believes rule in New York

1997I reasoned: "Notwithstanding the decisions in People v Lancaster (supra) and People v Valles ( 62 NY2d 36 ), where the Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was not required to instruct a Grand Jury concerning affirmative defenses which would not completely preclude prosecution, this court believes such an instruction should be given here.

1996Notwithstanding the decisions in People v Lancaster (supra) and People v Valles ( 62 NY2d 36 ), where the Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was not required to instruct a Grand Jury concerning affirmative defenses which would not completely preclude prosecution, this court believes such an instruction should be given here.

2025Indeed, the Court stated that "we have never held that a court may refuse to allow a psychiatric defense because the court believes the defense lacks merit" ( id. at 513 n 10 [emphasis added]).

2025Indeed, the Court stated that "we have never held that a court may refuse to allow a psychiatric defense because the court believes the defense lacks merit" ( id. at 513 n 10 [emphasis added]).

2001Alternatively, the People made no attempt to establish at the hearing that they have a policy of not indicting absent defendants (see, People v Bratton, supra; People v Leone, supra; People v Tano, 169 AD2d 878 ).

1996Notwithstanding the decisions in People v Lancaster (supra) and People v Valles ( 62 NY2d 36 ), where the Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was not required to instruct a Grand Jury concerning affirmative defenses which would not completely preclude prosecution, this court believes such an instruction should be given here.

1987(See, Matter of Sabo v Racette, 124 AD2d 920 [3d Dept].) In Matter of Vogelsang v Coombe ( 105 AD2d 913 , affd 66 NY2d 835 ), certain charges were dismissed and the court found that a new hearing as to them would be inappropriate because of the lapse of a significant period of time, the possible unavailability of the witnesses requested, and also because petitioner had already satisfied the bulk of his penalty.

1987(See, Matter of Sabo v Racette, 124 AD2d 920 [3d Dept].) In Matter of Vogelsang v Coombe ( 105 AD2d 913 , affd 66 NY2d 835 ), certain charges were dismissed and the court found that a new hearing as to them would be inappropriate because of the lapse of a significant period of time, the possible unavailability of the witnesses requested, and also because petitioner had already satisfied the bulk of his penalty.

1987(See, Matter of Sabo v Racette, 124 AD2d 920 [3d Dept].) In Matter of Vogelsang v Coombe ( 105 AD2d 913 , affd 66 NY2d 835 ), certain charges were dismissed and the court found that a new hearing as to them would be inappropriate because of the lapse of a significant period of time, the possible unavailability of the witnesses requested, and also because petitioner had already satisfied the bulk of his penalty.

1985In Kerstanski v Shapiro ( 84 Misc 2d 1049, 1051 ), the court reaffirmed the principle that: "Essentially, the courts have recognized that as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, they are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of prosecutors in their control over criminal matters.” Although the aforementioned cases do not deal specifically with the District Attorney dismissing counts in a pending indictment to satisfy the plea bargaining limitations in CPL 220.10, this court believes that the doctrine of "prosecutorial discretion” must be made app

1983Thus in People v Fogerty ( 18 NY2d 664 , supra), the court held that the filing requirement did not apply to State Police rules for administering blood tests, evidently because the rules related to the conduct of troopers (see dissenting opn of Justice Van Voorhis, at pp 666-667).

1979(See Albert Merrill School v Gody, 78 MisC 2d 647; Triple D & E v Van BurEn, 72 MisC 2d 569, affd 42 AD2d 841 ; Restatement, Contracts, § 367; see, also, Johnson v State of New York, supra.) It should be noted, however, that inequality of bargaining position, alone, is insufficient to render a contract unenforceable.

1979In Mastandrea v State of New York ( 57 AD2d 679 ), it was held that a filing of a claim for false arrest tolled the Statute of Limitations on all causes of action arising from the facts set forth therein.

1976Hosp. v Blake, 73 Misc 2d 305, 308 .) Moreover, the court believes that the claim has merit.

1976This court believes that this principle should be made applicable to administrative investigations (cf. Matter of Leopold v Tofany, 68 Misc 2d 3, 5 ) when a person’s very livelihood may depend upon the correctness of a spontaneous decision.

1962The court believes that the clause “if she be then living” coupled with “the then remaining principal ” leaves no doubt but that the said legacies became effective only in the event that the legatee survived the income beneficiary (Matter of Steinhardt, 279 App. Div. 1055 ; Matter of Robinson, 187 Misc. 489 ).

1962This court believes the principle enunciated in Matter of Badillo v. Santangelo (15 A D 2d 341) to be a sound one and applicable to the instant case and has followed this rule in Matter of Leibell v. Barnes ( 36 Misc 2d 751 ).

1962The court believes that the clause “if she be then living” coupled with “the then remaining principal ” leaves no doubt but that the said legacies became effective only in the event that the legatee survived the income beneficiary (Matter of Steinhardt, 279 App. Div. 1055 ; Matter of Robinson, 187 Misc. 489 ).

1962This court believes that the test for excessiveness is not whether larger verdicts have been rendered in similar cases, but whether this particular verdict is, in the famous words of Chancellor Kent “ so excessive as to strike mankind, at first blush, as being, beyond all measure, unreasonable and outrageous, and such as manifestly to show the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption ” (Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45, 52 ).

1956With respect to the question as to whether both defendant Mantell individually, and the defendant corporation may be held liable for the overcharge, the court finds in the affirmative (Kurland v. Bukspan, 184 Misc. 590 ; see Cha-Kir Realty Corp. v. Sanchez, 183 Misc. 427 ; Restatement, Agency, § 261).

1935(Buck v. Standard Oil Co., 224 App. Div. 299 ; affd., 249 N. Y. 595 ; Curran v. Buckpitt, 225 App. Div. 380 .) And in other jurisdictions see Ewing & Gaines v. Shaw & Co. ( 83 Ala. 333 ; 3 So. 692 ); Rexroth v. Holloway ( 45 Ind. App. 36 ; 90 N. E. 87 ); Huntley v. Mathias ( 90 N. C. 101 ).

1935(Brown v. Steamship Terminal Operating Corp., 267 N. Y. 83 .) This court believes that the rule of this State is that so long as the employer, principal or master has a right to direct the doing of a task and to state how the employee, agent or servant shall fulfill such task, but does not necessarily exercise such right of ordering the method, then, if the employee, agent or servant, in carrying out such task, commits a physical tort toward a third party, the employer, principal or master becomes responsible for the commission of such tort, and that the action at bar falls within this rule.

1935(Buck v. Standard Oil Co., 224 App. Div. 299 ; affd., 249 N. Y. 595 ; Curran v. Buckpitt, 225 App. Div. 380 .) And in other jurisdictions see Ewing & Gaines v. Shaw & Co. ( 83 Ala. 333 ; 3 So. 692 ); Rexroth v. Holloway ( 45 Ind. App. 36 ; 90 N. E. 87 ); Huntley v. Mathias ( 90 N. C. 101 ).

1935(Buck v. Standard Oil Co., 224 App. Div. 299 ; affd., 249 N. Y. 595 ; Curran v. Buckpitt, 225 App. Div. 380 .) And in other jurisdictions see Ewing & Gaines v. Shaw & Co. ( 83 Ala. 333 ; 3 So. 692 ); Rexroth v. Holloway ( 45 Ind. App. 36 ; 90 N. E. 87 ); Huntley v. Mathias ( 90 N. C. 101 ).

1935(Buck v. Standard Oil Co., 224 App. Div. 299 ; affd., 249 N. Y. 595 ; Curran v. Buckpitt, 225 App. Div. 380 .) And in other jurisdictions see Ewing & Gaines v. Shaw & Co. ( 83 Ala. 333 ; 3 So. 692 ); Rexroth v. Holloway ( 45 Ind. App. 36 ; 90 N. E. 87 ); Huntley v. Mathias ( 90 N. C. 101 ).

1935(Buck v. Standard Oil Co., 224 App. Div. 299 ; affd., 249 N. Y. 595 ; Curran v. Buckpitt, 225 App. Div. 380 .) And in other jurisdictions see Ewing & Gaines v. Shaw & Co. ( 83 Ala. 333 ; 3 So. 692 ); Rexroth v. Holloway ( 45 Ind. App. 36 ; 90 N. E. 87 ); Huntley v. Mathias ( 90 N. C. 101 ).

1935(Buck v. Standard Oil Co., 224 App. Div. 299 ; affd., 249 N. Y. 595 ; Curran v. Buckpitt, 225 App. Div. 380 .) And in other jurisdictions see Ewing & Gaines v. Shaw & Co. ( 83 Ala. 333 ; 3 So. 692 ); Rexroth v. Holloway ( 45 Ind. App. 36 ; 90 N. E. 87 ); Huntley v. Mathias ( 90 N. C. 101 ).

1935(Buck v. Standard Oil Co., 224 App. Div. 299 ; affd., 249 N. Y. 595 ; Curran v. Buckpitt, 225 App. Div. 380 .) And in other jurisdictions see Ewing & Gaines v. Shaw & Co. ( 83 Ala. 333 ; 3 So. 692 ); Rexroth v. Holloway ( 45 Ind. App. 36 ; 90 N. E. 87 ); Huntley v. Mathias ( 90 N. C. 101 ).