design defect claim in New York

2025Co., 59 NY2d 102, 107 [1983]).

2025Co., 59 NY2d 102, 107 [1983]).

2011Corp., 77 NY2d 525, 537 [1991, Titone, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part]).

2011Corp., 77 NY2d 525, 537 [Titone, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part]).

2011We conclude that Damon established as a matter of law that the motor home was designed so that it was reasonably safe for its intended use. “[T]he validity of a design-defect claim should be assessed by reference to the configuration of the product ‘as of the time [it] leaves the manufacturer’s hands’ ” (id.; see generally Adams v Genie Indus., Inc., 14 NY3d 535, 542 [2010]).

2011We conclude that Damon established as a matter of law that the motor home was designed so that it was reasonably safe for its intended use. “[T]he validity of a design-defect claim should be assessed by reference to the configuration of the product ‘as of the time [it] leaves the manufacturer’s hands’ ” (id.; see generally Adams v Genie Indus., Inc., 14 NY3d 535, 542 ).

2020This Court dismissed the City's third-party complaint against the sweeper's manufacturer alleging defective design, stating that "the absence of the sweeper would prevent [the manufacturer] from countering the design defect claim with evidence that the City's misuse, alteration, or poor maintenance of this particular sweeper was a proximate cause of [plaintiff's] injuries" ( 248 AD2d at 203-204 ).

2007In addition, by the Supreme Court’s decision only to preclude the plaintiffs from introducing the subject bottle at trial should they recover it, Well Done and Fantastic have been prevented from establishing that damage to the subject bottle after it was shipped, if any, rather than a defective manufacturing or design of the subject bottle, was the proximate cause of the infant plaintiffs injuries (see Squitieri v City of New York, 248 AD2d 201, 203-204 [1998]).

2018Defendants similarly failed to establish that the design of the chin strap did not breach their warranties of fitness and merchantability ( see Denny v Ford Motor Co. , 87 NY2d 248, 257-258 [1995]).

2006While there are instances in which a design defect claim premised on strict products liability is distinguishable from a design defect claim premised on breach of the implied warranty of merchantability (see Denny, 87 NY2d at 262 ), no such situation is presented here.

2025Even accepting that BMW satisfied its prima facie burden on its motion for summary judgment, the affidavit of plaintiff's expert raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the vehicle was not reasonably safe because of its allegedly defective seatback ( see Reis v Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc. , 73 AD3d 420, 422 [1st Dept 2010]; see generally Voss v Black & Decker Mfg.

2025Even accepting that BMW satisfied its prima facie burden on its motion for summary judgment, the affidavit of plaintiff's expert raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the vehicle was not reasonably safe because of its allegedly defective seatback ( see Reis v Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc. , 73 AD3d 420, 422 [1st Dept 2010]; see generally Voss v Black & Decker Mfg.

2024"A defendant moving for summary judgment dismissing a design defect claim must establish, prima facie, that the subject product was reasonably safe for its intended use or that the plaintiff's actions constituted the sole proximate case of his or her injuries" ( Morales v City of New York , 193 AD3d at 926 [citations omitted]).

2024"Only after this showing has been made does the burden shift to the party opposing the motion to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material triable issues of fact" ( Moscatiello v Wyde True Value Lbr. & Supply Corp. , 168 AD3d 833 , 834 [2d Dept 2019] [citation omitted]; see Warnke v Warner-Lambert Co. , 21 AD3d 654, 655 [3d Dept 2005]).

2022To the extent Giunta held otherwise, and Patino and Chavez relied on that holding, we find "good reason to disagree" and to depart from the Second Department's precedent ( Rojas v Romanoff , 186 AD3d 103 , 115 [1st Dept 2020]), and hold that the lack of an interlock can support a design defect claim ( see Sanchez v Martin Maschinenbau GmbH & Co. , 281 AD2d 284, 285 [1st Dept 2001]).

2022To the extent Giunta held otherwise, and Patino and Chavez relied on that holding, we find "good reason to disagree" and to depart from the Second Department's precedent ( Rojas v Romanoff , 186 AD3d 103 , 115 [1st Dept 2020]), and hold that the lack of an interlock can support a design defect claim ( see Sanchez v Martin Maschinenbau GmbH & Co. , 281 AD2d 284, 285 [1st Dept 2001]).

2020As to the design defect claim, "mere compliance with minimum industry standards is, at most, some evidence to be considered and is not a shield to liability" ( Spiconardi v Macy's E., Inc. , 83 AD3d 472, 473 [1st Dept 2011]).

2018That a danger is open and obvious does not preclude a design defect claim ( Micallef v Miehle Co., Div. of Miehle-Goss Dexter , 39 NY2d 376, 384-385 [1976]).

2012In this case, as the court previously noted, plaintiffs’ remaining claim against defendant is a design defect claim: “Based on the record before it on the [parties’ respective 2007] summary judgment motions, this court held that, insofar as plaintiff alleged that defendant had been negligent by failing to install a proper or sufficient guide rail, he had stated a claim for ‘design defects’ to which written notice provisions do not apply — a determination that was affirmed by the Appellate Division, Third Department (see Madden v Town of Greene, 64 AD3d 1117, 1119 [2009], citing Lugo v County o

2012Rather, as in this case, they are founded upon allegations that a municipality breached the continuing nondelegable duty to construct and maintain its roads in a reasonably safe condition by (1) failing to install a guiderail in the location where the accident occurred; (2) installing a guiderail that did not meet applicable engineering standards when it was installed; or (3) failing to upgrade a guiderail to meet later design standards when there is a history of accidents or upon significant repair or reconstruction of the road (see Madden, 64 AD3d at 1119-1120 ; see also Ferguson v Sheahan,

2012In this case, as the court previously noted, plaintiffs’ remaining claim against defendant is a design defect claim: “Based on the record before it on the [parties’ respective 2007] summary judgment motions, this court held that, insofar as plaintiff alleged that defendant had been negligent by failing to install a proper or sufficient guide rail, he had stated a claim for ‘design defects’ to which written notice provisions do not apply — a determination that was affirmed by the Appellate Division, Third Department (see Madden v Town of Greene, 64 AD3d 1117, 1119 [2009], citing Lugo v County o

2012Rather, as in this case, they are founded upon allegations that a municipality breached the continuing nondelegable duty to construct and maintain its roads in a reasonably safe condition by (1) failing to install a guiderail in the location where the accident occurred; (2) installing a guiderail that did not meet applicable engineering standards when it was installed; or (3) failing to upgrade a guiderail to meet later design standards when there is a history of accidents or upon significant repair or reconstruction of the road (see Madden, 64 AD3d at 1119-1120 ; see also Ferguson v Sheahan,

2012In this case, as the court previously noted, plaintiffs’ remaining claim against defendant is a design defect claim: “Based on the record before it on the [parties’ respective 2007] summary judgment motions, this court held that, insofar as plaintiff alleged that defendant had been negligent by failing to install a proper or sufficient guide rail, he had stated a claim for ‘design defects’ to which written notice provisions do not apply — a determination that was affirmed by the Appellate Division, Third Department (see Madden v Town of Greene, 64 AD3d 1117, 1119 [2009], citing Lugo v County o

2012Rather, as in this case, they are founded upon allegations that a municipality breached the continuing nondelegable duty to construct and maintain its roads in a reasonably safe condition by (1) failing to install a guiderail in the location where the accident occurred; (2) installing a guiderail that did not meet applicable engineering standards when it was installed; or (3) failing to upgrade a guiderail to meet later design standards when there is a history of accidents or upon significant repair or reconstruction of the road (see Madden, 64 AD3d at 1119-1120 ; see also Ferguson v Sheahan,

2012In this case, as the court previously noted, plaintiffs’ remaining claim against defendant is a design defect claim: “Based on the record before it on the [parties’ respective 2007] summary judgment motions, this court held that, insofar as plaintiff alleged that defendant had been negligent by failing to install a proper or sufficient guide rail, he had stated a claim for ‘design defects’ to which written notice provisions do not apply — a determination that was affirmed by the Appellate Division, Third Department (see Madden v Town of Greene, 64 AD3d 1117, 1119 [2009], citing Lugo v County o

2012Rather, as in this case, they are founded upon allegations that a municipality breached the continuing nondelegable duty to construct and maintain its roads in a reasonably safe condition by (1) failing to install a guiderail in the location where the accident occurred; (2) installing a guiderail that did not meet applicable engineering standards when it was installed; or (3) failing to upgrade a guiderail to meet later design standards when there is a history of accidents or upon significant repair or reconstruction of the road (see Madden, 64 AD3d at 1119-1120 ; see also Ferguson v Sheahan,

2008Equip., 241 AD2d 872, 873 [1997]).

2007These circumstances make the loss of the subject bottle and its contents severely prejudicial to the defense, not only with respect to the manufacturing defect cause of action but to the design defect claim as well (cf. Kirschen v Marino, 16 AD3d 555, 556 [2005]; Lawson v Aspen Ford Inc., 15 AD3d at 629 ).

2007However, in light of the plaintiffs 10-month delay in informing the Supreme Court and the defendants that the T-Rex had been negligently destroyed, a delay for which he offered no reasonable excuse, and during which time the defendants sought judicial intervention to compel production of the T-Rex, a monetary sanction against the plaintiff in the sum of $5,000 is warranted (see CPLR 3126; Denoyelles v Gallagher, 40 AD3d 1027 [2007]; O’Neill v Ho, 28 AD3d 626 [2006]; Garan v Don & Walt Sutton Bldrs., Inc., 27 AD3d 521, 523 [2006]; Jacobs v Macy’s E., Inc., 17 AD3d 318 [2005]; Carella v Reilly &