of-proof hearings,” only “declin[ing] to recognize such a

2012An entrapment defense may be negated by evidence that, notwithstanding any acts of inducement by the government — including such inducement as may occur in an undercover investigation, such as this one — a defendant was “ready and willing to commit the crime.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 361 Mass. 644, 651 (1972) (citation omitted).

2008See Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007).

1992Commonwealth v. Sherick, 401 Mass. 302, 305 (1987).

1982Cf. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 851-852 (1980), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 894 (1980) (hereinafter Globe I).

1975See Commonwealth v. Flaherty, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 282, 287 (1973).

1975While a preference for such a judicial record of facts found in a pretrial suppression hearing has been expressed on numerous occasions (Commonwealth v. Cook, 351 Mass. 231, 234 [1966], cert. den. 385 U. S. 981 [1966]; Commonwealth v. Murphy, 362 Mass. at 544, 546-547; Commonwealth v. Forrester, 365 Mass. 37, 44-45 [1974]; Commonwealth v. Henley, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 564, 567 [1973]), the fact that all the evidence at the pre-trial suppression hearing, introduced through a single witness, was uncontradicted 9 permits us to review the judge’s ruling on the motion without the necessity of remanding

1975While a preference for such a judicial record of facts found in a pretrial suppression hearing has been expressed on numerous occasions (Commonwealth v. Cook, 351 Mass. 231, 234 [1966], cert. den. 385 U. S. 981 [1966]; Commonwealth v. Murphy, 362 Mass. at 544, 546-547; Commonwealth v. Forrester, 365 Mass. 37, 44-45 [1974]; Commonwealth v. Henley, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 564, 567 [1973]), the fact that all the evidence at the pre-trial suppression hearing, introduced through a single witness, was uncontradicted 9 permits us to review the judge’s ruling on the motion without the necessity of remanding

1975While a preference for such a judicial record of facts found in a pretrial suppression hearing has been expressed on numerous occasions (Commonwealth v. Cook, 351 Mass. 231, 234 [1966], cert. den. 385 U. S. 981 [1966]; Commonwealth v. Murphy, 362 Mass. at 544, 546-547; Commonwealth v. Forrester, 365 Mass. 37, 44-45 [1974]; Commonwealth v. Henley, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 564, 567 [1973]), the fact that all the evidence at the pre-trial suppression hearing, introduced through a single witness, was uncontradicted 9 permits us to review the judge’s ruling on the motion without the necessity of remanding