fccs motion in Ohio

2007No. 04AP-1346, 2005-Ohio-2196 , 2005 WL 1055783 , ¶ 20. {¶ 51} Because there is no evidence that a legally secure permanent placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency, and because there is clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s determination *260 that a legally secure permanent placement cannot be achieved without granting FCCS’s motion for permanent custody, this factor weighs heavily in favor of granting that motion. {¶ 52} As for the other factors required to be considered under R.C. 2151.414(D), the first factor weighs equally in favor

2005In re Dailey, Franklin App. No. 04AP-1346, 2005-Ohio-2196 , at ¶ 25 . 5 The record discloses that appellants herein did not file objections to the magistrate's decision, nor did they file a response to FCCS' motion. 6 This assertion by FCCS is juxtaposed its position at trial, wherein it asserted that all seven children had been in foster care 12 out of 22 consecutive months.

2023Id.

2021And here, even if the actions of J.M. and her counsel in acquiescing to continuing the case, scheduling a hearing on FCCS' motion, and failing to object to the trial court deciding that motion are somehow deemed to not forfeit or waive the objection she now raises on appeal, it is beyond dispute in the record that an independent motion for an award of permanent custody to FCCS was filed prior to the April 1, 2018 hearing at which FCCS first indicated that it did not intend to proceed on its own motion. {¶ 30} In Stoll v. Crawford County Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 119 Ohio St.3d 494 , 2008-O

2021In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538 , 2008-Ohio-4825 , ¶ 42.

2020Gehm v. Timberline Post & Frame, 112 Ohio St.3d 514 , 2007-Ohio-607 , ¶ 14.

2016In re D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88 , 2007-Ohio-1105 , ¶ 12; In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163 , 2004-Ohio-6411 , ¶ 9.

2016In re D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88 , 2007-Ohio-1105 , ¶ 12; In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163 , 2004-Ohio-6411 , ¶ 9.

2007As such, we will address these three assignments of error together. 1 {¶ 15} We note initially that "the juvenile court is not required to consider placement with a relative prior to granting permanent custody." In re M.R.D. , Franklin App. No. 05AP-324, 2005-Ohio-5705 , ¶ 35 , quoting In re Andy-Jones , supra, at ¶ 36 .

2007As such, we will address these three assignments of error together. 1 {¶ 15} We note initially that "the juvenile court is not required to consider placement with a relative prior to granting permanent custody." In re M.R.D. , Franklin App. No. 05AP-324, 2005-Ohio-5705 , ¶ 35 , quoting In re Andy-Jones , supra, at ¶ 36 .

2007"The underlying rational of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony." Id. at 80 ; Abram , supra. {¶ 9} To meet its obligation to establish one of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1), FCCS's motion for permanent custody relied upon R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(a), (b), and (d).

2007In re Hayes (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 46 .

2005In re Keaton, Ross App. No. 04CA2785, 2004-Ohio-6210 , citing In re William S. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95 . {¶ 12} According to the facts presented at the November 2004 hearing on FCCS' motion for permanent custody, a case plan was developed to assist in reunification of appellant with J.Z.

2005In re Keaton, Ross App. No. 04CA2785, 2004-Ohio-6210 , citing In re William S. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 95 . {¶ 12} According to the facts presented at the November 2004 hearing on FCCS' motion for permanent custody, a case plan was developed to assist in reunification of appellant with J.Z.

2005K.S. "reported that [her] mother had beaten her with a belt on her leg and in her private area." (FCCS' motion to terminate visitation, at 2.) S.F., E.C., and D.S. reported that they had been sexually abused by their cousin, Calvin Smith, who, according to FCCS, had "a history of sexually abusing the children in this family prior to their removal from their mother's care." Id.

2005K.S. "reported that [her] mother had beaten her with a belt on her leg and in her private area." (FCCS' motion to terminate visitation, at 2.) S.F., E.C., and D.S. reported that they had been sexually abused by their cousin, Calvin Smith, who, according to FCCS, had "a history of sexually abusing the children in this family prior to their removal from their mother's care." Id.

2005See, also, In re A.C., Clermont App. No. CA2004-05-041, 2004-Ohio-5531 , at ¶ 30 ; In re: T.T., Butler App. No. CA2004-07-175, 2005-Ohio-240, at ¶ 11 ; and R.C. 2151.419 (A)(1). 4 {¶ 17} Here, FCCS filed its motion for permanent custody under R.C. 2151.413 , and, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 , the juvenile court held a hearing to consider FCCS's motion.

2003Chrystal’s claim is based on In re Frinzl (1949), 152 Ohio St. 164 , 39 O.O. 456 , 87 N.E.2d 583 .

2003Chrystal’s claim is based on In re Frinzl (1949), 152 Ohio St. 164 , 39 O.O. 456 , 87 N.E.2d 583 .

2003Agee v. Russell (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 540, 544 , 751 N.E.2d 1043 ; Howard v. Catholic Social Serv. of Cuyahoga Cty., Inc. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 141, 145 , 637 N.E.2d 890 . {¶ 15} The juvenile court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to grant the FCCS motion for permanent custody.

2003Agee v. Russell (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 540, 544 , 751 N.E.2d 1043 ; Howard v. Catholic Social Serv. of Cuyahoga Cty., Inc. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 141, 145 , 637 N.E.2d 890 . {¶ 15} The juvenile court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to grant the FCCS motion for permanent custody.

2003Agee v. Russell (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 540, 544 , 751 N.E.2d 1043 ; Howard v. Catholic Social Serv. of Cuyahoga Cty., Inc. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 141, 145 , 637 N.E.2d 890 . {¶ 15} The juvenile court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to grant the FCCS motion for permanent custody.

2002Ms. Bowers contends she was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of her trial counsel's failure to object to leading questions, failure to call witnesses on her behalf, failure to cross-examine witnesses and object to hearsay testimony regarding the children's wishes, and failure to object to Ms. Adams' testimony based on Daubert, supra. Mr. Thorington asserts that his counsel failed to oppose FCCS's motion for temporary custody, present corroborating witnesses regarding his attempts to combat his substance abuse problems, object to the failure of the guardian ad litem to timely submit his repo

2002Ms. Bowers contends she was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of her trial counsel's failure to object to leading questions, failure to call witnesses on her behalf, failure to cross-examine witnesses and object to hearsay testimony regarding the children's wishes, and failure to object to Ms. Adams' testimony based on Daubert, supra. Mr. Thorington asserts that his counsel failed to oppose FCCS's motion for temporary custody, present corroborating witnesses regarding his attempts to combat his substance abuse problems, object to the failure of the guardian ad litem to timely submit his repo

2002Thus, we quote at length from our opinion: {¶ 93} "In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, [the] appellants must show that `counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that prejudice arose from counsel's performance.' State v. Reynolds (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 670 , 674 . `The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.' Strickland, supra, at 686 .