Frazier factors in Ohio

2018Instead, the trial court is merely required to consider the Frazier factors while making the competency determination." Schulte v. Schulte , 71 Ohio St.3d 41 , 43, 641 N.E.2d 719 (1994). {¶ 91} " 'The fact that a child cannot remember certain generalities does not deem the child incompetent to testify.

2018Instead, the trial court is merely required to consider the Frazier factors while making the competency determination." Schulte v. Schulte , 71 Ohio St.3d 41 , 43, 641 N.E.2d 719 (1994). {¶ 91} " 'The fact that a child cannot remember certain generalities does not deem the child incompetent to testify.

2020Meigs No. 10CA3, 2011-Ohio-5702, at ¶ 21 , quoting, Schulte v. Schulte, 71 Ohio St.3d 41, 43 , 641 N.E.2d 719 (1994).

2020Meigs No. 10CA3, 2011-Ohio-5702, at ¶ 21 , quoting, Schulte v. Schulte, 71 Ohio St.3d 41, 43 , 641 N.E.2d 719 (1994).

2020“Such a requirement would unduly burden our trial courts with unnecessary formality.” Schulte v. Schulte, 71 Ohio St.3d 41, 43 , 1994-Ohio-459 .

2020“Such a requirement would unduly burden our trial courts with unnecessary formality.” Schulte v. Schulte, 71 Ohio St.3d 41, 43 , 1994-Ohio-459 .

2019Id. {¶21} In this case, the juvenile court failed to explore virtually any of the Frazier factors with J.W. before determining that he was incompetent to testify.

2019Id. {¶21} In this case, the juvenile court failed to explore virtually any of the Frazier factors with J.W. before determining that he was incompetent to testify.

2019Marion No. 9-13-50, 2015-Ohio-52, ¶ 56 . {¶25} Conspicuously absent from the juvenile court inquiry in this case were (1) any questions regarding J.W.’s ability to look back in time and accurately recall and communicate his impressions regarding significant, memorable events, (2) any questions regarding his interactions with J.J., twerking or any of the other allegations in the case or (3) any questions directed to determining whether J.W. recognized the importance of telling the truth and whether he understood the difference between telling the truth and lying — questions related to the first

2011State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 404 N.E.2d 144 . {¶21} Mrs. Rizer contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it found R.C. incompetent to testify because the court failed to consider the Frazier factors and “made up a new test” for competency – “whether or not a witness would be saddened by having to testify.” (Appellant’s Br. 17).

2011State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 404 N.E.2d 144 . {¶21} Mrs. Rizer contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it found R.C. incompetent to testify because the court failed to consider the Frazier factors and “made up a new test” for competency – “whether or not a witness would be saddened by having to testify.” (Appellant’s Br. 17).

2011State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448 , 2008-Ohio-2762 , at ¶61. {¶28} In this case, Ms. Frazier’s claim centers on the third prong of the Batson test.

2009{¶ 13} Respectfully, I dissent and would reverse the trial court's ruling denying Frazier's motion to clarify, and direct the trial court to clarify its sentence to accurately reflect the finding of this court in State v. Frazier , Cuyahoga App. No. 86984, 2006-Ohio-3023 .

2007United States v. Mezzanatto (1995), 513 U.S. 196 , 210 ; State v. Miller (Oct. 31, 1997), 2nd Dist.

2007United States v. Mezzanatto (1995), 513 U.S. 196 , 210 ; State v. Miller (Oct. 31, 1997), 2nd Dist.

2007See State v. Dehler (July 14, 1994), No. 65716, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3103 , at *25 (A letter sent by appellant to a judge admitting certain allegations and requesting placement into a pre-trial diversion program, which was subsequently forwarded to the prosecution and used at trial was found not to violate Evid.R. 410, since the "request to enter a pre-trial diversion program * * * is not equivalent to a[n] * * * offer to plead * * * as is required in order to invoke the proscription contained in Evid.R. 410."); United States v. Ceballos (C.A.11, *Page 31 1983), 706 F.2d 1198 , 1203 (A letter

2007See State v. Dehler (July 14, 1994), No. 65716, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3103 , at *25 (A letter sent by appellant to a judge admitting certain allegations and requesting placement into a pre-trial diversion program, which was subsequently forwarded to the prosecution and used at trial was found not to violate Evid.R. 410, since the "request to enter a pre-trial diversion program * * * is not equivalent to a[n] * * * offer to plead * * * as is required in order to invoke the proscription contained in Evid.R. 410."); United States v. Ceballos (C.A.11, *Page 31 1983), 706 F.2d 1198 , 1203 (A letter

2007See State v. Dehler (July 14, 1994), No. 65716, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3103 , at *25 (A letter sent by appellant to a judge admitting certain allegations and requesting placement into a pre-trial diversion program, which was subsequently forwarded to the prosecution and used at trial was found not to violate Evid.R. 410, since the "request to enter a pre-trial diversion program * * * is not equivalent to a[n] * * * offer to plead * * * as is required in order to invoke the proscription contained in Evid.R. 410."); United States v. Ceballos (C.A.11, *Page 31 1983), 706 F.2d 1198 , 1203 (A letter

2007See State v. Dehler (July 14, 1994), No. 65716, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3103 , at *25 (A letter sent by appellant to a judge admitting certain allegations and requesting placement into a pre-trial diversion program, which was subsequently forwarded to the prosecution and used at trial was found not to violate Evid.R. 410, since the "request to enter a pre-trial diversion program * * * is not equivalent to a[n] * * * offer to plead * * * as is required in order to invoke the proscription contained in Evid.R. 410."); United States v. Ceballos (C.A.11, *Page 31 1983), 706 F.2d 1198 , 1203 (A letter

2007A prosecutor is “entitled to latitude as to what the evidence has shown and what inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence.” State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 111 , 684 N.E.2d 668 .