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25 California opinions name it 3 courts 1978–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Soule v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences2021CACI No. 1204; see also Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 561 .) Under either test, causation measured by the substantial factor test is a separate element of a design defect claim. 2021CACI No. 1204; see also Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 561 .) Under either test, causation measured by the substantial factor test is a separate element of a design defect claim. | 2 | 9 |
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.green2 sentences2013Soule holds that one of the factors a jury may consider in assessing a design defect claim is “the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design . . . .” (Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 562 .) Elsewhere, the California Supreme Court has recognized “past design defect decisions demonstrate that, as a practical matter, in many instances it is simply impossible to eliminate the balancing or weighing of competing considerations in determining whether a product is defectively designed or not.” (Barker, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 433 .) Heeding the guidance of the California Supreme Court’s holdin 1991By that time, plaintiff had indicated that he was proceeding, as to defective design, only on the "consumer expectation" prong of the design defect test set out in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 413, 426 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 , 573 P.2d 443 , 96 A.L.R.3d 1 ] (hereafter Barker ). | 2 | 4 |
Demara v. Raymond Corp.green2 sentences2026(Demara v. The Raymond Corp. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 545, 558 ; see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853 , 854–855 & fn. 23 [defendant does not meet burden on summary judgment simply by pointing out “‘absence of evidence to support’ an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action”].) On appeal, the S&S defendants do not dispute that the consumer expectation test is applicable or that they failed to meet their initial burden of negating the existence of a design defect under the test.6 The Katereloses sufficiently presented the 6 On appeal, the S&S defendants argue only that 2021(Demara, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 554 [“Under both the consumer expectation test and the risk-benefit test, in proving a cause of action for design defect, the plaintiff must establish that the product’s failure to perform safely was a substantial factor in causing the harm to the plaintiff”]; CACI Nos. 1203, 1204.)7 In holding Nissan liable under both strict liability design defect tests, the trial made a separate finding under both tests that “the design defect was a substantial factor in causing the subject Nissan 2000 Xterra to accelerate suddenly.” Taking Nissan at its word that its ch | 1 | 2 |
Morson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2017It sought to examine the precise behavior of several obscure components of her car under the complex circumstances of a particular accident." ( Soule , supra , 8 Cal.4th at p. 570 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 882 P.2d 298 .) The court further reasoned that "ordinary experience and understanding [would not] inform such a consumer how safely an automobile's design should perform under the esoteric circumstances of the collision *158 at issue here," pointing out that expert testimony was required to explain the "complicated design considerations" at issue. 26 ( Ibid . ) Similarly, in Morson , supra , t 2017It sought to examine the precise behavior of several obscure components of her car under the complex circumstances of a particular accident." ( Soule , supra , 8 Cal.4th at p. 570 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 882 P.2d 298 .) The court further reasoned that "ordinary experience and understanding [would not] inform such a consumer how safely an automobile's design should perform under the esoteric circumstances of the collision *158 at issue here," pointing out that expert testimony was required to explain the "complicated design considerations" at issue. 26 ( Ibid . ) Similarly, in Morson , supra , t | 1 | 2 |
Zagami, Inc. v. James A. Crone, Inc.green2 sentences2017(See Zagami , supra , 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092 , 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 235 ["A court reviewing a special verdict does not infer findings in favor of the prevailing party."].) Moreover, even if we could infer that the jury relied on the negligent failure to warn finding in considering the design defect claim, we already have determined that the negligent failure to warn verdict is fatally inconsistent with the strict liability failure to warn verdict, and that inconsistency would vitiate a finding of negligent design defect on a failure to warn theory. 2017(See Zagami , supra , 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092 , 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 235 ["A court reviewing a special verdict does not infer findings in favor of the prevailing party."].) Moreover, even if we could infer that the jury relied on the negligent failure to warn finding in considering the design defect claim, we already have determined that the negligent failure to warn verdict is fatally inconsistent with the strict liability failure to warn verdict, and that inconsistency would vitiate a finding of negligent design defect on a failure to warn theory. | 1 | 2 |
Bly-Magee v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp.green1 sentence2026(Ibid.) The appellate court held that the declarations were inadmissible because they “reflect[ed] the jurors’ subjective reasoning processes.” (Id. at p. 1126.) Similarly, in Ford v. Bennacka (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 330 , the plaintiff—who was injured in a motorcycle accident and received an adverse judgment on special verdict after a jury trial—filed a motion for new trial asserting jury misconduct in which he “submitted declarations of five jurors essentially asserting the jury confused the concepts of comparative negligence and preponderance of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 332, fn. omitted.) Th | 1 | 1 |
Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.green1 sentence2026(Demara v. The Raymond Corp. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 545, 558 ; see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853 , 854–855 & fn. 23 [defendant does not meet burden on summary judgment simply by pointing out “‘absence of evidence to support’ an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action”].) On appeal, the S&S defendants do not dispute that the consumer expectation test is applicable or that they failed to meet their initial burden of negating the existence of a design defect under the test.6 The Katereloses sufficiently presented the 6 On appeal, the S&S defendants argue only that | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Honeywell International Inc.green1 sentence2024(Johnson v. Honeywell International, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 558, fn. 4 .) Scott v. Ford Motor Co. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1492 (Scott) is instructive. | 1 | 1 |
Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc.green1 sentence2024(Johnson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 65; see Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 187 (Webb) [sophisticated user defense applies to both strict liability and negligent failure to warn claims].) By the same analysis, the sophisticated user defense applies to a design defect claim based on the consumer expectations test, as a sophisticated user may not claim to be an ordinary consumer. | 1 | 1 |
Stephen v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences2017Code, § 801, subd. (a) ), 'and would invite circumvention of the rule that the risks and benefits of a challenged design must be *160 carefully balanced whenever the issue of design defect goes beyond the common experience of the product's users.' " ( Mansur, supra , 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375 , 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 ; see Stephen v. Ford Motor Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1363 , 1370, fn. 6, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 9 ["The consumer expectation test applies only when the defect can be determined by common knowledge regarding minimum safety expectations, not where (as here) an expert must balance the benefi 2017Code, § 801, subd. (a) ), 'and would invite circumvention of the rule that the risks and benefits of a challenged design must be *160 carefully balanced whenever the issue of design defect goes beyond the common experience of the product's users.' " ( Mansur, supra , 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375 , 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 ; see Stephen v. Ford Motor Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1363 , 1370, fn. 6, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 9 ["The consumer expectation test applies only when the defect can be determined by common knowledge regarding minimum safety expectations, not where (as here) an expert must balance the benefi | 1 | 1 |
Hunt v. McNeil Consumer Healthcaregreen2 sentences2017In Brown v. Johnson & Johnson , supra , the federal district court concluded that Bartlett 's holding did not extend to manufacturers of nonprescription drugs and therefore rejected the defendants' argument that federal law preempted the plaintiffs' claim that Children's Motrin was defectively designed. ( Brown v. Johnson & Johnson , supra , 64 F.Supp.3d at p. 721 ; see also Hunt , supra , 6 F.Supp.3d at p. 704 [concluding the plaintiff's design defect claim regarding a non-prescription drug was not preempted under Bartlett ].) *153 Batoh disagreed with the conclusions of Brown v. Johnson & Jo 2017In Brown v. Johnson & Johnson , supra , the federal district court concluded that Bartlett 's holding did not extend to manufacturers of nonprescription drugs and therefore rejected the defendants' argument that federal law preempted the plaintiffs' claim that Children's Motrin was defectively designed. ( Brown v. Johnson & Johnson , supra , 64 F.Supp.3d at p. 721 ; see also Hunt , supra , 6 F.Supp.3d at p. 704 [concluding the plaintiff's design defect claim regarding a non-prescription drug was not preempted under Bartlett ].) *153 Batoh disagreed with the conclusions of Brown v. Johnson & Jo | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2017In Brown v. Johnson & Johnson , supra , the federal district court concluded that Bartlett 's holding did not extend to manufacturers of nonprescription drugs and therefore rejected the defendants' argument that federal law preempted the plaintiffs' claim that Children's Motrin was defectively designed. ( Brown v. Johnson & Johnson , supra , 64 F.Supp.3d at p. 721 ; see also Hunt , supra , 6 F.Supp.3d at p. 704 [concluding the plaintiff's design defect claim regarding a non-prescription drug was not preempted under Bartlett ].) *153 Batoh disagreed with the conclusions of Brown v. Johnson & Jo 2017In Brown v. Johnson & Johnson , supra , the federal district court concluded that Bartlett 's holding did not extend to manufacturers of nonprescription drugs and therefore rejected the defendants' argument that federal law preempted the plaintiffs' claim that Children's Motrin was defectively designed. ( Brown v. Johnson & Johnson , supra , 64 F.Supp.3d at p. 721 ; see also Hunt , supra , 6 F.Supp.3d at p. 704 [concluding the plaintiff's design defect claim regarding a non-prescription drug was not preempted under Bartlett ].) *153 Batoh disagreed with the conclusions of Brown v. Johnson & Jo | 1 | 1 |
Batoh v. McNeil-PPC, Inc.green2 sentences2017In Brown v. Johnson & Johnson , supra , the federal district court concluded that Bartlett 's holding did not extend to manufacturers of nonprescription drugs and therefore rejected the defendants' argument that federal law preempted the plaintiffs' claim that Children's Motrin was defectively designed. ( Brown v. Johnson & Johnson , supra , 64 F.Supp.3d at p. 721 ; see also Hunt , supra , 6 F.Supp.3d at p. 704 [concluding the plaintiff's design defect claim regarding a non-prescription drug was not preempted under Bartlett ].) *153 Batoh disagreed with the conclusions of Brown v. Johnson & Jo 2017In Brown v. Johnson & Johnson , supra , the federal district court concluded that Bartlett 's holding did not extend to manufacturers of nonprescription drugs and therefore rejected the defendants' argument that federal law preempted the plaintiffs' claim that Children's Motrin was defectively designed. ( Brown v. Johnson & Johnson , supra , 64 F.Supp.3d at p. 721 ; see also Hunt , supra , 6 F.Supp.3d at p. 704 [concluding the plaintiff's design defect claim regarding a non-prescription drug was not preempted under Bartlett ].) *153 Batoh disagreed with the conclusions of Brown v. Johnson & Jo | 1 | 1 |
Mansur v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences2017Code, § 801, subd. (a) ), 'and would invite circumvention of the rule that the risks and benefits of a challenged design must be *160 carefully balanced whenever the issue of design defect goes beyond the common experience of the product's users.' " ( Mansur, supra , 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375 , 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 ; see Stephen v. Ford Motor Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1363 , 1370, fn. 6, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 9 ["The consumer expectation test applies only when the defect can be determined by common knowledge regarding minimum safety expectations, not where (as here) an expert must balance the benefi 2017Code, § 801, subd. (a) ), 'and would invite circumvention of the rule that the risks and benefits of a challenged design must be *160 carefully balanced whenever the issue of design defect goes beyond the common experience of the product's users.' " ( Mansur, supra , 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375 , 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 ; see Stephen v. Ford Motor Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1363 , 1370, fn. 6, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 9 ["The consumer expectation test applies only when the defect can be determined by common knowledge regarding minimum safety expectations, not where (as here) an expert must balance the benefi | 1 | 1 |
Terrence L. Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.green1 sentence2009Foster Wheeler bears the burden of establishing each of these elements.” 3 Other courts have agreed with the Tate opinion: “It is also well established, however, that a defendant may not defeat a state failure-to-wam claim simply by establishing the elements of the government contractor defense with respect to a plaintiff’s design defect claim.” (Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp. (7th Cir. 1996) 96 F.3d 992, 1003 ; see also Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. (9th Cir. 1996) 89 F.3d 582, 586 [“ ‘In a failure-to-wam action, where no conflict exists between requirements imposed under a federal cont | 1 | 1 |
| Foglio v. Western Auto Supplygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories
green
2 sentences2024Not only does the claim require the trier of fact to consider conduct independent of TDF’s design—Gilead’s alleged recognition of TAF’s superiority and its reasons for pausing development—but even as to TDF’s design, the claim does not depend on an evaluation of the risks 13 Gilead echoes an argument expressed by some commentators that there is a tension between Brown’s preservation of claims for negligent design defect and its rejection ( Brown, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1066–1068) of the case-by-case approach to the application of comment k adopted in Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories (1985) 172 C 2024Not only does the claim require the trier of fact to consider conduct independent of TDF’s design—Gilead’s alleged recognition of TAF’s superiority and its reasons for pausing development—but even as to TDF’s design, the claim does not depend on an evaluation of the risks 13 Gilead echoes an argument expressed by some commentators that there is a tension between Brown’s preservation of claims for negligent design defect and its rejection ( Brown, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1066–1068) of the case-by-case approach to the application of comment k adopted in Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories (1985) 172 C | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Serv., Inc.
green
2 sentences2020(Etcheverry, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 336 ; Arnold v. Dow Chemical Co., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 728– 729.) We are not persuaded by Monsanto’s argument that Johnson did not have a true design defect claim because he focused solely on inadequate 51 labeling of Roundup products. 2020(Etcheverry, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 336 ; Arnold v. Dow Chemical Co., supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 728– 729.) We are not persuaded by Monsanto’s argument that Johnson did not have a true design defect claim because he focused solely on inadequate 51 labeling of Roundup products. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Pruitt v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences2017The complex nature of the design defects alleged here requires such scientific resources to achieve a just resolution of the controversy by the finder of fact." ( Morson , supra , 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 795 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 343 .) Because expert testimony was "essential to assist the finder of fact in understanding the pros and cons of" the design defect claim, Morson concluded that the alleged design defects of the latex gloves could not correctly be evaluated under the consumer expectation test. ( Id. at pp. 793, 795, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 343 .) The court in Pruitt v. General Motors Corp. (1999) 7 2017The complex nature of the design defects alleged here requires such scientific resources to achieve a just resolution of the controversy by the finder of fact." ( Morson , supra , 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 795 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 343 .) Because expert testimony was "essential to assist the finder of fact in understanding the pros and cons of" the design defect claim, Morson concluded that the alleged design defects of the latex gloves could not correctly be evaluated under the consumer expectation test. ( Id. at pp. 793, 795, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 343 .) The court in Pruitt v. General Motors Corp. (1999) 7 | 2 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Spearin
green
1 sentence2026Icon West contends: 1) the design defect exception does not apply to indemnity for third party claims; 2) the controller’s defect was the result of manufacture, not design; 3) the Regents’ design provided specifications that the MCE controller failed to meet; and 4) the trial court determined that there were no design defects when it rejected Icon West’s contention that it could not be held liable or required to indemnify the Regents under United States v. Spearin (1918) 248 U.S. 132 (Spearin). 28 We need not reach most of these contentions. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Ford v. Bennacka
green
1 sentence2026(Ibid.) The appellate court held that the declarations were inadmissible because they “reflect[ed] the jurors’ subjective reasoning processes.” (Id. at p. 1126.) Similarly, in Ford v. Bennacka (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 330 , the plaintiff—who was injured in a motorcycle accident and received an adverse judgment on special verdict after a jury trial—filed a motion for new trial asserting jury misconduct in which he “submitted declarations of five jurors essentially asserting the jury confused the concepts of comparative negligence and preponderance of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 332, fn. omitted.) Th | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Scott v. Ford Motor Co.
green
1 sentence2024(Johnson v. Honeywell International, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 558, fn. 4 .) Scott v. Ford Motor Co. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1492 (Scott) is instructive. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Brown v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2017They also contend that under Brown, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1049 , a nonprescription drug manufacturer cannot be held strictly 17 Plaintiff contends that this design defect claim also relied on the theory that Motrin‘s design was defective for its failure to warn of skin reddening, rash, and blisters. 2017They also contend that under Brown, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1049 , a nonprescription drug manufacturer cannot be held strictly 17 Plaintiff contends that this design defect claim also relied on the theory that Motrin‘s design was defective for its failure to warn of skin reddening, rash, and blisters. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett
green
1 sentence2017Nor could they be required to stop selling Motrin in order to avoid state liability. ( Bartlett , supra , 133 S.Ct. at p. 2477 .) Plaintiff's design defect claim accordingly is preempted. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Booker v. Johnson & Johnson
green
1 sentence2017Ohio 2014) 54 F.Supp.3d 868 , 875 [relying on Bartlett to conclude the plaintiff's design defect claim regarding a birth control patch under the risk-utility test was preempted because "it was impossible for the Defendants to comply with both its state-law duty to alter the composition of the drug, and its federal-law duty not to alter an FDA-approved design"].) Thus, under federal law-including 21 U.S.C. § 355 , 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.3 and 314.70, and Bartlett -defendants could not unilaterally change the chemical composition of Motrin from ibuprofen to dexibuprofen in order to satisfy consumer ex | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
green
2 sentences2017California recognizes three different types of product defects under strict liability-manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning defects. ( Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp . (1991) 53 Cal.3d 987 , 995, 281 Cal.Rptr. 528 , 810 P.2d 549 .) "[A] product is defective in design either (1) if the product has failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if ... the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design." ( Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 2017California recognizes three different types of product defects under strict liability-manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning defects. ( Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp . (1991) 53 Cal.3d 987 , 995, 281 Cal.Rptr. 528 , 810 P.2d 549 .) "[A] product is defective in design either (1) if the product has failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if ... the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design." ( Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Jerry M.
green
1 sentence2014“When an appellant asserts there is insufficient evidence to support the judgment, our review is circumscribed. [Citation.] We review the whole record most favorably to the judgment to determine whether there is substantial evidence – that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value – from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof.” (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298 .) “Strict liability has been imposed for three types of product defects: manufacturing defects, design defects, and ‘“warning defect | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp.
green
1 sentence2014Under the consumer expectation test, the question “whether a product’s design and performance met the informed expectations of the ordinary consumer is a question distinct from, even if derivative of, the factual issues of what that design was and how it functioned.” (Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1568-1569 .) PCB’s decision to present no expert testimony regarding a design defect in the fan was intentional because PCB was not relying on the risk-benefit test. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
O'NEIL v. Crane Co.
green
1 sentence2014“When an appellant asserts there is insufficient evidence to support the judgment, our review is circumscribed. [Citation.] We review the whole record most favorably to the judgment to determine whether there is substantial evidence – that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value – from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof.” (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298 .) “Strict liability has been imposed for three types of product defects: manufacturing defects, design defects, and ‘“warning defect | 1 | 2014–2014 |
cluster 726718
green
1 sentence2009Foster Wheeler bears the burden of establishing each of these elements.” 3 Other courts have agreed with the Tate opinion: “It is also well established, however, that a defendant may not defeat a state failure-to-wam claim simply by establishing the elements of the government contractor defense with respect to a plaintiff’s design defect claim.” (Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp. (7th Cir. 1996) 96 F.3d 992, 1003 ; see also Butler v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. (9th Cir. 1996) 89 F.3d 582, 586 [“ ‘In a failure-to-wam action, where no conflict exists between requirements imposed under a federal cont | 1 | 2009–2009 |
cluster 537621
green
1 sentence2009New York Asbestos Lit. (2d Cir. 1990) 897 F.2d 626, 631 .)]”].) 4 Defendant, in its reply brief, claims that the third prong of the Tate test is satisfied by the jury’s finding on the third prong of the Boyle test. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Tina Griffith v. General Motors Corporation green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| People v. Kelly red | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Mitchell v. Gonzales green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| FELDMAN EX REL. FELDMAN v. Lederle Laboratories green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.