16 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaftgreen2 sentences2021A-5151-17 37 equivalence, not device safety," but that difference of focus "d[id] not render evidence of the 510(k) process irrelevant." The court noted that a jury deciding a design defect claim may consider whether a manufacturer "acted reasonably in choosing a particular product design," id. at 1047 (quoting Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994)), and it held that a defendant's compliance with the 510(k) process "may not render a manufacturer's design choice immune from liability, but it can be a 'piece of the evidentiary puzzle.'" Ibid. (quoting Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Ak 2021Ariz. 2018) ("Booker"), the district court found that the plaintiffs were correct "that the 510(k) process focuses on device equivalence, not device safety," but that difference of focus "d[id] not render evidence of the 510(k) process irrelevant." The court noted that a jury deciding a design defect claim may consider whether a manufacturer "acted reasonably in choosing a particular product design," id. at 1047 (quoting Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994)), and it held that a defendant's compliance with the 510(k) process "may not render a manufacturer's design choice immu | 3 | 3 |
Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc.green2 sentences2021A-5151-17 37 equivalence, not device safety," but that difference of focus "d[id] not render evidence of the 510(k) process irrelevant." The court noted that a jury deciding a design defect claim may consider whether a manufacturer "acted reasonably in choosing a particular product design," id. at 1047 (quoting Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994)), and it held that a defendant's compliance with the 510(k) process "may not render a manufacturer's design choice immune from liability, but it can be a 'piece of the evidentiary puzzle.'" Ibid. (quoting Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Ak 2021A-5151-17 37 equivalence, not device safety," but that difference of focus "d[id] not render evidence of the 510(k) process irrelevant." The court noted that a jury deciding a design defect claim may consider whether a manufacturer "acted reasonably in choosing a particular product design," id. at 1047 (quoting Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994)), and it held that a defendant's compliance with the 510(k) process "may not render a manufacturer's design choice immune from liability, but it can be a 'piece of the evidentiary puzzle.'" Ibid. (quoting Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Ak | 3 | 3 |
Amratlal C. Bhagat v. Bharat A. Bhagat (068312)green1 sentence2018Appellate courts "review[] an order granting summary judgment in accordance with the same standard as the motion judge." Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Coffman v. Keene Corp.green2 sentences1998O’Brien, supra, 94 N.J. at 179 , 463 A.2d 298 ; see also Coffman v. Keene Corp., 133 N.J. 581, 594 , 628 A.2d 710 (1993) (“Causation is a fundamental requisite for establishing any produet-liability action.”). 1998O’Brien, supra, 94 N.J. at 179 , 463 A.2d 298 ; see also Coffman v. Keene Corp., 133 N.J. 581, 594 , 628 A.2d 710 (1993) (“Causation is a fundamental requisite for establishing any produet-liability action.”). | 1 | 1 |
Parks v. Pep Boysgreen2 sentences1997See Parks v. Pep Boys, 282 N.J.Super. 1 , 659 A.2d 471 (App.Div.1995) (affirming in part and reversing in part, a summary judgment in favor of Pep Boys). 1997See Parks v. Pep Boys, 282 N.J.Super. 1 , 659 A.2d 471 (App.Div.1995) (affirming in part and reversing in part, a summary judgment in favor of Pep Boys). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
green
2 sentences2006In Dewey, supra, 121 N.J. at 94 , 577 A. 2d 1239 , our Supreme Court considered whether the PLA, which "provides a defense to manufacturers and sellers for harms caused by products whose dangerous propensities are known to the ordinary user, can retroactively insulate these defendants from liability for design defects inherent in their cigarettes." The Court explained that the defense in N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3a(2), regarding design defect, "combines the `consumer expectations' doctrine for determining whether a product is defective, with the obvious-danger factor of the risk-utility analysis [in Ca 2006In Dewey, supra, 121 N.J. at 94 , 577 A. 2d 1239 , our Supreme Court considered whether the PLA, which "provides a defense to manufacturers and sellers for harms caused by products whose dangerous propensities are known to the ordinary user, can retroactively insulate these defendants from liability for design defects inherent in their cigarettes." The Court explained that the defense in N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3a(2), regarding design defect, "combines the `consumer expectations' doctrine for determining whether a product is defective, with the obvious-danger factor of the risk-utility analysis [in Ca | 2 | 1995–2006 |
O'BRIEN v. Muskin Corp.
green
2 sentences1990The foregoing “hybrid” provision combines the “consumer expectations” doctrine for determining whether a product is defective, see O’Brien, supra, 94 N.J. at 182 , 463 A.2d 298 , with the obvious-danger factor of the risk-utility analysis, see Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 206-07 , 485 A.2d 305 (1984), to create a defense to a design-defect claim. 1990The foregoing “hybrid” provision combines the “consumer expectations” doctrine for determining whether a product is defective, see O’Brien, supra, 94 N.J. at 182 , 463 A.2d 298 , with the obvious-danger factor of the risk-utility analysis, see Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 206-07 , 485 A.2d 305 (1984), to create a defense to a design-defect claim. | 2 | 1990–1998 |
Amal Eghnayem v. Boston Scientific Corporation
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 1318-19 . 31 Conversely, the United States District Court of Arizona noted that a jury deciding a design defect claim under principles of negligence may consider whether a manufacturer “acted reasonably in choosing a particular product design.” In re Bard IVC Filters Prods. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Rocco v. NJ Transit Rail Operations
green
1 sentence2020Rocco, 330 N.J. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Eric Esher Schmid v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation Eric Schmid
green
1 sentence2010Id. at 80-81 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
McDermott v. TENDUN CONSTRUCTORS, ROHR INDUSTRIES, INC.
green
2 sentences1995The court recognized that this case was governed by the 1987 Products Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 et seq., and that the substantial changes to the access grates protected the manufacturer from a design defect claim under Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 167 , 484 A. 2d 1234 (1984), and McDermott v. TENDUN Constr., 211 N.J. 1995Super. 196, 210 , 511 A. 2d 690 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 43 , 526 A. 2d 134 (1986). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Brown v. United States Stove Co.
green
2 sentences1995The court recognized that this case was governed by the 1987 Products Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 et seq., and that the substantial changes to the access grates protected the manufacturer from a design defect claim under Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 167 , 484 A. 2d 1234 (1984), and McDermott v. TENDUN Constr., 211 N.J. 1995The court recognized that this case was governed by the 1987 Products Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 et seq., and that the substantial changes to the access grates protected the manufacturer from a design defect claim under Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 167 , 484 A. 2d 1234 (1984), and McDermott v. TENDUN Constr., 211 N.J. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
McDermott v. Tendun Constructors
green
2 sentences1995Super. 196, 210 , 511 A. 2d 690 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 43 , 526 A. 2d 134 (1986). 1995Super. 196, 210 , 511 A. 2d 690 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 43 , 526 A. 2d 134 (1986). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Masi v. RA Jones & Co.
green
1 sentence1991Super. 292, 297 , 394 A. 2d 888 (App.Div. 1978), this court determined that the failure to charge negligence in addition to strict liability for a design defect claim was not error. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Dewey v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
green
2 sentences1990Id. at 385 , 542 A.2d 919 . 1990Id. at 385 , 542 A.2d 919 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
red
2 sentences1990The foregoing “hybrid” provision combines the “consumer expectations” doctrine for determining whether a product is defective, see O’Brien, supra, 94 N.J. at 182 , 463 A.2d 298 , with the obvious-danger factor of the risk-utility analysis, see Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 206-07 , 485 A.2d 305 (1984), to create a defense to a design-defect claim. 1990The foregoing “hybrid” provision combines the “consumer expectations” doctrine for determining whether a product is defective, see O’Brien, supra, 94 N.J. at 182 , 463 A.2d 298 , with the obvious-danger factor of the risk-utility analysis, see Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 206-07 , 485 A.2d 305 (1984), to create a defense to a design-defect claim. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences1989Thus, in Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 305 Or. 256 , 751 P. 2d 215 (1988), the Oregon Supreme Court rejected a theory of market-share liability against two DPT manufacturers in the context of a design-defect claim on grounds that the "adoption of any theory of alternative liability requires a profound change in fundamental tort principles," which was perceived as more properly in the domain of the legislature. 1989Thus, in Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 305 Or. 256 , 751 P. 2d 215 (1988), the Oregon Supreme Court rejected a theory of market-share liability against two DPT manufacturers in the context of a design-defect claim on grounds that the "adoption of any theory of alternative liability requires a profound change in fundamental tort principles," which was perceived as more properly in the domain of the legislature. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.
green
1 sentence1984In our opinion Beshada, supra, would not demand a contrary conclusion in the typical design defect or warning case. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.